

**MILITARY LIFE OF
H.R.H. GEORGE, DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE**



1876

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*F. H. R. H. The Duke of Cambridge & G.
Colonel in Chief 17th Lancers
1876*

THE MILITARY LIFE OF H.R.H.
GEORGE, DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

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LATE RIFLE BRIGADE

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LATE MANCHESTER (63RD) REGIMENT

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CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS,	PAGE xi
----------------------------------	------------

CHAPTER XX

THE ABOLITION OF PURCHASE—1871

How System began. Royal Warrant of Charles II. William III. and Purchase. Regarded as Provision for Retired Officers by Queen Anne. Over-regulation Prices. Advantages: Duke of Wellington's and Lord Palmerston's Views. Royal Commission of 1870. H.R.H.'s Attitude towards Mr. Cardwell's Bill. Bill passes House of Commons. H.R.H. and the Government. Commander-in-Chief's Position. Mr. Gladstone's Letters. At last moment does not insist upon Vote. Duke of Richmond's Amendment carried in Lords. H.R.H.'s Speech. Purchase abolished by Royal Warrant,	1
--	---

CHAPTER XXI

SHORT SERVICE DEPÔTS, AND THE LINKED BATTALION SYSTEM

Army Estimates, 1870-71. Memo. on Current Topics. Army Enlistment Act, 1870, and Short Service. Previous Reserve Acts. Mr. Godley's Memo. Correspondence with Mr. Cardwell <i>re</i> Abolition of Three-years Clause in Army Regulation Bill. H.R.H.'s Memo. on Army Estimates, 1871-72. Mr. Brodrick's Letter. Correspondence with Sir H. Ponsonby. Reorganisation of Depôt System. Memorandum on subject. Localisation Committee's Report. An Intelligence Department,	27
--	----

CHAPTER XXII

AUTUMN MANŒUVRES—1871-72

H.R.H.'s desire to hold Manœuvres. The 'General Idea,' 1871. Extracts from H.R.H.'s Report, 1871. Composition of Force. General Principles. Tactics: Company Columns <i>versus</i> Line: Outpost Duties: More Cover to be taken. Value of the Yeomanry. The Control Department. Necessity for General Transport to be under Q.M.G. and G.O.C. Regimental Transport. The King in command of a Cavalry Brigade. Importance of Manœuvres and of fresh ground for proper instruction. The 'General Idea,' 1872. The 'unsparing criticisms of the Press.' Extracts from H.R.H.'s Report, 1872. The various methods of directing operations. General Arrangements. The Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. The Staff,	53
--	----

CHAPTER XXIII

ASHANTEE WAR, 1873-74

	PAGE
H.R.H.'s Diary of the Expedition. Letters, Sir Garnet Wolseley to H.R.H. Selected Corps <i>versus</i> the general roster. Reports arrival at Cape Coast Castle. More European Troops required. The Fight at Elmina. Unreliability of Native Levies. Sir Garnet on selected officers. The Advance commenced. Sir Garnet at the Prah. The Final Advance. Capture of Coomassie. Peace. The Indemnity and Prize Money,	63

CHAPTER XXIV

THE EASTERN QUESTION—1874-80

Mr. Gladstone dissolves Parliament. Mr. Gathorne Hardy new War Secretary. Revolt in Turkey. Dangerous state of tension in Europe. Lack of Recruits. Need for a settled Imperial Policy and Two Army Corps for Service abroad. Memo. on subject. Bulgarian Atrocities. Memo. on unpreparedness at Home. Eastern Difficulties increase. H.R.H. on Estimates, 1877-78. H.R.H. advocates Defence Committee as now formed. Russia declares War against Turkey. Occupation of Cyprus: Sir Garnet Wolseley commands. Colonel Stanley and Mr. Smith proceed to Cyprus. The Berlin Congress. Selection of a Commander-in-Chief for India. The Control Department. Sir Richard Airey retires, and is raised to Peerage. Colonel Stanley becomes War Secretary. His Letters to H.R.H.	89
--	----

CHAPTER XXV

H.R.H.'S DIARY OF WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTH AFRICA—1878-81

Russian Mission to Cabul. English Mission. England declares War on Afghanistan. Forcing of the Passes. Affairs in South Africa. Disaster of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift. Cabul and Candahar occupied. Fighting in Zululand. Zlobané and Kambula. Reinforcements. Relief of Ekowe. Treaty of Gundamuk. Sir Garnet Wolseley sent to Natal. Death of Prince Imperial. Battle of Ulundi. Capture of Cetywayo. Murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari. Second Invasion of Afghanistan. Fighting at Cabul. Sir Donald Stewart's march, Candahar to Cabul. Battle of Ahmed Kheyl. Disaster at Maiwand. Sir Frederick Roberts's march on Candahar. Boer Rebellion, 1881. British Defeats. Abandonment of Transvaal,	131
---	-----

CHAPTER XXVI

SOUTH AFRICA—1877-80

Kaffir War, 1877-78. Lieut.-General Thesiger sent to South Africa. End of Kaffir War. Raid by Zulus in Natal. Correspondence with Sir Bartle
--

CONTENTS

vii

PAGE

Frere. Disaster at Isandlwana. Lord Chelmsford's Letter. Sir Garnet Wolseley's forecast of Zulu trouble, 1875. Sent to South Africa to take command. Death of Prince Imperial. Consternation at home. H.R.H.'s Letters. Battle of Ulundi. Sir Garnet Wolseley assumes command. Colonels Wood and Buller. Trouble in the Transvaal. Sir Garnet marches to Pretoria. Expedition against Sekukuni. Honours for the Campaign,	145
---	-----

CHAPTER XXVII

THE BOER WAR—1881

Sir George Colley commands in Natal. Critical State of Affairs in Transvaal. Collision at Potchefstroom. Bad Feeling amongst Cape Dutch. Surprise of 94th Regiment. Reinforcements dispatched from India. Sir George Colley advances. Situation in Cape Colony. Sir Leicester Smyth's Letters. Laing's Nek. More Reinforcements. Sir George Colley's last Letters. Majuba. Sir Evelyn Wood succeeds Sir George Colley. Sir Frederick Roberts starts to command. Armistice arranged. 'Peace' declared. H.R.H.'s comments. Sir Leicester Smyth's forecast,	182
--	-----

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE TERRITORIAL SYSTEM

Mr. Childers becomes War Secretary. Colonel Stanley's Committee. Queen Victoria's views. H.R.H.'s speech on subject in 1878. His letter to Colonel Stanley. Mr. Arnold Forster on Linked Battalions. Lord Airey's Royal Commission. H.R.H.'s Minute to Secretary of State on military situation. Memo. to Mr. Childers, and his views. Sir C. Ellice's Committee on territorial names. H.R.H.'s advocacy of Territorial System in Mr. Cardwell's time. H.M. on proposals of Sir C. Ellice's Committee. Final steps. H.R.H.'s Memo. on dangerous state of inefficiency during Zulu War. Mr. Cardwell's haste, and subsequent difficulties <i>re</i> promotion and retirement of officers. H.R.H.'s Annual Report on Army in December 1881. Sir Frederick Roberts offered the Q.M.G.-ship. Mr. Childers's Farewell,	199
---	-----

CHAPTER XXIX

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION—1882

Critical State of Egypt in 1882. Riot in Alexandria. Reluctance to take action. Massacre at Alexandria and Bombardment by British Fleet. Tentative attitude at first adopted. Decision to send Expedition under Sir Garnet Wolseley. Duke of Connaught to command a Brigade. The Prince of Wales volunteers for service. Illness of Sir Garnet Wolseley. H.R.H.'s Diary of the Campaign. Draft of arrangements between Sir Garnet Wolseley and Sir Beauchamp Seymour. Sir Garnet's Letters telling story of Campaign. Secrecy as to real objec-

tive. Sir Garnet determines to strike a blow which will at once finish Campaign. Victory of Tel-el-Kebir. Her Majesty's and H.R.H.'s congratulations. Duke of Connaught's tribute to Sir Garnet. Settlement of Egypt and creation of Egyptian Army,	231
---	-----

CHAPTER XXX

THE SOUDAN—1884-85

State of Egypt after 1882. Proposed Demonstration near Suakin. H.R.H.'s Diary. El Teh. General Gordon at Khartoum. Expedition decided upon. The Nile Route <i>versus</i> the Suakin-Berber one. The formation of the Camel Corps. H.R.H.'s objections to denuding Regiments. Unforeseen difficulties encountered. Lord Wolseley's letters. Dispatch of the Desert Column. Sir Herbert Stewart at Gakdul. Abu Klea. The Queen's telegram. H.R.H.'s letters to Sir Herbert Stewart and Sir Charles Wilson. Death of Gordon. Fall of Khartoum. Sir Redvers Buller's Retreat. Abandonment of Campaign,	258
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXI

LORD HARTINGTON, MR. SMITH, AND MR. CAMPBELL-
BANNERMAN—1882-86

Lord Hartington and Lord Morley. H.R.H. on state of Army, 1882-83. Proposed reduction of Cadres. Proposed Restoration of Regimental Numbers. Lord Wolseley's Memorandum on state of Army. H.R.H.'s Annual Report on Army, 26 December 1883. Indian Drafts at this period. H.R.H.'s statement on Estimates, 1885-86. Lord Hartington's Farewell. Sir Charles Warren's Bechuanaland Expedition. Mr. Smith assumes office. His Farewell. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman assumes office as War Secretary for the first time,	301
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXII

MODERN SYSTEM OF WAR PREPARATION—1886-88

Lord Salisbury's Ministry returns to power. Mr. Smith again becomes War Secretary. State of Ireland. Sir Redvers Buller's Mission. Government's attitude towards Egypt. Renewed struggle against Reduction. H.R.H.'s Annual Statement, December 1886. Resignation of Lord Randolph Churchill. Mr. Smith's Farewell to the War Office. H.R.H.'s protests against reduction of Artillery. Mr. Stanhope open to conviction. Inauguration of modern system of war preparation. Short historical sketch of subject. Lord Wolseley's Memorandum. Mr. Stanhope's Memorandum. Comparison between the two. Re-grouping of War Office Departments. Extension of Lord Wolseley's time as Adjutant-General. H.R.H.'s Annual Statement, December 1887. A Director of Military Education. The Aldershot Command. H.R.H. and financial responsibility. H.R.H.'s Annual Statement, December 1888,	327
---	-----

CONTENTS

ix

CHAPTER XXXIII

CHANGES IN THE STATUS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF— 1887-1892

	PAGE
H.R.H. appointed Commander-in-Chief. Re-arrangement of duties in 1887	
Surveyor-General abolished, and sole military responsibility concentrated in Commander-in-Chief. Proposal to extend Lord Wolseley's time as Adjutant-General. Lord Wolseley's views on new arrangement. H.R.H. on financial responsibility. The Hartington Commission. Its recommendations and tribute to H.R.H. The Queen's views. Decision of Government on new proposals. Proposal to make Sir F. Roberts Adjutant-General. Sir Redvers Buller eventually chosen. Proposed Chief of Staff. Mr. Stanhope's views. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's views. H.R.H.'s Farewell to Lord Wolseley as Adjutant-General. Lord Wolseley becomes Commander-in-Chief in Ireland. His Letters. H.R.H.'s Annual Statements in 1890-1891. The Queen on Regimental Numbers. The Wantage Committee. Mr. Stanhope's Farewell,	350

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE DUKE'S RETIREMENT

Liberal Administration comes into power, 1892. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman again War Secretary. Lord Roberts and the Malta Command. Equalisation of Battalions at home and abroad. H.R.H.'s Annual Statement, November 1892. The Aldershot Command. Lord Wolseley and the Duke of Connaught. Lord Wolseley's Correspondence with the Duke. Discussion again <i>re</i> a Chief of the Staff. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman no 'fanatic for economy.' H.R.H.'s last Annual Statement. Feeling that Hartington Commission's Report must be acted upon, and changes made in Commander-in-Chief's position. H.R.H.'s intense loyalty to Throne and Army. Feels it his duty to offer to retire. Letter to the Queen. Her Majesty's reply. War Secretary announces H.R.H.'s retirement and writes to him. Lord Rosebery's Government select as successor Sir Redvers Buller. Fall of Liberal Government. Lord Salisbury's Administration select Lord Wolseley. Lord Wolseley's Letter to His Royal Highness. Tributes of esteem and affection to H.R.H. on his retirement,	373
---	-----

CHAPTER XXXV

CLOSING YEARS

The Jameson Raid. Mr. Chamberlain's Letter on the Settlement. The Augmentation of the Guards and Colonial Service. H.R.H.'s Memorandum on these subjects. The Re-conquest of the Soudan. Letters from Sir Herbert Kitchener. His opinion of Major Marchand.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Threatened War in South Africa, 1899. Lord Wolseley's predictions.	
Sir Redver Bullers proceeds to the Cape. British Reverses. Lord	
Wolseley's great moral courage and marvellous optimism. Lord	
Roberts's Letters. Mr. Chamberlain's Letter on Peace being signed.	
Lord Wolseley on the War Office. Death of the Duke,	410

APPENDIX I

THE CRIMEA, AND MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS,	427
---	-----

APPENDIX II

SIR DONALD STEWART'S AND SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS'S	
MARCHES IN AFGHANISTAN,	437

APPENDIX III

TABULAR STATEMENT OF CERTAIN PROPOSALS MADE BY	
H.R.H. WITH REFERENCE TO ARMY ORGANISATION, ETC.—	
1852-95,	445
INDEX,	452

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. FIELD-MARSHAL H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, K.G.,
COLONEL-IN-CHIEF 17TH LANCERS, 1876, . *frontispiece*
2. THE DUKE'S ROOM AT THE WAR OFFICE, 1871-1895, . *at page* 96
3. FIELD-MARSHAL H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, K.G.,
1896, „ 304
4. FIELD-MARSHAL H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, K.G.,
1900, „ 400
5. THE DUKE IN HIS STUDY, GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 1903, . „ 426

MILITARY LIFE OF H.R.H. GEORGE, DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

CHAPTER XX

THE ABOLITION OF PURCHASE—1871

How System began. Royal Warrant of Charles II. William III. and Purchase. Regarded as Provision for Retired Officers by Queen Anne. Over-regulation Prices. Advantages: Duke of Wellington's and Lord Palmerston's Views. Royal Commission of 1870. H.R.H.'s Attitude towards Mr. Cardwell's Bill. Bill passes House of Commons. H.R.H. and the Government. Commander-in-Chief's Position. Mr. Gladstone's Letters. At last moment does not insist upon Vote. Duke of Richmond's Amendment carried in Lords. H.R.H.'s Speech. Purchase abolished by Royal Warrant.

THE system of Purchase now claims attention; and although during the same period other matters were almost equally prominent, it will perhaps, for the sake of clearness, be advisable to interfere slightly with the strict chronological order of events, and leave all questions, other than those which appertain to this subject, till the following chapter.

The purchase of Commissions in this country apparently dates from the introduction of a standing army. Though nowadays it may seem hard to realise that so antiquated a system should have endured until so recent a period of our history, this was by no means the universal idea prevailing in 1871. The hardships entailed on those who were unable, from lack of means, to purchase promotion, were not, however, so great as might at first sight appear. Officers who were unable to purchase promotion rose to be seniors in the rank which they held; and these remained where they were until a death vacancy or other non-

purchase step gave them their preferment. On the other hand, the system caused rapid promotion, by which the non-purchase officer was bound also to benefit; and at least he received his promotion, when it did come, free of cost. In those days first appointments to military commissions were given to candidates on the Commander-in-Chief's list or to cadets at Sandhurst, on passing the necessary examinations and paying the prices of their commissions. There were also, in addition, some free commissions, which were given to those who passed highest out of Sandhurst, or to those who had special claims on account of the services their fathers had rendered the country.

It is true that an early Act¹ 'against the buying and selling of offices' was passed, which provided that any person who sold an office to which the Act applied, forfeited it, and was 'adjudged a disabled person in law.' But this did not apply to military commissions. Official recognition of the system indeed is found in a Royal Warrant of Charles II., which bears the date of 7 March 1683-84; and when purchase thus obtained the Sovereign's sanction, it was undoubtedly within his power to bring about such a result. The subsequent sale of commissions was consequently legal, its legality having in fact been upheld in the Court of Chancery by Lord Nottingham² in 1682.

The system arose partly from the way in which Regiments were originally raised. Those who were destined to command were deputed to raise them; and they were thus put to the trouble and expense of finding men. In return for this, they were allowed to nominate some of the officers; and they were in the habit of calling upon their nominees to pay in order to recoup themselves for their initial outlay. The nominees, therefore, virtually bought commissions; and naturally they sold them to their successors in turn.

The system of Purchase was prohibited at various times, but nevertheless it still continued to flourish. William III. looked askance on the system in general; and he required all officers and soldiers before entering upon the muster roll to swear that neither they, nor any one else on their behalf,

¹ 5 and 6 Edward VI. c. 16.

² Chancellor, 1673-82.

had paid for their posts. A clause to this effect was even inserted in the Mutiny Act of 1695;¹ but in 1701 the clause was withdrawn, and purchase re-established by means of regulations. Queen Anne provided, by a Royal Warrant of 11 May 1711, that no officer could sell his commission 'who has not served twenty years or been disabled in the service,' which proves that the primary object of permitting the sale of commissions was to provide for deserving officers on their retirement, at no cost to the public. Soon after, however—in the September of the same year—the rule was relaxed, and commissions under the rank of Major were authorised to be saleable without the above-mentioned restrictions, so that regimental debts might be liquidated, promotion accelerated, and provision made for the widows and children of officers.

In the next reign a more complete system was established, and a tariff of prices fixed by the Crown. A Royal Warrant of 8 March 1721-22, provided that the regulation prices only should be taken, and that purchasers should not set up rights against the Crown to sell again; whilst the Commanding Officer, who was the agent in such matters, was required to render a certificate to that effect. But the Crown retained absolute control in the matter, and decided whether commissions should or should not be sold; whilst occasionally it even appropriated the purchase money for the payment of debts. Free commissions, on the other hand, were regarded as so great a boon that the recipients were sometimes made to contribute pensions to officers who had been retired on account of ill-health, which arrangement virtually amounted to making the recipients pay for their commissions.

In 1765 the prices of commissions were readjusted by a Board of General Officers, who were directed by the King to draw up a new tariff of prices. Their terms of reference stated that, though certain commissions were allowed to be sold, His Majesty was in general averse from a practice which placed meritorious officers, who happened to be without means, at a disadvantage; but that as commissions were

¹ 6 and 7 William III. c. 8.

sold, it was better that the price should be a fixed and determined quantity, as otherwise many abuses were possible. Prices were then accordingly fixed, and a report to that effect made to the King, who was pleased to approve of it.

The tariff of commissions was once again altered in 1783; and when in 1793 a Commander-in-Chief was appointed, the Purchase system came immediately under his direction. Thus in a circular letter of November 1793 the price of cornetcies in the Cavalry was reduced to 700 guineas.

As regards the over-regulation prices, it is difficult to say actually how the system began. But probably it arose almost as soon as the prices of commissions were fixed. In any case, the over-regulation sometimes exceeded the regulation price, though the former was undoubtedly contrary to law. An Act of 1809¹ provided that the already-mentioned Act of Edward VI. should be extended to all military commissions, except as regards those which had been 'regulated and fixed' by the King. But it also enacted that any officer who received or paid more than was allowed by 'any regulations made by His Majesty' in relation to the purchase, sale, or exchange of commissions should, on conviction, 'forfeit his commission and be cashiered.' This enactment, however, did not have the effect of altering the system. What in reality happened was that an officer on retiring received the regulation price of his commission from the Government, and the over-regulation price from the officer who was to succeed him.

In 1856 a Royal Commission considered the question; and they reported that the over-regulation price was an almost necessary accompaniment of the system of Purchase. The evidence given before them showed that, though a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the Line was worth £4500, £7000 was usually paid for it. They considered that the system narrowed the field of choice. General Officers had necessarily to be selected from the Colonels lists. But though these might be able to purchase promotion, they were often incompetent; and so the Commissioners recommended that Lieutenant-Colonels should not be appointed by purchase.

¹ 49 George III. c. 126.

The arguments in favour of the Purchase system may briefly be enumerated thus. It afforded an opportunity for men, and sometimes very able men, to become General Officers whilst still young; and when we consider that most of the great Commanders in history were young men at the time they achieved their most striking successes, it must be admitted that the value of this point can hardly be over-estimated. That the English system did admit of great Commanders reaching the front rank whilst still young is shown by the careers of Marlborough and Wellington, not to speak of many other lesser lights; and generally speaking there can be no question that Purchase accelerated the promotion of the majority, which was a great advantage. For to remain too long in one rank is conducive to 'slackness' and inefficiency. It was also instrumental in saving the public from a large non-effective vote, whilst finally it provided a good class of officer for the Army; although, at the time it was abolished, a certain number of somewhat undesirable ones had been let in owing to the exigencies of the Crimean War and of the Mutiny.

The Duke of Wellington, in giving evidence before the Finance Committee in 1828, said that the officers obtained were 'from education, manners, and habits, the best officers in the world, and that to compose the officers of a lower class would cause the Army to deteriorate.' Lord Palmerston also, who, as Secretary at War from 1809-28, had had much experience of military matters, held the same views. He considered that it was desirable that the Army should be connected with the higher classes of society, and he did not know of any more 'effective method of connecting them than by allowing members of high families who held commissions to get on with greater rapidity than they would by mere seniority'; and he added that 'it was only when the Army was unconnected with those whose property gave them an interest in the welfare of the country, and was commanded by unprincipled military adventurers, that it could ever become formidable to the liberties of the nation.'

In 1870 a Royal Commission was appointed to consider

the question of over-regulation prices. This practice was well known, of course, but no official evidence on the subject was in the hands of the Government. It has already been shown that it was clearly illegal, and that any officer who paid or accepted an over-regulation price could, strictly speaking, be cashiered on conviction of such an offence. Moreover, if he possessed one at the time, his commission could be forfeited; and if he did not, he was in any case guilty of a misdemeanour. On this point the Royal Commission of 1870 stated:—

‘The system of regimental promotion having thus been established by Royal Warrant and regulations, an officer who retired under ordinary circumstances is necessarily informed of the officer who is to succeed, and as the officers of the same Regiment are in constant intercourse with each other, an opportunity is of course given for a private bargain or arrangement. In these transactions, where one man has something of value to sell, which can legally be sold, and another man is desirous of purchasing it, the opportunity being afforded them of coming to a mutual understanding, it has been found useless to prescribe by law and regulation the precise terms on which the sale is to be effected.’

As regards the Duke of Cambridge’s attitude towards the abolition of Purchase, the following letter indicates his views at the time:—

TO MR. CARDWELL.

‘HORSE GUARDS, 24 November 1869.

‘In our conversation on the Purchase system yesterday you asked me the question whether I should prefer the commencing the system of selection with the rank of Captain or that of Major. I can have no hesitation in replying that I infinitely prefer commencing with the rank of Major, for in the other case the evils I dread would be only intensified. I trust, however, you will permit to say that, in adopting the system of selection, you do not entirely abolish the Purchase system to which objection is made, whilst you create a new and serious evil which would greatly add to our difficulties in conducting the affairs of the Army. I should, of course, deeply regret any change in the system of Purchase, for, however theoretically objectionable, I think it has worked favourably to the interests of the service. It has enabled us to officer our Army with gentlemen, and it has kept our officers comparatively young in years com-

pared to the other armies of Europe. However, if it be decided to abolish Purchase, of course that view once established would have to be carried out in the form most practicable and feasible, whereas if we do not put a stop to all purchase, but make it stop at the rank of Major, we do not meet the wishes of those averse to Purchase as a principle, and we create for ourselves a difficulty which in my opinion we can only get over by adopting a principle of strict seniority as it exists in the non-purchase corps already. If this should turn out to be the result, we should then be compelled to add largely to the Retirements of the Army, in order to keep our officers young in age and efficient in bodily and mental qualifications. Whether right or wrong, we cannot in this respect overlook the fact that the public service is at the present moment, and by our system of Purchase, largely benefited out of the pockets of our officers. It may be said that this ought not to be. Granted that in theory this is correct; but thus it results that additional public expense will have to be incurred, and that at a period when rigid economy is enforced on every department of the State. Are you prepared for this additional expense?

‘You seemed to doubt yesterday the necessity for seniority as the result of selection, but I am confident that the more you look into the question the more satisfied you will be that this is inevitable. Without giving general dissatisfaction to the Army at large, without doing serious injustice to individuals passed over, you never could select officers situated as our Army is, and scattered all over the world performing a great variety of special duties. Ask yourself what is to be your standard of selection? I am at a loss to conceive how you are to lay down any sound or just rules in this respect, and the pressure put upon the authorities whose province it would be to select would be extreme and unbearable.

‘Much as I should, therefore, deprecate the abolition of Purchase, I think it would be better to decide upon such a course than to adopt the alternative one of selection commencing from the rank of Major.’

Mr. Cardwell determined to tackle this thorny question, and with this end in view he introduced the Army Regulation Bill. One of the arguments which the Government used in support of its policy was that it was no light matter for them, as an administration, to connive at the deliberate violation of an Act of Parliament—a state of things which had nevertheless sat lightly upon the shoulders of many of their predecessors. The Bill provided for the abolition of Purchase in the Army; but it also protected officers who had paid or received over-regulation prices against the penalties

they had thereby incurred. On the other hand, it subjected all officers, who in the future should traffic in commissions, to the penalties already in force against those who had paid or received over-regulation prices. Thus it was maintained that not only did the Bill provide against the perpetration of illegal practices for the future, but that it also provided equitable compensation for the past. Other provisions in the Bill dealt also with enlistment, terms of service, the auxiliary forces, and other matters which will be dealt with later.

It was stated on behalf of the Government that the abolition of Purchase was necessary as a preliminary to Army Reform; and that, as the over-regulation prices were increasing, it was urgent that the country should deal straightway with its abolition, when it could be accomplished for a matter of eight millions, instead of waiting until it had reached a much larger figure. For it was contended that, sooner or later, the system would inevitably have to be abolished. But so great was the opposition displayed against this measure in the House of Commons that the Bill was lightened by striking out the provisions as regards extending the Army Enlistment Act of 1870, and various other minor matters, which had the effect of reducing its dimensions from thirty-six to eighteen clauses. Eventually it was read a third time in the House of Commons on 3 July 1871, and was then sent up to the House of Lords.

The Government appears to have been most anxious that the Duke of Cambridge should support the Bill in the Upper House both by speech and vote. No doubt they felt that the weight of his great experience, and the high esteem in which the nation held him, would be extremely valuable assets in the Government scale. In fact, so great was the importance they attributed to his support in the House of Lords that the Prime Minister went so far as to use some unusually strong expressions, albeit couched in involved and guarded language, as regards what might occur if H.R.H. withheld his support.

It is almost a truism to remark that the Commander-in-Chief was not, and of course should never have been, a political official; and that it was by no means necessary that

he should have sat in Parliament at all, although it is true that all the Commanders-in-Chief since 1793 have been Peers with the solitary exception of Sir David Dundas.¹ Thus, even apart from the fact that the Duke was a Royal Prince, and therefore that it would have been unusual for him to have voted, his position as Commander-in-Chief should at least have protected him from the importunities and annoyance to which he was subjected as regards this point. Moreover, supposing that he did vote for a Ministerial measure which was afterwards defeated, in what position would he have stood with regard to a succeeding administration?

On this point some correspondence passed between the Duke and Mr. Cardwell, from which it will be seen that the Government maintained that the interpretation of the expression that they were 'entitled to expect in all matters of military policy your open and cordial assistance' was that the Duke should support them from his seat in Parliament; and that the exemption of the Commandership-in-Chief from the five-years rule which applied to other Staff officers, was in fact a bargain to the same effect. On the other hand, H.R.H. held that he fulfilled the condition of being in harmony with the Government by loyally trying to carry out its measures, but that it was no part of his office to abandon his political neutrality, and to transform himself into a partisan whose business it was to obey the crack of the party whip. This too would seem to be the substance of Mr. Cardwell's pronouncement in the House of Commons on 21 February 1871 quoted in the last chapter.²

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'PANSHANGER, HERTFORD, 3 June 1871.

'I understood yesterday that Lord Sandhurst is about to raise in the House of Lords on Monday a discussion on Army matters generally; and in conversation with Mr. Glyn on the subject I find that the impression which I mentioned to Y.R.H. the other day prevails still more strongly in the

¹ 'Although General Conway sat in the House of Commons in 1783, and the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords in 1843, and each was a member of the Cabinet while he held the command of the Army, yet the constitutional usage is one of absolute exclusion on the part of the Commander-in-Chief from all political action, and from all political parties in the State.'—Clode's *Military Forces of the Crown*, vol. ii. p. 346.

² Vol. i. p. 434.

House of Commons than I was aware of—I mean a feeling that the measure of Her Majesty's Government, if not actually deprecated, is certainly not cordially supported by Your Royal Highness. As a matter of fact this impression has been strengthened by your not having taken an opportunity of saying anything publicly in its favour.

'Mr. Glyn assures Mr. Gladstone and me that this feeling operates on our side of the House most adversely to Your Royal Highness; and that if such an occasion as that of Lord Sandhurst's motion passes without a clear expression of your cordial support, there will probably be such manifestations of this feeling as will be very serious.

'I have undertaken to convey this to yourself, and I entreat you to remember that, in opposing a motion early in the session, I stated that Y.R.H. had given to H.M. Government in the preparation of the measure your cordial assistance, and we abstained from making your office a five-years office on the express ground emphatically stated by the First Lord of the Treasury in the House of Commons that H.M. Ministers were entitled to expect in all matters of military policy your open and cordial assistance.'

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'HORSE GUARDS, 3 June 1871.

'I am in receipt of your letter of this day's date, in which you bring to my notice on your own part and on that of Mr. Gladstone the circumstances that Lord Sandhurst has a motion in the House of Lords on Monday next on Army matters, and that it would be desirable for the reasons you give that I should take that opportunity for making some statement in favour of the Army Regulation Bill, now before the House of Commons. In reply, I think it right shortly to refer to the position which I have the honour to fill, and which I have occupied with the most cordial good feeling existing between myself and every Secretary of State with whom I have been associated, and it has ever been understood by myself, and certainly been admitted by all previous Governments, that the officer holding the position of Commander-in-Chief could have and ought to have no politics, and I have consequently most scrupulously abstained from ever taking any part in any political discussions. At the same time, I have guided my conduct by the expressed objects and views of successive Governments, and have therefore given my cordial assistance in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief towards carrying out their wishes, even when at times my own impressions might have been not altogether in accordance with the decisions of the Government of the day. When military questions have been discussed in the House of Lords I have endeavoured to put forward the professional bearings of the subjects under discussion; but

the defence of the policy of the Government has never been expected to be undertaken by either myself or my predecessors in this office, nor in my opinion should it be, for otherwise I should cease to be disconnected with politics and should have to follow the fortunes of a particular administration, which as Commander-in-Chief it has been my special business to avoid.

'It was on these grounds that I have never made any reference to the measures now before Parliament, and I cannot conceive how any blame can attach to me for this line of conduct, adopted for a succession of years, and, as I believe, approved of by my successive Governments. I may refer you to your own speeches on this subject, in which constant reference is made to the absolute necessity for the Commander-in-Chief being most decidedly a non-political officer of the Crown. That there are members of the House of Commons who would be very glad to see this view changed is very probable, but I can hardly suppose that the Government share these views, and if they do not, I cannot believe that they can expect me suddenly to change the course which I have adopted in keeping myself entirely aloof from all political bias. Whatever measures Her Majesty's Government may decide to adopt in conjunction with Parliament, it will be my duty and my desire cordially and loyally to carry them out, and so long as this line of conduct is adhered to by me, I do not see how it can be assumed that I am not, to the fullest extent, carrying out my duty by the Sovereign, by the Government, by the Country, and by the Army. These are shortly the views I entertain. I was in hopes of seeing you to-day, when I should have been ready to enter fully into these matters with you in detail; but as I hear that you have left London, I think it right to put them on paper, and hope that you will give me an opportunity of discussing them further with yourself and Mr. Gladstone if need be, before Lord Sandhurst's motion on Monday comes on.

'I should be extremely obliged to you if you would let me know when I could see you.'

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'EASHING, 4 June 1871.

'I received Y.R.H.'s letter, and will lose no time in sending it to Mr. Gladstone. I hope he will be able to return to town to-morrow. I shall be at the War Office from an early hour to the time at which the House meets.

'In the meanwhile I feel it to be my duty once more to remind Your Royal Highness that the question what was to be the duration or rather the tenure of the Officer Commanding-in-Chief was seriously considered by the Cabinet, and that the statement made in the House of Commons by

Mr. Gladstone was made advisedly. It has no reference to general politics, but to measures of military policy only, and I have no expectation that he will be induced to depart from it.

‘As regards myself, I must submit it to yourself candidly to consider whether it is right that I should defend you in the House of Commons on the ground that you have given us your cordial assistance in the preparation of important Government measures, and for so doing I received at the time your warm acknowledgments, and then find that we are impeded in carrying those measures by an impression that they are not cordially supported by you.

‘This impression is stated to Mr. Gladstone and to me to be very injurious to the Government with many of their own supporters, who think that the Government ought not to allow such a state of things to continue. It may be an unfounded impression, but a word from yourself would dispel it, and that word has not yet been uttered.’

On 5 June 1871 Lord Sandhurst’s motion on recruiting and the new terms of service was taken in the House of Lords, upon which occasion the Duke spoke in defence of the action of the Government, a course which elicited from Mr. Gladstone’s Government a cordial tribute of thanks.

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

‘WAR OFFICE, 6 June 1871.

‘I am much obliged to Your Royal Highness for the letter which I have just received. I entirely agree that there was no suitable occasion last night for the consideration of any other subject than that of short service, and in Mr. Gladstone’s name and my own, I beg to thank you for the defence you made of our administration of that system.’

The Duke’s attitude as regards the Purchase question was that, though in theory he considered that Purchase was objectionable, he thought that in practice it had worked well and supplied the Army with good officers; whilst he was doubtful of the efficacy of the system of seniority tempered by selection, although he was perfectly ready, should such a plan be sanctioned, to carry it out to the best of his ability. It was not, of course, for him to decide whether the new system should be inaugurated. But he held that, as matters had gone so far, the Bill should pass; and he considered that the treatment provided for the officers concerned was generous. On 18 June, and nearly a fort-

night before the Bill had passed the Commons, Mr. Cardwell wrote to H.R.H. on the subject of a debate which was to arise in the Lords on the question, and although this correspondence is not of much interest in its bearing upon the main question, it is important upon account of the deductions which were subsequently drawn from the Duke's replies—in this case a very hasty one—to this or other letters.

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'74 EATON SQUARE, 18 June 1871.

'I enclose, in case you may not have observed it, a notice given by the Duke of Richmond for to-morrow. If any debate should arise upon it, and you were to express the opinion you entertain on the liberality of the terms of Purchase offered to the officers, it might render us material assistance.'

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'19 June 1871.

'I had no idea till I received your letter this morning that there was any chance of a discussion in our House to-night, or the Duke of Richmond moving for certain returns, to which you have drawn my attention in your letter just received.

'As I am quite unaware of what is likely to be said should a discussion take place, I must of course be guided by circumstances in the expression of any opinion I may be called upon to give.

'I have so many engagements this morning that I am afraid I cannot call at the War Office.'

In his difficulty as regards the attitude which he should adopt in the House of Lords towards the Purchase question, the Duke consulted his old friend and former political chief, Lord Panmure (then Lord Dalhousie), and received in reply from the latter a lengthy letter, in which, after discussing the question from various standpoints, he made use of the following words:—

'In your high position as a Prince of the Blood and Commander-in-Chief, Your Royal Highness has hitherto preserved a strict neutrality in all political matters, and by that means you have commanded the confidence of the Army and the respect of all who do not belong to that profession. The Government ought to feel the benefit which you conferred on them by this course, and in my opinion it is ungenerous in them to force Your Royal Highness into another course

at variance with that hitherto adopted, and, as I judge, not congenial to your own feelings.'

On 6 July His Royal Highness wrote to Her Majesty:—

TO THE QUEEN.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 6 *July* 1871.

'I saw Sir T. Biddulph yesterday, who will have informed You of the result of my conversation with Lord Halifax the other day. I understand that You are likely on Saturday to see Mr. Gladstone, and I would venture to suggest to You that it would be a great assistance to me in maintaining the neutral position I have always tried to keep as Commander-in-Chief of Your Army and in the interests of the Crown, if You would strongly impress upon Mr. Gladstone the absolute necessity of not pressing me on the matter of support in the House of Lords when the Army Regulation Bill comes up for discussion in that House.

'Nothing will of course be said by me in opposition to the Government, and anything I should say would be in a most neutral sense, but I should not be required to advocate the measure strongly, and I should on no account be called upon to vote. If ever the Commander-in-Chief is required to depart from his strictly neutral position, his tenure of office would inevitably have to depend on every change of Government, and by this means the office would become a political one, and with such a change the interests of the Army would be handed over to political influence—in fact, to the House of Commons, instead of as hitherto looking mainly to the Crown for its rewards and honours; therefore it is the interests of Yourself that are quite as much involved in this question as those of the Army, the Commander-in-Chief representing for these purposes both interests in his person. Dear Albert, the Duke of Wellington, and all those who have had the welfare of the country at heart have, I know, always advocated these views, and I am only reiterating them as knowing that they are shared by those far more able to give advice on so difficult and delicate a subject than myself; and knowing this to be the case, I feel no hesitation in bringing the whole subject so urgently and repeatedly to Your notice.'

This produced a letter from Mr. Gladstone, who attempted to prove that the abolition of Purchase was not a party question.

FROM MR. GLADSTONE.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 9 *July* 1871.

'I have this day had a conversation with Her Majesty on the subject of an apprehension which I understand Your Royal Highness to entertain that you would, by supporting

the Army Regulation Bill, including the abolition of Purchase, in the House of Lords, become in some manner or degree identified or associated politically with a particular administration, namely the present one, and would be placed therefore in a false position on the occasion of any change of Government. I did not understand Your Royal Highness to express any fear of this kind when I had the honour of a conversation with you on 5 June. But the fact that it has subsequently occurred would not, I am sure, in any degree diminish the desire of the Government to remove it. And I venture to think I have notified the Queen that there is no ground for such a fear. The abolition of Purchase, I am clearly convinced, does not now depend on the vote of the House of Lords. What does depend upon it is the convenient or inconvenient manner of the abolition, and the degree and certainty of care to be had for the interests of the purchase officers. Nay, I go with almost equal confidence a step further, and I express my belief that in the event of a change of Government at the present moment, any succeeding administration must take up the question of Purchase and prosecute it to its end. Were it a matter of policy simply, the House of Commons might be resisted in an extreme case, and a hostile or penal dissolution (to use the expression of Mr. Fox) had recourse to. But the peculiarity of the case lies in the illegality of the over-regulation prices, in the fact that this illegality has been officially ascertained and made known, in the impossibility of its being longer tolerated by any Executive Government in any possible Parliament of whatever politics, and in the circumstance that the only way really open for putting an end to it (as it cannot be removed by legislative action pure and simple) is to put an end to Purchase. I therefore hold that, while the entire responsibility of raising the question rests with the present Cabinet, it has now reached a position in which it must go forward in the hands of any Government whatever, and consequently that the recognition of this necessity cannot constitute a mark of adhesion to any one Government in particular, or a ground of quarrel or misunderstanding with any other. And I understand this view in substance to have the sanction of Her Majesty.

I wish, however, to add, with the Queen's sanction, that if Your Royal Highness should have a desire to see me on this subject, I shall readily await your commands. In the meantime I would beg Y.R.H. to refer to the reports of *Hansard* in the year 1847, when the Duke of Wellington was Commander-in-Chief, and in no political relation or sympathy with the Government. In that year the Short Service Bill was proposed, and it evidently was not, on its merits, agreeable to the Duke's views; but he supported it, and its passage would appear to have been, in all probability, due to the influence of his speech.'

On the same day also the Duke received another letter from Sir Thomas Biddulph, which alludes to some strong language used by the Prime Minister—‘the Government would hardly be able to support Y.R.H. in the House of Commons, where a strong desire exists to effect a change in the position of the Commander-in-Chief’—and which also alludes to a letter which the Duke addressed to Mr. Cardwell, from which an important inference was drawn by Mr. Gladstone.

FROM SIR THOMAS BIDDULPH.

‘WINDSOR CASTLE, 9 July 1871.

‘I wrote a short letter to Colonel Macdonald this afternoon to acknowledge the communication I had the honour of receiving this morning. Just before post-time, and too late to write, I was desired by the Queen to inform Y.R.H. of the results of an interview Her Majesty has had with Mr. Gladstone. I had taken the liberty of suggesting that Mr. Gladstone should see Y.R.H., and I understand he expressed himself to the Queen quite ready to do so, if agreeable to Y.R.H. At all events, by this means no misunderstanding can exist, which is always more or less liable to happen with reported conversations.

‘I am told that Mr. Gladstone gave the Queen to understand that if Y.R.H. was unwilling to vote, he would not urge that point, nor would he urge Y.R.H. to express any opinion in favour of abolition of Purchase on its own merits. All he asks for is this: that, taking into consideration the circumstances, the opportunity which the officers of the Army now have of accepting liberal terms, the agitation which must arise from the rejection of the Bill by the Lords, highly injurious to the Army in every way, and the impossibility which, in Mr. Gladstone’s opinion, exists of any administration whatever attempting to allow the manifest illegality of extra-regulation prices to continue, now that the system has been for the first time officially made known by the report of Sir G. Grey’s committee; that Y.R.H. should express a hope that the House may pass the Bill and terminate a state of things injurious to the Army and the country.

‘Mr. Gladstone repudiates any intention of wishing to ask Y.R.H. to place yourself in a difficulty with another administration. He therefore abstains from calling upon Y.R.H. to express an opinion of your own on the subject, and merely to view the question with reference to the consequences of rejecting the measure now proposed. I should not deal fairly with Y.R.H. if I did not say that Mr. Gladstone grounds the application now made for this support, partially on the opinions which he understood Y.R.H. to give utter-

ance to in a conversation with him (I think) early in June, and which were afterwards confirmed by a remark made in writing, if I understood perfectly, to Mr. Cardwell with reference to Y.R.H.'s speech on a motion in the House of Lords, when Y.R.H. said in the letter that the scope of the debate having been limited, you had made no remarks on the Purchase question, thus allowing the inference to be drawn that if the debate had been more extended Y.R.H. would have expressed yourself favourably to the Government measure. It is right that Y.R.H. should know this.

'I need hardly say how earnestly the Queen desires that some solution of the difficulty in which Y.R.H. is placed may be found. Mr. Gladstone urges the course pointed out, as he says, in Y.R.H.'s interests as much as in the interests of the Government, being persuaded that, were the Bill lost, with the impression that Y.R.H. had in any way contributed to its failure, the Government would hardly be able to support Y.R.H. in the House of Commons, where a strong desire exists to effect a change in the position of the Commander-in-Chief and in the entire system of the patronage of the Army, which the Government is anxious to preserve.

'If I may with great deference offer an opinion, it would be that all the considerations named are worth Y.R.H.'s very serious consideration.'

On 14 July 1871, the day on which the Duke was to speak in the House of Lords, Mr. Gladstone again addressed him and reviewed the subject at length; from which it appears that the Prime Minister was of opinion that the Commander-in-Chief, should he happen to have a seat in Parliament, was bound to support the measures of the Government because 'this is the understanding on which the five-years rule [*i.e.* the tenure of the Commandership-in-Chief] has been declared inapplicable.'

FROM MR. GLADSTONE.

'11 CARLTON H. TERRACE, 14 July 1871.

'As it would be contrary alike to the duty of the Government and (I feel certain) to the wishes of Y.R.H. that any possibility of doubt should exist as to their views, or as to their pledges with regard to the administration of the Army, and considering also that recollections are liable to vary, I take the liberty of recalling to the mind of Y.R.H. some of the principal propositions which have been laid before you by Mr. Cardwell and myself, and by some of our colleagues.

1. Mr. Cardwell has acquainted the House of Commons that, in the view of the Cabinet, it is requisite that the Commander-in-Chief should, on military subjects,

- be in harmony with the Executive; and this is the understanding on which the five-years rule has been declared inapplicable.
2. Mr. Gladstone has, in like manner, stated that, while they have no pretensions of any kind with respect to the general politics of the military authorities, they hold it to be required by the principles of our constitutional Government that the military policy of the Executive should have the decided support of those authorities. Without this declaration it might have been very difficult to obtain the acceptance of the Estimates of the present year.
 3. Both these declarations had the approval of Her Majesty. Her Majesty urged free and full communication beforehand, on the part of the War Minister, with the Commander-in-Chief; and such communication has been held.
 4. It does not appear in what way either honour or duty would permit Ministers to recede from these declarations, which form the virtual terms of a compact with the House of Commons.
 5. But what is now asked, so far from going beyond either the letter or the spirit of the declarations, is within them. They might apply to a case in which the two great parties of the State were at issue on the maintenance or abolition of a given system. Here, there is no such variance; the Opposition carefully abstain from any pledge to maintain that which the Government mean to destroy; and no one can be called upon to regard as their creed that which they will not profess to be their creed. No interference, therefore, in the controversies of party is asked on the present occasion, far less any defence of the conduct of the Government.
 6. Nor is any declaration asked as to Purchase on its merits. Purchase is gone. The only question remaining is as to the mode of abolition; and I learned with much pleasure from Y.R.H. that, as matters now stand, you consider the passing of the Bill to be the best mode.
 7. The Government are very sensible of Y.R.H.'s knowledge, experience, and devotion to the public service; and they feel, and I hope have shown they feel, an earnest desire to continue in harmony with Y.R.H., and this the more because, important as is this juncture with reference to their relations with Y.R.H. individually, it is perhaps yet more important for the reason that it may be found to involve, in its practical results, the general arrangements now in force with reference to the maintenance and duties of your high office.

'I venture to express the very earnest hope that this review, summary as it is, of the lengthened communications Your Royal Highness has so freely and so kindly held with us, may not only help to make manifest our real anxiety on a subject of grave moment, and one seriously involving the views and feelings of Her Majesty, but may also set free the mind of Your Royal Highness from any apprehension that earnest advice now given to the House of Lords to pass the Army Bill might in any respect expose you to animadversion or compromise the dignity which should always attach to the Commander-in-Chief.'

With regard to Mr. Gladstone's above-quoted letter, a friend of His Royal Highness's, who had taken a prominent part in the House of Commons debates on this subject, wrote as follows:—

'15 July 1871.

'I thank Y.R.H. for having allowed me to see what I cannot but call the outrageous letter from the Prime Minister. To me it appears outrageous both as regards the doctrine it lays down that the Commander-in-Chief is bound to support in Parliament, if he happens to have a seat there, the military measures of the Government, and also as regards the threat of altering the constitution of the Commander-in-Chief if Y.R.H. failed in this support. Divested of Mr. Gladstone's verbiage, that is the substance of this most remarkable letter. I quite think that Y.R.H., looking to the relation in which you stand to the Sovereign, and to the importance of maintaining the dignity of Your high office in relation to the Crown, might well hesitate to act in a way that might give a pretext to the Minister for such a course as he intimates in his letter, and I cannot but appreciate the sacrifice of Your own feelings for the sake of the office you hold and the Sovereign you serve; but I am inclined to think, as I ventured to say this afternoon, that the outrage is so great and the Minister has placed himself so completely in the wrong, that Y.R.H. would have been justified in calling upon him to withdraw his letter under threat of reading it in the House of Lords. There is a strong feeling of affection and respect for Y.R.H. entertained by the people of this country, and in such circumstances you would, I am confident, meet with full sympathy and support. As it is, I trust you will send this letter to the Queen and keep a copy of it, in case it should get into Mr. Gladstone's hands and he should retain it. Pray forgive my thus venturing to write to Y.R.H. I do so, feeling strongly on the subject.'

At the last moment Mr. Gladstone gave way on the subject of the vote, and H.R.H. received a telegram on the

14th which stated that Mr. Gladstone did 'not insist upon the vote, only upon a declaration that the Bill ought to pass.'

Lord Northbrook, who had charge of the Bill in the Upper House, used much the same arguments which had all along been advanced on behalf of the Government; and the Duke of Richmond moved an amendment to the effect that the House was unwilling 'to assent to a second reading until it had laid before it, either by the Government or a Royal Commission, a complete scheme for the first appointment, promotion, and retirement of officers.'

After a three days' debate, the Duke of Richmond's amendment was carried on 17 July 1871 by 155 to 130 votes.

The Duke of Cambridge's speech on 14 July is here presented *verbatim*, as it was printed in *Hansard*:—

'My Lords, the allusion which my noble friend the noble Earl [Earl Russell] has made to the special position of the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Army, justifies me in bringing prominently to your notice, on rising on this most important occasion, the peculiar position which that officer fills when he accidentally forms a member of your Lordships' House. I say accidentally, because your Lordships must be aware that my position here is not by virtue of any specific appointment, but that I hold my seat here merely as an individual Member of the House. At the same time I cannot lose sight of the fact that, holding that status, I have a great responsibility in connection with the Army of the country. That point has been most forcibly placed before you by the noble Earl who has just sat down, and I thank him for the very kind manner in which he has done it. I should have felt it at any time, and I feel now more especially that if ever there was a moment when the opinions which the noble Earl has expressed on that point must strike more forcibly than at another it is now, when, if this measure be passed into a law, on the Commander-in-Chief is to devolve the most serious responsibility of that selection, which all admit is difficult, and many declare to be next to impossible. My Lords, an idea was expressed yesterday that if selection were to become the rule of the service it would fall entirely into the hands of the Members of the Treasury Bench, who conduct the business of the country. I trust that would not be the case. My Lords, I venture to hope that such a state of things will never arise. I hope it will never arise, because the officer charged with these responsible duties should be entirely free from all political bias, all political feeling, all political impulse; and if not he cannot hope to command

the confidence of the Army over which he presides, or the confidence of the country. Therefore I heard with great satisfaction the opening observations of the noble Earl. My Lords, though selection is not the subject that is uppermost in my mind, still there are reasons why I refer to it first. A noble Lord has said that the proposed system of selection must entirely break down the regimental system. If it is to break down the regimental system I, for one, cannot conceive anything more detrimental to the interests of the Army of this or any other country. I believe that the efficiency of the English Army, and of every Army, depends mainly upon the regimental system. Without it there would be very little or none of that *esprit de corps* which is the very quintessence of a good Army. The regimental system represents the unit of the service, and is the tie and bond that makes an Army out of what would otherwise be a mere collection of soldiers. But I venture to imagine that when this question of selection was put forward, extremely dangerous as it may be to whoever has to administer it, it was not contemplated to break down the regimental system. On the contrary, when the question of selection was raised I distinctly said that I did not for a moment wish to see the regimental system broken down. It is intended, unless I am greatly mistaken, that, after purchase has been put an end to, the system shall be one of seniority tempered by selection. For example, if an officer is unfit to command a regiment he will not by course of promotion receive the command of one, and, on the other hand, eminent professional talent will be recognised and encouraged; but care will be taken, as I understand, to preserve the regimental system as far as possible, providing also that purchase does not revive under a new form. My Lords, I observed last night the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State dwelt upon the fact that out of a number of officers commanding regiments, one half were men who had served in other corps. That statement is doubtless correct, but I do not think that it altogether justifies the inference the noble Lord drew from it. I think it is to be accounted for by the great addition made to our forces during the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny. Many new battalions were then raised, and for the purpose of officering those battalions it was necessary to take officers from various other regiments; and then your Lordships must remember that the Army has been largely increased of late years, which has led to many more changes than would otherwise have taken place. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that it is sometimes desirable that an officer should be brought from one regiment into another, and that the regular and usual flow of promotion should be occasionally deviated from. As I have said, the regimental system is one of the most important of this or any other Army. If care

is taken that purchase does not again become the ordinary course of promotion, and if promotion is made to flow on regularly as a matter of certainty in a regiment, and that, I think, is the intention of selection—I am sure it was the intention of the noble Duke [the Duke of Somerset] and of the Royal Commission which proposed the question of selection as regards the command of regiments—I think that selection, however painful it may be to the officer who has to perform that most delicate and most difficult task, may be carried out with the confidence of the Army and with the confidence of the country, but on the express condition that the selecting officer keeps himself entirely removed from all political bias. I said in 1857 I was prepared to undertake the duty of selection if that course were decided upon, and if I have the confidence of the Army and the confidence of the country I am prepared to undertake it now. Having thus dwelt upon the question of selection, I hope your Lordships will bear with me while I draw attention to the circumstances under which this subject has been brought to your notice. In the course of last summer, to the indescribable astonishment of every nation in Europe and of no nation more than our own, we found that an immense European contest had sprung up within a short distance of our shores; and undoubtedly the feeling of this country, shared by every one of your Lordships and by every Member of the other House, was that the military status of this country was not in a condition to meet, at a very short notice, the emergencies that might arise. We had treaty engagements which the nation was fully prepared to maintain, but when we came to examine into the state of our organisation there was little ground for satisfaction. The spirit and high character of the British nation were still the same; but our Army organisation was so utterly defective that the time had evidently arrived when something should be done to place it on a more secure and satisfactory footing. That was the origin of the measure which is now before your Lordships. That measure and every part of it was introduced and recommended to Parliament on the responsibility of Her Majesty's Ministers. The person holding the office I have the honour to fill has not to initiate measures to be brought forward. He has executive duties to perform, and those duties he performs under successive Governments so long as he thinks he can do so with credit to himself and to the satisfaction of the country. The initiation of measures like the one under consideration rests with the Government; but in the performance of my executive duties I was called upon to assist the Government in the preparation of the details connected with this measure. It is essential that these things should be known in order that your Lordships may see the course of events with reference to this measure. My Lords, one of the most important points connected with

Army matters is that of recruiting. I have never denied, nay, I have said repeatedly in this House, that I have great doubt about the question of short enlistment. Still the proposal was a tentative one, and I thought short enlistment was the best course to adopt at a time when we had no Reserves and the Government wanted rapidly to form an Army Reserve. If you could maintain your Army to the extent which is required by long service, I, for one, should not hesitate to say that long service was the right and proper policy to pursue, and I believe that it is the most acceptable and the most suitable policy for the country. But that was not the question. I do not believe that Her Majesty's Government wished to throw the slightest slur on the British Army. Your Lordships know very well that I should be no party to any course intended to throw a slur on the British Army. I thought it was right to make a tentative effort to get more men in the shortest possible period, and the only way of arriving at that was by a shorter enlistment. If the men could not be procured on these conditions, we had the means of reverting to the old system, and again enlist those valuable long-service men whom the noble Earl has so well described. Well, that is the view I have taken of the short-service proposal. I may observe in passing, that I do not think the Secretary of State for War ever said that six months' drill was enough for a soldier, but only that six months' drill is a great advantage to a Militiaman, and, undoubtedly, very preferable to twenty-eight days' drill. Of course, I could not for a moment subscribe to the idea that six months' drill could possibly make a thorough soldier; indeed, I should be very sorry to see three years' service made the rule, because I think that six years is hardly enough. But now as to the question of purchase. No doubt when the proposition for the abolition of purchase was first propounded, every person acquainted with the subject felt that to abolish the system would involve an enormous expenditure if justice were to be done to the officers, and but few were of opinion that the country would be inclined to submit to the necessary sacrifice in order to carry out the change. It was natural, under these circumstances, that many should have preferred rather to retain the purchase system than to be parties to what they regarded as injustice. But viewing the matter in the abstract, I must say I coincide with the noble Earl [Earl Russell] that as a principle it cannot be defended for a moment. Therefore I agree to that extent with the noble Lord who moved the second reading of this Bill, that the purchase system cannot, as a matter of principle, be defended. I have said so before, and I say so now. But it may be asked, "Why, holding that opinion, did you give evidence in favour of retaining purchase before the Commission that sat to inquire into the subject?" I did so for this reason: because

I felt it to be absolutely necessary that there should be a flow of promotion in the Army, and because the purchase system maintained such a flow, the money coming out of the pockets of the officers. But if the country is now prepared to make the necessary sacrifice and is willing to incur a vast expenditure in order to put an end to the system, and is also willing to provide good retirements, the injustice of abolishing and the advantages of retaining purchase have been very much mitigated. It must, however, be borne in mind that this is an essential element in the case and it strikes me I have read speeches in "another place" in which my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for War has declared most distinctly that he intends that the flow of promotion shall be maintained at its present rate. That is the essential point. If the retirements are such that the flow of promotion is maintained at the same rate without as with purchase, many of the objections connected with the abolition of purchase disappear. It is essential, however, that that flow should be kept up. Let there be no mistake about that—upon that the efficiency of the British Army will depend. It is very important that I should make this statement to the House, because it might be asked how, after what on former occasions has fallen from me, I could carry out the new system. But the difficulty always in my mind was the expense of the abolition of purchase; and it was only the Royal Commission of last year which enabled the Government to meet this objection by admitting the necessity of paying the over-regulation prices, which in strict point of law is indeed inadmissible, but which was and is called for by principles of equity and justice. This admission of the Royal Commission and the attitude of the Government have greatly altered the conditions from those which existed when I gave my evidence before the Commission presided over by the noble Duke [the Duke of Somerset]. I frankly confess that in 1857 I was not prepared to believe that the House of Commons would act so liberally as they have done. As, however, they have done so, the question assumes a new shape. I believe the offer made may be looked upon as a liberal one, more liberal than I could ever have expected. I think it is unnecessary that I should enter into the details of this question. I may, however, state that I think that facilities should be given to every officer to exchange when he desires to take such a course, care being taken that purchase shall not be reintroduced under another form. I am quite satisfied that, in determining the question now before them, the House will take into consideration that fact, that this very liberal offer has been made to the officers of the Army, and the circumstances under which it has been so made. At the same time it is, of course, part of your Lordships' functions to exercise caution and prudence, and to weigh carefully the whole facts of the case before you pro-

ceed to determine it finally. I am not arguing that there is any difference between the debates in your Lordships' House and the other House of Parliament; but still the debates in this House are distinguished by a calmness and deliberation for which your Lordships' House is conspicuous, and under the peculiar circumstances of the case I feel assured that the question will meet with that calm consideration at the hands of your Lordships which it so fully deserves. My Lords, I have endeavoured to avoid wearying you by entering into the details of the subject which have been very carefully dealt with by my noble friend the Under-Secretary of State, and I have carefully confined my observations to the leading features of the question. If anything has fallen from me that may tend to bring your deliberations to a satisfactory issue, I shall have the advantage of feeling that I have performed to the best of my ability a public duty. But before I sit down, with your Lordships' permission I should like to take this opportunity of stating that, whatever your decision may be, I feel convinced that the officers of the British Army of the present day are worthy of our admiration and respect, and that it may be said with truth of them that they have deserved well of their country. They are men under whose leadership the Armies of England have been successful under every clime and under every circumstance, and I for one should deeply deplore any change that might be produced by legislation in the character of the officers of our Army. With that feeling few are more deeply impressed than the Members of Her Majesty's Government. They are satisfied that the officers of our Army have always conscientiously done their duty, and that any shortcomings that may have been apparent on the part of some of them have arisen solely from the want of that experience and information which we all admit they ought to possess. I trust most sincerely that your Lordships will believe that there is no reason to suppose that the abolition of purchase will lead to any relaxation of the zeal which they have hitherto shown in the performance of their duty. Had I entertained any fears in this respect, I should have been the first to have referred to them. But I firmly believe that their character remains unchanged, and that as long as the present class of gentlemen enter the service—I am happy to say that there is an abundance of candidates for commissions—so long will the British Army be able to keep up its good name, and so long it will reflect lustre on and be honoured by the country. If the officers were not well instructed I should take that blame upon myself rather than throw it on them, for whom individually, indeed, I am not responsible, but for whose education, as to its mode and effectiveness, I am answerable; and I am perfectly certain that the present Secretary of State or any of his predecessors would be prepared to enable me to give to the officers generally facilities for acquiring a thorough

knowledge of their profession. I believe that the spirit of the British gentleman and of the British citizen is the same now as it was formerly; therefore I do not see that, by making the proposed change, we shall be doing anything calculated to lower the tone of the British Army. I have endeavoured to explain to your Lordships my official position in connection with this subject. I have pointed out that I have as executive officer assisted the Secretary of State in bringing this measure forward on the responsibility of the Government; and I can only say that, whatever may be the results of your Lordships' deliberations, my utmost efforts shall be devoted to the service to which I have been ardently attached from my earliest days, and to which I trust I may be permitted to consecrate the last energies of my life, as a loyal servant of the Crown and to the best interests of my country.'

The Government measure having been thus virtually defeated in the House of Lords, although in reality only a postponement was asked for, it was now proposed to effect the abolition of Purchase by means of Royal Warrant, which in the opinion of the Attorney-General (Sir Roundell Palmer) 'was within the undoubted power of the Crown.'¹

Accordingly a Royal Warrant was signed by Her Majesty on 20 July 1871, which provided that all regulations as regards the sale of Commissions were to be cancelled from 1 November 1871. Purchase having been thus abolished, it still became necessary to pass the Bill in order that officers might be indemnified for violating the law, and payment of the over-regulation prices secured; and for these reasons the House of Lords consented to pass the Bill, which was read a second time on 31 July 1871.²

¹ Private letter to Mr. Cardwell published in General Sir Robert Biddulph's *Lord Cardwell at the War Office*, p. 259.

² Authorities consulted with reference to the Purchase question:—General Sir Robert Biddulph's *Lord Cardwell at the War Office*; Clode's *Military Forces of the Crown*; the *Times* 'Parliamentary Reports'; Sir George Colley's article 'The British Army' in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

CHAPTER XXI

SHORT SERVICE, DEPÔTS, AND THE LINKED BATTALION SYSTEM

Army Estimates, 1870-71. Memo. on Current Topics. Army Enlistment Act, 1870, and Short Service. Previous Reserve Acts. Mr. Godley's Memo. Correspondence with Mr. Cardwell *re* Abolition of Three-years Clause in Army Regulation Bill. H.R.H.'s Memo. on Army Estimates, 1871-72. Mr. Brodrick's Letter. Correspondence with Sir H. Ponsonby. Reorganisation of Depôt System. Memorandum on subject. Localisation Committee's Report. An Intelligence Department.

HAVING digressed from a strictly chronological sequence in order to present the Purchase question as a logical whole, it now becomes necessary once more to return to the other measures which came into prominence during Mr. Cardwell's tenure of the War Secretaryship. Incidentally it may be noted that, though during this period of transition from the old to the new order of things the Horse Guards and the War Office chiefs were not in thorough accord, matters soon settled down; and it is satisfactory to know that their personal relations to each other remained throughout cordial and friendly.

In February 1870 Mr. Cardwell introduced the Army Estimates for 1870-71, which provided for a reduction of over a million on the effective vote. This result was obtained partly by withdrawing troops from the Colonies, the rights and wrongs of which course have been dealt with in a previous chapter. The keynote of the new administration's policy being reduction at all costs, the Duke was naturally most anxious that this should be effected with as little loss of efficiency, hardship to individuals, and inconvenience as possible.

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'HORSE GUARDS, 27 November 1869.

'The state of Ireland appears to me to be daily getting worse and worse, and I cannot help fearing that some strong measures must be taken by the Government to meet the emergency which is likely soon to arise. In framing your Establishment Estimate for the coming year, would it not be necessary to take this matter into account? and should we be justified to reduce the Establishment of Corps with the state of Ireland staring us in the face? It is right that I should draw your attention to this point, as it is one of great importance. With very reduced establishments, all Regiments would be very inefficient for work were it necessary to occupy portions of Ireland, at all events on a military system. No doubt the Cabinet would have to decide so grave a point, but it is right for me to draw your attention to the actual state of affairs. We have, or soon shall have, Regiments enough for any work that may be required, but establishments of Regiments are very low, and, as far as I am aware, are likely to be still more reduced. It is with reference to this further reduction that I should conceive some decision should be come to at the earliest possible period. . . . I should not like your arrangements to proceed with the Duke of Argyll without my presence, nor should I like any great changes of organisation to be even suggested to the Indian Office without my having first carefully gone over them with yourself. Will you, then, let me know exactly how you intend to proceed, in order that I may make my arrangements accordingly? Do not mind inconveniencing me; my time belongs to the public, and is at your service at all times and under all circumstances, so long as I know what is wanted.'

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'HORSE GUARDS, 28 December 1869.

'I am very sorry that I had not the opportunity of a good talk with you over the coming Estimates in general before you went over them in detail, as you propose to do this week with Mr. Knox; but as this cannot be, I will refer you to some points which I believe you intend to consider with a view to some change or reduction. First and foremost is the question of the reduction of Officers. This reduction is carried very far, and will affect an enormous number of Officers. The India Office proposed 466 for Cavalry and Infantry combined. You propose, or rather Mr. Knox's plan proposes, 1134 of Infantry alone. If this be carried out, I think it should be spread over a very considerable period. It would be most injudicious, and I think impossible, to stop all first appointments. We should entirely shut out the young generation for several years—a most undesirable thing in

every point of view. I would therefore recommend that for every alternate vacancy, an appointment should be made. By this means we should not break faith with those to whom we have promised appointments, or rather whose names are down on our lists of candidates, and all parents and guardians would see a chance for their young men now preparing for the service. Another question is of great import: the proposal will still further retard promotion throughout the Army. How are the very old subalterns of fourteen and fifteen years to be dealt with? Could not inducements be held out to these to accept unattached promotion or retirement? It would be an enormous advantage if something of this sort could be done in combination with reduction in the junior grades. As regards rank and file per Regiment, 500 is a *very* low establishment. I send a return made out by the A.-G. of what a Regiment may with difficulty produce at 560 rank and file; this amounts to only 371 privates, or 406 rank and file without any garrison duties whatever, a case most rare to find. From these, if we deduct 60 men, that will leave only 346 if the establishment be 500. Think of such an establishment in Ireland, where detachments are numerous, or conceive some Regiments required for service; we could not produce a single corps fit for any real duty. Abroad, in the Continental Armies, these deficiencies could be easily supplied by calling in men on furlough, but here we have nothing but the Militia reserve or Reserve men to call upon, and these can only be so called in, in the event of war. It really is a very serious matter, and I do hope you may be enabled to give all Regiments a somewhat larger establishment than 500; but if this cannot be done for all, at least it should be done for the first 20 or 30 Battalions on the roster for service abroad. As regards the District Inspectors of Musketry, whom you seemed to wish to abolish, I doubt the policy of this step. I send you the copy of a letter from Colonel Halliday, the Inspector-General, when his opinion was asked last spring, and you will see what strong arguments he used against the measure. Our Army now shoot admirably, and it would be a great misfortune to impair its efficiency for so small an economy. I heard that you had some idea of reducing the subaltern ranks of Artillery and increasing the Field Officers' ranks. I hold the latter part of this proposal to be quite out of the question. To every Brigade of eight Batteries we have two full Colonels and four Lieutenant-Colonels. This number could not be increased. You said to me that a Lieutenant-Colonel could command a Battery instead of a Captain; at least so I understood. This I hold to be quite impracticable: it would be a lowering of the position of a Field Officer which these would hardly submit to, and would cause enormous dissatisfaction. I think the retirement scheme for Artillery and Engineers put forward by General Gambier really meets the case; and if you will look

carefully into that I think it would be the best that could be adopted. All retirements are expensive; but retirements must be adopted to a great extent wherever you have Seniority Corps and no purchase system to assist in inducing officers to leave the service. I hope the Staff may not be cut down too much. When we went to the Crimea we had no Staff, and felt the serious want of experienced officers for Staff duties. If a thoroughly efficient Staff be not maintained in peace, you cannot have one when war breaks out, and your Army is then rendered very helpless and inefficient. The changes in the College at Sandhurst should be worked out gradually; and meanwhile it will be necessary to decide how far you mean to agree with the recommendations of the Royal Commission. At present a mere rough estimate can be framed for prospective reductions; what is wanted is to know upon what footing the College is in future to be placed.

'I am myself strongly in favour of a fair admixture of purchasers with the non-purchasers. Nothing has, however, yet been decided in this respect. It will be well also, generally to consider the other recommendations of the Commission. Everybody writes to me in the sense as if all these recommendations are to be accepted; it is therefore very necessary that it should be clearly laid down that at present nothing has been decided upon, and that all is to go on as at this moment organised, till the several changes are gradually introduced. We ought to destroy nothing; what we want is to amend what already exists. I see by the daily business paper of the Secretary of State that a proposal has come from the Colonial Office to allow whole Regiments, with their officers, to be taken over by Colonial Governments, on their application. I hardly think this would do; numbers of officers and men may transfer their services to the Colonies if they like, but I would not break up altogether any Battalion or Regiment excepting such corps as are to be disbanded, as the Cape Mounted Rifles or Canadian Rifles. If the Local Governments could be induced to take these corps bodily into their service, it would be a great advantage to these unfortunate fellows. I doubt not that there are many other subjects upon which I should like to say a word, but my present letter is long enough already, and I will reserve any further observations to a future occasion.'

Not long after the introduction of the Army Estimates, Mr. Cardwell brought forward the Bill which eventually became the Army Enlistment Act of 1870.¹ It will be remembered that when the new War Secretary came into office, the Duke pointed out the difficulties which the absence of an adequate Reserve gave rise to—a point to which he had also

¹ 33 and 34 Vict. c. 67.

called attention many years before. By the Army Enlistment Act it was provided that no person should be enlisted to serve Her Majesty for a longer period than twelve years, either for the whole period in Army service, or for a portion of it, which was to be fixed from time to time by the Secretary of State. The Reserve service was to be in a 1st Class Army Reserve Force, under the Reserve Forces Act of 1867;¹ and the Secretary of State was empowered to vary the terms of Army service to a period of not less than three years, the total amount of the Army and Militia Reserve combined not to exceed 60,000 men. Six years with the Colours, however, was the period actually adopted,² although ten years later this was increased to seven years.

On the passage of the Army Enlistment Bill through the House of Lords, the Duke spoke, and afterwards received a letter from Lord Northbrook, in which the following passage occurs:—

FROM LORD NORTHBROOK.

‘WAR OFFICE, 27 July 1870.

‘I hope your R.H. will permit me to add a word of thanks for the cordial and effective support which your excellent speech in the House of Lords last night gave to the Army Enlistment Bill. It made my task a very easy one.’

Though the introduction of this comparatively short service system was an innovation, there had, nevertheless, been several previous Reserve Acts. An Act of 1859³ had already provided for the enlistment of a force not exceeding 20,000 men as a Reserve for the United Kingdom. This was to consist of persons who had previously served in Her Majesty’s Forces, or the East India Company’s, and who might volunteer for such further service; and under this Act all previous Acts on the subject were consolidated.

In 1866-67 a Royal Commission under Lord Dalhousie sat to consider the question of recruiting; and, in speaking of the existing strength of the Army, they reported that it was ‘barely sufficient for a period of peace, and the question is how we can most readily and speedily increase it, through

¹ 30 and 31 Vict. c. 110.

² Army Circular, 10 August 1870.

³ 22 and 23 Vict. c. 92.

the means of a Reserve Force of men who had already received their training in the ranks, but may have fallen back into civil life.'

The outcome of their recommendations was the Army Reserve Act of 1867, which has already been alluded to, and the Militia Reserve Act of the same year.¹ The Army Reserve Act created a Reserve of two classes. Class I. was to consist of 20,000 men to serve in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, whilst Class II. was to consist of 30,000 men liable to serve in the United Kingdom only. Under the Militia Reserve Act a Militia Reserve was created, which, contrary to what its name would imply, was a reserve for the Army and not for the Militia. It provided that Militiamen, in consideration of a yearly retaining fee of £1, could bind themselves to serve in the Regular Army in time of war when called upon. The effect of this measure was not tried till the South African War of 1899-1902 broke out; and, though of much use to the Regular Army, it proved on the whole to be a great disadvantage. Theoretically, no doubt, it was sound; but it omitted to take into consideration the possibility of some Militia Battalions being themselves sent on active service or abroad. What actually happened was this. The Army Reserve, properly speaking, was soon absorbed; and the Militia Reserve was then called out. So the flower of the Militia Battalions was taken away, and subsequently some of these same Battalions had to go abroad themselves, either to South Africa, where they were really unfit to take the field, or to Malta and elsewhere, where in consequence of their having been denuded of their best men, they were not fitted to guard important places. Naturally this result caused much dissatisfaction in the Militia, although it is true that some 30,000 valuable men were secured for the Regular Army. So the Act was repealed during Mr. Brodrick's tenure of the War Secretaryship, and a real Militia Reserve, *i.e.* a Reserve to be used for absorption in the ranks of the Militia and upon which the Regular Army had no call, was created instead. But this has since in turn been also cast aside. In 1870, at any rate, the

¹ 31 and 32 Vict. c. 111.

men available both under the Army Reserve and the Militia Reserve Acts only amounted to the insignificant figure of 23,000.

Generally speaking, the idea of a Short Service Army and a Reserve was by no means a new one. In addition to others, it had been advocated in 1859 by Mr. J. R. Godley, then Assistant Under-Secretary of State for War, who, in a memorandum which he had prepared on 'Recruiting and an Army of Reserve,' had pointed out that we then got men for the Army in an unsatisfactory manner, 'inveigled into enlisting; almost every man would like to purchase his discharge within a month of enlisting.' He also contended that the pay was too low, and that the only way of rectifying this evil was either to institute conscription or make the Army a desirable profession. But the British public would not put up with the former plan, whilst the Government was content with obtaining inferior material instead of attracting into the Army a proper class of men by a decent rate of pay. He therefore proposed, amongst other measures, to increase the pay to the 'natural' or 'market' rate, to abolish 'stoppages,' and to reduce the terms of service to seven years. But to return to the state of affairs under Mr. Cardwell. The introduction of Short Service and a Reserve must, on the whole, be pronounced a success, and it is painful to reflect on what might have happened in 1899 had the Reserve not been in existence. During that war it was for the first time really tried on a large scale, and the 98 per cent. of recruits who then responded to the call proved to be of excellent material, and acquitted themselves admirably throughout the campaign. There are objections, of course, to every Reserve system. They draw men away from civil employment. But this is the inevitable accompaniment of the system; and the same state of things exists in every European Army. Still the call to arms does not come very often; and for many years our reservists drew their pay without much trouble.

The Regulation of the Forces Act of 1871,¹ which dealt with the abolition of Purchase, has already been men-

¹ 34 and 35 Vict. c. 86.

tioned in connection with that subject. In its original form the Bill contained some clauses as regards the length and conditions of service. But these clauses were dropped during the passage of the Bill through the House of Commons, and consequently never became law. By these it was provided that men could be enlisted for any term not exceeding twelve years, a portion thereof to be passed in Army service, whose duration was to be fixed by the Secretary of State, without any proviso as to three years or any other term of service being the statutory minimum. The Duke did not approve of this. Hence the following correspondence:—

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

‘WAR OFFICE, 4 March 1871.

‘In Lord Northbrook’s absence a note has been given to me in which Sir R. Airey writes that you do not *concur* in the clause of the Bill which enables us to pass men into the Reserve without restriction to three years.

‘It is right you should know that this subject was much considered by the Cabinet.

‘We think that, whatever limit we may put on the exercise of this power, the Crown ought to have the power, and ought not to be fettered by any statutory restrictions.’

TO MR. CARDWELL.

‘HORSE GUARDS, 4 March 1871.

‘When I was with you just now I had not received your letter about the three years enlistment clause in the new Bill, otherwise I should have referred to the subject. The reason why I regret the proposed change in the enlistment clause, leaving out the three years which stands in last year’s Bill, is because I consider that *three* years’ service in the ranks of the Army is the very shortest period any Army ought to adopt for making a trained soldier, and that consequently any shorter period would be a very serious disadvantage to the efficiency of the service. The fact of leaving out the three years would imply that a shorter period of service might be resorted to, which I should deeply deplore. I am quite in favour of giving all possible power to the Crown so as to be as unfettered as possible; but I think it is in the interests of the Crown and of the Service that the shortest period of service should be strictly defined, so that at no time a different course should be adopted. Moreover, it is very objectionable that alterations should be frequently made in the Enlistment Acts, as it seriously

disturbs men's minds and makes them hesitate to enter the service. For this reason I am still decidedly of opinion that it would be very desirable to leave the period as it stands in the present Short Enlistment Act. You will remember that this subject was much discussed last year when the Bill was before Parliament, and that even the introduction of the limit of three years was much objected to as far too short a period, and it was only when it was stated that six years was the period intended, but that the power should be given to the Government to allow the men to go into the Reserve after three years, that the clause was passed.'

Short Service and a Reserve having thus been inaugurated, it became necessary then, as it is unfortunately still necessary, to define the purposes for which we keep an Army, and the different functions of its component parts. This is a question which, as all the world knows, is not yet settled. Only recently a Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the state of the Auxiliary Forces in vain attempted to obtain, first from one Government office and then from another—War Office and Admiralty included—some data as to why these forces were required at all; and if they were required, what kind of functions they might be called upon to perform. It is now a matter of history that they were unable to obtain an answer; and if they tried again now—in spite of the Defence Committee and Mr. Balfour's efforts—it is probable that they would again be equally unsuccessful. All the more interest, then, attaches to a memorandum on the subject, which will be found a few pages further on, written in 1870-71 by the Duke of Cambridge, which very clearly lays down the principles on which our offensive and defensive forces should be organised, and which might, perhaps with some advantage, have been adopted as settled policy. Meanwhile, on 20 December 1870, H.R.H. addressed a brief memorandum to the Secretary of State.

MEMO. FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'HORSE GUARDS, 20 Dec. 1870.

'The general question of the defence of the Empire being now under very searching and pressing consideration, it appears to me to be a fitting time to enter more especially into this subject in connection with our Colonial possessions.

Any measure that will tend to bring the Local Forces into a more intimate professional relation with the Imperial Army would, I think, be very advisable to encourage and mature.

‘It appears to me that if the officers of the Local Colonial Forces, whether Regulars, Militia, or Volunteers, were to be allowed to appear in the Army List in the same way as those of the Reserve Forces of the United Kingdom, it would have a very beneficial effect in giving them a real professional status, and proclaiming their position as officers of the Empire.

‘I should be glad, therefore, if the Secretary of State, concurring in this view, would bring the subject before the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to be dealt with in such manner as he may consider most expedient for the interest of the forces of our Colonial possessions.

‘It also suggests itself as worthy of consideration whether the uniform, arms and equipments of these forces might not be assimilated, as far as climate and other local circumstances may admit (in colour and pattern), to those of the corresponding branches of the Regular Army.’

On some date prior to the framing of the Army Estimates for 1871-72, and probably about December or January 1871, the Duke addressed a luminous statement to Mr. Cardwell on the subject of the general functions which our armed forces were supposed to fulfil, the whole of which was drafted and voluminously corrected in his own hand. In this truly remarkable document the Duke dispels unhesitatingly the idea that, once a great war is over, a prolonged period of peace must necessarily ensue; whilst he is convinced that Prussia, after the termination of her great war, will not be the victim of so foolish an illusion. This may seem an obvious platitude which it was needless to enforce, but any student of our military history will realise that it was not uncalled for in our own case. After nearly all our great wars the same phenomenon has been apparent. After the Peace of Fontainebleau in 1763 there was a clamour for reduction. So reduction took place, and the War of American Independence provided an early and rude awakening. The same arguments which are used to-day in favour of reduction were then used; and the close of the Napoleonic wars produced precisely the same results. The Crimean War provided us with the next awakening. But after the Mutiny Campaign which followed we again went to sleep; whilst

now, with the memories of the South African War still fresh in our minds, when, through lack of men for home defence, we had recourse to the ruinous expedient of raising 'Reserve Regiments,' we are apparently once more plunging into the same abyss. The Duke in his memorandum contended that other nations must perforce conform to the high standard which Prussia had instituted; and that even England, notwithstanding her exceptional position as an insular Power, could not altogether afford to ignore the examples of the others. It was true that two factors rendered our position exceptional: the possession of a vast Indian Empire coupled with extensive Colonial possessions, and the absence of conscription. In conscript armies the shorter the period of service the better it suited those concerned. For all looked with pleasurable anticipations to the day of their release and their speedy return to ordinary avocations. But with us, men engaged in order to obtain a livelihood—a fundamental difference between the two cases which has never been presented in a clearer light.

It is to be noted that the Duke already realises the value of the Reserve created by the Army Enlistment Act of 1870; but that he still regards it necessary to supplement that force by the Militia Reserve provided by the Act of 1867, of which in principle he obviously disapproves. He recommends the ballot, the necessity of which few competent authorities will deny, and he holds that this is the easiest form of compulsion which can possibly be devised.

He urges the necessity of our possessing a force of 100,000 men for foreign service, which is nothing else than the 'striking force' of three Army Corps, for which Lord Wolseley in later days unsuccessfully contended, and which eventually Mr. Brodrick, coming in on the wave of an ephemeral *khaki* craze, was enabled for the time being to provide for, although he was not permitted to carry out his scheme.

The Duke, though he would have as large a Reserve as possible, hardly anticipates that the short-service system will produce enough men—a forecast which was amply borne out by the lessons of the South African War; where, although

the material was excellent, the amount obtainable was by no means excessive. He also mentions that, though our objects are not aggressive, it is better and wiser to carry out the defence of the country by striking elsewhere than by patiently waiting for the enemy to land.

As regards the question of Infantry Depôts, the Duke wishes to have the Infantry organised on Territorial lines; but he does not advocate the adoption of Territorial names, or too close a connection between the Line and the Militia. Subsequently an attempt to connect them closely was nevertheless made, but has proved to be a failure. For the two are so utterly dissimilar that it is quite impossible to bring them into close touch with each other. To each sub-District, commanded by a Colonel, the Duke proposed to add a Depôt Battalion, an idea which has never been carried out under the modern system. The Colonel was only to be in general charge of the Depôt; whilst a Field Officer was to be in actual command.

This was undoubtedly a good plan, but when the Depôt system was instituted it was not carried out. For the Colonel, as well as being in charge of the Regimental District, was placed also in actual command of the Depôt as well, with results which cannot on the whole be pronounced satisfactory. This, however, has very recently been changed again.

MEMO. FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.¹

‘The period having now arrived when it becomes necessary to consider the Estimates for the ensuing year, and taking into account the present warlike state of Europe and the great difficulties and complications which may arise out of them, I think it right to place upon record for the consideration of the Secretary of State and Her Majesty’s Government the views I entertain as to the future organisation of our whole Military Force, in which I include the so-called Reserve Forces of every description. It may be said that the result of the present great contest² must and will lead, after its completion, to a state of prolonged peace, and that consequently our present means are amply sufficient for all our

¹ Probably written in November 1870, and revised early in 1871; pencilled note ‘Entered in November 1870’; entirely drafted and corrected in H.R.H.’s own handwriting.

² Franco-German War, 1870-71.

requirements. But to this view I cannot subscribe; on the contrary, I feel firmly convinced that the magnificent and complete organisation of the Prussian or German Army will in no respect be modified or reduced after the conclusion of the war, but will be maintained in its full power of development at the shortest notice, and it consequently becomes necessary for all other Powers who are anxious to maintain their independent position amongst the nations of the world to adapt their organisation as far as possible to the Prussian model. Even England will have to do so to the extent that her special institutions will permit, though doubtless our position is so peculiar and distinct from that of other countries that we cannot compare ourselves in this respect to Continental nations. There are two causes which render our military position peculiar to ourselves:—

‘1st. The possession of a vast Indian Empire and large Colonial possessions always requiring considerable permanent garrisons for their defence.

‘2nd. The absence of any law of conscription as it exists in, I believe, every other country in Europe.

‘It will not be necessary to enter into the first of these two causes, as it speaks for itself, entailing as it does a large amount of foreign service upon our troops, and thus rendering short periods of enlistment for the troops so employed objectionable and to a great extent impossible.

‘As regards the second, it is really the great question which underlies all the difficulties of forming a real Reserve in time of peace. In Conscript armies the shorter the period of service actually spent in the ranks the better does it suit those who are destined by law to become soldiers. Men do not select the Army by choice, but are compelled to serve by the institutions of the State. They consequently look forward with great anxiety and pleasure to the time when they will be relieved from duties thus imposed upon them, and when entering a Reserve Force they are enabled to return to their ordinary civil occupations in life.

‘On these conditions it is a very simple and easy matter, under judicious regulations, to have a large Reserve Force ready at any moment to fill the ranks of the Regular Army. But with an Army raised as our Army is, by voluntary enlistment, the men we engage enter the service for a livelihood, and as their actual profession through life, and so far from men thus raised looking forward with satisfaction to the period when they will be allowed to leave the ranks of the active Service for a Reserve Force, they do so with reluctance, and infinitely prefer continuing to serve on for pension, which is the ultimate object of most, if not all, enlisted men. This in itself renders every regulation for filling and keeping up a Reserve Force extremely difficult, and almost impossible, and it at all events adds largely to the expense of such a force, as the amount of pay to be

obtained by the men whilst serving in the Reserve can alone compensate them for the loss of the pension to which they look whilst serving in the ranks, or to the loss of freedom which must always to some extent be imposed upon them as long as they are attached to any Reserve Force, however little irksome you may endeavour to make it.

‘Taking these views into consideration, I will now submit my ideas of what ought to be done to meet the difficulties in which we find ourselves placed, whilst assimilating as far as possible our Military Institutions to those of the present day.

‘I should not propose to alter our present mode of enlistment for 12 and 9 years, making a total of 21 years with a pension, supplemented by the Short Service Enlistment Act of last year,¹ and I would endeavour to obtain as large a Reserve Force under the latter Act as possible. But inasmuch as I doubt the possibility of obtaining an adequate Reserve Force by this means, I am afraid we shall be compelled to continue the Militia Reserve Act,² at all events for some time longer. It is to the Militia generally that I look as the main Reserve of the Army, and in order to carry out this object without detriment to that force, I think that recourse must be had to the ballot to fill up these vacancies which would thus be created in the Militia, and which it may not at all times be possible to fill up by voluntary enrolment.

‘The ballot for the Militia is the easiest form of conscription that can be devised, and as it would only be adopted for a force intended for home defence, and men so balloted for could not be forced to leave the country against their will, it appears to me to be a justifiable measure for purely defensive purposes, and one that, combined with the ordinary mode of voluntary enlistment for the Militia, ought not to entail any special hardship upon the localities in which it might have to be applied, as it could always be more or less avoided by the proper local exertions to find a sufficient supply of men without having recourse to it. I would not allow of substitutes, but would establish a well-regulated force of Volunteers, subject to Martial Law when under arms, which could be entered by all men desirous of escaping Militia service whether by ballot or otherwise; the men composing such Volunteer Force to find themselves in everything without assistance from the State, excepting in arms and accoutrements; and on this condition I would exempt a man serving in the Volunteers from the ballot for the Militia. The State would, in this way, have a Militia raised by enlistment, supplemented by ballot, when necessary, for the entire population, compelled by law to serve for a certain period

¹ The Army Enlistment Act of 1870, 33 and 34 Vict. cap. 67.

² The Militia Reserve Act of 1867, 30 and 31 Vict. cap. 111. H.R.H. disapproved of this. It was tested for the first time in South Africa 1899-1900, and was found most objectionable. It was repealed in 1901.

of years for home defence, and which would at the same time represent the great Reserve of the Regular Army; and besides this a Volunteer Force maintained exclusively at its own expense, and for which the State would pay nothing, but for this reason exempt from the Militia ballot. Starting from these premises, I am anxious that, exclusive of garrisons in India and the Colonies, we should at all times maintain at home an Army of 100,000, exclusive of Depôts, and of a sufficient reserve of Field Artillery for the Reserve Forces ready at the shortest notice to be placed in the field for foreign service, a Militia of from 150,000 to 200,000 men for home defence to replace the Regular Army on the emergency arising for its taking the field, and to serve also as the main Reserve of the Army, and a compact body of Volunteers exempt from Militia ballot on condition that the State paid nothing towards their maintenance beyond their arms and accoutrements, and the expenses of concentrating, should they be required either for service or for drill purposes. I would further have as large a Reserve Force as I could obtain through the present Short Service Enlistment Act and the Militia Reserve Act, to fill up the Cadres of Regiments, but inasmuch as I do not place any great reliance on any very considerable body of men being obtained by these means, I look chiefly to the ordinary Militia for filling up the ranks of the Army, and I suggest the ballot for the Militia to fill up, when required, the vacancies thus created. By these various means I hope we might rely on a home force of about 400,000 men for purposes of defence of the country, and of this force 100,000 Regular troops would at all times be kept in a condition to take the field, for it must be remembered that, whilst the objects of this country are certainly not aggressive, it is far wiser and better to carry out the defence of a country by striking a blow elsewhere than by waiting to allow a foreign enemy to reach our shores, thus exposing our own population to the miseries and risks of war, the fatal results of which we have now so clearly demonstrated by what is going on in a neighbouring country.

‘In order to arrive at these figures, it will be necessary to add very largely to the numbers at present composing the Regular Army. The Cavalry ought, I think, to be again brought up to a four-squadron organisation in eight troops, as we have discovered in the recent war the great value of Cavalry, and ought therefore to have a sufficiency in this arm for the force of 100,000 men which I wish to see prepared at all times to take the field.

‘Generally a field force is assumed to have one-sixth Cavalry. We have at present nothing like this, and if we take into account that the only available Reserve Cavalry we have are the Yeomanry Cavalry, and that these alone will be left for Home Service should the Army take the field, it is

essential that those Regiments of Cavalry we have should be placed on a more efficient footing than they are at present, and each Regiment ought to be able to take the field with four complete squadrons, which at present could not be done with an establishment of only seven troops.

‘It will also be necessary to increase considerably the Field Artillery. An Army of 100,000 men at 3 guns per thousand—a very low proportion—requires 300 guns. We have at present only 180 fully horsed; consequently there remains a deficiency of 120 guns for this purpose only; but if we take into account that neither Militia nor Volunteer Artillery could be used as Field Artillery, however valuable or useful they may be and are as Garrison Artillery, it is evident that we require a much larger proportion of Field Artillery than even the 120 additional field guns referred to above. I have an impression that the present Garrison Artillery might be largely used as Reserve Field Artillery in time of war, their places to be filled in the garrisons by Militia and Volunteer Artillery. If I am correct in this view, by giving, say one Battery of horses with their drivers to every Garrison Brigade, each Brigade of Garrison Artillery could be trained in successive Batteries for Field Artillery, and from twenty to thirty Batteries of Garrison Artillery could, on an emergency, be converted into Field Artillery, producing from 120 to 180 reserve field guns, a very fair proportion for the purpose.

The disposal of the Depôts of Regiments serving abroad, and including the Depôts for the Artillery, still remain for consideration. I think the present system of Depôts affiliated to Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry and Batteries of Artillery is objectionable, and does not work well. I believe it to be, on the whole, more expensive than the old system; I know it is not liked by the Army generally. I would like therefore to restore the Cavalry and Artillery Depôt as it existed up to last year.

‘As regards Infantry Depôts, I think a plan of concentration for them ought to be devised, which would bring the Infantry of the Army more or less into local connection with Districts throughout the country, without, however, introducing that very close contact with Militia Regiments which some desire, but which I do not advocate for various reasons.

‘I should like to see the Territorial Districts as at present existing throughout the United Kingdom left intact; but I would form sub-Districts in each present District at the head of which I would place a Colonel on the Staff, under whose charge I would place the Reserve Forces of every denomination, including Army and Militia Reserve men, Pensioners, Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry serving in such sub-Districts. A force of 20,000 men of such Reserves might form the command of one officer, who, whilst having entire control and being responsible for these various forces, would at

the same time be himself under the direct command of the General of the District. To each of such sub-Districts I would further attach a Depôt-Battalion, in some suitable central Barrack of the District, and I would to this extent localise a certain number of Infantry Regiments in each of these sub-Districts. The Colonel commanding in each sub-District would have the general charge, having a Field Officer to assist him in the actual command of the Depôts, selected for his intelligence and activity, and around these Depôts so composed I would collect the Reserve men and Pensioners of the District for purposes of annual drill and exercise, and for purposes of recruiting to the extent it may be deemed desirable. By this means a certain local connection would be established not alone between the Depôts of Regiments stationed in each District and the Reserve men of every description residing within each locality, but also between the Depôts of Regiments and the Militia and Volunteers of each District, which, it may be hoped, might and would produce a flow of Reservists from the Militia Regiments in the ranks of the Corps whose Depôts they would thus be intimately associated with, being all under one and the same command. I need hardly add that, should such a scheme be adopted, it would be advisable to take the appointment of officers, as well for the Militia as for the Volunteers, out of the hands of the Lords-Lieutenant and place them in the hands of the Crown in a similar manner to Army appointments, every care being taken to give due weight to the recommendation of Lords-Lieutenant and general local interests.

‘To complete the views I have advocated in this memo. it will be desirable, not to say necessary, with a view to attaining efficiency, to have annual concentrations of the Army, Militia, and, when possible, of the Volunteers, in smaller or larger bodies, as it may be found possible or desirable to arrange such concentrations.

‘That they are essential to the efficiency of an Army has been fully found by the admirable results they have produced in the German Armies; and indeed no real or sound organisation is possible in which such concentrations do not form a leading feature in the general arrangements.

‘That great difficulties exist in the United Kingdom for carrying out such concentrations I readily admit; but I think we ought to endeavour to get over these to the extent which we may require, and I doubt not that, with judgment and discretion, arrangements might be made in the New Forest and in other localities for carrying out the necessary object.

‘The details of my views as laid down in this memo. I shall be prepared to put forward whenever required; as it appears to me desirable, in the first place, to deal only in general principles, the details of which can be worked out hereafter should they be found sound and practicable.

‘I now conclude with the hope that the views expressed may be deemed worthy of the fullest consideration at this serious European crisis in which we find ourselves spectators.’

It should be borne in mind that the foregoing memorandum of the Duke was originally drafted in November 1870. When, exactly thirty years later, in November 1900, owing to the stress of the war in South Africa, public opinion was sorely exercised on the question of Army reorganisation, H.R.H., who, though then in retirement, still took the keenest possible interest in all matters connected with the Army, wrote to Mr. Brodrick, who had just become Secretary of State for War, and forwarded him a copy of the foregoing memorandum and received the following acknowledgment:—

FROM MR. BRODRICK.

‘WAR OFFICE, 20 November 1900.

‘I am honoured by Your Royal Highness’s letter of the 21st inst., and by the interesting paper which accompanied it. Perhaps I may be permitted to say that, looking to the period of thirty years—almost to the day—which has elapsed, the singular far-sightedness and comprehensiveness of Your Royal Highness’s views is brought out strongly by this paper.

‘On something like the lines indicated we have been able to keep over 200,000 troops in South Africa, yet have had a considerable though not complete force at home.

‘I am interested to see the ballot for the Militia figured in your forecast, and perhaps it is nearer to-day than it was then, though the way in which Great Britain has responded to the call *Voluntarily* in the last twelve months surely puts back any compulsion somewhat.

‘I thank Your Royal Highness most heartily for so kindly giving me the benefit of your notes.’

In the following letter to Sir Henry Ponsonby, and also in the additional memorandum which he addressed to the Secretary of State, the Duke unfolds his views in somewhat greater detail:—

FROM SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

‘BALMORAL, 29 October 1870.

‘The Queen has commanded me to assure Your Royal Highness that Her Majesty has not lost sight of the paramount importance of maintaining the strength and efficiency of the Army.

'The Queen has been in communication with Mr. Cardwell, who is considering the schemes for amending the organisation of the Reserve Forces.

'The Queen commands me to observe that Your Royal Highness has suggested that the regular army at home should consist of 100,000 men ready to take the field. According to the Adjutant-General's confidential return for October, furnished to the Queen, it would appear that the numbers of the home forces amount to 93,000, and as these numbers are below the establishment it would appear that the establishment is actually about 100,000, as Your Royal Highness desires.

'The total numbers of the Militia, Yeomanry, and Pensioners is, I presume, about 130,000. Your Royal Highness requires that these figures should be increased to 200,000 either by increasing the Regiments or adding to their numbers. The Queen imagines that the question of taking the appointment of the officers out of the hands of the Lords-Lieutenant will touch on certain constitutional rights and affect innumerable personal claims, but it is a subject which requires careful consideration.

'The Queen fully agrees with Your Royal Highness as to the unsatisfactory condition of the Volunteer Force, and believes that Mr. Cardwell is quite aware of the necessity of taking some steps with reference to it.

'A Volunteer Store and Train Department would entail very great expenditure and seems to be scarcely necessary; but in alluding to the mode in which it is desirable that Volunteers should provide themselves with everything, Your Royal Highness probably requires that the individual Volunteer should be properly equipped, and that a competent Staff should be at all times prepared to organise the movements of this force.

'Their being under Military Law in times of peace would be doubtless desirable, but it is doubtful whether any power to effect this could be obtained.

'The Queen, who is most anxious to communicate fully with Mr. Cardwell, would be glad to hear further from Your Royal Highness on the subject if necessary.'

TO SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

'LONDON, 30 October 1870.

'In reply to your letter which reached me this morning, I wish to explain to you shortly what I am anxious to see done in the way of improved organisation of our Army and Reserve Forces. I am anxious that, irrespective of our garrisons in India and the Colonies, we should have 100,000 regular troops at all times at home ready to take the field; this force to include Cavalry in due proportion, at least 10,000 to 15,000, and about 300 Field Guns, making

three for every 1000 men—not at all an extravagant estimate. Besides these we ought to have *Depôts* for our Regiments abroad, and a reserve of Field Artillery for our Militia and Volunteers, as those latter forces, though producing excellent Garrison Batteries, cannot be made efficient for Field Battery purposes. We ought to have about two hundred Field Guns for this latter purpose, and the Garrison Brigades should, I think, be made available in case of necessity to man them, by having a certain number of horses with drivers attached to each Garrison Battery for purposes of instruction of the Garrison gunners. Cavalry Regiments ought to have the additional eighth troop again raised so as to form the fourth squadron for the field. I would form a direct reserve for the Army of men who have served in the ranks, but who will not re-engage for pension; but inasmuch as I doubt our getting the number of men required for this purpose, I would supplement them by the Militia Reserves. This force, including the enrolled pensioners, should amount to about 50,000 men, and these would at all times at once fill up the *Cadres* of Regiments, including Artillery, to the full war complement. The main reserve of the Army, however, should be found in the Militia, to be brought up for the United Kingdom to from 150,000 to 200,000 men. This force should be made really efficient, and should be ready at all times to take the place of the Army whenever the latter takes the field. The appointment of officers to be vested in the Crown and to be taken away from the Lords-Lieutenant, the Militia to be called upon to supply the wants of the Army when the emergency requires it, the force to be raised by voluntary enlistments if possible, but the ballot to be had recourse to if direct enlistment will not suffice for filling up the ranks. No substitute to be allowed, but a Volunteer Force to be established, into which the class of men would enter who wish to avoid the ballot for the Militia. These men to find themselves in everything without cost to the State, with the exception of arms and accoutrements.

‘This Volunteer Force to be under Martial Law whenever it was out and under arms. The officers for the force to be appointed and selected by the Crown. These several forces should furnish amongst them at least 400,000 men really available and be perfectly-drilled men, of which 100,000 regular troops would at all times be ready to take the field and could be sent abroad at short notice, leaving 300,000 for a reserve and for home defence. The Commissariat and Staff for the whole force to be supplied by the Regular Army and its subsidiary departments.

‘If we could work up to this normal statement and adhere to it, I think much good will have been affected, and our forces will be in such a sound condition as to enable this country to maintain its legitimate position in

the Councils of Europe. I shall be happy to give the Queen any further details she may require.'

MEMO. FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.

'Herewith I forward three Returns¹ which I have had drawn up to explain in detail the memo. of the 4th instant, which I have sent to the Secretary of State.

'No. 1 embodies the amount of force required if the whole amount of 100,000 should belong to the Regular Army, and which, I believe, would be the safest plan and should certainly be put in force on the imminence of war.

'No. 2 is less expensive, and takes 15,000 men from the Reserve Forces to make up the total of 100,000 men.

'No. 3 is the least expensive, and keeps the Infantry at our present establishment, requiring 19,000 men from the Reserve Forces to make up the required numbers.

'The proposed establishment of Cavalry and Artillery is the same in all three schemes, as I consider it absolutely essential that those two branches of the service should be increased to the extent indicated.'

The most important measure taken in hand at the time we are speaking of was the reorganisation of the Depôt system. The measures adopted by the Government of the day on the report of the Royal Commission of 1866-67 failed signally in its application to the Army, and it consequently became necessary to reconsider the whole question. It is obvious that when battalions were abroad, it was necessary that some kind of Depôt system should be in existence at home to supply their wants, and various plans had at one time or another been tried. Amongst these was the four-company Depôt system, which provided in effect some small battalions, although too small to be utilised as such in case of emergency. For some years previously, the advantages of a double-battalion plan had at various times been advocated, and amongst others by Lord Hardinge, who preceded the Duke as Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, when in 1857 it was decided to add to the number of battalions of the line, this result was achieved by adding second battalions to the first twenty-five regi-

¹ Endorsed in H.R.H.'s writing: 'These Returns will be found registered in the A.G.'s Dept. They were passed through this office. They were shown to General Forster by Col. Egerton.—5 Jan. 1871.'

ments in order of seniority, and one each to the 60th Rifles and Rifle Brigade. So to meet the existing requirements of 1872 it was determined to extend in some measure this principle. But in this was also bound up the question of welding together the Regular and Auxiliary forces into one harmonious whole—an ideal which Mr. Cardwell was determined on attaining, but one which neither he nor his successors have ever been able to accomplish thoroughly. One of his great objects too was to confer an increased local character on the regular military forces. It was therefore proposed to divide the British Isles into brigade depôts, each with two line battalions and with Militia and Volunteer units affiliated to them. As Mr. Cardwell said, ‘Reserve districts, pensioner districts, recruiting districts, were not co-terminous with each other, or with the divisions of the General Officers.’ So he held that it was necessary to weld together and consolidate the whole system of regulars and reserves. As each line battalion then consisted of ten companies, it was proposed to detach two to the Depôt. Thus, each Depôt would have four companies, and the Colonel in charge would not only be in command of the Depôt, but also of the Militia and Volunteer units assigned to it.

The following memorandum of the Duke’s, which, together with the first report of the Committee which sat to consider the question, was presented to Parliament in February 1872, very clearly indicates the principles of the plan which was eventually adopted; and, except that regiments have since become, at any rate in name, or if not in name, at least for official purposes scheduled as ‘territorial,’ it in a manner represents the present system. Indeed the plan pursued was in some respects also identical with that advocated in the Duke’s memorandum on the Estimates of 1871-72 which were presented in the earlier portion of the present chapter, although, of course, he never contemplated that his plan would eventually be carried to such extreme lengths.

MEMORANDUM BY THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE ON MR. CARDWELL'S PROPOSAL FOR THE ORGANISATION OF THE VARIOUS MILITARY LAND FORCES IN THE COUNTRY.

‘With reference to the Secretary of State’s proposal to form Local Depôts or Centres as the mode of bringing about a closer connection between the Regular Army and the Reserve Forces with the Militia and Volunteers, I think the following plan should be adopted:—

‘1. Double Battalion Regiments to be worked as one corps, to be formed into three distinct bodies—one Battalion abroad, at whatever fixed establishment may be required, with one Lieutenant-Colonel, two Majors, eight Captains, sixteen Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants, one Adjutant, one Quartermaster, and one Paymaster; one Battalion for home service at a reduced home establishment, with one Lieutenant-Colonel, two Majors, eight Captains, fourteen Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants, one Adjutant, one Quartermaster, one Paymaster. The Depôt Centre to be formed by two Companies from each of the two Battalions, with one Captain and one Subaltern to each Company.

‘2. The Local or Depôt Centre to be in charge of a Lieutenant-Colonel, assisted by a substantive Major, one Quartermaster, one Paymaster. Two Militia Regiments to be included in each such Districts, and the Army Reserve men and Pensioners, making up the entire force of the Local Centre. The two Militia Adjutants to do duty with the Depôt Centres when their Regiments are not embodied or out for training. Each Militia Regiment to have its Sergeant-Major, Quartermaster-Sergeant, and Orderly-Room Clerk, as part of its fixed establishment of non-commissioned officers. The Depôt Companies to have one Colour and one Company Sergeant at all times, distinct from the Militia Sergeants.

‘3. All other Regiments to be linked by Brigades of two and two, and to be in every respect organised as the Double Battalion Regiments as regards one Regiment at home, one abroad, and with a combined Depôt Centre as specified above.

‘4a. The present number of Battalions of the Army, 141, to be maintained as at present and the Regiments linked, to be continued as separate corps for the Officers, and made to act as much as possible in mutual support. The Majors for the Depôt Centres to be taken from the home Regiment or Battalion, and to take this duty in alternation for a period of two years.

‘4b. All recruits to be raised and drilled both for the Line and the Militia at the Depôt Centres, and to be passed from these as rapidly as possible into the two Service Battalions or Militia Regiments as the exigencies of the service may require; but in cases of War and Militia embodiment, these

Depôt Centres to be the *nuclei* for the formation of a Local Reserve Battalion. The reserve men in each district to be trained equally for a certain number of days in each year at these Depôt Centres.

'The present accommodation to be thoroughly examined into and made available for the above purpose, and supplemented whenever necessary by additional accommodation.

'5. The first Battalions for foreign service to be on an increased establishment, and these to form the first *Corps d'Armée* for service abroad.'

The Committee which considered the subject, and which subsequently became known as the Localisation Committee, consisted of General MacDougall as chairman, Colonels Middleton and Sir Garnet Wolseley, Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart, and Mr. Ralph Knox; and the scope of their work was practically defined by the Duke's memorandum, which laid down the principles, the details of which it was the Committee's business to work out.

It was provided that recruits should serve three months at the Depôts, after which they would join the home Battalions, some of them subsequently proceeding abroad to join the foreign Battalions which were linked to the home ones. But though the two Battalions were thus affiliated to each other as regards men, the officers still remained on separate lists. The Army Reserve men who resided in the Depôt Districts were attached to the Depôts, whilst the Militia and the Volunteers also came under the same organisation. The arms and clothing of the Militia and the Reserve were to be stored at the Depôts, and it was anticipated that in time of stress the Depôts would be expanded into eight-company Battalions. Needless to say, this plan was not, and indeed could not have been, carried out during the South African War. On the contrary, the Depôts were denuded of their Officers and Staff, with the result that chaos reigned at most of these establishments. The Committee laid down elaborate plans to be followed on the outbreak of a great war, when fifty Battalions would be required to take the field, with consequently no linked Battalions at home to feed them. On such emergencies they proposed that all Line Battalions should be raised to war strength, supplemented, if necessary, by the Militia Reserve; whilst in each of the fifty Districts

concerned both Militia Battalions were to be embodied, and in each of the remaining ones a single Militia Battalion. They also proposed to complete each *Depôt* to the strength of a full Battalion to serve as a training school for each of the two linked Battalions; whilst each Militia Battalion would be completed to war strength, and enlistment during this period was to be made general.

These recommendations were in the main, no doubt, extremely sound, but when the time of stress came, in the great crisis of 1899-1902, it was found to be perfectly impossible to carry them out. There were not enough Officers and non-commissioned officers to raise the *Depôts* to Battalion strength. There were not even enough to carry on the ordinary routine business at these centres, even had there been the accommodation; and lastly, there were no men available wherewith to complete the Militia Battalions to war strength. So this part of the scheme was, at any rate, an unmitigated failure.

Reverting to the time under consideration, the Committee issued a second report on 4 July 1872, and a final one on 21 February 1873, which slightly altered the distribution of the *Depôts*. Their recommendations generally were legalised by the Military Forces Localisation Act of 1872,¹ which provided for the building of the necessary barracks, and for the measures which were requisite in order to inaugurate the localisation of the Military Forces of the Crown. Three and a half millions were allowed for the carrying out of these plans, which the Treasury was empowered to pay from time to time out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

Briefly, then, the modern system was created by the Army Enlistment Act of 1870, supplemented by the Localisation Act, although many subsequent changes took place before matters were finally settled.

Battalions were grouped in pairs in Brigade Districts, so far at least as concerned recruiting and *Depôts*, and numbered consecutively. Beyond doubt this plan gave rise to much friction between Battalions thus arbitrarily brought

¹ 35 and 36 Vict. c. 68.

together, and this regrettable feeling had not entirely died out at the outbreak of the great Boer War.

So much for this period. It will, however, be necessary again to return to the subject, when in 1881 the Territorial System comes into full force.

On 22 February 1873 the Duke wrote the following letter to Her Majesty, in which he touched upon the newly created Intelligence Department:—

TO THE QUEEN.

‘COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S OFFICE,
22 February 1873.

‘MY DEAR COUSIN,—Mr. Cardwell has, I believe, made a submission to you in favour of the creation of a new department in my office, to be styled the “Intelligence Department.” This is to be presided over by a General Officer, with the rank and pay of a Deputy-Assistant or Quartermaster-General, specially selected for his capacity for the performance of such duties.

‘After consultation with Mr. Cardwell, I would submit to you the name of Major-General MacDougall for that post. He is an accomplished man, with considerable aptitude for such work, and he has been recently employed under Sir James Lindsay in the Reserve Forces branch of the office, and specially in direct communication with Mr. Cardwell in drawing up the new scheme for the Localisation of the Army. I hope, therefore, to receive from You the approval of such selection.’

CHAPTER XXII

AUTUMN MANŒUVRES—1871-72

H.R.H.'s desire to hold Manœuvres. The 'General Idea,' 1871. Extracts from H.R.H.'s Report, 1871. Composition of Force. General Principles. Tactics: Company Columns *versus* Line: Outpost Duties: More Cover to be taken. Value of the Yeomanry. The Control Department. Necessity for General Transport to be under Q.M.G. and G.O.C. Regimental Transport. The King in command of a Cavalry Brigade. Importance of Manœuvres and of fresh ground for proper instruction. The 'General Idea,' 1872. The 'unsparing criticisms of the Press.' Extracts from H.R.H.'s Report, 1872. The various methods of directing operations. General Arrangements. The Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. The Staff.

It will be remembered how in the early fifties, the Duke, then Inspecting General of Cavalry, had urged the necessity of holding manœuvres, and with what scant success his efforts had been attended. Indeed it was not until the lessons of the great wars of 1866 and 1870-71 had awakened the nation to the importance of military affairs generally, that he was at last able to have his way and inaugurate manœuvres on a large scale. The value of manœuvres had been amply proved by the high state of efficiency to which the Prussian Army had attained; and it is regrettable that, after the first efforts made in the early seventies, to hold manœuvres on a large scale, no such attempt should again have been made till 1898, a year before the Boer War broke out.

The Duke took a deep interest in all the arrangements which had to be made for the measures of 1871, and all the details were practically worked out by him, whilst he thought it was advisable that the Commander-in-Chief himself should take command. During August he was away on leave at Homburg; but whilst there he kept up an unceasing

correspondence on the subject with Sir Richard Airey, the Adjutant-General, General Forster, the Military Secretary, and other prominent members of his Staff. This letter to Sir Richard Airey is only one of many similar which he wrote at this period.

TO SIR RICHARD AIREY.

‘HOMBURG, 15 August 1871.

‘I am extremely anxious to extend our manœuvres if we can manage the transport. The difficulty is in having to place the three first Camps so widely apart: Woolmer, Hartford Bridge Flats, and Chobham, which prevents our getting them together for combined movements. I should like to take up the fine position on the Hog’s Back one day if we could; and I should like to have *one day at all events*, if not two, devoted to a *combined movement* of the *whole force* under my immediate directions, if that could be managed, with only a *marked enemy*, consisting of a few Battalions and Squadrons. This is generally the way the Prussians manœuvre for a day or two at their large concentrations.

‘The last few days could be devoted to this; but then the Transport requires consideration, and this you might have looked to with this object in view. Perhaps the Hog’s Back position might be carried in this way by the supposed defending or English Army. Will you let our officers at the Horse Guards consider this? I am very indignant at the remarks in the papers regarding our troops being soft and requiring so many things. There is really *no truth* in this, for our officers and men can do as much hard work as the Prussians. I would wish you to curtail baggage, etc., as much as possible. If they give the men plenty of straw to lie upon, they will not want *waterproof sheets* for the tents at all, nor *blankets* I think; but then we must have plenty of straw. Don’t you think this would do? I am very anxious to try it. A *standing* Camp is quite a different thing from a moving one. In the former all these things are required, but not in a moving one. If we get plenty of straw for the men, the trial might be made, I think. Officers should not be allowed to take plain clothes at all. No leave can be given during the fortnight, and consequently plain clothes are unnecessary. I presume orders have been already issued that no *Messes* will be allowed. Officers must take Squadron and Company messes on the most *reduced* scale. Will you and Ellice look to these details at once? . . .

‘Will you consider the question of *Umpires*? How many shall we require, and who should they be?’

At the close of the manœuvres he submitted to the

Secretary of State an elaborate report, in which the following passages occur:—

‘It having been decided by the Government to form a larger concentration of troops than usual for the purposes of inaugurating a course of manœuvres on a more extended scale than has hitherto been the practice in this country, and to bring together, if possible, some portions of the Reserve Forces, including Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, to be associated with the Regular Army, it was, after much consideration, decided to take Aldershot as a basis for such concentration, as affording facilities for supply and varieties of ground which it would be difficult to combine in any other locality. It must be remembered that this was the first essay of any concentration of this kind, if we except Chobham in 1853, which, however, was small in comparison and took the form of a standing camp, whereas the present concentration was to manœuvre over a large tract of country, to the extent that circumstances would admit.

‘Accordingly, early in September, the troops and Reserve Forces were brought together from various parts to Aldershot, and there formed into three distinct divisions of three brigades in each division, one of Cavalry and two of Infantry, with their proportion of Artillery and Engineers, including Reserves of Artillery, the whole three divisions forming a *Corps d’Armée* amounting in strength to over 30,000 men.

‘I thought it might be as well if I took general charge myself, and having received your concurrence in this view, I assumed the command of the force on 9 September, having Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant as my second-in-command in charge of the 1st Division, Major-General Sir Charles Staveley and Major-General Carey commanding the other two Divisions. The details of formation of the force are herewith annexed. I was anxious at once to bring these respective Divisions into working order, and with this object in view, as also for the facility of supply and the requirements for watering so large a body of men and horses, the 2nd and 3rd Division were moved, on Friday, September 8, to Hartford Bridge Flats and Woolmer respectively, the former in one day, the latter in two marches. Major-General Carey had charge of the 2nd Division, Sir Charles Staveley of the 3rd. The 1st Division was retained somewhat longer at Aldershot to enable us to judge of the amount of transport required for its move, which depended, to a certain extent, upon what was found necessary for the other two Divisions, and did not, therefore, move off till Tuesday, the 12th, when it marched in two marches to Chobham. My own headquarters I established and retained during the whole period of concentration at Aldershot, as the most central and most convenient position for conducting the necessary duties of the command. . . .’

Undue interference by commanders with details is one of the evils which have to be guarded against at manœuvres. For such proceedings naturally filter through from the highest to the lowest ranks, with the result that lack of initiative and independence are apparent throughout, and the value of the experience is largely nullified. The Duke was careful to guard against these evils, and in his report he writes in the following terms:—

‘A feeling having got abroad that General Officers were too much restricted in their movements, I gave the merest outline for the day’s proceedings, only confining the operations to a certain limit of ground on each flank and giving the general line of direction, which was essential, in order to obtain the necessary supplies for both men and horse.’

The tactics employed were in advance of the times. For it must be remembered that in those days an attack in line, as distinguished from an attack in column, was viewed as a very extended formation.

‘Our line formation is of such marked advantage; for the loss of troops moving to attack in extended line must be much less than when columns are employed, even if these columns be similar to the company columns so much adopted in foreign armies, and with large bodies of skirmishers in advance of them. . . .

‘In foreign armies columns are almost invariably in use, which of late years have been modified in the Prussian Army by the introduction of company columns with large intervening bodies of skirmishers. The value of these, as compared to the heavier columns of whole battalions, or even regiments of more than one battalion, cannot be overrated, and nobody is more prepared to appreciate their utility than I am; but wing columns can easily be more adopted in our service than they have hitherto been, and no doubt would be found very valuable so long as the troops are not exposed to any severe direct fire. But with exposure to fire, the ground admitting of large development, I am as strong an advocate as ever for the formations in line to which our troops have ever been accustomed, and in which extended order, with good reserves in support, they have been so often enabled to resist the most formidable attacks by troops in formation of columns, far less exposed themselves from the thinness of the double line of men, as compared to the depth of men in column. It requires both steadiness and solidity, which is another term for confidence, to justify the line formation; but these are qualities which I venture to believe and hope our Infantry possesses, and

under these circumstances I do not think it would be right to give up a formation which has hitherto always proved itself to be well adapted to the character of our troops. The skirmishing of our men has greatly improved, from the value all men attach to good and deliberate shooting, and was generally much approved of. I think at times regiments and companies, and indeed whole brigades, exposed themselves too much to direct fire, and the undulations of ground were not at all times sufficiently appreciated or taken advantage of; but these are defects which manœuvres will mend, and I doubt not that great changes for the better will be visible in coming years.

‘The outpost duties of Infantry still require much study, and it is in such duties that these larger concentrations are so valuable, as their real objects or results cannot be so fully appreciated as when demonstrated by manœuvres on an extended scale. The desire of all to learn these duties was, however, so apparent, that I feel persuaded no opportunity will henceforth be lost to master the subject thoroughly and with effect. . . .’

As regards the Yeomanry, his views, in the light of a recent experience, are especially sound:—

‘I think the Yeomanry, as a home auxiliary force, valuable and useful; but I think their equipment should be simplified as much as possible, and that they should be specially trained to use their carbines or short rifles dismounted.’

As regards the Control Department, he says:—

‘The transport of the Army is supplied by the Control Department. This is right in principle, and should be maintained, but once supplied I think the application should be handed over to the Military Authorities, and the Quartermaster-General’s officers should, under the General Officers of Divisions, take the responsibility of making the transport available for the numerous duties to which it has to be apportioned. A further enormous relief to the transport of the Army would be afforded by largely extending the regimental transport of Regiments. An attempt was made to form a regimental transport in two Regiments of Cavalry, the 9th and 12th Lancers, which met with the most complete success, and to a very limited extent the carriage of ammunition was handed over to Infantry Corps with a like advantage. If this system were extended and made general for all Regiments of Cavalry and Battalions of Infantry, I am satisfied that a right course would be adopted. It must of course be clearly understood that the men and horses thus employed regimentally should be considered as extra to the ordinary establishment of corps, and that no diminu-

tion of fighting strength should result from such an arrangement. Besides this, the regimental transport should be limited to regimental requirements, the supplies being as a matter of course carried by the Transport Corps. Thus, whilst the Control Department kept in its own hands all the transport necessary for feeding and supplying the stores of the Army, the regimental transport would carry its tents, ammunition, and such other regimental baggage as would be allowed by regulations; and whilst the Regiments would have their own interests at stake in looking after their own transport, no interference would result to the general necessities of the troops in the field being thoroughly attended to by the officers of the Control Department. . . .

As regards the troops engaged, he pays a high compliment to their keenness, though he also shows that they required more instruction.

‘The troops during the day worked admirably, but there were times when they exposed themselves too much to direct fire, and hardly took sufficient advantage of the cover which the undulating nature of the ground furnished, whilst advanced positions were given up, which I think would in reality have been much longer maintained.’

These manœuvres were especially remarkable from the fact that His Majesty, then a Major-General, commanded a Cavalry Brigade, concerning which H.R.H. says:—

‘I am also satisfied that I should not do justice to the feelings of the entire *Corps d’Armée*, were I not to notice the pleasure that all experienced in seeing H.R.H. the Prince of Wales associated with the force in actual command of a Brigade of Cavalry, the duties of which he conducted with an interest and vigour (taking part in the ordinary duties of camp life) which it is truly gratifying to observe.’

The Duke concludes his remarks on the manœuvres of 1871 by observing:—

‘Having now referred in detail to the several important subjects that came under my more immediate observation, and having endeavoured to give a fair and full account of all our proceedings during the period of concentration, I have only in conclusion to add the expression of my opinion that the results of such manœuvres as have been recently conducted will prove of the greatest advantage to the efficiency of our service, and that every effort should be made that these concentrations should, for the future, be annual. It will, of course, be desirable that each successive year the troops should be brought together in a different

locality, so as to vary as much as possible the ground to be worked over, and teach both men and officers the nature and value of different descriptions of ground specially selected for the purpose of manœuvres. The greatest care will, however, be required in making such selection; for ground much broken by hedge and ditch has been found on this, as on former occasions, to be not only extremely difficult for purposes of instruction, but often impossible for purposes of combined operation, upon which, after all, so much depends. Having now completed this report, I trust it may be accepted in that spirit with which it has been prepared, and whilst gratefully acknowledging the willing and zealous assistance I have received from all who participated in these manœuvres, I have endeavoured to do justice to the various branches of the service that have come under my observation. . . .

During the manœuvres of the following year, 1872, His Majesty was again present, and in the Duke's report we read that he was 'accompanied by H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, who, though not taking any immediate charge of any portion of the Force, took a most lively interest in all our proceedings, and at his own desire daily accompanied me, as attached to my Staff.' They partook generally of a somewhat different character from those of the preceding year, as the following extracts from the Duke's report show:—

'Last year having been the first occasion when a large concentration of troops took place for purposes of extended manœuvres, the whole arrangements had to be made more or less in a tentative spirit; whereas, this year the experience gained has enabled us to deal more decidedly on many points, and to extend our operations far more than we were then in a position to do.

'Thus Aldershot, as a large and permanent military station, with great facilities for supply, was last year the centre around which our military operations were conducted, whereas this year a tract of country was selected new to all in a military sense, distant from the usual stations for military supply. The result has been that, whereas last year the means of transport were far below the actual necessities for the force in the field, this year the whole of the troops had to be supplied with the full amount of transport required, adding considerably to the expense to be incurred and to the difficulties generally of the operations to be carried out.

'In a practical point of view, however, there cannot be a doubt that this change from the former arrangement has been a great advance upon our first essay, and has tended

largely to increase the usefulness of such military concentrations, in which the great object must always be to aim as much as possible at the realities of a state of war, though it is impossible to avoid being more or less hampered by the fact that the operations are undertaken in a country at profound peace, and in a state of high civilisation and advanced culture. And this brings me to a point upon which I think it right to dwell for a few moments.

'The criticisms which have been passed upon our proceedings, and which have been somewhat unsparing, have all to my mind been framed upon the supposition of actual warfare, whereas sufficient account ought to have been taken of the fact that we were not dealing in reality, but in the nearest approach to it we could attain, under the peculiar circumstances to which, as stated above, all manœuvres in time of peace must necessarily be subjected. Thus, much exception has been taken to the liberal use of imaginary forces, to keep within bounds the contending parties, and to bring them into direction in which it was absolutely necessary, for the sake of general arrangements and supply, that they should be moved. No doubt the great object to aim at is freedom of action for those in command, but in peace manœuvres this is next to impossible, as the forces could not be supplied as they ought to be, unless the operations are kept within a reasonable distance of the basis of supply, without entailing an amount of expense and risks of failure in supply which nothing could justify. Hence the necessity for fixed lines of direction upon which the troops must be moved, entire latitude being given to General Officers to carry out any operations they may deem desirable within a fixed area. This latter can only be attained either by imaginary forces to be moved at the discretion of the officer in chief control of the operations, or by fixed bounds to be stated from day to day. It was thought that, of the two alternatives, the former was the more military one, and therefore the more resembling reality than the latter, and hence the adoption of this mode of dealing with the case. If it has led to difficulties it can of course be altered, and the latter plan, that of fixed bounds, substituted for it on future occasions. One or other of these alternatives is, however, essential, not only for the reasons stated above, but also for the additional and highly important one, that without such restraint the movements, which on many occasions were already far too extended, would become much more so, and that probably the actual contact of the opposing forces would frequently become quite impossible, or else that the same ground might be worked over from day to day without that continued change which is so essential to the utility of these mimic operations of war. My own opinion is strongly in the direction of allowing the result of each day's work to decide upon the capabilities of those in

command of the forces engaged, and to leave it to the officer in chief command to direct the line which the general idea and course of operations should pursue. By this means jealousies are avoided, the capabilities of officers in command are fairly and fully tested, and the troops are constantly moved into fresh ground, which requires study and quick application of altered circumstances for the various branches of the service, as they found themselves. I am fortified in this view from my belief that this is the mode in which the manœuvres in foreign countries, where they have had more experience in these matters than we hitherto possess, have been invariably conducted; and I further believe that, if we have fallen into error, it is far more in the direction of too much latitude being given to those in command than the reverse, for I understand that in other countries the Commander-in-Chief is informed beforehand from day to day what are the intended general ideas of the movements for the succeeding day, whereas, so anxious was I to leave the General Officers to their own devices, that I was as ignorant of the intentions of either side, and at times more so, than were those who were mere spectators on the ground. . . .

‘The Southern Force was assembled about 15 August in a Camp of Exercise at Blandford, in a very admirable position, with abundance of downland for encamping and drill purposes, whilst the Northern Force was formed at Aldershot, there to be thoroughly equipped and prepared for the field, and thence to move up by march route to the ground selected for the alternate manœuvres of the two forces against one another. I made these arrangements with a view to obviate the inconveniences which resulted last year from the too sudden movement of the troops with a Staff, just brought together from various parts, and altogether strangers amongst themselves, as also to the troops intrusted to their charge; and I think that the result has proved beneficial in every respect, and fully answered the purpose I had in view. Indeed, I should have preferred even a longer time of preparation in this respect, as giving confidence and experience to all concerned; but unfortunately there is much difficulty in extending the period of concentration, for the Militia can only be out for drill for a limited number of days; the Volunteers and Yeomanry have not even the same amount of time at their disposal, and it is undesirable to keep large bodies even of the Regular Army too long encamped, with their horses picketed out, whilst the expense is thereby very largely increased. The Southern Force had the advantage of being drilled and exercised more together than the Northern one, as it was assembled for an entire fortnight at Blandford, where brigade and divisional field days were practised, which gave the force much cohesion; whereas the Northern troops were but a very short period

at Aldershot engaged in these preliminary manœuvres, as they had to undertake a long march from thence to Pewsey, whence they made their ultimate move to the front, and where they were joined by their Militia and Volunteer Corps, brought from Aldershot and elsewhere by rail, as it was deemed advisable to give the Militia Regiments by this means a prolonged period of preliminary training, which they could not obtain if on the march with the regular portion of the forces. I have my doubts as to this arrangement having been a judicious one, and should prefer in future to bring up a corps bodily, even though the Militia may lose some valuable time for drill; because on a march much is to be learnt, and greater cohesion is gained which cannot be acquired when regiments are merely engaged in isolated battalion or regimental drill.'

As regards the Staff, H.R.H. says:—

'In reviewing generally the whole of the proceedings as connected with the manœuvres of the present year, I am much pleased with all the arrangements connected with the Staff. These seemed to work well and smoothly and far better than they did last year, because more time was given in the outset of the operations to bring the Staff into working order by personal intercourse and mutual arrangements. The Staff by some have been considered a large one for the troops engaged, but this, I think, is a great advantage, as it is so essential to have an opportunity of giving practical effect to the Staff duties of an army in the field, of which our Staff are from circumstances so much in want, and the larger number of officers who can therefore benefit by such practice the better for the interests of the service generally.'

CHAPTER XXIII

ASHANTEE WAR, 1873-74

H.R.H.'s Diary of the Expedition. Letters, Sir Garnet Wolseley to H.R.H. Selected Corps *versus* the general roster. Reports arrival at Cape Coast Castle. More European Troops required. The Fight at Elmina. Unreliability of Native Levies. Sir Garnet on selected officers. The Advance commenced. Sir Garnet at the Prah. The Final Advance. Capture of Coomassie. Peace. The Indemnity and Prize Money.

THE close of the Liberal Government's term of office of 1868-74 was marked by the Ashantee War, of which it is now possible to give an almost unique account. As already mentioned, during previous campaigns the Duke was in the habit of keeping with his own hand a narrative of the course of events. So the history of the campaign is now prefaced by the Duke's own narrative; and it is supplemented by extracts from the extraordinarily interesting letters which Sir Garnet Wolseley addressed to H.R.H. during its continuance. It is significant to note that in his first letter he alludes, in somewhat disparaging terms, to the composition of the Infantry Battalions in 1873 under the new short-service conditions, which, although only three years in operation, had already undergone a change.

Lord Wolseley's idea was to endeavour to overcome the obvious drawbacks and dangers of employing Regiments 'composed of growing lads unfit for the fatigues of a tropical campaign' by using composite Battalions formed of companies selected from various Regiments.

If we start from the assumption that our Infantry force of fighting men, the backbone of our Army, are of the type described by Lord Wolseley—and it is to be feared that his description is far more applicable now than it was in 1874

—there is unquestionably much to be said in favour of the composite system.

The Duke, however, was invincibly opposed to it, and on the grounds that all teachings of military history were against the employment of congeries of detachments. In justification of his views, it can at least be said that the experiment was subsequently unsuccessful at Majuba, and that our arms narrowly escaped disaster when it was employed in the Bayuda Desert in 1885.

Hence Sir Garnet Wolseley was overruled; and in lieu of composite corps he was given three Infantry Regiments with which to perform his task. His opinions are, however, given in full, since they represent accurately how and why he differed from H.R.H. on this point.

His subsequent letters written to the Duke form a most complete diary of a campaign probably unparalleled in its conditions.

THE DUKE'S DIARY OF THE EXPEDITION.

‘During the spring of 1873 alarming rumours reached England of a serious incursion of the Ashantee nation and army into our possessions, or rather on those of the Protected States, as they are called, on the Gold Coast. The inhabitants of the Protectorate, called Fantees, could not hold their own against the invading enemy, and cried for assistance from our Government, which we were not disposed to afford them till the matters became so serious, and the Ashantee successes so great, that our Forts were threatened. Colonel Harley, late of the 2nd West India Regiment was Administrator at the time of the Colony. He at length asked for assistance from home, and a considerable body of Royal Marines, both Artillery and Light Infantry, was sent out under Lieut.-Colonel Festing, of the Marine Artillery, to give support to the small body of West India troops stationed on the Coast. The reason for their selection was on account of the deadliness of the climate for Europeans living on the shore, so the Marines were sent to be retained on board ship, and to be only landed should any great emergency demand it. At the same time the whole of the 2nd West India Regiment was ordered on from the West Indies to the Gold Coast. About July we heard of an attack having been made upon the town and Fort of Elmina by the Ashantees. The Marines were landed with some Bluejackets, and, in conjunction with a few West Indians and other natives of the Coast, made a most gallant defence under Captain Fremantle, R.N., and Colonel Festing, and gave the Ashantees a very

severe thrashing. In spite of this advantage, however, matters did not look well, and Commodore Commerell, in command on the Station, having, while making a reconnaissance on the lower part of the Coast, been fired upon and severely wounded with several of his brother officers and men at the mouth of the River Prah, the Government came to the decision that an expedition must be organised for clearing the Protectorate of those dangerous intruders, and by an advance upon their capital, Coomassie, to strike a heavy blow at their power and prestige, to prevent a recurrence of such acts of wanton aggression.

Colonel Sir Garnet Wolseley being at the time Assistant-Adjutant-General at the Horse Guards, was selected for this important and difficult duty, and was allowed to make his own selection of a body of English officers to assist him in raising native levies, and to prepare for the arrival of European troops, should he find it possible, with reference to the deadly climate, to make any use of them. None were to be sent till he reached his destination and could judge for himself as to the practicability of an advance into the interior of the country. At the same time, Commander Glover of the Navy, who had been Governor of Lagos, and had great knowledge of the Coast, was also despatched under the authority of the Colonial Office to raise as large a body of native tribes as he could, with a view of co-operating with Sir Garnet Wolseley. Wolseley himself received the local rank of Major-General, took Colonel McNeill with him as second in command and Chief of his Staff, and made an excellent choice of active and energetic officers as his companions. He left England about the end of September in the *Ambriz*, and reached his destination at a time when matters still looked as uncomfortable as possible. He at once began to cut a good road towards the Prah under direction of Major Home, R.E., raised two native corps under Wood and Russell, and sent word home that if troops were sent to him, the advance on Coomassie could be made. At the same time stations for troops, some entrenched, were made along the road so as to ensure its safety. The Ashantees becoming very pressing in the neighbourhood of Elmina, an advance was made by the General from that station, and a serious fight ensued at Essaman, in which the Ashantees were defeated, though not without difficulty, and in which McNeill was so seriously wounded that he had to return to England. This engagement and one or two more, specially at Dunquah, induced the Ashantees to commence their retirement across the Prah, which they effected successfully, the force at the General's disposal not being sufficient to prevent it, though the punishment inflicted upon them in the various encounters with them was amply sufficient to demoralise them entirely. At the end of November the 2nd Battalion 23rd, and 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, detachments

of Engineers and Artillery, besides the 1st West India Regiment from the West Indies, were sent out to the Coast, to be shortly followed by the 42nd Highlanders as a reserve, this force being placed under Sir A. Alison as a Brigadier and second in command. These troops arriving safely at their destination before the road to the Prah was quite completed, were sent to sea again to keep them in health, and ultimately landed during the first days of January. The want of transport was the serious drawback, there being no animals on the Coast for the purpose, and everything had to be carried by men. These, though obtained in large numbers, deserted as fast as procured, and the result was that only two European Corps could be moved to the front, and unfortunately the 42nd, having been landed before the 23rd, the latter were directed to remain on board ship, which caused much ill-feeling, which well it might. This was felt so much by Sir Garnet that he ultimately landed the Headquarters and 100 men of the 23rd, and took them with him to the front. The River Prah was crossed on 20 January, and though King Coffee Kalkalli sent messengers to sue for peace, and to try to stop the advance on Coomassie, the General, whilst ready to negotiate, did not stop his advance for a single hour, but steadily kept on his course in pursuit of the object in view. The Adansi hills, a fine position about half-way between the Prah and the capital, were passed without opposition, and matters appeared to be approaching a peaceful solution when the Ashantee forces were found to be concentrated near Amoafal, within easy distance from Coomassie, prepared to dispute the capture of that city. Sir Garnet attacked this army under the King in person, with all his most important chiefs, on 31 January, and after a severe struggle during the whole day, entirely defeated him at Amoafal with great loss, and with considerable numbers of slightly wounded men on our side, specially of the 42nd, which was the Regiment most engaged. Five more days' hard fighting followed, and Coomassie was entered in triumph on the evening of 4 February.

Though King Coffee Kalkalli promised submission and offered to come in to sign a treaty of peace, he did not do so, and violent rain having come on with swelling of the rivers along the route and consequent danger to the line of communication, which, moreover, had been much threatened by the enemy, though without success, Sir Garnet decided upon destroying the town by fire, and blowing up the King's Palace. This was effected on the following day, and the return march towards the Coast was commenced without molestation, and successfully effected with little or no discomfort to the troops in general, including the sick and wounded, by the end of the month. The whole of the troops re-embarked for England the last days of February, and were landed at home by the end of March, Sir Garnet himself leaving the

Coast on 5 March. Thus ended one of the most daring and successful little expeditions ever undertaken by this country, well-planned, determinedly and ably executed both by the Commander and the troops placed at his disposal, and alike creditable to all parties concerned; and though no treaty has been signed, the moral effect produced by the destruction of Coomassie after its being taken by the white men, will be so profound throughout the native races of Africa that no further apprehension need be entertained of the Ashantees again interfering with our interests, or with those of our so-called allies on the Coast of Africa.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'HORSE GUARDS, 3 September 1873.

'I feel deeply sensible of the honour done me by Your Royal Highness's letter of the 1st inst., and by the privilege accorded to me of writing direct to Your Royal Highness during the progress of our expedition, a privilege of which I shall gladly avail myself.

'The proposals I put forward relative to the formation of battalions for this service were based upon the belief that our Infantry at present—so unlike what it was in days gone by—being so largely composed of growing lads, was unfitted for the fatigues of a tropical campaign, it would be necessary to draft into any whole battalion selected for the work so many volunteers from other corps, that the regimental spirit—the backbone of Her Majesty's Army—would be swamped.

'The theatre of operations is a dense forest, where fighting can only be conducted by small units, as we found in Burmah and in New Zealand. My idea was therefore to use strong companies selected from battalions, according to the ability of each to furnish either one, two, or three. I thought by this means to preserve the *esprit de corps*, in fact to intensify it by the increased rivalry that would thus be called into play. This expedition being of a peculiar and novel nature, I thought that perhaps its requirements might be better met in a special manner, especially as it would have been thus possible to have carried out the principle of selection as regards officers, a point that in bush-fighting is of such vital importance.

'I have thus stated the reasoning upon which my proposals were based in order to explain to Your Royal Highness why I made them, and not from any wish to re-open now a question that has been decided by Your Royal Highness—a decision to which as in duty bound I at once bowed when I was informed that my proposals did not meet with Your Royal Highness's approval.

'I am sincerely grateful and flattered by the confidence reposed in me by Your Royal Highness, and I hope and trust

that I may be enabled to fulfil the high opinion so graciously formed of me. If I fail to do so, it will not be from want of energy. The expression of Your Royal Highness's sentiments towards me is an additional incentive to exertion on my part.

'If I possibly can attain the objects in view without landing European soldiers, I shall certainly endeavour to do so, as I am most anxious to avoid exposing the lives of more than are absolutely necessary to the baneful influence of such a climate. If after arrival at Cape Coast Castle I write home requesting the despatch from England of the troops now being prepared for service there, Your Royal Highness may rest assured that I have been most unwillingly constrained to ask for them, not seeing my way to fulfilling the objects of my mission without their assistance. Two months will elapse between the date of my asking for them and of their arrival on the Coast, under any circumstances, and it is quite possible that events in that time may have changed so that even when they arrive I may not require them; if so, of course I shall send them back to England without landing them at all.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
CAPE COAST, 5 October 1873.

'I arrived here on the 2nd inst., all those with me being well and in high spirits. . . . A few of the kings and chiefs were here awaiting my arrival, so I thought it best to see them at once, which I did yesterday. I had previously consulted with Colonel Harley and others who ought to know the native character, as to what I should say to them and the terms I should offer. I shall not attempt to give Your Royal Highness in this hurried note an account of what I said, as I was surrounded by reporters who will give what I said, I have no doubt, word for word in their newspaper letters. I made great use of Her Majesty's name throughout, as if my instructions had come to me direct from Her, as in dealing with people like these the Queen's name has great weight, and they do not understand or appreciate the messages from the Ministers. I endeavoured to impress upon them this war was theirs and not Her Majesty's war, and that She could only help those who helped themselves. I am to see them again to-morrow to hear their answer. They are difficult people to deal with, and those at this place being somewhat more civilised than the chiefs in the rural districts, have much weight with the others; for that reason they are a very grasping set, and may induce the well-disposed kings of the distant provinces to hold out for more money. The Commissariat are giving their carriers here one shilling a day, and it is just possible

that the kings may say that their men will not accept my offer when they can get a shilling here as carriers. My answer will be: yes, but then those carriers are regularly enlisted, and have nothing to do with you, the kings or chiefs. They are my servants, and I shall be prepared to enlist as fighting men for six months some thousands of your best warriors if you will give them over to me entirely, to be commanded by English officers. This I know to be what they dread most, as it would take all power and authority out of their hands, destroying their prestige for ever with their own people.

'This question of obtaining men will be my great difficulty, for their argument is that the war is an English war, having been brought about by the cession of Elmina, and that consequently it is our duty to fight the Ashantees. The road is now, through the untiring energy of Lieut. Gordon, 98th Regiment, made as far as Yancoomassie, about twenty-six or twenty-seven miles from here. It is practicable for Artillery. I have a post at Akroful, about fifteen or sixteen miles from this on that road, consisting of fifty men of the 2nd W.I. Regiment and some Fantee police. I am having a large clearance made at Dunquah (twenty-two miles on same road from this), where I shall construct a fortified post, and will then push on the men I now have at Akroful in it. My next stage from thence will be Mansue, and when I get there I shall have within a protected radius so much ground that I shall be able to look about me and see what I can do towards clearing the Ashantees out of Mampon, where their main camp has been for a long time.

'I am sure that Your Royal Highness will be horrified to learn that, upon inquiry of how our supplies of provisions and arms stood here, I find that we had yesterday only provisions for the Regular Troops on the Coast for *four days!*

'That the only arms are nineteen Sniders in the Imperial, and four hundred Enfields in the Colonial Store. There are also a few Dutch Sniders, but there is no ammunition for them. I did not expect to find any large body of troops raised here, but I *did* expect to find our magazines brim-full of arms and provisions.

'This cripples my actions very much, for now I shall not be able to do anything until the arms I demanded before leaving England arrive, and Your Royal Highness is aware that the ships hired by the Government for conveying stores are not usually quick sailers.

'I have sent Lieut.-Colonel Wood to Elmina with some officers to see what can be done there towards raising troops. I have sent Captain Furze, 42nd Highlanders, and Lieut. Saunders, R.A., to the Gambia on a similar mission. I left Lieut. Gordon, 93rd Highlanders, at Sierra Leone to raise

men there, and I have sent Lieut. Bolton, 1st W.I. Regiment, to Accra and Winnebah to do likewise. If I can obtain even 2000 men from places at a distance from Cape Coast Castle, I shall be to that extent independent of the people here, who, seeing that I can obtain men without their aid, will perhaps feel then more disposed to come forward.'

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'CHEVELEY PARK,
NEWMARKET, 30 October 1873.

'Your very interesting letter of the 5th inst., from Cape Coast Castle, reached me yesterday before I left London, and I hasten to thank you for it, and to say that I hope you will continue to give me every information in your power in the way you have done in this communication. There is no doubt that the want of stores and provisions to which you refer is a most serious drawback, but after every inquiry made, it seems that you saw the Returns of everything on the Coast before you left England, and that it was pointed out at the time that hitherto the supplies on the Coast had been of late always kept very low, as it was not supposed that they would be required to any large amount, and as every description of supplies deteriorate in that bad climate. Meanwhile every requisition you made has been at once complied with, so that I hope long before this reaches you you will want for nothing; and if the supplies have been largely drawn upon for native levies, that was a contingency which your predecessors ought to have reported at once with a view to filling up from home the issues made. I trust no further difficulties or anxieties will arise in this respect, and I am satisfied that there is the greatest desire on the part of all concerned to furnish you with everything you want *most liberally*.

'All your arrangements for raising men and your distribution of the officers for this purpose seem judicious. The twelve additional officers you have asked for have at once been ordered, and will be embarked with the least possible delay. As regards the paucity of officers in the 2nd West India Regiment, of that you must have been aware; that before you left, your experience at the Horse Guards must have suggested to you the immense difficulty there is in keeping a sufficiency of officers for duty with these Regiments on account of the climate, and now, when so much more is required of them, the casualties are sure to be greater than at any other time. I therefore cannot suppose that you calculated upon getting any officers of this West India Regiment for other duties, for unless largely augmented, this is quite out of the question. The railroad you have asked for is being prepared and beginning to be shipped, and a telegraph is also to be sent, but on these

points you will hear officially from the Secretary of State. Colonel Harley has arrived, and I have seen him.

‘From what he states I apprehend that the march on Coomassie is likely to be undertaken. Of course it is for you and the Government at home to decide upon this point, so I give no opinion, but hope only that we may get timely notice for any Europeans that may be required to be embarked, for the season for action is evidently *very short*, and the men (I mean Europeans) cannot be re-embarked before the bad season again sets in. . . .’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘CAPE COAST, 9 October 1873.

‘Since writing to Your Royal Highness on the 5th instant, I have again had an interview with the kings and chiefs here, and the result has been more satisfactory than I had anticipated. They asked for more money on the score of the high price now charged everywhere for provisions, but this demand I countered by saying that if they did not approve of the rate I had proposed for subsistence, viz. 4½d. a day per fighting man, I would be prepared to issue rations in kind. This stopped them, for they like money better than supplies. Nearly all the kings have now started for their towns, where they hope to collect their men. They impressed upon me their want of power over their people, and implored me to assist them in their efforts to get their fighting men together. I have therefore sent with each king, one English officer, an interpreter, and two native police, with this object in view, and I expect good results from this arrangement. I am woefully short of officers; but through the kindness of Captain Fremantle, the senior Naval officer, who as a temporary measure lent me three Naval officers and four Marine officers, I am able to tide over my present difficulties; I must, however, look forward a few weeks, when I am sure to have some of those I brought out with me incapacitated from fever; when my numbers are thus reduced, I shall be at my wits’ ends to do, or rather to carry on, the work and the arrangements already begun. The expense of sending out subaltern officers is small, and the guinea a day allowed to them from the date of their joining this command is money well expended. I know that England teems with active young officers at present longing for active work in the field. The more of them that Your Royal Highness can send to me the better able I shall be to bring this business to an end. The Staff I have with me I can assure Your Royal Highness is worked at a high pressure; I never saw men work harder or more willingly. The amount of clerical work got through daily is immense, as all officers going on special missions to native kings require to have written instructions. Everything has to be created, for I found *nothing* in working order when I

arrived—the sanitary condition of this place was deplorable—no one seemed to do more than write minutes deploring the sad state of filth the town was in, but no one moved actively to try and abate the nuisance. I am having all refuse heaps buried, and as the clearance of bush or of grass round the town progresses, I have the stuff so cut down buried in heaps. I am loth to give an opinion so shortly after landing here upon such a serious subject as the necessity for employing Europeans upon this expedition; but the conviction forces itself upon me more and more every day, that to carry out my mission economically and efficiently, the services of the two Battalions of Infantry and of the detachments of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers that I originally asked for will yet have to be made use of. At present I am incurring great expense in my endeavours to raise a native force that I can have no great confidence in, and that may probably desert me and the few officers I have with me in the first serious encounter I shall have with the enemy. The Fantees have lost all heart; they are thoroughly cowed by the defeat they have had, and they are one and all individually *afraid* of their enemies. Your Royal Highness will therefore easily understand my anxiety to have with me a reserve of English soldiers, not only for the protection of the officers who have volunteered for this expedition, but also with a view to inspiring confidence in my own ranks and a corresponding dread amongst the Ashantees. As I have always said, Your Royal Highness may rest assured that I shall only land the European Contingent when everything is ready for them, and that I shall take every possible care of them from the moment I land them until I can again send them on board ship.'

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE,
11 November 1873.

'I have received your most interesting letter of 9 October with enclosed sketch of road, and I cannot sufficiently tell you how much I feel interested in the various important subjects to which it refers. So far, everything seems to be going on satisfactorily, and though you are working under difficulties, having to create all arrangements for a large force, still you seem to be progressing, and are satisfied with the officers you have at your disposal, whose health thus far has been good, and has not been impaired by the climate. I can understand your desire to have more of them; but you must always bear in mind that you have got as many as you have asked for, and that no restriction has been put upon your demands in this respect. Thus the twelve additional officers you lately requested should be sent are all ready to go. Some have already sailed, and others, for whom there was no immediate accommodation, will follow.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'CAPE COAST, 15 October 1873.

'I am glad to have it in my power to give Your Royal Highness some good news from this place. Ever since my arrival I have been most anxious to strike a blow, no matter how small, provided I was as morally certain as any one can be, at any time in war, of a complete success. It was absolutely necessary in my position here. Around me were these dispirited and demoralised Fantees without confidence in themselves or faith in us; they did not believe we were in earnest; we had been for a long time saying to them "go on," but they wanted to have "come on" addressed to them. Since the Commodore's misfortunes on the Prah and in its neighbourhood, the tribes to the westward of Elmina have one by one declared against us and joined the enemy, receiving detachments from their main army at Mampon, and supplying it daily with food and stores purchased in Elmina and even at this place. Until the Houssas from Lagos (138 strong) had joined me I was unable to undertake anything; but as I knew tolerably accurately when they would arrive, I made my plans accordingly. Having selected the hostile villages west of Elmina as the point I intended for the blow, I directed Colonel Wood, commanding there, to summon the chiefs of those places to appear before him to account for their conduct; they flew to the Ashantee Camp for advice, and after deliberation with the Ashantee generals and captains they refused to obey. They were told that, although we were brave, the Ashantees were still braver, and that we would never dare to attack them in the bush, that if we attempted to do so they, the Ashantees, would move from Mampon to their assistance. The Houssas arrived on Saturday; they were armed with Enfield rifles; I issued Sniders to them, and set some officers to drill them all day in the use of their new arms. They are a fine, wiry-looking set of men, and seem to take a great pride in being soldiers. I went with them to Elmina the day they arrived, and explained to Colonel Wood what I intended doing, telling him that he was to have command of the column, but that I meant to accompany it for political reasons. On Sunday I announced publicly that I had received bad news from the Volta, that Captain Glover had been attacked at Addah, etc. etc. I went on board H.M.S. *Barracouta* during the day and took Captain Fremantle into my confidence, telling him my plans and requesting his co-operation. He entered into all my views, promising to keep everything secret.

'On Monday I announced that I had received still further news from Captain Glover that he was hard pressed, and that I intended embarking in the evening *en route* for the Volta. The whole strength of the 2nd W.I. Regiment, every guard and orderly being dispensed with, was about 100 men

(a little under 100); I sent these on board H.M.S. *Decoy* at 6 P.M., 40 Bluejackets from the Squadron being landed here to take the guards. At 9 P.M. I went on board H.M.S. *Barracouta*, every one being still under the impression that I was bound eastward. News of our doings is quickly spread here, and the Ashantees are kept well informed of all that goes on in these coast towns. As my force was very small and the quality of the main body of it unknown to me, I was most anxious to keep my real intentions secret from the enemy lest he should have met me with too large a force to be dealt with. I desired also to show him that I could surprise him, for a well-executed surprise has always a very demoralising effect upon uncivilised troops; once make them feel that they cannot rely upon the information they receive, and that we are evidently well informed of *their* doings, and then hit them a hard blow suddenly where they do not expect it, and I believe that one has then laid the first stepping-stones to further successes.

‘I shall not attempt to enter into details as to the manner in which I prevented my intentions being known; but the secret was so well kept, that even when we got under weigh between 1 and 2 A.M. on the morning of Tuesday the 14th instant, most even of my own Staff still believed that we were bound for the Volta. We landed at Elmina at 4 A.M., but as the tide was low, all our troop-boats grounded on the bar at the mouth of the river and so delayed our movement a little.

‘The official report of the operation is contained in the letter to the Secretary of State for War by this mail. I shall not therefore weary Your Royal Highness by recapitulating here an account of our proceedings. The day’s work was a complete success, and its effect has already galvanised these people with a new life. . . . The experience we have all gained from our little operation of yesterday is very great, and the lessons it has taught us are most important. The Houssas, although led by two of the officers I brought out with me, were uncontrollable. They fired away their ammunition at nothing, mostly in the air. Every man employed had 70 rounds of ammunition (60 in pouch and 10 in haversack); these were soon expended by the Houssas. The tremendous fusillade unsteadied the 2nd W.I. Regiment, and had an effect even upon the Marines, and the utmost exertions were necessary on the part of all officers—the Staff working even harder than the others—to prevent this firing at nothing becoming general from front to rear of the column. In this bush work one cannot have too many officers, nor be too careful even in selecting the best officers and the best men. Success must always be cheaper than failure; and in such a country it is only with the very best and steadiest soldiers that success becomes as much a certainty as can ever be counted upon in war. The bush is so thick that one quickly

loses control over the component parts of a column; officers and N.C. officers must therefore act upon their own responsibility to a very large extent, and if the officers are not good, there is great risk of panic. This was made very clear yesterday.

'The day after to-morrow I shall move the Houssas from this to the front; on the 18th instant I intend sending them under Lieut. Gordon, 98th Regiment, to a village called Abrakrampa, about three miles to the west of Akroful, where I now have a fortified post occupied by 50 men of the 2nd W.I. Regiment. I intend making Abrakrampa very strong, and moving the detachment from Akroful there. As soon as I have collected about 5000 native levies at Dunquah and its neighbourhood, I shall try what can be done against Mampon; for before I advance beyond Mansue I must clear the country between the coast on the south, the Prah river on the west, and Bosumprah on the north. As soon as I have done so, I shall begin collecting a large magazine of stores at Mansue. The steamer *Wave* has just arrived; to-morrow morning, the 16th, we begin unloading her: she then goes on to Captain Glover with stores for him.

'*Sunday, 19 October.*—I have at last succeeded in moving these Cape Coast chiefs to do something. Two companies are now assembling at Napoleon, and I hope soon to have more of them there, as I want to be strong at that point, and yet do not like keeping any of the 2nd West India Regiment at it, as they are always ill there. I was there this morning at 7 A.M. (it is under five miles from this), and even at that hour a fog hung over the river, and the smell from the marsh was offensive, and I should say most injurious to health. The Ashantees frequently come close to the redoubt, and a prisoner is occasionally taken. On Friday I saw some natives carrying an Ashantee head past Government House that had been brought from the neighbourhood of Napoleon.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'CAPE COAST, 24 Oct. 1873.

'Troops engaged in the bush quickly lose all formation, and the fight resolves itself into knots of men led by officers; the result depends upon the manner in which those officers do their work. The fire of the native troops is so very bewildering to all but the very steadiest troops that panic can only be prevented by the soldierlike qualities of the officers engaged. Owing to the difficulties of transport, the number of English soldiers that can be employed in this war must be small; but in my opinion every soldier employed should be a volunteer of good health and strong physique, and every officer should be *carefully selected*, so that the small force engaged should be the *élite* of Her Majesty's Army, a result that cannot, in

my humble opinion, be secured by sending out any one formed Battalion.

‘In minor operations such as we are here engaged in, the peculiar difficulties to be encountered can only be successfully met by specially devised plans of operation carried into execution by troops specially formed for the occasion. I humbly submit that the rules and regulations of our Army are not calculated to meet the exigencies of a little war like this, and it is because I feel this strongly that I presume to suggest to Your Royal Highness a peculiar, though by no means a novel, plan for the formation of the third Battalion that I have been obliged to ask for. If I failed to give Your Royal Highness the result of my recent experience here I should be wanting in my duty, and I have to ask pardon if in doing so I have in any way presumed too much upon the liberty of personal correspondence with Your Royal Highness that has been so graciously accorded to me. Should these views be approved, I hope that Your Royal Highness will allow Lieutenant-Colonel Colley, now at the Staff College, to come out in command of the third Battalion, as he is very anxious to serve here, and he is an officer that I have every confidence in. It is very essential that the seniors should be officers qualified to take command of the expedition should any untoward accident at any time dispose of those appointed by Your Royal Highness as first and second in command. In this bush fighting, no matter what care one may take to prevent the senior officers from unnecessary exposure, it is impossible to say whether the junior ensign or the commanding officer may be the first knocked over.’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
CAPE COAST CASTLE, 30 October 1873.

‘... I heard from Festing in the evening; he had surprised an Ashantee force and dispersed it. Unfortunately his native allies, of which his force was almost entirely composed, behaved very badly; some would not fight at all, and even the best of them had not only to be led by our officers, but to be *driven* by them with sticks into action. I am very anxious that all our skirmishes with the enemy should invariably end by a general charge (with a great cheer) for even fifty yards towards the enemy, but there was no charge possible with the native allies. As usual where all the chief fighting has to be done by the English officers, several were wounded, but their wounds are only scratches, for these Ashantee arms do not hurt much at fifty yards. Captain Godwin, 103rd Regiment, is the only one really hurt; he was hit in the groin by a slug, and I do not yet know whether it

still remains in his body. I never can have too many officers here, for these Fantees will do nothing without they have an Englishman with them, and between slight wounds and slight touches of fever, we always have a number on the sick list. The young officers I have brought out with me work like slaves, and my difficulty is to prevent them from knocking themselves up by overwork; I cannot replace them here.

'The more I see of this business, the more I am convinced that it is essential we should so end it as to prevent for ever the *possibility* of another war. The people are not worth fighting for, and to promise them protection is merely to relieve a quarrelsome, worthless, and cowardly race from all the responsibilities of a war that they are certain to bring down from time to time upon their country. Not seeing any immediate prospect of being able to use the Sailors and Marines with advantage, I sent them back to their ships, leaving fifty of them until Saturday next, 1 November, at Abrakrampa, when they will also return to Cape Coast and re-embark. The moral effect of showing these white men along the road is good, and gives the enemy an exaggerated idea of our strength. I am anxious to show them as often as possible, and in as many places as I can, but to really use them as seldom as possible, carrying on the skirmishing necessary with the retreating enemy by means of the native levies. I have issued a bombastic proclamation calling upon the whole Fantee country to rise and follow up and crush the retreating enemy.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
CAPE COAST, 4 November 1873.

'... I have done all that lies in my power to put some courage into these wretched Fantees. I began by boldly going straight into the bush with a handful of white men and a few West India soldiers to attack the Ashantees in their own selected positions; I showed them how easily we beat the enemy; I gave them arms and ammunition at their express desire; I gave to each chief an English officer, who did his best to organise and discipline them; I have appealed to their love of country, and their desire for money; but all in vain—they won't fight: when driven into action by the pistols and sticks of English officers they bolt *en masse* when taken under fire. They are only fit to be the slaves of the Ashantees, and when once we have vindicated our honour here by giving the enemy one good sound thrashing, we shall be justified in studying our own interests only when deciding upon the terms we should make peace upon. A people who will not fight for their own liberties, and for their own country, are unworthy of any consideration.'

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘SANDRINGHAM,
KING’S LYNN, 2 December 1873.

‘I have received your several letters, including the two last of 4 and 7 November, and I have to congratulate you on the late successes you have had, and which, I concur with you in thinking, makes your position in every respect a far better one than it has yet been since this contest commenced, and indeed better, as you say, than you had any reason to expect. If one takes into account the very small reliable force at your disposal, and the wretched conduct of the natives, whether under your command or allies, it is only extraordinary that you have been able to accomplish as much as you have done, and it speaks volumes in favour of the courage and devotion of our officers who have been able to get men so ill-disposed to fight to do anything, or to make any stand at all. Nothing can be better than the conduct of all our officers, Military and Naval; and the Bluejackets and Marines have proved themselves as useful and valuable a body of men ashore as they are at all times afloat. I am glad too that you have been enabled to give me a very good account of the 2nd West India Regiment. I have always myself had a good opinion of these troops. In so many little affairs they have had since I have been at the head of the Army, I do not remember a single instance in which they have not done their duty right well.

‘Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Colley is one of the officers selected to go out; and generally the selections have been made with great care and an anxiety to let you have the best men. Brevet-Major Russell, of the 13th Hussars, seems to have performed his work right well; and I am happy to say I have been enabled to promote Lieutenant Gordon, 98th, into the 84th Foot, and Lieutenant Gordon, 93rd, has been also promoted in his own Regiment. I hope that all your future communications may be as satisfactory as those received hitherto.’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘CAPE COAST, 21 November 1873.

‘... We have had several reports that King Coffee is dead, but I do not believe them. His death would complicate matters very seriously, as it might leave me without any one to treat with when I have given them a good thrashing. No answer has been received to my letter to the King, although there cannot be much doubt that at least one of the copies reached Coomassie safely. The greatest difficulty I have to face in this war is the question of carriers; the people are so naturally lazy that even the promise of high wages will not induce them to work. I shall be obliged

to put some pressure upon them, for after all England is doing for these people, I cannot afford to allow the expedition to come to a standstill through a too rigid observance of English laws, laws that are in every way unsuited to these natives.

'I have good reason to believe that this Army of Amanquartia is the one great Army of the Ashantee Kingdom, and that if I now had the power to destroy it, that a march to Coomassie would be merely "*a walk over*." . . .'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
CAPE COAST, 27 November 1873.

' . . . As the native allies will not fight, I am now using them in large numbers as carriers: 500 men are furnished daily from those collected at Dunquah, who come in here in the evening in charge of an officer, and return the following morning, each man carrying 50 lbs. In this way I hope to have a large magazine soon at Mansue. The work at the several places selected as halting-places for the European troops is going on rapidly. I am having huts constructed of bamboo (split) and thatched with palm-leaves. In each is a guard bed, so that no man will have to sleep on the ground. The halting places selected are:—

- '1st. Inquabim (about $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles from this).
- '2nd. Akroful.
- '3rd. Yancoomassie.
- '4th. Mansue.
- '5th. Sutah.
- '6th. Amponsie Quantah.
- '7th. Damsamsue, which is close to the Prah—all being short marches.

'At Damsamsue I shall have an hospital for 100 men, at Mansue one for 60 men, and at all the intermediate stations hospitals for 30 men each.

'At Inquabim (the first stage from here) I have a very large iron tank filter, and I hope to be able to get one on to Akroful. As soon as the enemy are clear across the Prah, I shall throw a flying bridge over that river, and establish, if possible, a very strong *tête de pont* on the north bank. This will be the beginning of the second phase of the war, for the Ashantees do not yet realise that we shall ever dare to cross into their territory.'

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'HORSE GUARDS, 22 December 1873.

'Long before this the European transports will have reached you, and by this time I hope they are hard at

work moving towards Coomassie or on the Prah. Of course you could do little or nothing till their arrival; but I don't feel at all sure that you could have done very much with them had they been with you earlier, as you have been all this time hard at work preparing for their reception; and had you been obliged to land them before all this had been fully accomplished, the chances would have been that they would have suffered much from the climate, whereas now I hope they will, in a good measure, escape from this danger. At all events you will bear in mind that you were yourself most anxious they should not come out before the beginning of December, and they will now be with you very much at the period you originally named before starting from England. . . .'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'FAISNWAAH, about 25 miles south of the
River Prah, 6 December 1873.

' . . . I shall push on all the available men I have to Prah-sue, and I shall cross the river just before daybreak, having strong batteries on the southern bank to cover the movement. Under cover of the men I take across the river, I shall construct a strong *tête de pont*, and then throw my bridge across. I hope the enemy will attack me immediately as I cross; but if they do not I shall make myself very strong there, and push on my road, so that everything may be ready when I move forward the English Regiments, to attack the Ashantee Army wherever I may find it.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
CAPE COAST, 14 December 1873.

'Your Royal Highness's most gracious letter, dated the 11th ultimo, reached me on the 11th instant, and I have to offer my best thanks for the advice contained in it, advice that in future I shall strictly attend to. . . .

'My relations with the Navy have throughout been of such a cordial nature, and I have from the date of my landing here received such unvarying assistance from every one in the Fleet, that I have felt myself compelled to avail myself of the services of a small Naval Brigade (250 in number). I knew they expected it; and as whatever little I have been able to accomplish up to the present time has been chiefly carried out by Sailors and Marines, I thought it but fair that those who had borne the heat and burden of the day should also be allowed to share in the more brilliant operations that the use of English troops is now likely to enable me to undertake. They will act as a small Battalion of Infantry, all the men and officers being care-

fully selected as the very best in the squadron now on this coast. I have sent the 2nd 23rd Fusiliers and 2nd Rifle Brigade to cruise at sea until the end of the month, and intend doing the same with the 42nd when it arrives. . . .

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE,
2 January 1874.

'Your two letters of 6 and 14 December are just arrived, and as a mail goes out to-night, I have only a line to acknowledge the receipt of them, and to say that I consider the news you give me as highly satisfactory.

'No doubt it would have been more satisfactory to yourself to have given the Ashantees a good licking before they were enabled to cross the Prah, but you would hardly expect them to give you this chance, and I hope you will have the opportunity you seek when you cross over the Prah into their own country, as I do not think you can arrive at a lasting or satisfactory peace till they have felt the power of our arms, and understand by actual demonstration upon themselves what a disciplined European Force can accomplish.

'I am glad the 23rd and Rifles have safely reached you. No doubt you are wise in sending them out to cruise in a healthy latitude till you require their services on shore. Your keeping the 42nd as your reserve is of course a point which it is for you to decide. I am glad you get on so well with Commodore Hewett; he has the highest reputation in the Navy. Your having present a small Naval Brigade is very right, and I quite approve of it. Certainly the Navy and Marines have hitherto had all the hard work, so they ought to share in the honour and glory of the expedition.

'I shall certainly not fail to support the recommendations you have made of the several officers of your Staff who have been with you from the first, and who have all done such hard and effective work for you. . . .

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
CAPE COAST CASTLE, 26 December 1873.

'... Unfortunately the short rifles¹ for the 23rd and 42nd have not yet arrived, and I am in despair, for without a sword bayonet it will be impossible for a soldier to get through the bush. The ordinary bayonet in the bush is only an encumbrance: I have taken them away from all the

¹ The Rifle Brigade at this time, and save at brief intervals, since its first formation in 1800, had carried 'short rifles' and sword bayonets; the rest of the Infantry were armed with longer weapons and bayonets.

native troops and purchased native knives for them instead. Every Ashantee soldier carries one of these knives, with which he is able to cut a path for himself as he goes through the bush; he could thus walk round the ordinary English soldier armed only with a bayonet. . . . I shall cross the Prah with the Naval Brigade and some native troops about 5 or 6 January for the purpose of making a bridge and a strong *tête de pont* to cover it. My scouts are now on the north side, but until I have some troops there also they cannot be trusted to go far inland.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'CAMP PRAHSU, 3 January 1874.

'I arrived here yesterday morning, having marched here by the stages I have fixed for the English Regiments. The Naval Brigade, 251 men, marched in here this morning, no man having fallen out during any of the marches between Cape Coast and this place. The men have been carefully selected volunteers from all the ships of the Fleet; I cannot expect that the three Regiments will all be as fortunate, for the sailors have had very fine weather all through; and as Your Royal Highness knows, heavy rain, that may come on here at any time, makes a great difference in the way that men march, especially over unmetalled roads. We have to-day 370 white men of all ranks in camp here, and only ten on the sick list, many of which cases are very slight, such as boils, a thorn in the leg, a blistered foot, and so on. In other words, we have less than 3 per cent. sick. I shall indeed be fortunate if I can keep the percentage of sick down to even 10 per cent. This is a lovely and well-situated camp. The tent I write in is on the bank of the river, and is 30 feet above the water. When my first detachment reached this place it was a tangled mass of brushwood; now there is a great clearance, having a well-situated and well-laid-out hut camp upon it, with regular streets and squares giving it the appearance of a prosperous native town. The whole place and for miles around is like an ants' nest, swarming with workmen building and collecting material. The Engineers under Major Home, assisted by the Sailors, are now working at our bridge, and I hope it will be passable for troops by the forenoon of the 5th inst. The river is 62½ yards wide at the point selected for the bridge; the current is swift, and the river is still unfordable, although falling daily. The bridge is being constructed upon piers of cribwork, after the mode so common in Canada, a few trestles being used on the northern bank. I expect the first detachment of the English Regiments to arrive here on the 8th and the last detachment on the 13th inst., and I hope to have everything fairly ready for my final advance into Ashantee terri-

tory on the 15th inst. My one great difficulty is transport, and I am very anxious on this subject, as the carriers sometimes, without any known reason whatever, desert by hundreds. My advance beyond the Prah can therefore only be at a slow pace. . . .

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘CAMP PRAHSU, 8 January 1874.

‘Nothing of great importance has taken place since my letter of the 2nd instant, beyond the still further desertion of carriers. Some whole tribes have run away, crippling the transport so seriously that I have had to order the 42nd and the Rifle Brigade to halt where they are on the road, and to re-embark the one wing of the 23rd that had landed. It is quite possible that I may be able to dispense with the services of the 23rd altogether, owing to the dispersion of the Ashantee Army to the men’s homes. All my former calculations were based upon the understanding with the Control Department that I should have at least twenty, and perhaps thirty days’ supplies here for all my force by the 15th instant, and as that is now impossible owing to the wholesale desertion of the carriers, my plans must be modified in consequence. This is very annoying, and naturally increases my anxiety considerably. . . . My bridge is finished, and the *tête de pont* will be completed to-morrow. The road to E-siaman where Russell’s Regiment is now stationed (about thirteen miles to the front) will soon be cut and practicable for guns. I am putting up a storehouse at that place, as it will be my first stage when I advance from here.

‘I had to call upon the 1st and 2nd W.I. Regiments and Wood’s Regiment to act as carriers for a short time; all have responded like good soldiers. The nights and early mornings are now so deliciously cold that one might imagine oneself in England, but I fear that our Native soldiers will suffer from the sudden change between the temperature at night and by day. I hear from the Volta that Captain Glover will be able to cross the Prah with a larger force than he had anticipated when he wrote to me announcing his having already begun his march, in accordance with the orders I had sent him. My scouting party, about eighty men under Lord Gifford, is now at Ansah, about nineteen miles from this, and will be to-morrow established on the Fumusu River, with scouts thrown forward to Acrowfumu. . . .’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘CAMP PRAHSU, 15 Jan. 1874.

‘I hope to-morrow to have my outposts on the Adansi Hills. If they are unopposed, as I believe will be the case, I shall send the whole of Russell’s Regiment to the crest

of the pass to fortify it, leaving Wood's Regiment and Rait's Artillery at Moinsey at the foot of hill on southern side, and 200 of 2nd W.I. Regiment in support at Acrowfumu. It is probable that I shall again hear from the King on the 21st or 22nd instant, and he may then perhaps send me back all the prisoners. If he does so, I shall be inclined to believe his sincerity in saying that he wants peace. Of course I shall not halt or concede in any way to his wishes until I have the heir-apparent and some other persons of distinction in my hands as hostages.'

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE,
PARK LANE, W., 22 *January* 1874.

'... I consider that the news received is most satisfactory, and I approve highly of all the arrangements you have made thus far. You are *most wise* in landing the 42nd as well as the two other European Regiments, and I quite agree to the propriety of your taking all three with you, and leaving the 1st W.I. Regiment on the coast and to guard your communications.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'THE KING OF ADANSI'S PALACE,
FOMMANAH, 25 *January* 1874.

'... If the King fights at all, I expect it will be about twelve miles on this side of Coomassie, where, according to our latest information, he has now about 5000 men of all sorts collected together. As I proceed I have to establish posts behind me, fortifying them and leaving in them small garrisons for their protection. This reduces my effective strength, but it cannot be helped. The Adansi range of hills, over which we passed yesterday in our march to this place, is a very formidable obstacle. I am very glad that I had not to force a passage over them, as for a long time I believed I should have had to do; the native path up them was exceedingly steep, and men at the top might have held the position with stones alone; we cut a zigzag road up to the crest, which is about 620 feet above the surrounding country. . . . I look forward to beginning to re-embark the English troops about the 20th of next month, for once I have sufficient stores on this side of the Adansi Hills, I shall push on quickly to Coomassie, and there end the war somehow or other.

'Colonel Colley has done wonders in the transport affair, and we have now a very fairly organised corps of carriers distributed throughout the line of communications. I cannot speak too highly of what he has done, and of the zeal and intelligence with which he has worked at this very uninteresting duty. Myself and Staff are in excellent health

and spirits, and together with all around us most confident of success. Every one works hard and with a will; the behaviour of the troops is admirable.'

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'6 February 1874.

'Your letters of January 3 and 9 have reached me, and yesterday your telegram came of the 24th giving us the satisfactory news that you are within thirty miles of Coomassie, and that the King was prepared to accept your terms, which certainly seem moderate enough. Of course the treaty would be signed at Coomassie by yourself, where you would have a certain proportion of white troops with you to show the King and native chiefs and people that the white men had been able to cross the Prah and to dictate terms in the heart of the Ashantee kingdom. I look upon the war at an end with this event, and I congratulate you on the success which has attended your exertions. The difficulties which you have had to contend with have been very great, and you have done wonders with those who have assisted you in the undertaking, and who have worked so hard and so well to support you. I confess your letters made me feel anxious on account of the difficulties you were expressing as to transport, and your telegram was therefore a great satisfaction. Perhaps the moral effect produced by one sharp action with the enemy might have been better than trying to make peace without any fight; but on the other hand the saving of life must be looked on as a great thing, and if the treaty is well managed, I hope the effect thereby produced may be permanent and beneficial. There is only one point in your information which I greatly regret, and that is the circumstance that the 42nd were landed before the 23rd, and that the result has been that the latter Regiment has been re-embarked and left on board ship. The jealousy amongst corps is naturally very great, and it is well it should be so, for that certainly maintains the fine and noble spirit in an Army. Consequently, when danger is to be met or glory gained, every Regiment thinks it right to have its chance. The 23rd was one of the first two Battalions by roster to go out, and did so go out. The 42nd followed some time after, as a reserve. The 23rd should therefore have preceded the 42nd in disembarking, and at any amount of inconvenience I should have re-embarked the 42nd and not the 23rd. I am afraid this circumstance has produced a strong feeling of annoyance and vexation in the 23rd, which I greatly regret and deplore. It may have been unavoidable, and I shall be glad to hear from you that it was so, but I cannot help mentioning to you that the matter has been much discussed and has not been at all understood. Orders will go out to you by the Mail to-day, I believe, to dispense with the European Regiments as early

as you can, and I am glad it has been settled that they are to come home. . . .

TELEGRAM FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY TO SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR WAR.

‘COOMASSIE, 5 February 1874.

‘Reached this place yesterday after five days’ hard fighting. Troops behaved admirably. Officers killed: Captain Buckle, R.E.; Captain Nicol, Hants Militia; Lieutenant Eyre, 19th Foot. All other casualties under 300. The King has left the town, but is close by, and says he will pay me a visit to-day to sign the treaty of peace. I hope to commence my march to the coast to-morrow. All wounded doing well. Health generally good. Dispatches follow by special fast steamer.

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘AGEMMAMU, 7 February 1874.

‘. . . We have had very hard fighting, the brunt of which was borne by the 42nd Highlanders. Most of the wounds are slight, and all are going on well: the first batch of the men (the Naval Brigade and the 23rd R.W. Fusiliers) will, I hope, re-embark on the 21st instant, and unless something unforeseen takes place, I trust that all may be again on board ship and *en route* for England about the 26th of this month. The troops have undergone great exposure during the last few days, but as yet none have suffered from it, and all are as cheery as possible. I hope that Your Royal Highness will be pleased with all I have done here, for I shall esteem myself most fortunate should I succeed in obtaining Your Royal Highness’s approbation.’

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘13 February 1874.

‘Just a line to congratulate you on everything going on so satisfactorily.

‘I hope by this time you have been for some days at Coomassie, and will ere long be on the march back to the coast for embarkation to England.

‘I cannot tell you how delighted I am to find that you have at all events landed the Headquarters and 100 men of the 23rd Fusiliers, to take up with you. I know the Regiment is much hurt and distressed, being, moreover, the senior Regiment, and having been the first to embark and arrive on the Coast, at not having been ordered to land before the 42nd.

‘How did this happen? It was a great pity, and I deplore it sincerely.

‘The two West India Regiments seem to have behaved admirably throughout, and their conduct in so cheerfully

responding to your call to become carriers is beyond all praise. Pray let these Regiments know that I fully appreciate their services on the part of the Government, and let me know if you think any special recognition could be made to them for the hard work they have so cheerfully performed. . . .’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘CAMP FOMMANAH, 13 February 1874.

‘When halting for the day at Detchiasu, messengers from the King of Ashantee reached me, saying that the King wished for peace, and expressing his regret at having fought with white men. . . . I think I may say that my mission here is now at an end, and I trust that the results obtained may be considered satisfactory by Your Royal Highness. I have been surrounded by a body of officers who have worked like gentlemen of the best stamp, and who were never above doing anything required of them, no matter how disagreeable may have been the duty to be done. I know of nothing more repugnant to the feelings of a soldier than having to remain in the rear in charge of transport, yet I have had a large number of officers so employed, amongst whom were men whose abilities were really thrown away upon such work; but I had nothing else to give them to do, and my transport required the utmost care and nursing. I am convinced that a civil transport corps under civilians, as ours is in England, will never work in war. We should have had a serious breakdown here had I not taken my transport away from the Control and given it over to Combatant officers. I shall reserve all my views on this subject until I shall have the honour of waiting upon Your Royal Highness at home. I have gained a great deal of most valuable experience in this war, the least part of which is not that regarding the working of our present system of administration. I have taken part in most of the wars that we have had for the last twenty-two years, but upon no previous occasion has any operation caused me the anxiety of mind that I have experienced here. In none have I met with a braver enemy, and the difficulties of fighting in this forest country, where there are no openings at all free from bush, exceed anything I had anticipated. I hope to leave Cape Coast for England in the first week of March with all my Staff, and to be at home about the 23rd or 25th of that month. . . .’

TELEGRAM FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY TO SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR WAR.

‘16 February 1874.

‘King Coffee having sent 1000 ounces of gold as first instalment of indemnity, with a request for peace, I received his envoy at Fommanah on the 13th inst., and sent draft treaty to Coomassie for signature.

'King of Adansi intends to leave Ashantee and live with Wassaws and Dankeras in alliance with Her Majesty.

'An officer left Captain Glover eighteen miles east of Coomassie on 10th inst., and passed through Coomassie to Fommanah unmolested, with escort of only twenty men. Captain Glover will retire immediately to Accra.

'All my white troops are on their way to Cape Coast. The last detachment will embark 22nd inst. Sick and wounded are doing well.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'CAPE COAST, 27 *February* 1874.

'... The prize property brought away from Coomassie has been sold here by public auction at very high prices, with the exception of some very heavy gold ornaments that will be taken home by the prize agents for sale in England. The total amount of the prize money, when everything has been sold, will not exceed about £4000, so I am afraid the soldiers will not get much unless the Government would generously add to it the 1040 ounces of gold paid by the King of Ashantee as the first instalment of the indemnity he has promised to pay. Its value to the English nation is very small, but if thrown into the prize fund it would just make each private's share worth their having. I have not made this proposal officially, as I should not feel justified in doing so, and I trust that Your Royal Highness will kindly pardon my having mentioned it here.'

With a sense of modesty somewhat unusual amongst rising public men, Sir Garnet Wolseley appears to have been reluctant to accept all the honours which it was very properly proposed to confer upon him in recognition of the brilliant manner in which he had conducted the campaign.

TO MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 26 *March* 1874.

'... I am satisfied that, whatever Sir Garnet Wolseley's personal feelings may be, the public would never be satisfied if he was not to receive some marked distinction, and whether he likes it or not, he must accept the Baronetcy with the pension of £1000 a year attached to it. His declining the G.C.B. is quite right, and does him every possible credit.'

CHAPTER XXIV

THE EASTERN QUESTION—1874-80

Mr. Gladstone dissolves Parliament. Mr. Gathorne Hardy new War Secretary. Revolt in Turkey. Dangerous state of tension in Europe. Lack of Recruits. Need for a settled Imperial Policy and Two Army Corps for Service abroad. Memo. on subject. Bulgarian Atrocities. Memo. on unpreparedness at Home. Eastern Difficulties increase. H.R.H. on Estimates, 1877-78. H.R.H. advocates Defence Committee as now formed. Russia declares War against Turkey. Occupation of Cyprus: Sir Garnet Wolseley commands. Colonel Stanley and Mr. Smith proceed to Cyprus. The Berlin Congress. Selection of a Commander-in-Chief for India. The Control Department. Sir Richard Airey retires, and is raised to Peerage. Colonel Stanley becomes War Secretary. His Letters to H.R.H.

IN 1874 Mr. Gladstone suddenly dissolved Parliament, with the result that the Conservative Party was returned to power with a substantial majority. Pressure of circumstances, emphasised perhaps by Mr. Disraeli's own inclinations, caused the Conservative Government to devote attention mainly to foreign affairs. Thus, in the matter of actual legislation, little was done during their tenure of office. Consequently the Army was permitted, so far as changes in organisation and administration were concerned, to enjoy a period of rest which was much needed after the great changes introduced by the preceding administration.

Mr. Gathorne Hardy, whose appointment dated from 21 February 1874, was the new Secretary of State for War; and Lord Pembroke, who was, however, shortly afterwards replaced by Lord Cadogan, was the new Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State; whilst Colonel Stanley, who afterwards became Lord Stanley of Preston, and eventually Lord Derby, was the new Financial Secretary.

The following letters from Mr. Gathorne Hardy and Colonel Stanley will shed some light on the relations which

then subsisted between the Duke and the new War Secretary, the manner in which they conducted their business, and the views which the latter generally held:—

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

‘WAR OFFICE, 27 April 1874.

‘I trust that Y.R.H.’s uniform kindness to me during many years will prove a sufficient excuse for my adoption of the somewhat unusual course which I am at this moment presuming to take.

‘When Mr. Hardy, on his accession to office, first appointed me as Financial Secretary of this office, it became my duty at an early date to examine the probable financial effect of those measures of H.M.’s late Government which were still imperfect in their details, with regard not only to the present but also to their future cost and working.

‘On doing so, I found on the one hand ample reason to question whether the economy of some of these measures would be as great as had been supposed, whilst on the other I could not avoid the suspicion that Y.R.H. could hardly be satisfied with some of the changes which financial considerations would have rendered necessary.

‘Under these circumstances, which I reported verbally to Mr. Hardy, I have, with his approval, placed in the form of a memo. (which shortness of time renders incomplete) the points on which I conceived a revision was still advisable, and I have received Mr. Hardy’s sanction to place myself in communication with Y.R.H.’s immediate Staff, or (in case of necessity) with Y.R.H. in person, in order that I might be enabled to work by the light in which Y.R.H. had considered Mr. Cardwell’s scheme.

‘If I may for a moment speak of myself, my one and only object in becoming Financial Secretary here was with the hope that I might be enabled to prove of use, and that while responsible to Mr. Hardy in matters of policy, and while, through him, equally responsible to the House of Commons for the due maintenance of economy, I might be the means of at least endeavouring to carry out Y.R.H.’s views in the manner most satisfactory to Yourself with regard to the mode in which the money voted by Parliament should be expended within the definite limit imposed by the House of Commons upon the War Office.

‘May I presume to add that, joined to my genuine belief that Y.R.H. (and Sir Richard Airey’s) knowledge of the wants and condition of the service is greater than that of any other person alive, I have in Y.R.H.’s kindness to me from boyhood a very powerful motive for wishing to do all that may be most agreeable to Y.R.H. whilst consistent with my own special duties?

'I have therefore the honour to submit the enclosed memo. (under cover to Sir R. Airey) before I send it to Mr. Hardy. I have acquainted him with my intention, and have received his assent to my having taken this course. If there should be anything in the memo. to which Your Royal Highness objects, I hope thus to be enabled to alter the paper before submitting it to the Secretary of State for his consideration.'

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'HEMSTED PARK, 1 Sept. 1874.

'From all that I have heard of Sir A. Horsford, he would seem to be eminently qualified for the post of Military Secretary, and I should think such an appointment will be viewed with general satisfaction.

'I am very glad to hear that Y.R.H. has derived benefit from the waters at Homburg, and is looking forward to work without apprehension of any return of the painful enemy. I presume that Sir A. Horsford will soon be returning, and I am happy to say that from what I am told there is no fear about his pay. . . . I am very sorry to hear that Sir R. Airey will be lost to the War Office. He has done good service there. I am about to try my luck with the partridges, but there is so little covert that, though they are numerous, I do not expect much sport.'

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'HEMSTED PARK,
STAPLEHURST, 16 September 1874.

'I have heard with great regret that Y.R.H. has not been so well, and I send a line to say that from all I hear there is no urgent business at the War Office at present to call Y.R.H. home before your health is quite restored. It would be most unfortunate to commence work while any need for rest remains, and anything that I can do will be most readily done to prevent the necessity for it. I write in haste as it is nearly post-time, and I have only just had the intelligence and learnt where to address a letter.'

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'HEMSTED PARK,
STAPLEHURST, 27 December 1874.

'I have not quite settled upon what day I shall return to town to remain, but of course I am at Y.R.H.'s disposal any day. Just at the beginning of the year there is a good deal of private business to be done before leaving the country. Mr. Stanley will be back soon, but I have not heard on what day. The Paymaster question has not yet come before me,

and remains with him at present. Lord E. Cecil has not told me when he returns to London. It is quite clear that there will be no little discussion on Army matters in Parliament, but I do not observe much unity of sentiment in those who condemn everything which at present exists and assume the worst of all that is in prospect. I am anxious to proceed with caution and take no step without feeling sure that it will not have to be reversed. A sudden increase of expenditure would, I fear, lead to reaction, and would be a formidable weapon in the hands of opponents.'

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'17 GROSVENOR CRESCENT,
21 February 1875.

'I hope to be at the War Office at twelve to-morrow, and hope that time may suit Y.R.H. It is not my intention to bring up the question of linked Regiments, and if it should arise, I shall certainly not accept the view of my predecessor without more consideration.

'With regard to Reserves, I am hoping for the Report of the Committee now sitting before any change.'

The Recruiting problem was as much to the fore in 1874 as it is to-day; and in the course of the following letters the Duke lays down very clearly that larger Estimates are the only alternative to Conscription:—

TO MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE,
30 November 1874.

'... I feel more than ever anxious about our Recruiting. It is quite true that we are in excess of men at the present time; but that is not the point. It is the description of men of which our Battalions are formed that gives me such uneasiness. The fact is, our Home Battalions are gradually becoming mere boys, and I do not see whence the Reserves are to come from to fill up the ranks of these very reduced Cadres. It is a large and very awkward question, and I am satisfied it will require much graver deliberation than can be given to it by General Taylor's Committee. Of course, that Committee will prepare all necessary details, but I think a strong Committee of the Cabinet will have to look into this most serious question, and we shall have to be prepared for a very violent attack. . . .'

TO MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'WIMPOLE HALL,
ROYSTON, 29 December 1874.

'... I think it well to say a few words in reply to your

letter, as I think you misunderstood to some extent the purports of my speech. I did not expect increased Estimates now, but I felt persuaded that the subject of Recruiting and the Reserves would be much discussed in and out of Parliament this coming year and session, and I wanted the public clearly to understand the issue upon which they would have to decide, either *ultimately* increased Estimates or Conscription. If I am right in this, what I said will prove of advantage to the Government which has to propose any alteration or modification of the present system, and therefore I think the remarks were properly timed and not injudicious. It was in fact paving the way for what might ultimately and upon full discussion become an absolute necessity. Do not alarm yourself in supposing that I expected you to bring forward any increased Estimates on this account now. I think with you that it would be injudicious to do so; but I am satisfied in my own mind that the time is not far distant when it will *have to be done*, unless you take the Conscription, what I hold to be impossible, excepting perhaps to some extent in the shape of a ballot for the Militia. . . .

After the Ashantee War there was a lull for some time in actual warlike operations, though for a few years prior to 1876 a storm had been brewing in Europe. In July 1875 an insurrection broke out in Herzegovina, in which Bosnia also joined, and so European attention was once more concentrated upon the affairs of the Turkish Empire.

So threatening did appearances seem at this epoch, that the Duke thought it desirable, 'at the period when the Estimates of the year come under review,' to recapitulate generally our military position. Accordingly, on 13 December 1875 he addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of State, in which, after taking a general survey of the situation in Europe and Asia, he called attention to certain noticeable defects in our military organisation and to our supreme unpreparedness for a state of war.

The Army, though good as far as it went, was obviously deficient in point of numbers; and the Reserves provided under the Acts of 1867¹ and 1870² only amounted to 8000 Army and 30,000 Militia Reservists. Whilst fully recognising the necessity of giving the military schemes of the late

¹ Reserve Forces Act, 1867, 30 and 31 Vict. c. 110; and Militia Reserve Act, 1867, 30 and 31 Vict. c. 111.

² Army Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 and 34 Vict. c. 67.

Government every chance of a fair trial, the Duke was compelled to admit that, so far, they had left us in a most unprepared condition for war. At the same time he regretted that, when the Short Service system was introduced, care had not been taken so to increase the then establishments of the Army as to pass through the ranks an adequate number of men for the creation of a Reserve. It was easy enough on paper to bring into being a Reserve; but it was clear that, if establishments were at the same time reduced to their lowest ebb, a sufficient complement of men could not possibly be forthcoming. It was of course, at that time of day, useless to deplore what had been done, or rather left undone. But it was advisable to take stock of the military material available, and consider for what purposes an army was required. This statement may at first sight seem an obvious platitude which it was needless to drive home; but until Mr. Balfour's speech in the House of Commons on 11 May 1905 attempted to throw some light on the matter, we were not within measurable distance of obtaining a clear answer to this complicated question.

It is interesting to note that the Duke lays down in 1875 the necessity of our possessing a force of two complete Army Corps to send to India or elsewhere, a principle which was not officially recognised until Mr. Stanhope's celebrated memorandum laid it down thirteen years later, in 1888. Credit for this tardy realisation of H.R.H.'s ideals has generally been given to Sir Henry Brackenbury, the then head of the Intelligence Branch,¹ and to Lord Wolseley, the then Adjutant-General. But here we have incontestable proof that the Duke advocated the same plan in 1875, and with what success is shown by the fact that, when in 1888 we first took stock seriously of our military resources, it was found that we could not have put into the field even one Army Corps, properly equipped as regards transport, medical, and other departmental services. Moreover, it is to be noted that this memorandum is not dated from the War Office, but from Sandringham. Had it been from the War Office, it might have been said that it was partly the work of some

¹ Director of Military Intelligence, 1886-91.

far-seeing member of the Duke's Staff. But as at the time H.R.H. was staying at Sandringham, and as the memorandum is entirely in his own handwriting, it seems clear that the ideas therein expressed are his own. There is a story in the Mobilisation Branch of the War Office, which is told even to-day, to the effect that, when in 1886 the branch was first created, the Duke remarked that it would be sufficient to leave all such matters as Mobilisation arrangements till the approach of war had rendered them necessary. H.R.H. may have let fall such a remark; but in view of the memorandum which is printed below, and of the others which, during the continuance of the Eastern crisis, follow each other with almost monotonous regularity on this particular point of the necessity of possessing a force fully prepared in all respects for war, it is difficult to reconcile this reputed utterance of the Duke's with the proposals which he lost no opportunity of urging.

But assuming that he did say so, it is but reasonable to imagine that he meant that, in view of the uninterrupted struggle in which he had been engaged ever since he first came to the Horse Guards in 1852 for the very existence of our Army as a fighting force, and also of the ever-recurring reductions followed by spasmodic increases, when a war scare intervened, which form such a wearisome feature in this book, it was unnecessary to devote time to theoretical schemes dealing with the Mobilisation of forces which, upon an emergency arising, might be not available, and possibly even non-existent.

The story of the original muddling in defence work of the Mobilisation Branch will possibly never be fully known to the public. But the futile efforts of a succession of estimable officers engaged in deadly earnest in evolving mobilisation tables and schemes based on a succession of improbable theories has caused no small amusement to military cynics. At one time the invader was to be met on the shore, as was Julius Cæsar; while at another period all the brains of the Army were engrossed in a subterranean defence of the Surrey Hills, leaving it to the invader to complete his disembarkation undisturbed.

Perhaps, then, in the nebulous state of affairs as regards principles at that time existing, the Duke may have been doubtful, and with some reason, as to the value of this particular branch.

It is unquestionable that subsequently the Mobilisation Branch proved of inestimable value; and the South African mobilisation arrangements worked absolutely without a hitch. Indeed it was the only branch of the War Office which earned the unstinted praise of the War Commission. At that period Mobilisation was under the direct supervision of the Commander-in-Chief. Perhaps the Mobilisation Branch performed some work which, strictly speaking, belonged to the Adjutant-General's department. But whether this be so or not, its admirable arrangements reflected the highest credit on Lord Wolseley and all concerned, and proved to be the most completely successful incident of that great soldier's tenure of the Commandership-in-Chief.

MEMO. FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'SANDRINGHAM,
KING'S LYNN, 13 *December* 1875.

'In the present aspect of European affairs, not to say of the world in general, and at a period when the Estimates of the year come under review, it becomes a duty I owe to myself as Military Head of the Army to bring to the notice of the Government, through the Secretary of State for War, my views as to our present military condition, and as to any changes which it may seem advisable or necessary to adopt in the present organisation of our Land Forces. We have been startled of late by the state of affairs in Turkey, with which Europe's diplomacy is now much and anxiously engaged; in Central Asia the Russians are making rapid and unceasing advances and progress; China has given us cause for the greatest anxiety; Burmah has been no less a source of grave apprehension, all the more serious from its close proximity and probable alliance with China; the Malays in the Straits Settlements are in actual revolt. These are all questions which seriously, and may gravely, compromise the British Empire. Added to this, all Continental Powers are either armed to the teeth or are increasing and raising their armaments to an extent which is extremely alarming, and which must attract the notice and anxieties of any Power which has a right to expect to be largely consulted in the great interests of the world.

'Under these circumstances how are we situated, and



*The Duke's Room at the War Office
1871 - 1895*

how prepared militarily to meet any sudden emergency? What we have of our Army is good, thoroughly good, according to my impressions, but we are lamentably deficient in point of numbers; and what is worse, our means of increase, in the shape of a Reserve, is in a most unsatisfactory, not to say deplorable, condition.

‘It may be considered premature to give any decided opinion upon the new order of things connected with the Short Service enlistment, introduced within a recent period, and it is only right that the new organisation, having been brought forward by the late Government and accepted by Parliament and the country, should have a fair and honest trial, such as the present Secretary of State and Government seem disposed to give it; but certainly, as far as it has gone at present, it can only be looked upon as working anything but favourably to our military interests, inasmuch as it has left us, for a time at all events, in a most unprepared state. Not that our recruiting has failed, for in this respect we have done really better than I at all anticipated, with the exception of that for special corps, such as the Guards and Royal Artillery, for which a peculiarly powerful description of man has to be obtained, who, in the present condition of the labour market, finds such good and easy employment at the highest wages that he is indisposed to enlist for Her Majesty’s Service, but inasmuch as our Reserves, upon which we must mainly rely in the hour of need for a speedy and certain development of strength, are almost non-existent, or are at all events in such a condition that no degree of reliance can be placed upon their certain and ready appearance when wanted.

‘These Reserves (enrolled under the Acts of 1870 and 1867) consist at present only of about 8000 men formed and established during General Peel’s tenure of office at the War Department, and of about 30,000 men of the Militia Reserve also instituted by General Peel. It is much to be deplored, and was certainly in my opinion a very great misfortune, that at the time the Short Service system was introduced care was not taken to increase the then establishments of the Army. Had this been done, a Reserve such as is intended to be formed under that organisation now accepted would have been more rapidly produced. As it was, the Cadres of Regiments were reduced to the lowest establishments practicable for their maintenance, and the Reserves will only have their commencement next year, and even then they will take years before they can attain the numbers described by Lord Cardwell to be necessary for efficient and reliable military strength.

‘It is, however, useless to lament over what has not been done. What is required is to ascertain what should be done under the actual circumstances in which we find ourselves placed. To do this we must first make up our minds as to

what we require, and what really should be considered as the foundation of our military power. In doing so we must not for a moment attempt to compare our numbers with those of Continental nations. Our insular position gives us a great advantage in this respect, and as a great Maritime Power our Navy must always constitute our first line of defence or even of offence, if such a word is at all applicable to our general position, which it would not be excepting under very exceptional circumstances. Her Majesty's Government can alone decide so weighty a problem; but to me it appears that we should at all times be able rapidly to strengthen our Army in India and the Military Stations in our Colonies, and we should, if need be, have the means of holding one or two *Corps d'Armées* of about 36,000 men each of all arms, disposable either in support of our Fleet or to carry out such treaty engagements as we may have entered upon from time to time. Though not a military Power as compared with Continental nations, 50,000 to 60,000 British troops in any part of the world could, in conjunction with our Fleet, play a great part in the material and political interests of our allies, and would be greatly valued by such as needed our help, whilst they would largely contribute towards our moral weight and influence in our intercourse with other nations.

'If such be a legitimate view of our requirements, how do we stand as regards to them at the present moment? For the reasons stated already, we could not be in a worse condition, for though our Cadres are good we have no present mode of filling them up rapidly. It has been demonstrated by the difficulties we have experienced in making up the Battalions of Infantry for ordinary reliefs in our Indian and Colonial possessions that we cannot do this, as at present constituted, without largely volunteering for other corps—a most objectionable practice, most distasteful to the whole Army, and most undesirable, not to say wasteful, in a general point of view.

'But I may be fairly asked, How has this difficulty arisen? Simply from the fact that our Cadre establishments are kept too low, and that, though we recruit fairly well, still ordinary recruiting and the necessity for putting aside so many men in corps to proceed on ordinary India or Colonial service, obliges us to make up the increased establishments of Battalions thus proceeding by the only means we can have recourse to, however objectionable it may be, namely that of Volunteering.

'I may be told that, if such be our ordinary difficulties, how do I ever expect to attain the object I have proposed as regards the power of this country to place a sufficient body of troops, on an emergency, for service in the field? My reply is, that the same arrangements that would facilitate our supplying our ordinary Indian and Colonial Reliefs would at the same time give us at all times disposable a Corps such as I have

described as essential for special services in the field. To accomplish this it will be necessary to maintain the first twenty-one Battalions of Infantry, which would form one *Corps d'Armée*, at all times at an increased establishment of 850 rank and file. As six to eight Battalions are required annually for ordinary reliefs, this strength would at all times enable Battalions to proceed abroad without difficulty at the proper establishments, thus avoiding the volunteering difficulty so much complained of. Moreover, the present Reserve men of *General Peel's class* would bring up the Battalions to a war footing of 1000 rank and file for extraordinary purposes. To arrive at this we require an augmentation of about 5000 men, which is my first and principal recommendation.

'My next is as regards our powers of dealing with the Reserves we have, as well those referred to above as also the Militia Reserve. Some enactment should be introduced to enable us to call a certain limited proportion of these out annually for three to four weeks' actual drill with Battalions of the Line. The difficulties of accomplishing this end are great, but I think they ought not on that account to be assumed to be insuperable, and means should be devised for meeting them. As regards the Militia Reserve, could not a certain number of Militia Regiments when out for drill be stationed where the Line Battalion of their Brigade happens to be quartered, and could not the Reserve men of such Militia Regiment, whilst in garrison with its own corps, be directed to be drilled with and placed in the ranks of the Line Battalion, retaining their Militia clothing and necessities? This would at all events enable us to see how far these men would be available for our purposes if a necessity arose for their taking their places as Reserve men for the Line. It will be observed that my only recommendations for the present refer to an augmentation of our Infantry and a better control over our Reserves. We are fairly off for Field and Garrison Artillery, the latter to be largely supplemented by very fair Militia Artillery, which we fortunately possess should the emergency arise. Our Cavalry is extremely good as far as it goes, though I certainly should like to see Regiments rather stronger, at all events in men, than they are at present. Our Engineers too are up to present requirements, though a few more Companies could be usefully employed. Something, however, must be done to get the class of men we require for the Guards and the gunners of the Artillery, and in this respect I think an increased penny a day will become necessary, certainly for the men of the Guards, I fear also for the Artillery; but about the Guards I can have no doubt, as they have lost by recent arrangements the extra penny they had in comparison with the Infantry of the Line, and I think the extra penny is *essential* for the increased expense they are put to on London duty.

It may in time become necessary to modify the terms of enlistment and to revert again to somewhat longer service, with more connection with the Militia; but the country is not yet ripe for so large a change, and I should be satisfied to see the proposals tested which I have ventured to suggest. Beyond the power of calling out and testing the existing Reserves more fully than at present I have not put forward any organic change, and the increase in the number of men is simply a question of finance, which I think present contingencies would amply justify. I think it better not to attempt on the present occasion to enter more fully into details, and I confidently leave the question in the hands of the Secretary of State, who I am satisfied will appreciate the importance of the great issues at stake.'

As regards affairs in the East, matters were precipitated to a crisis by the murder of the French and German Consuls at Salonika on 6 May 1876, whilst on 30 May the Sultan Abdul Aziz was dethroned and assassinated a few days afterwards.

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'HEMPSTED PARK,
STAPLEHURST, 6 June 1876.

'I have read with much interest General Haines's letter on the grave subject of Russian progress in Eastern Asia. Although I do not anticipate so immediate a pressure as he does, there are abundant reasons for cautious preparation. The news from Turkey did not at all surprise me. In such countries a living pretender to the throne cannot remain near the occupant. Suspicion will always exist in such a case against those who have the interest in his death. The events there have at least given some breathing-time, and compel Russia to reconsider her position. At present she is weak in the Mediterranean, and a *coup de main* by her is out of the question. The subject of victualling Malta has not been lost sight of. Mr. Haliburton had some consultation with the Admiralty before I left town, and is, I believe, maturing a plan for doing it with great rapidity, if needful. Sufficient grain could, I believe, be thrown in within ten days, and meat at no long interval afterwards. The sky is certainly dark in the East, but I have much faith in firmness and determination. There is no real union among those who wear its appearance.'

In the meantime Bulgaria had also rebelled against the rule of Turkey, and many atrocities were committed in the

name of Christianity. The Porte suppressed this revolt with ruthless severity, and in consequence alienated the sympathies of Europe. In this country a formidable outcry was raised against Turkey on the 'Bulgarian atrocities.' But the advocates of this movement forgot, or found it convenient to forget, that it was the so-called Christians who had set the ball rolling, and who, in the first instance, had afforded examples of ferocity, which the Turks were not backward in meeting by similar measures.

Servia and Montenegro soon afterwards, in June 1876, joined in the fray, and the Turco-Servian War was the outcome. It is now a matter of common knowledge that Servia was secretly supported by Russia. But in spite of this, Turkey was entirely successful in suppressing the revolt. At this critical state of affairs, the Duke, on 24 October 1876, addressed another memorandum to the Secretary of State. All the other European nations except ourselves were preparing for possible war. We alone remained quiescent. During the ensuing winter, H.R.H. urged the advisability of setting our house in order. He explained that the existing Reserve would soon be exhausted, and that the only force on which we could then fall back would be the Reserve created by the Militia Reserve Act of 1867.¹

But these men, if called upon suddenly, would be insufficiently trained, and he therefore urged the necessity of calling them out at the Depôts for a period of training; as, if properly drilled, they would form a very valuable reserve to the Regular Army. He also lays his finger on the weak spot of the Militia Reserve system as it then existed, and points out that, if embodied, Militia Battalions would be ineffective units. This only too faithfully anticipated the situation apparent in 1899-1902, when Militia Regiments, after having contributed their Reservists to the Line, were embodied, and in many cases sent abroad or to South Africa in an attenuated condition.

He also adverted to the necessity of purchasing a certain number of supernumerary horses for Cavalry Regiments, and also for the Artillery; and he impressed upon the Sec-

¹ 30 and 31 Vict. c. 111.

retary of State the urgency of buying stores and clothing to meet the requirements of an increased establishment.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SERVICE IN THE PRESENT CONDITION OF EUROPE.

' 24 October 1876.

'When Europe is in the state of political excitement which has been brought about by the present aspect of affairs in the East, it is right and proper that every country should look specially to its own condition as respects military preparedness, or rather, perhaps, unpreparedness, whatever part it may be called upon or desire to take in the course of events as they may arise.

'Turkey is at the present moment in arms against its revolted provinces; Russia is most decidedly arming; Austria is no doubt organising forces to meet any emergency; Germany is so admirably organised that at any moment she can stand prepared with her armed forces ready for battle; France is using every effort to recover her military position; Italy is, probably next to Germany, as fully prepared as she can be, with the financial difficulties she has to contend with; England alone has thus far done nothing, and is certainly in a complete position of quiescence. Should this state of things continue, or should we take advantage now of the probable lull during the coming winter months to put our house in order? My opinion is strongly in favour of this latter course, though no doubt it should be carried out with perfect quiet and without the least ostentation.

'I have thought it right to look about me during the last few weeks and see what this country could do militarily in the event of any very sudden emergency; and I herewith submit for your consideration a detail by which, in about three weeks, between 20,000 and 25,000 men of all arms could be made up by our present number of Army Reserve men, and sent to any part of the world that may be required. In a couple of months no doubt 10,000 more men could be prepared, and possibly a further 10,000 within a reasonable additional period, by drawing considerably on the most advanced Militia Reserve men. This may be considered to represent a fairly respectable force, but it would trench very largely on our small number of Reserves; and it is therefore essential to consider what had best be further done without causing unnecessary anxiety in the public mind, or having recourse to any very large expenditure.

'It would certainly be a very great advantage if it were possible to call out at their several *Depôt Brigades* and drill thoroughly the Militia Reserve men of all counties. Of these

there are in round numbers 30,000, and these constitute our main reserves. If these men were really effectually drilled and fit to take their place in the ranks of the Line, they would form a very valuable and reliable body of men. When drilled, they might return to their civil occupations till actively required.

'Militia Regiments should be called upon to recruit up as far as possible to fill up the vacancies in their ranks caused by these Militia Reserve men being drafted into the Line, otherwise the Militia force would be found to be very much below its establishment should Militia Regiments have to be embodied.

'It would also be extremely desirable to purchase a certain number of supernumerary horses for Cavalry Regiments, so as to complete the Squadrons up to, at all events, 100 efficient horses per Squadron. The Artillery should also have additional horses purchased to complete a proportion of Batteries to their full establishments, and to form Ammunition Columns. The first Infantry Regiments for service should have horses for their Regimental Transport, a few wagons being issued to them from store to train horses and men. The Army Service Corps ought also to have horses in addition to those at present in their charge.

'The stores and supplies, including clothing for Regiments first for service, should be prepared for the increased establishment contemplated, packed and set apart ready for issue. Supplies of clothing should also be prepared for a general increase of establishment to all Corps.

'At present I think these points would meet the absolute requirements of our position; but should matters continue to look as serious as they have done of late, it will become necessary to consider whether, after filling up all Corps to their present establishment, recruiting should not be generally extended throughout the Service, at all events in Regiments next for service, so as to make up the Regiments first for service in the Infantry to 1000 rank and file, those to follow to 700 or 800, and to complete Squadrons of Cavalry and Batteries of Artillery as they stand first for service, to their complete war strength.

'Should these general principles be accepted as sound and prudent without being deemed extravagant, I should be prepared to enter into fuller details for carrying out the various points touched upon; and meanwhile I will not add to the length of my observations, which I have confined to laying before you, for the information of the Government, general principles which appear to me called for by the circumstances in which Europe is unfortunately placed at the present critical juncture.'

Two days later the Duke received the following reply from the Secretary of State:—

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

‘ERIDGE CASTLE,
TUNBRIDGE WELLS, 26 October 1876.

‘I have read with interest Y.R.H.’s report on the so-called mobilisation, and agree that probably some modifications will be advisable. Each Corps should be a more complete representative of what it is meant to be when made up. Supposing such an expedition to Turkey as you have discussed meant only to hold fortified positions, would there be such need for horses? This is a military question. At present no force, to take the field in the ordinary way, is contemplated. It seems, too, pretty clear that no great movements are likely just at present, and probably not during the winter. It will, however, no doubt be necessary to go into all our requirements for any emergency, and I shall be glad to have the full details, in addition to the memorandum already in my hands.’

How dangerous the state of affairs had now become is shown by the following letters:—

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

‘HEMPSTED PARK,
STAPLEHURST, 15 November 1876.

‘I return with thanks the interesting letters of General Walker and Colonel Wellesley. Certainly affairs wear a serious aspect, but as I receive no intimation from the F.O. or the Prime Minister, I can hardly take any open steps which may be considered of a warlike character. All that may be needed should be clearly defined, so that we may be ready for action should necessity arise. I still hope, however, that war may be averted.’

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

‘WAR OFFICE, 23 November 1876.

‘We have a Cabinet at 3 P.M. to-morrow, and if there be none on Saturday, I propose to go to the country on Friday night. I return with many thanks the letters of General Walker and Colonel Conolly, both of value in their way.

‘Our land force is no doubt despised, but it is the dissension which has arisen in foreign affairs which gives the strongest impression of our weakness. I cannot see that Lord Beaconsfield’s speech was warlike in tone. It spoke of nothing but necessity justifying war; but if that came, that England had resources for more than a campaign. It is clear to me that an English force should not be hastily employed, and if we are driven to send one, that we must

seek from Parliament such a development of our force as to secure an adequate representation of our power, with Reserves of all sorts in abundance.'

Four days after Mr. Gathorne Hardy's last letter was written, the Duke presented his annual memorandum on the forthcoming Army Estimates (1877-78). He states that it was fortunate that his suggestions of 1875 had in part been adopted, and that Reservists had been called out. He also calls attention to the question of a Militia Reserve, and very rightly points out that recruits should be supernumerary to the establishment of their Militia units.

He likewise alludes to the necessity of increasing the Artillery to meet the requirements of the eight Army Corps scheme. Nowadays it is not generally realised that Mr. Brodrick's much-abused Army Corps scheme was by no means a novelty. In January 1876, and for six subsequent years, an eight Army Corps organisation figured in our army lists. These Army Corps were distributed as follows: the 1st at Colchester, the 2nd at Aldershot, the 3rd at Croydon, the 4th at Dublin, the 5th at Salisbury, the 6th at Chester, the 7th at York, and the 8th at Edinburgh. This scheme, however, was merely a framework; and nothing approaching the number of troops required was available then, or at any subsequent time. It was, indeed, little else than a game of 'bluff,' in order to make others suppose that our organisation and resources were far more advanced than was really the case. The scheme, nevertheless, survived the first two years of the Liberal Government which came into power in 1880, and then it dropped out.

When, however, in 1901 the scheme was revived in a modified and more modern form by Mr. Brodrick's six Army Corps scheme, the idea—mainly because Members of Parliament and others were terrified by the mere name 'Army Corps,' which suggested sinister ideas of conscription and militarism after the Continental pattern—was assailed with violent abuse, though in reality it aimed at nothing more than organising in a more rational and workmanlike manner our previous somewhat haphazard military arrangements, by clearly defining the rôles which all our forces

would have to play in warfare, and by assimilating, more nearly, peace and war conditions.

It will be within the recollection of readers of this book how, after the Crimea, the Duke's proposal to organise our troops on Home Service into Divisions, and to number these off as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, was refused by the then Secretary of State (Lord Panmure), who considered 'it would give a handle for the ignorant to pull at,' and that it was imperative 'to keep John Bull in a good humour.' In consequence the Home Service Divisions were not numbered, but given territorial descriptions such as 'Southern,' etc.

Possibly had Mr. Brodrick followed Lord Panmure's lead, and, in place of numbering his Army Corps, given them names, such as 'Aldershot,' 'Salisbury,' it would to some extent likewise have kept John Bull in a good humour !

In any case, whether the last Army Corps scheme was beneficial or mischievous, one point at least met with the complete approval of the Esher Committee and others: the maintenance of a striking force, ready at all times with its transport and departmental services to take the field; and this plan was also strongly advocated by the Duke long before it had been advanced by any other military reformer.

MEMO. FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'27 November 1876.

'A Memorandum was drawn up by me on 13 December of last year on the requirements of the Military Service, preparatory to the Estimates of 1876. The time has now arrived when a similar duty is imposed upon me. I expressed an opinion then that the circumstances of the world at that period were serious and required grave attention, and though some of the troubles then apparently arising, such as complaints in China and in the Straits Settlements and in Burmah, seem to have blown over, it will be admitted that in Europe affairs are more than critical, and that a war on a large scale is trembling in the balance. Under these serious circumstances, it becomes more than ever difficult to say what our requirements for the ensuing Estimates may be, and I approach the subject with the greatest anxiety and with much hesitation. Possibly the best solution may be to look at the situation in a double aspect: one with reference to the continuance of the ordinary state of things, the other should matters arrive at a point

when war may become inevitable; and I shall endeavour to strike out a medium course between the two extremes. Nothing could have been more fortunate than the suggestion I threw out in 1875, and which has been so thoroughly accepted by the Secretary of State, that it would be well to put the first 18 Battalions of Infantry on an increased establishment of 820 rank and file. This measure is now being carried out, and I would only wish it had been completed to the fullest extent at the present moment, as it would have enabled us to place in the field at the shortest notice a *Corps d'Armée* ready for any contingency of about 25,000 or 30,000 men. I trust, however, that by the early spring we shall be prepared in this respect; and meanwhile every exertion has been made to put together a force to the extent suggested above, which, by means of Reserve men and Militia Reserves, I firmly believe and hope we may be enabled at the shortest notice, though with very considerable difficulty and trouble, to place in the field. In the furtherance of this object it may be well to point out how fortunate it was that the Secretary of State decided upon testing, and did test, by the authority vested in him of calling out the Army Reserve men, the physical capacity of these Reserves.

'These men, to the extent we have them at disposal, are called out and engrafted upon certain Regiments of the Line, placed on a mobilised footing this year, and the success was complete. It is on these men I rely for filling up the gaps in our first battalions at the shortest notice to the establishment of 820 rank and file, and probably these numbers may in a few weeks be made up to 1000 rank and file per Battalion.

'But it must be remembered that with these men our *regular* Army Reserves will be virtually exhausted, and it is only to the Militia Reserve that we can look for any further assistance.

'In a separate letter on the Army Corps Organisation, I have suggested the absolute necessity of increasing our Cadres of Artillery for the eight *Corps d'Armées* for Home Defence that have been laid down on paper. I deem this increase absolutely essential even for a peace organisation, and I submit it to the Secretary of State as such. It will entail the addition of 20 Batteries of Field Artillery, but on a considerably reduced establishment of horses and men for the greater proportion of our Field Batteries, the first Batteries only for service being retained on a full Peace Establishment, the rest being completed to six guns per Battery, but with the entire first row of wagons left out. This will give us an addition so much needed of 120 field guns, at a cost in round figures of about £38,000.

'I think also, as a result of our last mobilisation, it has become evident that it will be absolutely necessary to

decentralise our stores to a large extent, and to have the requirements of each separate Army Corps, as proposed in my letter already referred to above, placed in certain commodious stations, where each Army Corps can draw its necessary supplies of Stores and Equipments, without having recourse to the one Central *Depôt* for all these materials of war that we now have concentrated at Woolwich.

‘Our recruiting of late has been excellent. Two Regiments of the Guards, the Grenadier and Coldstream, have been brought up to their proper strength; the Scots Fusiliers, I regret to say, are still largely below their establishment. The Royal Artillery have also made considerable progress, though still incomplete in Gunners. The Royal Engineers are in a fine condition. The Infantry are recruiting most satisfactorily, both as to number and as to the class of recruits that enter the service; the Cavalry are over-complete. All Corps are extremely well organised for the limited numbers embodied in their ranks. Thus far as regards our present *Peace Establishment*.

‘But when you look to complicated requirements, such as may be called for should the peace of Europe be broken, our condition is not what it should be, and requires large and important augmentations. Our Reserves continue very limited, the Limited Enlistment Act only beginning to come into operation this year, and this, moreover, to a very small extent, and our sole reliance having to be placed in the 30,000 Militia Reserve men, irrespective of the very valuable Army Reserve men already referred to, and disposed of to make up our 18 first Battalions for service to the increased establishment of 820, or ultimately 1000 rank and file.

‘It therefore becomes a matter for grave consideration whether, under present circumstances of European complications, we should not continue our exertions in the direction of additional recruiting for all Regiments on the Home Establishment, say at all events up to 600 or 700 rank and file per Battalion. Should peace be maintained, it would be easy to discharge into the Reserve our oldest soldiers, by which means reductions could be easily again effected, at an increase to our Army Reserve most valuable to us to possess, and carrying out the principles of Reserve service at a more rapid rate than can possibly be attained at the present rate of discharge after six years’ service with the Colours.

‘It further, in my opinion, will be absolutely necessary to give a more thorough training to our Militia Reserve men than they have ever yet had, including instruction in Musketry with the Martini-Henry rifle, which has not hitherto been imparted to them. This, I conceive, should be effected as far as possible at the *Depôt* Brigades, with the assistance of the officers and men of their respective *Depôts* of the Line, though without taking these men away in every respect from the supervision of their own Militia officers

and non-commissioned officers, a due proportion of whom should be detailed for this special and necessary duty. Probably twenty-eight days might suffice for these requirements; but should it not be deemed sufficient, a prolongation of the period should be decided upon without hesitation.

'It would be well also to consider whether the Militia Reserve men should not be deemed supernumerary to their strength of Regiments, and the Militia Battalions recruited up to their proper establishments without taking the Reserve Militia men into account.

'The seven Regiments of Cavalry first for service should receive at once an additional or fifth Squadron as a *dépôt* for the four Squadrons for the field.

'Possibly this augmentation might take place by one troop per Regiment in the first instance, the second troop to follow when the numbers of men by enlistment increase. Without such addition it will be impossible to place more than three Squadrons in the field, which I consider a very faulty organisation, except in cases of great emergency, when time does not admit for doing more.

'The Royal Artillery should all be placed on a higher establishment of men and horses per Battery, and instead of Batteries having no wagons, the whole of the first row of wagons should be added and horsed.

'Some addition should also be made to the Royal Engineers, more particularly in the telegraph and torpedo branches of that service.

'These are the intermediate requirements, to which I anxiously draw attention, for an expectant attitude, such as the present state of affairs in Europe appears to me urgently to demand. Should they be accepted, it would enable the Government to rely at any moment upon placing from 30,000 to 40,000 or even 50,000 men in the field at a moderately short notice; and the anxieties we may experience as to our unpreparedness would be considerably relieved. Of course, it would become necessary to increase largely the Transport Corps and Military Hospital Corps, to the extent of force that it may be thought necessary to have ready for service.

'Should war actually ensue, it would, of course, become absolutely essential to go far beyond what is stated above.

'The whole Militia would have to be embodied for permanent duty; all Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry would have to be recruited up to the full war establishment, including those in India and the Colonies; the Artillery and the Engineers would equally have to be placed on a war footing; and the Train and Hospital Corps would have to be dealt with in a like manner.

'To test the efficiency of such portions of the force as we have available at the present moment, I would strongly urge that the force I have in my eye at the present moment for immediate service abroad should this year be concen-

trated for manœuvres at some convenient locality, and be kept together for at least a month or six weeks. Such force should be composed of twenty-one Battalions of Infantry including a Brigade of Guards, in three Divisions,¹ with seven Regiments of Cavalry at three Squadrons each, and their due proportion of Artillery, fifteen Batteries, and Engineers; also a sufficient supply of Transport to enable the force to move for extended manœuvre, a proportion being Regimental Transport.

‘With this recommendation, I think it better at the present moment to bring my observations to a close; but I cannot too strongly press upon the Secretary of State that, in spite of the mobilisation of the vast armies of other nations, we still continue at our ordinary Peace Establishment, and that it would be unfair to the Military Authorities and to the Secretary of State himself to expect that much can be accomplished with the limited means at Government disposal, though, should the recommendations I have above made be accepted, there is every reason to hope that our Army would be enabled to maintain the present position it has acquired for the Empire in the great contests and campaigns of the past and present generations.’

Amongst the many luminous documents which the Duke wrote during his long official career, perhaps hardly any does greater justice to his foresight, or more completely anticipates the wants of later days, than a private letter which he addressed to Mr. Gathorne Hardy on 5 December 1876. It is worthy of remark that this particular letter was written whilst H.R.H. was confined to his house through illness, and consequently absent from the War Office. So that, at any rate, is presumptive evidence that the ideas therein expressed are likely to have been his own.

The Defence Committee has but recently been re-organised, since for long the absence of cohesion between various branches of our public service has been manifest. It is only by instituting a system under which the War Office, Admiralty, and Indian views and requirements can be assimilated to meet the complicated demands of our Imperial problems that satisfactory and economical results can be achieved.

Happily, in our own time, these ideals seem now in a fair way to be realised, and the chiefs of the public departments

¹ At that time an Infantry Brigade consisted of three Battalions, and the Infantry of a Division of two Brigades with an extra ‘Divisional’ Battalion.

concerned, together with naval and military experts, will for the future meet regularly under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, calling in from time to time any one whose opinion it is desired to obtain.

Now here we have the Duke, no less than twenty-seven years before this result was finally achieved, insisting upon identically the same principle.

TO MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

‘GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 5 December 1876.

‘... Ellice told me of your wish to have something put on paper as to a movement to Constantinople. Such a paper is being prepared; but it does not satisfy me, I confess. My views are most decided: the Government alone can decide on the policy to be adopted. If the Government would kindly, through you as Secretary of State for War, put certain propositions or contingencies on paper for me, in conjunction with the Military and Naval Authorities, to reply to, I shall be ready to give the best answer in my power. But we ought to have the contingencies laid down clearly and definitely so that there may be no confusion. The only way to arrive at this solution is to form a Committee of yourself, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and myself, to have power to add to our numbers and call into council the First Sea Lord, Adjutant-General, Q.M.G., Surveyor-General, Inspector-General of Fortifications. These, as the professional officers, can carry out, or rather work out the details, and all would be done smoothly, deliberately, and well.

‘Now everything is at sixes and sevens.

‘We are working in one direction, Simmons¹ has other views, the Navy are left out altogether, yet without them we can do nothing. I *entreat* of you to take the matter up at once, and ask Lord Beaconsfield to institute a secret and confidential Committee as I suggest. It does not follow that anything will be wanted, but we are, at all events, not idle, are prepared and are ready to carry out what the Government decide upon as events arise. I cannot too strongly press this consideration upon you, for we have no time to lose. We ought also, I think, to have Departmental Meetings at the Office, you and I being present, to see that we have all the stores and supplies ready should we be called upon to embark a *Corps d'Armée* at short notice. I am told many things may be found wanting; be it so, but then let us know what they are, and how they can be supplied. I am not well, so remain at home all this week. Should you run up towards

¹ Lieut.-General Sir John Lintorn Simmons, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Inspector-General of Fortifications, 1875-80; Field-Marshal 1891; died 1903.

the end of it for the day, and give the day and hour, such meeting might take place, but this should not interfere with the first-named secret Committee, which ought at once to be constituted.

'Should it be necessary to think of employing India troops, the Secretary or Under-Secretary for India should be one of its members.'

As already remarked, Turkey in her campaign against Servia was completely successful. But at this point Russia interfered, and on 24 April 1877 the Tsar Alexander II. declared war against Turkey. Two days later the Duke wrote to the Secretary of State as follows:—

TO MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 26 April 1877.

'I consider it right to send you the enclosed, not in order to create difficulties, but to prevent the possibility of its being thought that the Commander-in-Chief is not alive to the gravity of the present situation, which would certainly be quite unpardonable on his part.'

MEMO. FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'HORSE GUARDS, 24 April 1877.

'War having been declared by Russia to Turkey according to this day's intelligence, and the Russians having crossed the Pruth with 17,000 men: the time has arrived when the military requirements of the Empire will have to be specially looked to with a view to Imperial interests, more particularly as regards the possibility of having to employ troops at the shortest notice. With this view, I think that it may be deemed advisable by Her Majesty's Government to have prepared for any such service one Army Corps of 30,000, which might at any time be embarked in three weeks, or within that period.

'The Regiments to form such a Corps have been recruited up to the establishments of 850 rank and file, and are fairly completed in numbers to this extent, though the men are very young. Reserve men and Militia Reserves will be required to be in perfect readiness to complete these Regiments to a War Establishment, and transports should be available at the places of embarkation, as well as stores to the requisite extent. It is essential, in my opinion, that no time should be lost in preparing all the necessary details for carrying out this service: the Brigades and Divisions should be formed, with the Staff Officers selected for such duties.

'It may also be right to consider whether confidential orders should not be sent to India to prepare a force to act

upon Persia in the event of that country taking an active part in the coming struggle against Turkey and on the side of Russia, as seems likely to be the case. Should the necessary details for these duties be too long deferred, it will become a matter of the most serious difficulty to be ready on a sudden emergency arising, and it is on this account that I deem it my duty, as head of the Army, to express a strong opinion in the sense now indicated.'

Russia soon discovered that the task was by no means so easy as she had supposed. But after the Fall of Plevna, the siege of which had lasted from 20 July to 10 December 1877, the Turkish resistance very largely collapsed, and the way to Constantinople apparently lay open to Russia.

So, on 3 March 1878 peace was for the time concluded at San Stefano, by which treaty Turkey ceded that portion of Bessarabia to Russia, which the latter had lost in 1856, whilst certain other adjoining territory in Asia Minor was similarly dealt with. The independence of Servia, Montenegro, and Roumania was also recognised, the territory of the first two being expanded, whilst Bulgaria was to become an autonomous state under the suzerainty of Turkey.

Meanwhile the war party in this country had been gaining strength, and England refused her consent to the Treaty of San Stefano. So war preparations began. The Government obtained a grant of six millions for naval and military purposes, and when the news came that Russia was pressing on Constantinople, a British fleet was directed to pass the Dardanelles, and soon afterwards the Government decided to call out the Reserves and to send an Indian Contingent to the Mediterranean.

Under a Convention signed at Constantinople, 4 June 1878, Great Britain engaged herself in certain circumstances to join the Sultan in defending his Asiatic possessions, and Cyprus was occupied by us so that England could 'make necessary provision for executing her engagements.' By this Convention we took over Cyprus from Turkey on what was practically a perpetual lease; and the annex of 1 July provided that 'England will pay to the Porte whatever is the present excess of revenue over expenditure in the island.'

Sir Garnet Wolseley was selected by Lord Beaconsfield to take command in Cyprus, and immediately proceeded thither to take up his new duties. At the start there appear to have been few conveniences for the troops which were sent there; and a considerable amount of sickness was prevalent amongst them. It was accordingly decided by the Cabinet that the Secretary of State for War (Colonel Stanley) and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith) should proceed to Cyprus, and decide on the spot as to what arrangements were necessary. So serious at this period did the Eastern situation appear, that it was decided that Lord Chelmsford's demand for more troops in South Africa could not with safety be complied with.

When Colonel Stanley, accompanied by Captain Fitz-George, arrived at Cyprus, he wrote several very interesting letters to the Duke, some of which are presented below.

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

‘GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 7 July 1878.

‘I have this moment received permission to communicate to Y.R.H. the fact that, from telegrams received from Berlin to-day, we have reason to know that the Porte has ceded the island of which Y.R.H. spoke yesterday.

‘There were delays and difficulties, and we only just know the fact. Y.R.H. is, I believe, the only person out of the Cabinet who has been informed, and I am requested to ask that You will keep this matter, as we have to do, entirely *secret*, till we hear more.

‘I expect that the news will leak out from Constantinople, but that does not relieve us.

‘I propose to send early to-morrow morning to ask if Y.R.H. will see me before the Cabinet which meets at twelve, and at what hour?

‘If we understand the telegrams rightly, Lord Beaconsfield *has* submitted Sir Garnet Wolseley's name to Her Majesty to take command. Very irregular; but perhaps Y.R.H. will excuse it, as also my hurried note.’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘MALTA, 18 July 1878.

‘I arrived here yesterday evening, and intend leaving again at 7 P.M. this evening in H.M.S. *Himalaya*: the numbers embarked will be reported by telegraph for Y.R.H.'s information. I was horrified to find that I could only obtain 36

Hospital Marquees, which does not afford as much Hospital accommodation as it was arranged at the last War Office meeting I should have, without allowing any margin at all for storehouse accommodation or unforeseen emergencies.

'I have telegraphed to the Secretary of State for War for more, and I hope Y.R.H. will order them to be sent to me.

'I am rather nervous about the water-supply in Cyprus, and find there are no Norton-tube wells in store here. Campbell, the Director of Artillery, described Malta to me as overflowing with stores of all sorts, but I find it very deficient in everything. We learn from the experience of those under canvas here that the heat in our bell-tents in Cyprus will be most trying, and perhaps dangerous to health. I intend reducing the number of men in each bell-tent to eight, and to issue extra tents as far as I can, so that the tents may be doubled as was done during the last hot weather in the Crimea; there is not a water-cart to be had in Malta. We have had a pleasant telegram from the Commissariat Officer now in Cyprus, saying that supplies were to be had in quantities there. I have no doubt that when we reach that place many of the difficulties which appear formidable at a distance will be easily overcome, and I am not inclined to take a gloomy view of our prospects, but I think that common ordinary precautions should be adopted against an epidemic of any large amount of sickness, and the first precaution that occurs to me is to provide myself with an ample supply of Hospital Marquees.'

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

'WITHERSLACK, 27 September 1878.

'Lord Cranbrook writes from Balmoral that he is coming up to London on Monday, and I propose to see him on Tuesday, after which I will acquaint you with the result of our conversation. I feel that we are in for a war, but the present tendency is rather to deal with it from India than from England.

'Personally, as Y.R.H. knows, I was opposed to the Indian troops taking their Martini-Henry rifles to Cyprus, but the orders were given for them to be taken back into store and for their old Sniders to be reissued to them, whenever they returned to India. I am not aware that arrangement has been cancelled.

'With regard to what Y.R.H. says about sending only six years men to the Reserve, it must be remembered that we are still far above our *legal* strength, and that we have neither money nor authority for exceeding it. If recruiting were slack, or if we were nearly down to our limits, it would be different, but care shall be taken to bear Y.R.H.'s suggestions in mind.

'As to Cyprus, I feel that my going there is very doubtful, under the present aspect of affairs.

'I hope that the sickness may abate, but there are no signs of permanent improvement yet.

'I will take care to bring back the papers which Y.R.H. was good enough to leave with me.

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

'WAR OFFICE, 17 October 1878.

'Several members of the Cabinet met to-day to consider whether we could comply with Thesiger's demand to have two more Battalions sent out to the Cape. After long and anxious discussion, it appeared that, on political grounds connected with Russia and Eastern Affairs, we ought not to weaken ourselves on our chance of having to deal with troops nearer home, especially as there is no actual statement that the war is more than likely at the Cape. (But we might send out the special service officers.)

'It was also decided that Mr. Smith and I should go out (subject to recall) to Cyprus early next week, and that we should, by travelling day and night, return in about three weeks.

'Lytton does not seem likely to ask for troops, but anyhow I propose, with Y.R.H.'s consent, to ask Lord Cranbrook to take my office work here, so that all the reins will be in his hands and Y.R.H.'s. I shall be within a week's call by telegraph. There is nothing urgent here at this moment except the Medical Question. Will Y.R.H. call for a most confidential report as You proposed—the terms of which we can easily arrange? I propose to leave London on Friday night. Hoping that Y.R.H. will excuse a very hurried line.'

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

“HIMALAYA” AT LARNAKA, 30 October 1878.

'I have just time, before the mail goes, to write one line to inform Y.R.H. that Sir Garnet Wolseley gives a decidedly satisfactory account of the state of things here.

'He came off to us on our arrival last night, and I have been with him this morning in and about Larnaka. Fever has now practically disappeared, and I am bound to say that those officers whom I have met who have had attacks of illness, which is the case with most, do not appear ill or broken-down, as we are led to expect. The heat now ranges at the three chief military stations from 85° maximum to 58° minimum. I understand that the rations are good, the huts going up, and the Commissariat working well.

'Here there are no troops except the Indian Native Sappers, who leave on Sunday for “Simoom.”

'We go to-morrow to Nicosia, and thence to the places which are meant for cantonments. I hope to see all the troops, except perhaps the detachment of the 42nd Highlanders at Baffo, for which there is hardly time. Colonel White (1st Royal Scots) has done wonders here, and the place is fairly clean. All say that there is no reason why this island should not be quite as healthy ultimately as the other Mediterranean stations, and, except Alexandria, which has always been out of the question, I am told that the health of the men has been as good here as it would have been at any other point in the Levant, whether island or mainland. I cannot speak too highly of the cheerfulness of Sir Garnet under many pressing difficulties. He seems always resolute and confident, and is a most able administrator, both in civil and military functions. He has authorised me to say that affairs are daily improving, and that the reports of the *severity* of illness have been much exaggerated. I am hardly in a position yet to say much to Y.R.H. from my own knowledge, but I will do so without fail after we have been round the island. We are all very grateful to Y.R.H. for having spared us Captain FitzGeorge, who has made friends on all hands, and is a favourite with every one from his ability and good humour.

'I must ask excuses for a letter written under many interruptions, for the two Admirals are here, and there are constant visits of ceremony.'

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

"HIMALAYA" AT SEA, 10 November 1878.

'I wrote rather hurriedly to Y.R.H. from Larnaka on arrival. I was then able to say upon authority of Sir G. Wolseley that the general state of affairs at Cyprus was satisfactory, and, on the whole, I see no reason to modify that view now.

'I first went over the Hospital and Commissariat and Ordnance Stores at Larnaka, and endeavoured by careful inquiry to ascertain what was the truth of the breakdown of the Commissariat, and what were the remedies for the future. Captain FitzGeorge is good enough to prepare a memorandum on these questions in detail. . . .

'Seeing that the Commissariat people had little (if any) power of impressing transport, and that the people speak a language which our officers did not, I think much allowance must be made. I cannot, after careful inquiry, find out that any Regiment went without a single meal. Delays sometimes took place, but that was, I think, unavoidable, and there was no privation, though much inconvenience and discomfort. It is also to be remarked that Regiments, though landing as on active service, brought their baggage as if changing quarters. In one case I am informed that

this amounted to fifty (odd) tons, and when transport is bad, roads deep and sandy, and the camp some miles off the Commissariat had no doubt a hard task.

'The following day we went up to the Headquarters Camp near Nicosia. There are only the staff there. I had long talks with Sir A. Home, Greaves, Brackenbury, and others, and I must confess that I found them much depressed as to the past and future. The doctors are puzzled altogether. They say that places which ought to have been healthy have turned out badly, and that the selection of a permanent site for barracks or cantonments can only be effected after time and experience.

Sir A. Home, however, adds that he sees no reason why Cyprus should not ultimately be quite as healthy as any of the other Mediterranean Stations. For the present he evidently inclines to using natives principally to do the duty in the summer months.

'Next day we rode to Mathiadis, where the 71st are camped; the huts are going up fast, and would have been all up by the middle of last week, except hospital, but there was ample accommodation even when I was there, by putting twelve men (instead of ten) into each hut. The men in hospital were well cared for, and did not, for the most part, seem very ill, and the men who were at duty or working looked in fair health and good spirits. Colonel Lambton and the officers spoke cheerily, and are making the best of everything. They are getting hounds out from England, and meantime amuse themselves as they best can. . . .

'Time became of so much importance that we determined to visit Kyrenia and Baffo by sea, and accordingly, after coasting round *viâ* Larnaka and Famagusta, we were off Kyrenia on the 5th. . . . The fever is not of severe type, and there are no deaths, but it never ceases. This last relapse only occurred last week. I shall probably have time to add a line to this before the mail leaves Malta.'

Eventually, at Bismarck's suggestion Russia consented to refer matters to a European Congress, which subsequently met at Berlin, and the result of which was the substitution of the Treaty of Berlin for that of San Stefano.

By the Treaty of Berlin, Russia got back Bessarabia, and advanced somewhat her Caucasian frontier; and the new province of Bulgaria was cut into two, the Southern portion becoming Eastern Roumelia, with a Christian Governor appointed by the Porte.

The danger of war as regards Europe was consequently averted. But one result of the attitude which we had

adopted towards Russia was very soon apparent on the Indian frontier. Russia, having been thwarted by Great Britain in Europe, at once turned her attention to Afghanistan, which from thenceforth became the sphere of her renewed activities. A Russian envoy was sent to Kabul; upon which Great Britain decided on also sending a mission to the Afghan capital. This, however, was stopped at the frontier. So the mission, now supported by our Army, advanced. Kabul and Kandahar were occupied, and the Treaty of Gandamak was the outcome. But in 1879 the British Envoy was murdered at Kabul, and a British Army was once more dispatched. Before, however, final victory had been achieved, the Conservative Government had fallen, and the story of the Afghan Campaign belongs to another chapter.

Whilst the Eastern Crisis, which for the sake of clearness and continuity has been treated as a whole, was passing through its various phases, there were of course other matters of interest during the same period, although during the War Secretaryships of Mr. Gathorne Hardy and Colonel Stanley no great organic changes, as already explained, took place.

In 1875 the question arose as to who was best fitted to succeed Lord Napier of Magdala as Commander-in-Chief in India. Hence this letter:—

TO SIR RICHARD AIREY.

‘GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 3 August 1875.

‘I am extremely anxious to have your real and decided opinion before I go as to the fittest man to succeed Lord Napier. My own opinion is decidedly in favour of Sir Frederick Haines, unless you prefer Ellice.’

The subject of the ‘Control’ Department has been alluded to in a previous chapter. It will be remembered that in 1868 Sir Henry Storks had been appointed Controller-in-Chief, and that the new system was the cause of considerable friction. On 11 December 1875, however, the ‘Control’ Department was divided into the ‘Commissariat and Transport’ and the ‘Ordnance Store’ Departments.

In August 1876 the Report of the Royal Commission on

Promotion in the Army was issued. By it compulsory retirement was recommended in some cases, and other changes were also advocated.

In reference to this the following letters passed between the Duke and Mr. Gathorne Hardy:—

TO MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

‘HOMBURG, 23 August 1876.

‘. . . I have not troubled you with a letter as yet, as I had nothing very particular to write about, and felt that it was well to give you time for looking about you, for rest, after a fatiguing session. But I now must break silence in order to draw your attention to the Report of the Royal Commission on Promotion in the Army. The Commissioners have given you a very tough job to deal with for the recess, and I want to suggest some points which I hope may lighten the burden very considerably. In the first place, I am much opposed to any sort of *compulsory* retirement, but at all events, I entirely object to the idea of a Captain being forced to leave if he has not attained his majority at twenty years’ service. This I look upon as a *fatal error*, for virtually it does away with the Army as a *profession*, which must have more certain prospects than such an arrangement would afford. I have no objection to make it worth an officer’s while to leave if he likes it, on fair and even good conditions, but it ought to be *voluntary and not compulsory*. My idea is, that if you give a wide opening to officers entering the Commissariat or Store Departments from the combatant branch of the service, also restoring the Paymaster’s Office, and by giving great latitude for men to go on half-pay with the object of entering the Militia, that these openings, with good voluntary retirements in addition, would meet the case sufficiently to keep up a fair flow of promotion; and I therefore would suggest that you should set about making your people draw up Regulations, in conjunction with ourselves, for carrying out these objects, by which means I hope we might largely curtail the heavy expenses recommended by the Commissioners, which the House of Commons and the country would, I fear, never stand without a considerable reduction in the Army, which I should consider dangerous and impossible. I cannot say I am at all pleased at the Commission retaining the five years rule for either Lieut.-Colonels or Majors. We shall thereby create a very large half-pay list, the very thing we ought to try and get rid of as much as we can. Of course there are many other subjects I could name from which I might dissent, but I give you just my leading ideas, and shall be glad to hear from you what you think on these points. I hope you will read my evidence, by which I am happy to abide. We were startled by Mr. Disraeli’s promotion to

the Upper House. He will be a great loss to you in the Commons; but I suppose his health admitted of no alternative, in which case we must accept the necessity, and hope no ill effects may ensue.'

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'HEMPSTED PARK,
STAPLEHURST, 26 August 1876.

'I am glad to hear that Homburg is answering its purpose, and hope its good effects may be lasting. The Commission has no doubt given me a hard nut to crack, and the expenditure necessary in any case will undoubtedly raise controversies as to the best mode of limiting it. Although only Sir George Balfour has given notice of a motion on organisation, he will have sympathisers of greater power than himself, and no doubt Lord Cardwell among them. He will find representatives in the Lower House, and the question will be forced into consideration. I have not had a great deal of time yet to study the Report, but have read Y.R.H.'s evidence, and the greater portion of that of the other witnesses. The Commissioners rather insinuate that if they had considered it within their powers, they would have recommended some changes of organisation, and they certainly addressed questions to the witnesses bearing upon that point.

'Compulsory retirement of young men will of course raise strong objections, as I hear that it has already done so in regimental messes. The difficulty is to *secure* promotion at a sufficient rate without it, for it is obvious that mere relief at the top will not meet the requirement. I have to see that the promise as to promotion is kept, and at present do not see my way to renounce the methods proposed, although they may need great modification.

'It seems to me impossible to draw up regulations without actuarial calculations as to the result. I should of course give the greatest weight to military considerations, and any definite propositions founded upon them. At present, however, my views are in the nebulous condition, and need to be consolidated before I make any movement.

'Lord Beaconsfield's title did not take me by surprise, and I had for some time agreed that it was the only feasible course for him. It makes, however, an immense change in the Commons, which, while I greatly regret, I feel was inevitable. Time alone can solve the difficulties.'

In 1876 the Duke and the Army lost with deep regret the valuable services of Sir Richard Airey¹ as Adjutant-General,

¹ General Lord Airey, G.C.B., was born 1803; ensign 1821; Q.M.G. 1855-65; Governor of Gibraltar 1865-70; A.G. 1870-76. Died in Lord Wolseley's house, 1881.

who on his retirement from that post was raised to the Peerage as Lord Airey, and who, as quoted in a previous chapter, is described by Lord Wolseley as the 'ablest and wisest soldier' he ever knew.

He had been appointed Adjutant-General in 1870, and so in 1875 his term of office should properly have expired. At this time, however, the Duke wrote the following letter to the Secretary of State on the subject, which also contains a most interesting reference to Lord Beaconsfield and Egypt:—

TO MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 29 November 1875.

'... Before I say anything more, let me congratulate you on the happy decision the Government has come to for the purchase of the Khedive's share in the Suez Canal. This is a measure which has given *universal satisfaction*, and that has given strength to the Government and the country, which will be very beneficial in every point of view. I have seen Mr. Disraeli here to-night, and congratulated him on the satisfaction with which his great measure has been accepted by the public at large; and he seems much gratified at what has been done—a feeling which seems to be fully endorsed by Her Majesty, who expressed herself to me as delighted. There are several points I would have spoken to you upon had I seen you before you left London. I wanted to know what Carnarvon said about Lord Napier of Magdala being offered Gibraltar. I also wanted to hear your views about the continuance in office, at all events for some time longer, of Sir Richard Airey. I think we could ill spare him just now, when his prudence and experience is of so much value to us both. His five years are now expired, and he ought therefore to vacate his post. I believe Sir Richard is ready to do anything I think desirable, either to stay on for a time or to vacate whenever wished. I hope you will think with me, that we should at all events retain his services for some time longer. . . .'

Sir Richard Airey's Adjutantship-General was, however, extended for another year. Hence these letters:—

TO MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 9 October 1876.

'Sir Richard Airey, to my *great grief* and to the loss, as I firmly believe, of the public service, is to give up his office on November 1st. He has served continuously now in various most important positions for *fifty-five* years, and at Head-

quarters both as Military Secretary, Quartermaster and Adjutant Generals. I should wish to mark his retirement by some special act of Her Majesty's favour. To make him a Field-Marshal would, I suppose, give great offence to other old officers senior to him. And yet this is the only military reward left us to give. What do you say of a Baronetcy? He has no sons, and I don't know that he would care about it; but I see it has been recently done for Sir Alexander Milne, who was very much in a like position. Would you kindly think this matter over, and let me know if you are of opinion that something special should be done, and what the best form of doing it would be?'

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'HEMPSTED PARK,
STAPLEHURST, 10 October 1876.

'No one has a higher esteem and regard for Sir Richard Airey than myself, and personally I shall be truly sorry to lose him. His services in every capacity have been of the greatest value to the country, and I have some time since, both in conversation and writing, urged his claim to some mark of honour upon Lord Beaconsfield. I hope that a satisfactory result may be obtained, as I am sure that not only Sir Richard Airey's friends, but the Army and the country generally, would appreciate a due recognition of his merits. I shall not fail to keep the subject before the Prime Minister.'

Though not strictly bearing upon the history of the period under review, the following letter, written by the Duke on the last Christmas Sir Richard Airey was in office, may be of interest:—

TO SIR RICHARD AIREY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, Christmas Day 1875.

'I cannot deprive myself of the pleasure of thanking you for your most kind note and good wishes at this festive season, which I heartily reciprocate towards yourself. As regards my connection with the service, I have done my best to support its interests during the years I have been placed at the head of the Army, and I have, I hope, been of some use to the profession, though I fear it has sometimes been supposed I have not stood up enough for its old and valuable traditions. At all events, I have the satisfaction of feeling that I have done my best to defend its rights and general interests, and I shall endeavour to continue doing so, as long as I have health and strength to bring to the task, not always an easy one, as you know full well, in these days of change and perpetual criticism.

'I am delighted that you will be able to dine here to-morrow.'

In 1876 Sir Garnet Wolseley, at that time a Major-General in Natal, was offered and accepted a seat on the India Council as military member, a post which he held from November 1876 till July 1878, when he proceeded to Cyprus as High Commissioner. As regards his appointment to the Council of India, Mr. Gathorne Hardy wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'WAR OFFICE, 31 October 1876.

'I will take Friday and Saturday instead of Thursday and Friday for London, and I shall hope to see Y.R.H. about half-past one o'clock, if convenient. A note from Sir Garnet Wolseley informs me that he is offered and ready to accept a seat on the India Council, so that his place will have to be filled. He may do good service there, and speak for the English view of Army matters.'

Before closing the record of Mr. Gathorne Hardy's War-Secretaryship, the following letter concerning Colonel Burnaby and his celebrated 'Ride to Khiva' is well worthy of perusal:—

TO MR. GATHORNE HARDY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, *Wednesday Morning.*

'... I saw Captain Burnaby yesterday, and a more interesting conversation I never remember holding with anybody. He is a remarkable fellow, singular-looking, but of great perseverance and determination. He has gone through a great deal, and the only surprise is how he got through it. I think you ought decidedly to see him, and I think he had better also be interviewed by the Foreign and India Office, after you have heard what he has to say. He has been in Khiva, where no Englishman has ever been but Abbott, and Sir R. Shakespear years ago. He will tell you very remarkable things, which are quite sufficient, I think, to cause us much anxiety and great alarm, as he says, if we don't act soon, it will be decidedly too late, and the Russians will easily reach Merv and Herat and the confines of India, which the officers say openly is the great object they have in view, and towards which they have made such tremendous strides, particularly of late. I arranged that he should be with Horsford about 12.30, when, if at the Office, you might like to see him, or you could fix your own time for doing so. But pray see him, for it is very important that you should do so.'

On 4 May 1878 Mr. Gathorne Hardy was raised to the peerage as Lord Cranbrook, and subsequently became Secretary of State for India. It will be remembered that on the Conservative party's accession to power, Colonel Stanley had been appointed Financial Secretary, a position which, owing to his transference to the Treasury, he had vacated in 1877, on which occasion he wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

‘WAR OFFICE, 12 *August* 1877.

‘I think it my duty to inform Y.R.H. that Lord Beaconsfield has offered me the Secretaryship of the Treasury, and that I have considered it right to accept it, though I am very sorry to leave the War Office. I trust that Y.R.H. will allow me to express my gratitude to you for your unvarying kindness to me during the time that I have been Financial Secretary, as well as at all other times when I have been under You. I cannot say how deeply I have felt the advantage which Y.R.H. has afforded me in the conduct of a difficult branch of the War Office, by your guidance in matters connected with the service. And I have further to thank Y.R.H. for having forwarded the recommendation for the honour which Her Majesty has graciously conferred on me, in making me one of her Aides-de-Camp.

‘Trusting that Y.R.H. is the better for your stay abroad, and with the hope that my successor may be as devoted to the service and to Y.R.H. as myself . . .’

Colonel Stanley was, however, on 2 April 1878 appointed Secretary of State for War, in succession to Mr. Gathorne Hardy. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary for War, Lord Cadogan, was about the same time transferred to the Colonial Office, being succeeded at the War Office by Lord Bury (afterwards Earl of Albemarle). On the occasion of his departure from the War Office, Lord Cadogan wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM LORD CADOGAN.

‘BABRAHAM HALL,

‘CAMBRIDGE, 3 *March* 1878.

‘I understood that Y.R.H. was engaged yesterday, or I would have asked to see you before I left, and to announce to you my retirement from the War Office. I had asked Lord Beaconsfield some time ago to transfer me, if he had the opportunity, to the Colonial Office, where I thought I

might learn work which might be of advantage to me in future. The opportunity has now come, and although very grateful to Lord Beaconsfield for thinking of me, I cannot but regret that I am called away from the War Office at a moment when so much interesting and important work is going on. I do not wish to be thought running away from my post at a critical moment, but I was advised that the offer so kindly made could not be declined. Under these circumstances, I shall venture to call and take official leave of Y.R.H. on Tuesday next. May I be allowed to take this opportunity also of expressing my sincere gratitude for the great kindness and forbearance which I have invariably met with in my official intercourse with Y.R.H. It has been my earnest endeavour to do my duty and assist the work of the Office to the utmost of my power, and the countenance I have received from Y.R.H. has greatly supported me at all times. I am very sorry that there are two or three important questions left still undecided, which I had hoped to have seen settled. The Committee on Short Service is, I hope, in a position soon to make a Report, and the question of Short Service as applied to India is, I hope, ripe for Mr. Hardy's decision. We have arrived at a crisis; but I trust that the labours of the various Departments of the War Office will be found to have been successful in preparing for any events which may arise, and in spite of the difficulties which fetter the action of Military Authorities.

'My successor has been a soldier and is a Volunteer, and will, I hope, carry on the work well.

'Pray excuse the liberty I have taken in writing these few lines.'

Changes of uniform are always unpopular amongst officers, because they know that there is never any finality in the matter, and that they usually entail a considerable outlay. Some changes, however, are inevitable; and among other things the shako worn by the Regiments of the Line was universally condemned. Hence the introduction of the hideous helmet. Her Majesty's views as regards the Germanisation of the Army in the matter of dress will doubtless meet with the cordial approbation of many.

FROM SIR THOMAS BIDDULPH.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 19 March 1877.

'The Queen desires me to acknowledge Your Royal Highness's letter and the patterns of helmets for the Infantry.

'As Your Royal Highness is of opinion that these helmets will be advantageous and suitable to the troops, Her Majesty would not like to object to a trial of them being made, but

with one alteration. The Queen is not anxious to see the British Army so much assimilated to the Germans, and wishes particularly, in order to avoid it, to do away if possible with the spike at the top of the helmet, which Her Majesty considers neither ornamental nor useful. Perhaps some other finish to the top could be devised, which would neither resemble the German helmets nor yet that of our Police.'

Even during the rule of so excellent and sympathetic a War Secretary as Colonel Stanley, the Duke had still to fight the often fought battle against a reduction of personnel in the Army, as the following letters testify:—

TO COLONEL STANLEY.

'SANDRINGHAM,
NORFOLK, 29 January 1879.

'Ellice has sent me down a paper with the details of the proposed reductions. I confess I think them *overwhelming*. I am most anxious to aid you by every means in my power, and, of course, to some of them I have not a word to say, such as the reduction of the Cavalry, Engineer Train, Militia, Yeomanry, Pensioners. But the Infantry men I really believe to be *indefensible*, and the Artillery goes further than I had expected. I entreat of you to consider well the last two points before deciding upon them. We have now a very fine and powerful Artillery force. To reduce all their wagons from as many as twenty-eight Batteries I believe to be a great mistake. I should only propose to reduce the wagons by one half, which, of course, must be submitted to. But the worst feature of all is the *Infantry*. We really cannot spare a man in that arm, and yet we are to lose 3960 men! With *two wars* on our hands, and with no *addition* whatever for carrying them on, how can you justify such an act? A Regiment at 400 is literally *useless*; with our Short Service system we should never have 200 men on parade. At all events, let us keep the lowest at 480; this would make a difference of 1360 men. I cannot imagine how you can ever justify putting up their strength again if you reduce them now, with these two wars upon us, which are by no means certain to be concluded within the coming financial year. My advice would be not to reduce a single Infantry soldier; but if it is inevitable, then at least retain the last 17 Regiments at 480 instead of 400, as proposed in Ellice's paper. I would suggest that money should be saved by making no general moves at all this year, excepting in such cases where Regiments are so much detached that discipline would materially suffer by their not being brought together; and I wish you would also think of having only the Militia out partially, and not the entire force, for three

weeks. By this means you would save at all events the 1360 Infantry so much required. We have happily, as I understand, no fear of European complications at the present moment; hence the other reductions may be risked, though even these are *dangerous*, to my mind; but remember you have *nine* Battalions of Infantry abroad in excess of ordinary times, and these are already absorbed by the Afghan and Zulu wars. It is quite time that you propose to take statutory powers to raise 4000 men if required; but this is really not the same thing as having the men we want actually in hand. Pray let us make more savings in the Clothing Department, in the Arsenal, in buildings; only do not reduce the efficiency of the Infantry, which we must do if we reduce Regiments to the extent now proposed. The Artillery too requires the gravest consideration. To my mind, it is *too large* a reduction, and once *gone* we never shall be able to justify their being brought back to a safer establishment. I am sure you will forgive me for writing to you thus strongly, but I feel so extremely anxious on this matter that I am bound to tell you my thoughts. I do not wish to throw difficulties in the way of your necessary reductions, but I entreat of you to curtail expenditure where we could justify it far better than in the mode now proposed, which is in Infantry men, and too large a number of Artillery horses. I hope, therefore, that no definite decision will be come to before a further attempt has been made to find the means of meeting the difficulty from other sources.'

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

'WAR OFFICE, 30 January 1879.

'I thank Y.R.H. for your letter, and I feel as much regret as any one that reductions should have to be made. But with the distress in the country, the absence of any spring in the revenue, and the utter impossibility of putting on extra taxation, the evil is one which must be faced; and Y.R.H. is aware that from the first I have ventured to impart to Y.R.H. the difficulties in which I find myself placed, and that the reductions now proposed are those which are considered as least disadvantageous to the service.

'I presume that we may hope to settle the Estimates finally on Monday, and, of course, nothing would be done till Y.R.H. had had it submitted to you. Ellice tells me that he has written all details, so I will not repeat them; but perhaps I may be allowed to remind Y.R.H. that the force, even if the proposed reduction be carried out, will still exceed that which Mr. Hardy found existing when he came into office. He increased it 4800 men (I think); the reduction now would be 3960 or 4000.

‘If I thought that better arrangements would be proposed, I should be glad, but we have cut off large sums all round, and the other votes will not bear reducing further.

‘I hope that we shall be able to satisfy Y.R.H. that what is proposed is for the best under the circumstances. Ellice, Simmons, Lysons, and others have all been severally consulted.’

As will have been seen from the letters already quoted, Colonel Stanley’s tenure of office was marked by the extremely cordial and intimate relations which subsisted between the Duke and his political chief. It is true that the Duke had been on the most friendly terms with the great majority of the Secretaries of State with whom he had been associated during his long tenure of the Commandership-in-Chief. But with none had he been so intimate as he was with Colonel Stanley. The following letters, however, will better illustrate the point:—

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

‘WAR OFFICE, 31 *December* 1878.

‘. . . May I respectfully wish Y.R.H. every happiness and prosperity for the New Year?’

‘I cannot but feel, in any satisfaction with which I am enabled to look back to the year just closing, that very much is owing to the very great kindness and consideration which I have met with at Y.R.H.’s hands, and I heartily trust I may look forward to the New Year with the same feelings.’

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

‘WAR OFFICE, 26 *March* 1879.

‘I have been so continuously engaged all day that I have had no opportunity before this, either of offering in person to Y.R.H. my humble expression of good wishes for your birthday, or of writing to the same effect.

‘I trust that Y.R.H. may continue to enjoy all possible health and happiness, and that You may long remain in the discharge of those honourable and important duties which the country has confided with such satisfaction to Y.R.H.’s hands.

‘I would beg You, Sir, to believe that these are not mere formal good wishes, but that they spring from a feeling of deep and sincere gratitude for the uniform kindness with which Y.R.H. has honoured me, and my sense of which must be my excuse for having thus written.’

FROM COLONEL STANLEY.

'5 PORTLAND PLACE, 28 *April* 1880.

'I have the honour to acknowledge Y.R.H.'s note of this morning. . . . We return from Windsor about 3.30, I believe, if not sooner, and therefore I should propose to wait upon Y.R.H. at *five* to-day, as near as I can.

'I hope, Sir, you will allow me to take this opportunity of thanking you most gratefully for your exceeding kindness and consideration to me during the years I have had the honour to be your colleague. They have been eventful years, but I hope that the Army has not suffered either at my hands or at others', and that steady improvements have not been less useful than violent change.

'The difficulty which I must have inevitably met with on becoming Secretary of State was removed by Y.R.H.'s tact and kindness, and I trust that I have endeavoured, to the best of my power, to show in return my sense of that consideration by losing no occasion of insisting on the working of the civil branches of the Office being carried on in concurrence with, and in obedience to, the interests of the military branches.

'Once more thanking Y.R.H., and with my humble wishes that you may have a long and prosperous official life before you . . .'

CHAPTER XXV

H.R.H.'S DIARY OF WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTH
AFRICA—1878-81

Russian Mission to Cabul. English Mission. England declares War on Afghanistan. Forcing of the Passes. Affairs in South Africa. Disaster of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift. Cabul and Candahar occupied. Fighting in Zululand. Zlobané and Kambula. Reinforcements. Relief of Ekowe. Treaty of Gundamuk. Sir Garnet Wolseley sent to Natal. Death of Prince Imperial. Battle of Ulundi. Capture of Cetywayo. Murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari. Second Invasion of Afghanistan. Fighting at Cabul. Sir Donald Stewart's march, Candahar to Cabul. Battle of Ahmed Kheyl. Disaster at Maiwand. Sir Frederick Roberts's march on Candahar. Boer Rebellion, 1881. British Defeats. Abandonment of Transvaal.

H.R.H.'S DIARY OF WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTH
AFRICA—1878-81.

'In the month of November 1878, as a consequence of the great war between Russia and Turkey, matters took so unfavourable a turn that war became inevitable, and was proclaimed by our entering the Khyber Pass in November. The immediate cause of it was the admission of a Russian Mission to the capital of Shere Ali, the Ameer of Afghanistan at Cabul, whereas we had no mission there; and indeed the Ameer had always objected to our sending one. The Viceroy, Lord Lytton, felt that this was an indignity to which the Government could not submit without losing that prestige upon which so much of our hold on India depends, and accordingly a demand was made by him, sanctioned of course by the Home Government, for a similar mission to be sent to Cabul to place our relations on an equal footing with those of our great rivals in the East. General Sir Neville Chamberlain was selected as the head of this mission, and after much negotiating, started on his errand, was stopped at the little Fort of Ali Masjid, which commands the Khyber Pass; and the mission had accordingly to return to Peshawar, which could only be looked upon as a gross indignity offered to what had, thus far, been a friendly neighbour. An ultimatum was therefore dispatched to Cabul, which receiving no satisfactory answer, war was declared on the

Ameer by the Government of India, and three columns were at once pushed across the frontier on 12 November, one under Lieut.-General Sir Sam Browne through the Khyber Pass, a second column under Major-General Roberts into the Kurum Valley, a third under Lieut.-General Donald Stewart from Quetta upon Candahar. Sir Sam Browne's column was composed of a Brigade of Cavalry and four Brigades of Infantry, chiefly Native troops of Bengal and the Punjaub, and having, besides European Artillery, the 10th Hussars, the 1st, 17th, 51st, 81st, 4th Batt. Rifle Brigade in the Corps. This body attacked the Fort of Ali Masjid, and captured it after a short bombardment with trifling loss, pushing on afterwards to Dakku, and ultimately to Jellalabad, where it remained after entrenching itself. A reserve Division followed up under Lieut.-General Maude, which occupied the Passes and the several posts commanding the Pass, on the advance of the first Division to Jellalabad. The 9th Lancers, 1st Batt. 5th, and 2nd Batt. 9th, formed a portion of this division in conjunction with Native troops.

Major-General Roberts at the same time entered the Kurum Valley with two Brigades, of which 2nd Batt. 8th and 72nd formed a part, and made a very successful advance up to the Shutargardan Pass, having a sharp engagement and severely handling the enemy in this advance, and subjugating the whole of that valley, in which it succeeded in establishing itself solidly and without much loss on our side.

Quetta was made the starting-point for the third Column, where General Biddulph led the advanced division, followed by General Stewart's own division, and on their junction, Candahar was occupied by the combined forces after a sharp Cavalry engagement in the immediate vicinity of that city. The advance of this column was much hampered by the difficulty of obtaining a sufficiency of Transport, and the loss of camels in the Bolan Pass and afterwards was very great indeed. Besides Bengal Native troops, Bombay also furnished a comparatively small contingent, and the Europeans, in addition to a large force of Artillery with siege train, were made up of 15th Hussars, 59th, 2nd Batt. 60th, and 70th Regiments. Expeditions were made from Candahar to Girishk on one side, Khelat-i-Ghilzi on the other; but these were subsequently withdrawn and Candahar alone retained, the force there being much reduced at a later period in consequence of the difficulty in keeping the force supplied, and Quetta and the Peiwar Pass were then more strongly occupied.

The wild mountain tribes in the Khyber gave much trouble during the winter months, and several expeditions had to be made to punish them and keep them in subjection, which were all successful and without much loss on our side, though we had one sad catastrophe in a night march near Jellalabad, when a Squadron of the 10th Hussars following

a Squadron of the 12th Royal Lancers in crossing the Cabul River were swept away by a sudden rising of that stream, and lost one officer and about forty troopers, with their horses. A sharp Cavalry affair took place immediately after in which our troops, under Gough, made some brilliant charges, routing and cutting up a very superior force of the enemy.

'Another war, the *Zulu War in Natal*, had meanwhile broken out. The Cape Colony had been much disturbed for a very considerable period, and the Kaffirs in the frontier had given much trouble, but were brought to submission about the month of June by the troops under Lieut.-General Thesiger, who shortly afterwards succeeded to the title of his father, Lord Chelmsford. The native tribes bordering Natal had also become very troublesome, and amongst these the Zulus were by far the most formidable, possessing as they did a large and well-drilled Army under their native king Cetywayo. The whole of the troops in the Cape were gradually moved into Natal, and columns were formed under Colonels Pearson, Glyn, Wood, Rowlands, and Durnford to protect the Natal and Transvaal frontier. Sir Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner, proceeded himself to Natal to conduct the negotiations, and these proving unsuccessful, war was declared on these savages, and an advance made into their territory on 12 January 1879 by the several columns crossing the Tugela River, which formed the boundary of the Colony. The troops in the Colony were composed of the 2nd Batt. 13th, 2nd Batt. 3rd, 1st and 2nd Battalions 24th, 80th, 88th and 90th Regiments, besides several Batteries of Artillery and Companies of Engineers and some native levies and volunteers, raised for the occasion, and at a subsequent period, just prior to the commencement of hostilities, the 2nd Batt. 4th and 99th were sent out as a reinforcement. Pearson had the right or No. 1 Column, composed of 2nd Batt. 3rd and 99th, with a Naval Brigade attached; Colonel Durnford had No. 2 Column, all natives; Glyn, No. 3, with both Battalions 24th; Evelyn Wood, No. 4, formed of 2nd Batt. 13th and 90th; Rowlands, No. 5, with the 80th, the remainder being kept at stations in reserve.

'On January 12, 1879, Colonel Glyn's No. 3 Column crossed the Buffalo River into Zululand, and took up a position in the enemy's country. Advancing afterwards, the camp was formed on 20 January near the Isipezi Mountains at a place generally called Isandlwana. On 22 January Lord Chelmsford, with the native levies and one half of the European force, went forward to reconnoitre the enemy, leaving his camp standing in charge of Major Puleine of the 1st Batt. 24th Foot, with the greater portion of his Battalion and one Company 2nd Batt. 24th, and two guns of Colonel Harness's Battery. Colonel Durnford, R.E., with a portion of

the native contingent of No. 2 Column under his orders, was at the same time ordered up to strengthen the camp. As senior officer, Durnford on arrival assumed the command. Though strict orders had been given by Chelmsford to hold and defend the camp without moving out, these orders were not obeyed, and Zulus appearing on the left flank, Durnford started off to meet them, got involved in an unequal contest, and retreating before the Zulus, called upon Pulleine to assist him with his European forces. Unfortunately this order was complied with, the Zulus to the number of 15,000 advanced in their ordinary and special order of battle, and enveloping the entire camp destroyed it with all its defenders. Meanwhile, Lord Chelmsford had been reconnoitring to his front, little expecting what was taking place in his rear. He had intended moving a portion of his camp forward that day, when on his return home he found what had occurred. He therefore collected the forces he had with him, and being without provisions or reserve ammunition, he determined to force his way through the enemy back to the Buffalo at Rorke's Drift, which had been made the base of operations on that stream.

'Rorke's Drift' was occupied by a Company of the 2nd Battalion 24th under Lieutenant Bromhead, with Lieutenant Chard of the Royal Engineers as senior officer on the spot. These two gallant men having been apprised of what had happened to their front, hastily threw up some field-works with mealie-bags and other commissariat stores, which were collected near a house situated on that spot, and thus hurriedly prepared, resisted for an entire evening and night the successive onslaughts of a very powerful body of the enemy. Most fortunately they were enabled to hold their own, and on the evening of the 23rd, Lord Chelmsford's force having spent the night at the disastrous camp at Isandlwana amongst the remains of their unfortunate comrades, hastened at break of day towards Rorke's Drift, and succeeded in relieving the garrison which had made so splendid a resistance. The loss of our troops in this defence was, fortunately, not very heavy, but that at Isandlwana was painful in the extreme. The greater portion of the 1st Battalion 24th was cut to pieces with its officers; also the two guns of Harness's Battery were taken, and the whole of the camp and stores, including a very considerable number of Martini-Henry rifles, and a large reserve of ammunition.

'Colonel Pearson's Column' had about the same time crossed the Tugela River and advanced into Zululand towards a place called Ekowe. On the way up it fought a very tough though successful action with the enemy, which it defeated on 27 January, and established itself permanently at the Mission Station near Ekowe, which it strongly entrenched, and prepared to defend with the European troops forming this column, whilst the mounted portion of

the force and the native contingent was sent back to the Tugela River in order to facilitate the provisioning of this force, a matter of much difficulty. Colonel Evelyn Wood's Column also held its own in the neighbourhood of Utrecht, making some successful raids to the front, but otherwise with no specially marked success. Nos. 2 and 3 Columns were thrown together, and were gradually re-formed at a place called Helpmakaar.

'The news of these various incidents reached England early in February, and created a profound impression and great alarm. Immediate steps were taken to send out large reinforcements, which were very naturally and reasonably asked for, and Generals Crealock, Newdigate, and Marshall were at once ordered to accompany these troops to the seat of war. The Regiments to go out consisted of two Cavalry corps, 1st Dragoon Guards and 17th Lancers, the 21st Fusiliers, 58th, 3rd Battalion 60th, 91st and 94th from England, and the 57th from Ceylon, two Batteries and an Ammunition Column of Artillery and a Company of Royal Engineers; also all the available detachments that had been left in the Cape, including the 88th Regiment. Major-General Clifford was afterwards added to take charge of the base of operations, land the troops, and forward the supplies. A very fine fleet of transports, all merchant vessels, were rapidly taken up and fitted out, and by the end of February the whole of these had sailed for their destination. Prince Napoleon, the Prince Imperial, went out as a volunteer, being most anxious to join the Expedition in his private capacity. Happily for our interests, the Zulus did not follow up the great success that they had unfortunately gained, and the Colony of Natal, which was so seriously threatened, was not overrun as had been feared and expected.'

'In India our troops maintained the position they had respectively taken up in Jellalabad, Kurum, and Candahar, and, with the exception of a large number of smaller expeditions against the wild mountain tribes, no important movements took place. The difficulty of supply through the Bolan Pass, however, became so grave that the Candahar force had to be greatly diminished in strength, a garrison of about 6000 men only was left at the latter station, the rest of the troops being withdrawn to Quetta and the Peshawar Valley, where the Reserves were formed in support. Several brilliant Cavalry actions took place, with invariable success on our side. Shere Ali had meanwhile died, and negotiations for a peaceful solution of all difficulties were entered upon with Yakoob Khan, his supposed successor. Up to the present time, however (April), nothing has transpired as to a satisfactory solution, and an advance to Cabul of portions of the force is now spoken of as likely.

'Early in April we heard that a convoy of the 80th Regiment was attacked by the Zulus between Derby and Luneburg, and the commander of this force, Captain Moriarty of the 80th, with 70 of his men, were cut to pieces or drowned. It was brought about, no doubt, by the delay of four days, which occurred by the rising of a river which the enemy could not cross, and only about 40 men, under a Lieutenant Harward, managed to escape. The attack was made by a brother of Cetywayo's with about 4000 men. I fear that great carelessness was evinced in the manner in which this detachment was encamped. This occurrence took place on March 12. We heard about this time also that a lost Colour of the 1st Battalion 24th had been recovered out of the Buffalo River by a party of volunteers under Major Black of the 24th, who had also found the bodies of Lieutenants Melville and Coghill, who were interred where found, surrounded by dead enemies.

'On 17 April we heard by telegraph of a severe action which had been fought on March 26 by Colonel Evelyn Wood's Column. He had attacked Cetywayo's brother in his stronghold at Zlobané, and had captured about 20,000 cattle, but was subsequently attacked himself by the Zulus in his entrenched camp, but succeeded, after four hours of desperate fighting, in defeating the enemy, and was even enabled, for some distance, to follow up the defeated enemy. Our loss in killed and wounded was seven officers, seventy men. We must hope that this success may produce a good moral effect.

*'By this and the preceding mail we also heard of the rapid arrival of the reinforcements. Lord Chelmsford formed these troops into a large column on the Lower Tugela, and moved out himself with these troops on 24 March for the relief of Pearson at Ekowe. The column was composed of the 57th, and 3rd Battalion 60th and 91st Regiments, just landed; also the Naval Brigade landed from the *Shah* and *Tenedos*, the remaining portions of the 3rd and 99th Regiments, some Mounted Infantry and Volunteers, and some native contingents with a large convoy of wagons. They had arrived within ten miles of the Ekowe Station without having been attacked by the enemy, said to amount to between 15,000 and 25,000 men, and they were moving by a different route from that taken by Pearson in his original advance. This officer had been communicated with by flashing signals, and it was ascertained that he was running very short of provisions, and had many sick and wounded in his camp. The anxiety for the success of this movement is therefore very great.*

'On 22 April we got the news of the relief of Ekowe on 2 April by the force under Chelmsford, after an attack of the Zulus, 11,000 strong, on the force entrenched in camp on the Umvolosi River. The attack lasted for about an hour,

and was made from both flanks; but in spite of the most gallant advance, the enemy never succeeded in reaching the shelter trenches, and were entirely defeated with very heavy loss to the enemy, and with very trifling loss to our people. Major Barrow, 19th Hussars, with his Mounted Infantry and natives, pursued for many miles, and cut up large numbers of the enemy. The following day Chelmsford marched to Ekowe and brought out the garrison, having determined to abandon the station as too inaccessible for safety, and having decided upon forming a new post nearer the sea-coast. Our loss: one officer killed and four men, and about four officers and twenty men wounded; of these Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 60th Rifles, dangerously.

'This mail also brought details of the severe actions fought by *Colonel Wood's Column* on March 28 and 29. On the former day the mounted portion of the force under Buller went out and stormed a very high hill called the Zlobané, securing 20,000 Zulu cattle at grass. Our people then suddenly found themselves surrounded by about 20,000 Zulus cutting off their retreat. The cattle had to be abandoned and a retreat made, during which eight officers and nearly the whole of the mounted force were cut to pieces. Captain R. Campbell, and Barton, Coldstream Guards, and several other officers were amongst the dead, and Wood had a horse shot under him. The following day, flushed with this success, the Zulus advanced on *Wood's Camp at Kambula*, and after four hours' hard fighting they were defeated with very heavy loss to them and with considerable loss to ourselves. They were pursued by our mounted men under Buller and Russell for several miles. Lieutenant Nicholson, R.A., and Lieutenant Bright were killed, and several officers and about eighty men killed and wounded. It was evidently a narrow escape from another disaster, but happily it ended in success. Our reinforcements were rapidly arriving and being landed, but we have lost a transport, the *Clyde*, with the draft for the 24th Foot. All the men, with their arms and accoutrements, were saved, but a very large amount of stores were lost, which is a very serious misfortune.

'Subsequent mails have brought full details of both the relief of Ekowe and Wood's actions of March 28 and 29, and fully corroborate the general impression expressed above. The reinforcements had all arrived, and had been landed with complete success and without loss of horses, and preparations were being made with the utmost rapidity for a forward movement from two points, the one from the Utrecht side under Lord Chelmsford himself, with Newdigate, Marshall, and Wood under him, the other from the Tugela mouth, under General Crealock.

'A full report has come in of the loss of the *Clyde*. The conduct of Colonel Davies of the Grenadier Guards, and of the whole of the detachments on board, is beyond all praise,

and deserves commendation, and every soul was saved, but all the stores are unfortunately lost.'

'*From Afghanistan* we hear of Yakoob Khan having actually arrived in the English camp, and negotiations have commenced with him for peace, which it is much hoped will turn out successfully. Major Cavagnari conducts these negotiations. The accident to the Squadron of the 10th Hussars, when nearly the entire Squadron was swept away in crossing the Cabul River, seems as unaccountable as ever. A wrong direction, in a difficult ford at night, was taken accidentally, and with the sad results explained above. Several fine affairs of Cavalry have taken place with the mountain tribes, in which our troops are completely successful, and great execution was made in the several charges and pursuits. In one of these a fine officer of the Guide Corps, Major Battye, was killed.

'*Yakoob Khan, having made overtures for peace*, came into our camp in the course of the month of May, and on Monday 28 we heard that peace with Afghanistan had been signed at Gundamuk, our advanced camp, securing to us the command of the three main passes—the Khyber as far as Lundi Kotal and Ali Masjid, the Kurum Valley as far as the Peiwar, and the Pisheen Valley on the Candahar Road. The advanced positions of Jellalabad and Candahar to be given back to the Afghans, a permanent Resident on our part at Cabul, with subordinate Residents in the other parts of the country whenever deemed necessary, and entire control over the foreign policy of the Afghan State. For this, we acknowledge Yakoob Khan as the legitimate heir to the country, and undertake to support him if threatened from without. Thus ends the Afghan War of 1878. The peace is considered as embracing all the points we have asked for, and that may be deemed essential for our Indian and Imperial interests. The troops are, as far as possible, to return at once to India from the advanced positions held, but Candahar will, for the present, *retain* its British garrison.

'*On May 28*, the Government announced the appointment of Lieut.-General Sir Garnet Wolseley as Chief Administrator and Commander-in-Chief of South Africa, embracing Natal and the Transvaal and seat of war. Sir Bartle Frere is to retain his position at the Cape Colony and in Kaffraria, etc. Sir Henry Bulwer and Colonel Lanyon to be Lieut.-Governors, as at present, of Natal and the Transvaal; and Lord Chelmsford is not recalled, but Sir Garnet Wolseley has been given local rank of General, to supersede him in his command. It is a serious step, and one that has much to be said, *pro* and

con, and I wish it could have been avoided. He takes out with him a large staff for special service, and embarked for South Africa on Friday, May 30. The accounts from South Africa continue to be of a very varied character, and are not very decided or satisfactory. The want of transport is a most serious drawback, as it hampers, and indeed impedes, the advance, the troops being all ready in their positions. They are divided into two columns, one under General Crealock, of two Brigades to advance from the Lower Tugela, the other under Newdigate with Marshall's Cavalry and Wood, as a flying column; the whole under Lord Chelmsford himself, to advance from the Utrecht side. General Clifford has charge of the base, with his headquarters at Pietermaritzburg. The distance between the two columns is, in my opinion, too great, nearly 200 miles. Much sickness prevails amongst officers and men, more particularly on the Tugela line.

'On June 19 the terrible news reached us in the evening by telegram of the *Prince Imperial having been killed on 1 June* in a reconnaissance. The story that reached us is as follows:—A party of six men of Bettington's Local Horse went out that day under a Lieutenant Carey, of the 98th Foot, the Prince Imperial accompanying him to sketch the ground for the following day's encampment, about eight miles in advance. They off-saddled, and were resting in a mealie field, when they were suddenly surrounded by some Zulus, who had crept up to them unawares in the long grass and fired a volley into the small party, who rushed to their horses. Lieutenant Carey and four men got away, but the Prince by some mischance could not mount his horse, was missed by his companions, and was found with the two other men killed near the spot where they had been halting. A party of the 17th Lancers went out at once under General Marshall, and found the body with seventeen assegai wounds, stripped naked, but not mutilated, only a locket with chain round the neck being left on him. The news reached me in a telegram from Lady Frere, and Lord Chelmsford telegraphed the fearful catastrophe to Colonel Stanley. I immediately communicated with Lord Sydney to arrange for breaking this dreadful intelligence to the Empress at Chiselhurst. The entire nation is overwhelmed with grief and confusion at this catastrophe, which all feel should never have occurred; but we must await the details. How the Prince could have been allowed to be sent so recklessly to the front it is impossible to understand, or how he could have been left to his fate by Lieutenant Carey and the four men who got away unharmed. Already we had been surprised to hear he had been allowed to go with a reconnoitering party with Colonel Buller for three days, whence he had only just returned, and during which he had been in considerable danger. It is too horrible to contemplate.

'In other respects the news is rather better. General Marshall had been on an expedition to Isandlwana, where he buried some of the dead, including Colonel Durnford, whose body was recognised; but the 24th men were left unburied at the special request of Colonel Glyn, their commanding officer, who asked permission to have this painful duty left till it could be performed by his own men at a later period, which seems to me to have been a most unfortunate mistake. Forty wagons were recovered and taken back to Rorke's Drift. The whole operation was not molested by the enemy. Sufficient transport and supplies for one month were also collected at the front, and one day's march in advance had been made by General Newdigate's force.

'After long delays and considerable change of plan, Lord Chelmsford at last advanced upon Ulundi towards the end of June, taking Newdigate's and Wood's columns with him; Crealock remaining in the Lower Tugela, and Marshall taking general charge of the lines of communication. On July 2 the Zulus attacked this force whilst on the advance to *Ulundi*, and near that place, and were signally and thoroughly defeated by Lord Chelmsford, with but slight loss on his side and heavy loss to the enemy, who were pursued and cut up by the 17th Lancers and Buller's Horse. Ulundi was taken, the King's kraal burnt. Lord Chelmsford considers the war virtually over with this signal victory, and all rejoice that it should have fallen to his lot to have accomplished his task without the intervention of Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had not got up to the front. Chelmsford withdrew from Ulundi the same day, and moved in the direction of the Mission Station of St. Paul's, in order to get into communication with Crealock's Column on the Lower Tugela, on which line Wolseley himself proposes to advance.

'Preparations are being made for sending away portions of the troops at once, and Chelmsford himself and a considerable portion of the Staff and Special Service Officers, are at once to return home.

'Sir Garnet Wolseley now set about occupying the country in all directions, and succeeded, after much difficulty, in seizing Cetywayo, the capture having been effected, after much difficulty, by Major Marter of the 1st Dragoon Guards. He was conveyed to Cape Town, where he has been assigned quarters, and continued a prisoner at large ever since.

In October an expedition was prepared against Sekukuni, who was disposed to give great trouble. Several columns of natives were put in motion, but the chief was that under Lieutenant-Colonel Baker Russell, of the 13th Hussars, one of the officers on Sir Garnet's Staff, and which, in addition to native levies, was composed of a considerable body of Europeans, including portions of Royal Artillery, 1st Dragoon Guards, 21st and 94th Regiments. After a very arduous march, and Sir Garnet having himself joined the main

column, the attack was made on Sekukuni's *Town* on 28 November 1879, and after a severe struggle, and considerable losses on our side, the place was captured and the enemy entirely defeated, which brought the war to a close. Garrisons were then formed for the Transvaal and Natal; the troops, with the exception of four Battalions of Infantry and some Artillery, were sent to their several destinations, even the King's Dragoon Guards being sent on to India. Sir Garnet Wolseley returned home, and Sir George Colley was appointed to succeed him as Administrator and High Commissioner in that portion of South Africa, and everything was allowed to resume its normal condition, it being assumed that the country had been completely pacified, and that all that was in future required would be to govern the separate portions of these extended colonies with moderation and firmness.'

In September 1879 news reached India and England of the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari at Cabul with the whole of his escort, and it was therefore at once decided to advance afresh into the Afghan country and to occupy Cabul. This operation was entrusted to General Roberts from the side of the Kurum Valley with a force as rapidly as possible brought together in that direction, whilst troops were also assembled under General Bright in the Khyber Pass to keep open communications on that line in support of the column under Roberts. This officer advanced over the Shuturgardan Pass on September 7, driving the enemy before him, Yakoob Khan shortly after giving himself up as a prisoner in our camp, to escape the imputation of being a party to the murder of the Envoy and his escort. Roberts had a very handy force with him, composed of three Brigades of Infantry and one of Cavalry, the latter under Brigadier Massey, the former under Brigadiers Macpherson, Baker, and Hugh Gough. Besides a large contingent of Native troops and Bengal Artillery, the 9th Lancers, 67th, 72nd and 92nd were the component portions of this force, whilst the 6th Dragoon Guards, 8th Hussars, 9th, 12th, 51st, besides Artillery and other Corps, European and Natives, occupied the Khyber line, and pushed on in that direction as far as circumstances would permit. Having defeated the enemy in front of Cabul, Roberts entered and occupied that town before the end of the month, and at once began to establish himself in full possession of the government of that portion of the country. He occupied the Bala Hissar, which was considered as commanding the city itself, and also held the Sherpur Cantonment, having got possession of the whole of the enemy's field-guns after his successful action. Matters did not continue long to run smoothly. The Afghans, under Sirdar Jan and other Afghan Chiefs, collected in force, and attacking

Roberts with vastly superior forces, compelled him to fight a succession of severe engagements ending in the evacuation of the Bala Hissar, and his shutting himself up with the whole of his force in the Sherpur Cantonment. A great effort was now made from the Khyber side to bring relief to Roberts's force, and after some delay Brigadier-General Charles Gough with a Brigade made good his way to Cabul, and the relief of the troops was effected, the force under Roberts himself having meanwhile repelled a serious attack made on the Cantonment, and having as a result completely defeated the Afghans in a sortie he made subsequent to the attack.

'Meanwhile Sir Donald Stewart had been ordered up from Kandahar to reinforce and assist the Division at Cabul, General Primrose with a fresh Division, composed of Bombay troops, taking the place of Stewart's Division at Candahar. The difficult march was accomplished by Stewart with perfect success, though one action had to be fought at Ahmed Khel, which was a severe one, but in which the enemy was completely routed, and as a result dispersed in all directions. On the junction of the two Corps, Stewart took the supreme command over the whole of the troops in and about Cabul, including troops under Bright in the Khyber Pass line, which was constantly engaged in minor actions with the tribes all along that route. The 59th and 2nd Battalion 60th were the two European Corps which came up under Stewart, who brought with him two entire Brigades of Infantry and one of Native Cavalry, the latter under Palliser. Yakoob Khan had been removed to India whilst Roberts was in command, and was deposed for having acted, as it was supposed, with bad faith during the time of the massacre of Cavagnari, and no new ruler was set up in his place. A change of Government in England in April 1880 had now brought about a change of Viceroy and of policy. Lord Lytton resigned at once, and Lord Ripon succeeded him. The new Gladstone Ministry decided upon an early withdrawal from Afghanistan, and all preparations were made to accomplish this end at the earliest practicable period. Overtures were made to Abdurraman to take the Ameer'ship of Cabul, and after much negotiation and delay this was at last effected about the month of August, not, however, before a new incident had taken place in the direction of Candahar.

'*Ayoub Khan* had left Herat during the month of June, and had advanced towards the Helmund River with a view of either attacking Candahar or forcing his way up towards Kelat-i-Ghilzi and Ghuzni. The Native levies under the Wali of Candahar had gone out to Girishk on the Helmund to watch this force, and if necessary to oppose it. They were soon followed by a Brigade under General Burrows detached from Candahar to support him. The Wali's troops shortly

after mutinied and dispersed. Ayoub Khan thereupon pushed on his advance. Burrows with his Infantry Brigade, composed of the 66th Foot, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, and Jacob's Rifles, besides Artillery, and with a Brigade of Native Cavalry under Brigadier Nuttall, 2nd Scinde Horse, and 3rd Bombay Cavalry, went forward to stop his movement; they met at Maiwand on July 27, and after a very severe action Burrows was completely defeated and driven back into Candahar with the loss of the greater part of his troops, his baggage, and most of his guns. This news reached England in Goodwood week, and made a most painful impression on the people of England. Every effort was made to retrieve this terrible disaster. General Primrose shut himself up with what remained of Burrows' and Nuttall's Brigade, and with the intact Brigade of Infantry of Brigadier Brook, in Candahar, where he was regularly besieged by Ayoub Khan, and though he made one ineffectual sortie, in which Brigadier Brook and many of the 7th Fusiliers, the other European Regiment he had with him, were unfortunately killed, was enabled to do no more than hold the city till succour arrived from without. General Phayre with the Bombay Reserve Division made strenuous efforts to move troops up from the Bolan Pass and route, and after much delay was enabled to come up, but not before Candahar had been effectually relieved by a Division under Sir Frederick Roberts, which, after a most magnificent march from Cabul, had succeeded in pushing its way to the beleaguered city.

'Immediately on the news of Maiwand reaching India, Stewart was directed to send all his available troops to Candahar. Roberts was directed to take the command of this force, with General John Ross as his second in command, composed of three Infantry Brigades under Macpherson, Baker, and MacGregor, and the Cavalry Brigade under Hugh Gough. The 9th Lancers, 2nd Battalion 60th, 72nd, and 92nd formed the European portion of this splendid force, all seasoned troops, with well-selected Native Bengal Regiments; and whilst Stewart gradually withdrew from Cabul, and through the Khyber Pass to India—a movement which was accomplished with complete success, and without molestation—Roberts, leaving Cabul on August 8, made his march on Candahar in the most magnificent style in twenty-one days; reached Candahar without the loss of a man, at once engaged Ayoub Khan, and entirely defeated him on September 1, taking the whole of his thirty-six guns, Ayoub himself flying in wild dismay with his troops shattered and broken to Herat. Candahar was thus happily relieved by the end of August, and General Phayre coming up with his troops from the Bolan, the Maiwand disaster was thus far happily retrieved, and we were once again in firm possession of Southern Afghanistan. General Primrose was relieved of his command, as were Burrows and Nuttall, and upon

Roberts's Division being moved back to India, Major-General Hume was placed in command, with fresh troops and considerable reinforcements, both from Bengal and Bombay. Later we entirely withdrew from Candahar again, taking up our position at Quetta; and thus the Afghan Campaign of 1879-80 was brought to an end.¹

'As following the Zulu War and settlement of the Transvaal, the Boers broke out in open Rebellion in 1881, defeated Sir George Colley at Laing's Nek, the Ingogo, and at Majuba Heights, where he was killed; and the Government, though they sent out large reinforcements under Major-General Evelyn Wood, to repair the disaster, decided upon making peace and restoring the Transvaal to nominal, and in fact real, independence. This was altogether so disastrous a proceeding that I do not like further to dwell upon it. Several Regiments were sent to South Africa from India, 14th and 15th Hussars, 2nd Battalion 60th Rifles, 83rd, 92nd, besides 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, 7th Hussars, 41st, 97th from home and the Colonies, and thus our disaster might have been retrieved. But it was decided otherwise, much to the distress of the whole Army, who considered their honour seriously compromised by such a conclusion to a very unfortunate contest.'

¹ Since this chapter went to press, certain letters to the Duke dealing with the campaign in Afghanistan have come to hand among H.R.H.'s correspondence. As it was thus too late to insert them in this chapter, they are given in an Appendix.

CHAPTER XXVI

SOUTH AFRICA—1877-80

Kaffir War, 1877-78. Lieut.-General Thesiger sent to South Africa. End of Kaffir War. Raid by Zulus in Natal. Correspondence with Sir Bartle Frere. Disaster at Isandlwana. Lord Chelmsford's Letter. Sir Garnet Wolseley's forecast of Zulu trouble, 1875. Sent to South Africa to take command. Death of Prince Imperial. Consternation at home. H.R.H.'s Letters. Battle of Ulundi. Sir Garnet Wolseley assumes command. Colonels Wood and Buller. Trouble in the Transvaal. Sir Garnet marches to Pretoria. Expedition against Sekukuni. Honours for the Campaign.

ALTHOUGH the Duke's Diary, given in the last chapter, describes the various operations in which we were engaged in South Africa in 1878-81, at the risk of repetition it has been deemed advisable to give in this and the succeeding chapters some of the more interesting and important of the letters H.R.H. received from the seat of war during that eventful period, together with his letters to the various officials at the Cape. These are now presented, with such brief notes as have been considered necessary in order to explain the current position of affairs.

The troubles at the Cape prior to the Zulu War, alluded to by the Duke in his diary, were due to the risings of the Galekas and Gaikas in 1877-78. On 30 April, Major-General Thesiger inflicted a sharp defeat on the rebels which practically terminated the operations.

FROM LIEUT.-GENERAL THESIGER.

'HEADQUARTER CAMP,
BARLIESGRAVE POST, 1 May 1878.

'I have just time to inform Y.R.H. that the attack on the rebels yesterday was most successful. The converging columns came up at the right moment, and the enemy were dispersed in all directions with the loss of at least 100 killed,

and the loss of all their cattle. I regret to report that Lieutenant Saltmarshe, 90th Light Infantry, was killed, and Captain Stevens and six privates of the same Regiment were wounded. I have not as yet received any account of the loss sustained by the Fingo levies, but I know them to be very trifling. The rebels I estimate as having been 600 to 700 strong. There were five companies of the 2nd 24th, and the same number of the 90th Light Infantry engaged; all of them entered the bush, and in fact did nearly all the fighting. I have several columns out to-day searching the different places where the fugitive Kaffirs may have taken refuge, and directly I have satisfied myself that only small parties remain, I shall move my force to the old ground round the Perie and Buffalo Poort bush, and attack the rebels that I know are congregated there. I have now a satisfactory force at my command, and I shall, I trust, be able to harass the rebels without ceasing until they are dispersed or surrender themselves.'

FROM LIEUT.-GENERAL THESIGER.

'KING WILLIAM'S TOWN,
S. AFRICA, 12 *June* 1878.

'The telegram sent by me yesterday for conveyance to England by the last mail will have conveyed the news of the war being considered virtually at an end.

'I feel proud to report that in my opinion the Imperial troops must be credited with the largest share in this successful result. Had it not been for Colonel Evelyn Wood's untiring energy, and Major Buller's dogged perseverance, I feel sure that the rebels would never have been hunted out and dispersed from the difficult country in which they had taken refuge. Day after day and night after night, however, small columns entered the bush until every part of it was as well known to our troops as to the Kaffirs themselves, and at last, finding themselves deprived of all food and even rest, there was no option but to disperse. Sandilli himself had been left without a horse for some time, and no sooner was a fresh one got for him than it was seized by some of our parties. He was wounded on 29 May by a party of Lonsdale's Fingoes (who have done real good work under Colonel E. Wood), but he did not die until six days after. . . .'

Hardly, however, had the tribesmen in Cape Colony been brought into subjection, when affairs assumed a threatening aspect on the frontier of Natal. The Zulu King raided our territory in pursuit of fugitives from his own kingdom, and when called upon to desist, let it be clearly known that he would not be interfered with.

Preparations were thereupon made by General Thesiger (Lord Chelmsford) to invade Zululand and bring the King to a better frame of mind. Owing to the absence of railways and roads at this period, the movement and concentration of troops and of their supplies was an extremely difficult affair. In December 1878 Sir Bartle Frere, who was at this time Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner of South Africa, wrote to the Duke on the general situation.

FROM SIR BARTLE FRERE.

‘PIETER MARITZBURG,
NATAL, 28 December 1878.

‘... I have not troubled Y.R.H. with any news from Natal, for I knew how fully Lord Chelmsford reports everything of interest, and I had little to add except to tell you how thorough and judicious all his arrangements appear to an outsider; and how admirable is the spirit and perfect the confidence in their General which seems to pervade all ranks of your forces under his command. Between drought and deficient transport, scanty and local resources of every kind, from the immense distances and imperfect means of communication, it has been very uphill work, but everything seems now in train, and the reinforcements sent us, at such a time of urgent need in India and Europe, have given us all fresh spirit, and I think you may feel confident that the result will be all that could be desired. One of our greatest difficulties has been in the singular temper of the Colonists and their officials. They are very good fellows, and much more English than our old friends at the Cape, but very touchy, full of local prejudices and party feeling, and split up into a great variety of cliques and interests, none of which can look beyond the boundary of Natal. The Transvaal and its Boers, the Cape and its merchants and politicians, the Diamond Fields and its Jews and diggers, the Free State and its Dutch Constitution, are all enemies and rivals, and if Durban the Port, and Pietermaritzburg the Capital, of the little insulated Colony, could only settle their centre of gravity, all the world would revolve round Natal. . . . The Zulus are in some respects magnificent animals, and properly governed would be a very fine race; but at present the Ashantees are as well, if not better, governed; one of the King's latest exploits, since Sir Garnet Wolseley was here, was the indiscriminate massacre of all the unmarried women and girls who did not accept the husbands allotted to them from two regiments kept celibate till they were over forty. The corpses were ordered to be placed on the highways by hundreds as a warning to other disobedient women, and

when the relations stole them away to bury them, their kraals were "eaten up"—i.e. men, women, and children were all put to death.

'Yet there is a considerable party here who have much sympathy with this demon King. The Governor wrote to remind him of his promises at his coronation, that all indiscriminate killing without trial was to cease. But Cetywayo told him to mind his own business, that he had not yet begun to kill, and when he did, he would show the Governor what killing was.

'Yet many people here think we are very hard on the Zulu King, and very unjust not to give him more time to kill Y.R.H.'s soldiers, when they go to demand redress for the killing being extended to women who have fled into British territory. I can only account for it by the sort of toleration a man extends to his pet wolf. "He is like a dog in the house," and only eats his neighbour's sheep, and occasionally some of the cottager's children. . . .'

On 22 January 1879, ten days after Lord Chelmsford had crossed the Tugela, occurred the terrible disaster of Isandlwana.

FROM LORD CHELMSFORD.

'NATAL, 27 January 1879.

'I cannot allow this mail to leave without sending Y.R.H. a few lines, altho' I can add no additional facts to the telegram and dispatch I am sending this day to the Secretary of State. We have certainly been seriously underrating the power of the Zulu army, and it is fortunate for Natal that Cetywayo never ordered it to cross the border when there was but one battalion in the Colony, and no colonial defence worth mentioning. From our present experience it is evident that one year ago the Zulu army could have swept through Natal from one end to the other, without any possibility of stopping it.

'The Zulus appear to have no fear whatever of death, and altho' mowed down by hundreds at a time, they quietly filled up the gaps and moved on. It is sickening to think of the lamentable loss of life which has taken place, and mortifying to consider the rich booty which the Zulu army has carried off.

'The garrison of the camp appears to have been scattered about one mile and a quarter in front of the camp it was ordered to defend, and of course fought at a very great disadvantage by not being together, and by having both its flanks unprotected. It will be a melancholy satisfaction to Y.R.H. to know that the Imperial troops fought in the most gallant manner, and that their courage and determination is

the theme of wonder and amazement amongst the natives who saw them fight and who escaped to tell the tale.'

TO LORD CHELMSFORD.

'13 February 1879.

'Your letters dated Christmas Day and 3 January have been duly received, as also the telegrams containing the sad intelligence of 22 January, on which day so large a proportion of the 1st Battalion 24th, a company of the 2nd Battalion, some Artillery and other details, seem to have met with so serious a reverse. It is impossible for us here to understand how this occurred without knowing the details, which have not yet reached us, and which we are awaiting with the greatest anxiety; but meanwhile it is a consolation to think that these gallant men died bravely fighting, and that they sold their lives dearly to the enemy. It is truly sad that the Colours of the Regiment, two guns, and a large amount of stores and supplies have been lost to us, but these latter must of course at once be made good. The Government here at once accepted the gravity of the situation, and have decided to send out two full Regiments of Cavalry with their horses, two Field Batteries with their guns and horses, a Company of Engineers, and six Battalions of Infantry, to reinforce you with the least possible delay. Within a fortnight all these troops will be embarked and will have sailed, and I trust they may arrive in time to save the Colony from any general rising; but of course the want of telegraph communication by cable is a sad and serious drawback, and will, I fear, create a considerable difficulty to yourself in the general arrangements you will have to make in meeting the difficulties which may now have presented themselves in the conduct of the war. Rest assured, however, that I entertain the fullest confidence in your prudence and discretion, and am satisfied that you are fully equal to the emergency that has arisen, and you have, moreover, excellent officers and soldiers to assist your efforts. The troops will all embark with their full equipment, and as they will not be able to take all their heavy baggage into the field, I would request of you to prepare store accommodation, either at the Cape or Natal, to take in this baggage immediately on arrival so as to avoid all delay in their taking the field. Three General Officers have been selected to accompany this force, Major-Generals Crealock, Newdigate, and Marshall. They are placed at your disposal, and whilst giving them the commands for which their rank and abilities entitle them, I hope that you will so arrange as to interfere as little as possible with the very able and distinguished officers at present at the head of your respective columns. You have asked for 100 Artillerymen to act as Mounted Infantry. It seems to us all a strange proposal,

which we do not quite understand. We have therefore decided upon sending a second Field Battery, complete with its guns and horses. If you would prefer employing them in some special manner not known or understood here, you are empowered to place their guns and wagons in store, and employ them in any way you may think most advisable for the public service. You will by this means, moreover, have a good reserve of Artillery to fill up casualties, should you deem this necessary. Of course the Adjutant and Quarter-master General's Departments will give you all these details, and meanwhile I think it well to refer to these points in my private letter to you. My anxiety on your account is chiefly as regards the large native population within the Colony you have to deal with. If we had been altogether successful, no doubt these would have given little trouble, and indeed we might have hoped for their active support. As it is, I fear they may be either useless, or what would be even worse, they may turn against you; and this is the chief danger to which I look. But it is useless at present to speculate on what may or may not happen as a result of the recent check, and I therefore will not pursue this subject further. At all events the large reinforcements now going on will, to a great extent, replace the native contingent on which you relied, and which may now have deserted you, and their value in this respect will be so great that they will more than double the force with which you at first took the field. . . .

TO SIR BARTLE FRERE.

‘COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S OFFICE, 13 *February* 1879.

‘Your letter of 28 December has reached me, and a most interesting one it is, giving me much detail with reference to the Zulus, of which up to that time I had no knowledge. Since then the sad news has reached us by telegraph of the reverse that has befallen our Army on 22 January.

‘This has come like a clap of thunder upon us, and is very distressing, so much so indeed as to upset all our hopes and calculations for a speedy issue of the war. We are most anxiously waiting for details to understand clearly how it has all come about, for at present there is much that is quite inexplicable to us. The distance and want of telegraphic communication adds much to our perplexity, and is an additional source of danger to the general position of the Colony. However, I know you have a good man in Lord Chelmsford, and able officers to back him, with gallant troops under their command; and for the rest, we must place our faith in God’s providence, which will help us out of our present difficulties as it has done on other occasions. Meanwhile large reinforcements are at once ordered out to the

Cape, two Cavalry Regiments, two Field Batteries, a Company of Engineers, and six Infantry Battalions. Of these one will proceed from Ceylon direct, the 57th, on its relief now going on. All these troops will go from home, and we hope to have them all off within twelve days. Still it will be long before they can be with you, and the intermediate suspense is very anxious and distressing. These troops will take their horses, and three General Officers will accompany them—Major-Generals Crealock, Newdigate, and Marshall, excellent men, very intelligent, reliable, and active. They are all junior to Chelmsford, in whom I have the greatest confidence, and who no doubt will do, and has been doing, all that is prudent and right. . . .’

This Zulu menace did not come upon us without ample warning. So far back as 1875, Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had been sent out to Natal to settle various matters which were at the time causing difficulty, had expressed himself in no uncertain terms on the subject.

Prior to his return to England he called the attention of the authorities to the dangerous menace to our power caused by the presence of the armed Zulus on our frontier, and in the same letter thus expresses himself about the incapacity of the young soldiers, then forming part of the attenuated garrison there, to take the field:—

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
NATAL, 21 August 1875.

‘. . . As I have already informed Y.R.H., I have applied to have this garrison increased in strength. . . . Upon the extreme frontier lies Zululand, where a powerful and despotic King reigns, having at his disposal from 30,000 to 40,000 warriors, all now armed with guns, and many of them having good rifles, with which they are fair shots; they make their own powder. They live under a very severely enforced discipline, and are fine, brave fellows. . . .’

‘In other words they are very dangerous neighbours, and would be most formidable enemies. . . . I see no immediate cause for alarm, but I think it would be most culpable on the part of the Government here unless every possible precaution were taken to guard ourselves against possible danger. . . .’

‘I have just made a minute and careful inspection of the half Battalion of the 13th Light Infantry stationed here. I inspected the recruits by themselves, of whom I am sorry to say there are a greater proportion than is good for any

Corps. They are, in my opinion, in every way just the same sort of men who were in the habit of enlisting when I first entered the service; most of them I consider to be at present unfit for the hard work of a campaign, although I see no reason why they should not be very efficient soldiers in another year or eighteen months, when they have done growing and their muscular power has been improved by good living. . . .

That the pinch of short service and its inevitable outcome, under the conditions framed by Mr. Cardwell, the flooding of the ranks of our Infantry Battalions with immature lads incapable of taking the field, would sooner or later make itself felt, was inevitable. But it was a curious coincidence that the officer who is to this day Mr. Cardwell's staunchest admirer, should thus have been one of the first to draw the official attention of the Duke to the unsatisfactory results produced. Be the reason what it may, young soldiers or indifferent leading, it is certain that seldom has a British force met with such a succession of reverses as did that under Lord Chelmsford.

The public imagination was naturally profoundly stirred by the terrible massacre of our men at Isandlwana; but there were other reverses which, if less far-reaching, were much to be deplored. Thus the true story of Wood's and Buller's severe defeat on the Zlobané Mountain on 28 March 1879 has yet to be written, and has never attracted public attention owing to the fact that the news of the subsequent repulse of the Zulus at Kambula Hill was received at the same time, and the public were content to learn that the operations had resulted in the eventual defeat of the Zulus.

That the fighting capacity and general condition of our troops in South Africa at this period caused considerable anxiety even in the highest quarters is well evidenced by the following letter from Sir Henry Ponsonby:—

FROM SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

‘WINDSOR CASTLE, 19 May 1879.

‘. . . The Queen is very much distressed at Y.R.H.'s account of the state of the Army, and has commanded me to ask Colonel Stanley for further information, not only as to the actual state of affairs, but as to what steps the

Government think it right to take to remedy an evil of so serious a nature.'

When reinforcements were ordered out there was, as is ever the case in our service, no lack of volunteers, and among others, the gallant young Prince Imperial was most persistent in his endeavour to proceed to the seat of war.

The Government, however, at first declined to allow him to go out at all, and this was communicated to him in the following letter:—

TO THE PRINCE IMPERIAL.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 20 *February* 1879.

'I received last night a reply from Colonel Stanley as to the question you put to me with regard to your joining in the Natal Expedition against the Zulus in South Africa, and I regret to say that the Government are of opinion that they cannot depart from the ordinary course adopted, that of declining permission to go on service, excepting to such as are called upon to go as a matter of duty to the State. I regret this decision all the more, as I know how anxious you are to see service in the field and to join our troops under such circumstances, and I fear therefore the disappointment will be great; but of course I have personally no alternative but to give you the information and reply which has been given to me to the question I put in your name. Let me assure you of my thorough appreciation of the chivalrous motives which have induced you to wish to see active service in the field.'

Unhappily, as it turned out, the young Prince's determination to see active service at length induced the authorities to relent, and he was permitted to go out, ostensibly as a spectator, under certain restrictions, which, however, were not enforced.

On leaving England the Duke provided him with the following letters of introduction to Sir Bartle Frere and to Lord Chelmsford:—

TO SIR BARTLE FRERE.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 25 *February* 1879.

'I am anxious to make you acquainted with the Prince Imperial, who is about to proceed to Natal by to-morrow's packet, to see as much as he can of the coming campaign

in Zululand, in the capacity of a spectator. He was anxious to serve in our Army, having been a Cadet at Woolwich, but the Government did not think that this could be sanctioned. But no objection is made to his going out on his own account, and I am permitted to introduce him to you and to Lord Chelmsford, in the hope and with my personal request that you will give him every help in your power to enable him to see what he can. I have written to Chelmsford to the same effect. He is a charming young man, full of spirit and energy, speaking English admirably, and the more you see of him, the more you will like him.

‘He has many young friends in the Artillery, and so I doubt not, with your and Chelmsford’s kind assistance, he will get on well enough.’

TO LORD CHELMSFORD.

‘GLOUCESTER HOUSE,
PARK LANE, 25 February 1879.

‘This letter will be presented to you by the Prince Imperial, who is going out on his own account to see as much as he can of the coming campaign in Zululand. He is extremely anxious to get out, and wanted to be employed in our Army, but the Government did not consider that this could be sanctioned, but have sanctioned my writing to you, and to Sir Bartle Frere, to say if you will show him kindness and render him assistance to see as much as he can with the columns in the field. I hope you will do so. He is a fine young fellow, full of spirit and pluck, and having many old Cadet friends in the Artillery he will doubtless find no difficulty in getting on, and if you can help him in any other way, pray do so. My only anxiety on his account would be that he is *too plucky* and *go-ahead*.’

FROM THE QUEEN.

‘WINDSOR CASTLE, 24 February 1879.

‘DEAR GEORGE,—I hasten to thank you for your letter just received, and to return these very nice letters from the young Prince Imperial. I am greatly touched at the kind and gratifying expressions he makes use of, and cannot but admire his desire to go out and serve with my brave troops. But I am glad I am *not* his Mother at *this* moment. Still I understand easily how, in his peculiar position, he must wish for active employment. But he must be careful not to unnecessarily expose himself, for we know he is very venturesome. I should like to see him before he starts. Any time between twelve and one, or any afternoon between five and six, he liked to come and see me—but not this week. Let me now thank you for your two previous letters, which I received at Osborne. You may be certain I shall strongly

urge an increase, and not even keeping the Army as it is: a *reduction* is, thank God, out of the question. . . .’

Readers of this book will remember, with reference to the last sentence in Queen Victoria’s letter, that in January 1879 it was proposed to effect a reduction in our military forces, for financial reasons, whilst the Afghan and Zulu wars were still in progress. It is only too true that reductions have frequently been effected in our Army at infelicitous moments, but never, perhaps, before has a government seriously proposed such a course with two wars actually on its hands at the time.

Needless to say, the Duke protested most strenuously to Colonel Stanley, the War Secretary, and happily this protest, to which Colonel Stanley replied on 30 January, combined with the unsatisfactory condition of affairs both in South Africa and Afghanistan, resulted in the abandonment of the contemplated reductions to which Her Majesty alludes.

Within four months of the date of this letter, the Duke, and indeed the whole nation, was filled with consternation at the appalling death of the gallant young Prince Imperial, under circumstances the bare remembrance of which must ever cause an acute feeling of sorrow and shame to all Englishmen.

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S OFFICE, 25 June 1879.

‘The dreadful intelligence which reached us by telegraph on Thursday last, June 19, of the death of the Prince Imperial in a reconnaissance on June 1, had filled us all with the greatest horror and sorrow.

‘As the telegram giving the news was necessarily very short, we were unable clearly to understand the exact circumstances under which this deplorable event took place. But I cannot disguise from you that, as the matter stands, it is painfully unsatisfactory in all respects; and I therefore feel confident that Lord Chelmsford will have immediately taken every step to clear up the mystery which to us is so inexplicable. There are two points requiring explanation: Why and by whom was the Prince allowed to go on this dangerous expedition, he being a mere spectator and volunteer in the camp? and how was it that he appears to

have been abandoned to his fate by Lieutenant Carey and his escort, who, with the exception of two men, who fell nobly by his side, returned to camp *uninjured* (?) to give information of this great misfortune, instead of having stood by him to protect and assist him, as they ought to have done, not merely in the case of this gallant young Prince, but had it been any other officer, N.C.O., or private soldier of our Army? In short, the thing looks most uncomfortable, and requires much elucidation, and the public mind, both here and on the Continent, is much excited by this grave event; and therefore I hope the most ample explanation may be sent home, and action may have been taken, if default can be ascribed to any quarter.'

TO LORD CHELMSFORD.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 26 June 1879.

'The dreadful news which reached us by telegraph on Thursday, 19 June, of the death of the Prince Imperial in a reconnaissance or sketching expedition on 1 June, has filled all hearts with grief and sorrow, and is the only subject of conversation and consideration both at home and abroad.

'I was in hopes that it had been so distinctly laid down that the Prince was to be looked upon as a spectator and volunteer in camp, that the possibility never occurred to me of his being sent out on such very dangerous expeditions, and even when I heard of his going out with that very gallant and distinguished officer, Colonel Buller, I was in some anxiety on his account, and this is confirmed to me in your letter of 21 May, in which you refer to his having been in some danger and behaved remarkably well. But that he should have gone to the front with so small an escort, and with a junior officer, Lieutenant Carey, alone in his company, requires explanation of the fullest kind; as also does the fact of his having been killed, poor lad, with two of his escort gallantly fighting for their lives, whilst Lieutenant Carey and the four other men who were with him returned to camp, apparently much frightened, though otherwise quite unharmed. I still hope and pray there may be a mistake of some sort in this account, and that when the reality becomes known, it may not turn out to be so bad. But at present the feeling of horror, distress, and I may say dismay, is intense, and it will require the most clear account and the most searching investigation to satisfy the world, both at home and abroad, that he was not abandoned to his fate by the officer and men who were with him. I make no doubt that you will have at once made the most minute investigation into the fate of this gallant Prince, and that you will have felt the necessity for withholding nothing from us which could possibly clear

up all doubt as to the facts, and further, that if you found it necessary to take action, should there have been default, you will not have hesitated to have acted upon what the gravity of the circumstances required. The condition of the poor Empress is of course lamentable in the extreme, for with this lad all her hopes are buried in the grave for ever. Had the poor dear gallant young fellow been killed in a general action, or by your side, or by the side of one of the superior officers, it would have been the will of God it should be so, and nothing further could have been said; but that he should have met the fate he did, in the manner in which thus far the telegrams describe it to us, is the point which causes so much painful comment, and which seems to all, including myself, to be so inexplicable.'

Among the Duke's papers relating to the sad circumstances of the gallant young Prince's death is a brief memorandum written by the Empress Eugénie, at the period of her crushing sorrow, apparently with a desire, in a manner, to allay the storm of criticism which at the time convulsed all ranks both in England and on the Continent on this most painful subject.

In this touching appeal which Her Majesty desired should be made known to all English and French people as her opinions, she alluded to the supreme consolation it afforded her to feel that her beloved son had fallen as a soldier in the execution of his duties, and expressed her hope that no one might be made to suffer on his account.

Truly it would be hard to find a more eloquent or dignified epitaph with which to summarise the close of that splendid young life given in the service of our country.

POUR M. PIÉTRI.

'La seule source de consolation terrestre, je la puise dans l'idée que mon enfant bien aimé est tombé en soldat, obéissant à des *ordres* dans un service commandé et que ceux qui les lui ont donnés le croyaient capable de bien les remplir et de rendre des services utiles.

'Pas de récriminations: que le souvenir de sa mort réunisse en un commun regret tous ceux qui l'aimaient et que personne n'ait à souffrir *pour lui*, ni dans sa réputation, ni dans ses intérêts. Moi qui ne peux plus rien désirer sur terre, je demande cela comme une dernière prière.

'Parlez à tous dans ce sens, Anglais ou Français.

'EUGÉNIE.'

The gallant young Prince's sentiments towards this country and its Royal Family can well be appreciated by perusing the extract from his will which is engraved below the statue erected to his memory in St. George's Chapel, Windsor. History hardly affords a greater contrast than between the following words and those expressed in the will of his great-uncle Napoleon I.

'Je mourrai avec un sentiment de profonde gratitude pour Sa Majesté la Reine d'Angleterre, pour toute la famille Royale, et pour le pays où j'ai reçu pendant huit ans une si cordiale hospitalité.'¹

The repeated reverses to our arms, and the pertinacity and the bravery of the Zulus, created a feeling of great insecurity among our various columns, and when Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived in Natal, he found that considerable despondency existed. True, however, to his advocacy of short service, he refused to admit that this was due to the youth of our lads, but he laid the blame on the leaders. It is but fair to the memory of the latter to recall Sir Garnet's condemnation of the condition of the 13th Light Infantry in Natal four years earlier, and to bear in mind that, whatever may have been the shortcomings in respect of too youthful soldiers in 1875, they were vastly greater in 1879 in some corps, by which time the majority of the old soldiers had completed their service and taken their discharge, and their places had been filled up with young recruits. Hence the Battalions sent out in 1879 were in a decidedly unsatisfactory condition.

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

' GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
PIETERMARITZBURG, NATAL, 30 June 1879.

' . . . I must not conceal from Your Royal Highness the despondency that I am told on all sides pervades the forces here. It is no question of young soldiers, but of bad leading. Had a man like Evelyn Wood been in command here, or a man like Colonel Colley, or many others whom I could name, the war would have been over by this. Such men may make mistakes, but their very mistakes are better than the plans of unknown officers, who command no respect or who

¹ Testament du Prince Impérial, 26 Février 1879.

want the confidence of those under them. . . . I cannot say too much for the earnest zeal of General Clifford. I do beg and urge upon the Government in the most earnest manner that he should be given a commission as second in command to succeed me in the event of my being shot; that is always supposing H.M. Government is not disposed to promote Colonel Colley to that position. He is the ablest man I know, and in the interests of the public service, if they alone are to be regarded, it would entirely be advisable that he should succeed to the command here in case of my death. . . .'

Before Sir Garnet Wolseley could join Lord Chelmsford, the latter reached Ulundi, and inflicted a decisive defeat on King Cetwayo and his redoubtable warriors. In the following two letters the final advance and battle are briefly described:—

FROM LORD CHELMSFORD.

'HEADQUARTERS,
ZULULAND, 28 June 1879.

'The troops under my command move forward this evening after sunset six miles towards Ulundi and bivouac at daybreak. General Wood's force, strengthened by three Squadrons, 17th Lancers, will push forward and seize the left bank of the Umvolosi River, which commands the right bank, and which is necessary to us for our wagon laager, there being no open space on this side.

'We know that there is a considerable force of Zulus assembled in and about the Ulundi Kraal, and it is only reasonable to expect that they will defend the King's capital to the best of their ability; we have arrived therefore at a serious crisis in the campaign, and it is possible that in the next few days an opportunity may be afforded us of bringing the war to a satisfactory close.

'We leave 500 wagons here, converting them into two strong forts, with a cattle-enclosure between them. The garrison to be left will number about 500 Europeans, besides 150 natives. We go on without tents, and carrying only ten days' provisions, ammunition, tools, etc.—in fact, only what is absolutely essential. The number of wagons between the two columns will be nearly 200, but after having to look after 700, it will be a very light charge. . . . Up to the present moment, however, all that I could possibly have expected in the shape of progress, immunity from sickness, efficiency of transport, has been more than realised, and I consider that the columns move forward this evening with, humanly speaking, every chance in their favour.

'Whatever, however, the result may be, and whatever verdict may be passed upon me as General, I shall never

forget Y.R.H.'s kindness or the generous support given to me at a moment when it was most needed. . . .

FROM LORD CHELMSFORD.

'CAMP EMPANGENI, 6 *July* 1879.

'My dispatch to the Secretary of State for War will give Y.R.H. full particulars of the Battle of Ulundi. I will therefore only mention that the troops behaved admirably. The fire while it lasted was very heavy, but on all sides of our hollow square the men were under perfect control, and the small amount of ammunition will speak for itself. . . . Small compact columns complete in themselves should be organised and sent patrolling all over that portion of the country which has been conquered, and Cetywayo, if he does not choose to submit, should be left with all his people in the thorn country to which he has retreated.

'I have had eighteen months of very hard work and of great anxiety, and I consider that I have earned some rest. . . .

TO LORD CHELMSFORD.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE,
PARK LANE, 24 *July* 1879.

' . . . Above all, and before all, let me congratulate you and the gallant troops under your command for the glorious news which reached me by telegraph yesterday of your entire and signal success at Ulundi, ending in the complete defeat of the Zulu Army under the direct command of Cetywayo, and the subsequent burning of the King's kraal, and the several military kraals surrounding it. Nothing, as far as can be judged by the necessary shortness of the message received, could have been better done, and happily with comparatively small loss on our side, and the moral effect thus produced will, I sincerely trust and confidently believe, put an end to the war, and enable us to settle the difficult questions connected with our position in South Africa in a manner satisfactory to ourselves and of advantage to the permanent position of our Colonists in those distant regions. The general demonstration of joy and satisfaction felt by the public at large is all that could be wished, and it would give you intense pleasure to see it as I have been enabled to do the last two days. There is universal rejoicing from Her Majesty downward, and the feeling is as sincere as it is general. We are in great hopes that we shall soon hear of the return of some, at all events, of the troops recently employed in the field, though at the same time there should be no hurry in this respect, for it is of great importance that all difficulties should be disposed of before a

large diminution of the force takes place. My dear old Corps, the 17th Lancers, seems to have had a great opportunity of distinguishing itself, of which it has known how to take advantage, and I am naturally proud of my old Corps. At the same time I feel satisfied that all performed their duty admirably, for your short report by telegraph states this most distinctly. Let all the troops know how greatly I am gratified.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'CAMP NEAR PORT DURNFORD,
Friday, 11 July 1879.

'... I have heard from Lord Chelmsford last night. His letter was dated the 3rd instant, the evening before his successful engagement; in it he asks me if I have any instructions to allow him to return home, as he is very anxious to do. I know that during the day I shall receive dispatches from him, so I wait their arrival before sending him an answer. My present intention is to say that, as he wishes to leave for England, he can do so whenever he likes. I fancy that he is really in need of quiet and repose; and if zeal and hard work entitle any one to rest, he should have it. Although fortune favoured him in a marvellous manner after his disaster at Isandlwana in enabling him to get back with the remnant of his column into Natal, and in preserving his stores of provision at Helpmakaar and Rorke's Drift, still a blight seems to have rested on all his actions. I am very glad he has had a real success before leaving the country—a success so substantial that I hope it may virtually end the war. If he had not acted promptly before Ulundi, my intention was to have pushed through from here with all the mounted troops I could collect to join his Column; but much as I should have enjoyed seeing the *coup de grâce* delivered in this war, I am sincerely glad that things have turned out as they have, and that Chelmsford can now go home feeling he has struck the blow himself without any assistance from me or the reinforcements I had brought with me.

'The men look well, although the buff belts in their present unpipeclayed and dirty state cause them to look like sweeps. The 60th, whose black belts require no cleaning, look ever so much better than the red-coated Regiments in consequence.

'Although I believe we shall have no more fighting, still I dare not relax any of our military precautions against surprise, so that night duty is still very severe.

'Yesterday I received Your Royal Highness's telegram, dated 23 June, desiring me to make full inquiries into the circumstances connected with the poor Prince Imperial's unhappy death. As Your Royal Highness will have learnt

long before this reaches England, those inquiries have already been made and Captain Carey tried by court-martial, the proceedings of his trial having been forwarded to Your Royal Highness by a previous post. . . . As soon as I can settle matters here with the Chiefs of Zululand I mean to run off to the Transvaal, to which province I intend sending a Brigade under Brigadier Wood, he being the best commander of those in South Africa. His name is in every one's mouth, from the bugler up through all ranks, as the MAN of the war. If his advice had been followed, I know the plan of operations would have been very different, and England would not have to pay the heavy bill now owing for this unfortunate war.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'CAMP, EMPANGWENI DRIFT,
UMVOLOSI RIVER, 18 July 1879.

' . . . On Wednesday I saw General Wood's Flying Column on parade, when, all things considered, the men marched past remarkably well. I never desire to command better soldiers than those composing the three Regiments of that Column—the 1st 13th L.I., the 80th Regiment, and the 90th L.I. The last-named is the youngest Corps as regards men's ages, but General Wood tells me he has every reason to be perfectly satisfied with their behaviour in action as well as in camp. The 80th is a splendid body of men. I wish those who are to form part of the Commission to report on the short service system could have seen this Flying Column march past last Tuesday.

'The men who have been the life and soul of this war are Brigadier-General Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Buller. If their advice had been acted upon steadily, I believe that no further operations would have been necessary now. Every one looked to them, and they could not have looked to abler men. I earnestly hope that Your Royal Highness will be enabled to recommend Colonel Wood to Her Majesty for the permanent rank of Major-General, not as a reward for what he has done, but in the interests of the Queen's Army and of the State. We have very very few General Officers fit for command, and I most humbly and respectfully urge, therefore, that an officer who has proved himself fit for command in the crucial test of active service before an enemy should, in the interests of the nation, be given permanently the position in the Army which he has been now so long holding temporarily in the field. This matter impresses itself very keenly upon me at present, when, for want of really good leaders here, I am forced to give the command of the columns I am about to operate with to officers holding the rank of only Lieutenant-Colonel.

'I am extremely sorry to say that I have felt myself

obliged to allow both Brigadier-General Wood and Lieut.-Colonel Buller to return home. Both are pretty well worn out, and both require rest for mind as well as body. I feel their loss beyond measure, as I had looked to them to finish this business, and then to wind-up matters for me in the Transvaal when I go there.

'My present plans are, after I have seen the Chiefs here, to march again with a Brigade upon Ulundi, and from there to operate with Mounted Infantry and natives against Cetwayo, should it be necessary to do so. At the same time I shall detach a force under Lieut.-Colonel Baker Russell, 13th Hussars, to a point in the neighbourhood of the Mission Station, marked on the Government map as Intabankulu, where a fortified post will be established, and from which he will operate towards the Black Umvolosi River, between the Enhlongana and Itaka rivers, with mounted troops, the country being open and well-suited for Cavalry. I shall send with him as many irregulars as I can, together with one good squadron of the 17th Lancers. I have with me a man in whose dash and soldierlike qualities I have every confidence, I mean Colonel Baker Russell.

'I think the time has arrived for reducing the force. I am therefore sending back the Battalion of Marines from Cape Town, and I have just telegraphed to the Commodore asking him to send home the 1st 13th Light Infantry in the *Euphrates*. I shall send home the King's Dragoon Guards as soon as possible, also two Batteries of Artillery. I am breaking up the Cavalry Brigade now. It only exists on paper, as General Marshall has long been employed under General Clifford on the line of communications. . . .

' . . . I think the war may be considered as over, although we may have a few skirmishes still. The fact is, the enemy have never fought since the day at Kambula. The other day at Ulundi their attack was most feeble, and their fire was child's-play; their attack wanted heart, and only lasted, I am assured, for seventeen minutes, when the Cavalry went at them, and the whole Zulu force took to their heels.'

FROM SIR BARTLE FRERE.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
CAPE TOWN, 28 July 1879.

' . . . Meantime I am ignorant of the causes of the retrograde move, after Ulundi. It was generally supposed to have been in consequence of Sir Garnet's orders to Lord Chelmsford, when he took over the command, but this, I understand, Sir Garnet denies. Y.R.H. is likely to know the exact circumstances before we do, out here. Of the evil results of the move, whoever caused it, there can, I think, be but one opinion. It is, I need not say, a cardinal principle in dealing with such people as the Zulus to follow up every

blow and to give a defeated enemy no rest nor breathing-time. It was one of Lord Chelmsford's misfortunes that he was so often unable to press his advantage, after such blows as Kambula and Ginghilovo, and to some extent this delay since the victory at Ulundi may do harm by encouraging Cetywayo's attempts to rally his scattered forces and prolong the war. But I hope Sir G. Wolseley will be warned in time, and not be in too great a hurry to send away the force he has got, till he is quite sure he can do without it. I have told him how strained is the position in many quarters from which he probably hears nothing, but where every man takes his cue from Zululand, and where a fresh outbreak may give us much trouble. For this reason I much regretted the departure of the Marines. They were seasoned men, used to work in detachments and to shift for themselves, and would have been of more use than twice the force of unseasoned recruits. . . .

TO SIR BARTLE FRERE.

'KISSINGEN, 26 Aug. 1879.

'Your most kind and amiable letter of 28 July has followed me here, and I thank you for the news contained in it. I rejoice with you at the signal success of Lord Chelmsford at Ulundi, and I am very glad he was able to effect the destruction of the King's Kraal after defeating his army. I only wish he had remained there for a short time longer, and had had more Cavalry at hand to follow up the great victory he had achieved; as it is, a fresh advance seems necessary, and this being the case, I cannot understand the haste with which the troops, sent at great expense from England, are now being hurried home. No doubt if not required in S. Africa, the sooner they return to England or to their several destinations the better; but at all events I should have kept the fresh troops, such for instance as the fine body of Royal Marines sent out, and would have sent away some of the Battalions that have had the hardest work in South Africa, and who therefore require rest and reorganisation after a severe campaign. . . .

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE,
12 August 1879.

'I have received your letters of June 30 and July 11, and rejoice at Lord Chelmsford's success at Ulundi, and his destruction of the King's kraal. The troops of all arms seem to have behaved most admirably on this occasion, and the operation appears to me to have been ably and efficiently conducted. Lord Chelmsford's wish to return home after this great success does not surprise me, and I am glad there-

fore that he will soon be home. I would, however, strongly urge upon you the propriety of being *very cautious* as to the disposal of the troops. If you can really spare them, the sooner they are moved from South Africa to other stations the better, but I would not be in too great a hurry in this respect, and I confess to being rather anxious as to whether they are not being sent away too rapidly. The 17th Lancers were intended for India, and I hope they will not have embarked before the orders disposing of the troops may have reached you. In a similar manner, some of the Infantry Regiments are destined for other stations, and I hope, therefore, that these equally may not have embarked before their intended destinations have reached you. . . . As regards the officer who would take your place in the event of anything occurring to disable you, of course this duty will devolve on Major-General Clifford, a very hard-working and able officer, in whom every confidence could be placed. I cannot at all agree in the advisability of preferring a very junior officer like Colonel Colley, however able he may be. No Army could stand these sort of preferences without entirely damping the energies of senior officers, and the balance of the advantage is very decidedly, in my opinion, in favour of the senior officer unless otherwise disqualified. But in the present case there cannot be a doubt that Major-General Clifford is specially qualified for the duty, and must therefore be the man, and it had been so arranged in Lord Chelmsford's time. I fear it is but too true that much confusion existed in the South African forces. Chelmsford is a gallant, estimable, and high-principled man, generous to others, unsparing of himself, and modest withal. But he had evidently a bad Staff. The consequence has been the utter want of system complained of. I agree to every word of your remarks relative to the Department and to the Transport branch specially, as I am satisfied, with yourself, that the Transport should be Military and that well selected Military Staff Officers should have its management, control, and supervision. The new Warrant about to be issued is in this direction, and will, I hope, obviate many of the shortcomings complained of. . . . I hope that you may be right with regard to the conclusion of the war, though your last telegram tells us of your intention to reoccupy Ulundi. I was rather surprised to hear of its having been at once given up again. Certainly the moral effect of a longer stay would, in my opinion, have been of advantage. I am afraid that the Carey Court-Martial is found to be so full of grave errors that it will come to nothing and will have to be quashed, which I hold to be a great misfortune to the service and even to the individual under trial, but I am afraid there is no alternative, as matters stand, than to adopt the course proposed. I am afraid you will find more work on your hands than you seem to expect before matters are really settled in South Africa,

and I shall be indeed surprised if you can bring matters to a satisfactory conclusion by the end of the year. . . .’

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘KISSINGEN, 18 August 1879.

‘I see by the latest telegrams that you are sending home all the General Officers in South Africa and their respective Staffs, replacing them in the command of columns by officers of the rank of Lieut.-Colonel. . . . You may have reasons for what you are doing, but I cannot understand the arrangement so far as it goes. Another point I regret greatly is the very rapid manner in which you are withdrawing, or proposing to withdraw, the troops from South Africa. The Royal Marines are not even landed in South Africa, and yet they consisted of 1000 most efficient men all eager for work; the remount horses sent out at great cost are not even landed to replace some of those rendered inefficient by the hard service they have gone through, but are to be sold at the Cape; the 17th Lancers are to be dismounted at once, though it is evident that their effect in a charge at Ulundi worked like magic with their lances on the affrighted and retiring Zulus. Why this hot haste I know not, and all the more so as I find you are again obliged to advance on and reoccupy Ulundi, doubtless as the result of its having been immediately given up again after the battle before it.’

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘KISSINGEN, 26 August 1879.

‘. . . I rejoice with you at Lord Chelmsford’s success at Ulundi, which I hope may virtually bring the war to an end. We must always remember the great difficulties he has had to contend against, and which he has gradually overcome. That he should wish to return home is not unreasonable, and I am glad that he has started and may soon be expected. I confess to being somewhat surprised at the views you express on the General Officers in South Africa. To me it appears that they have not had much chance of showing what they are capable of, and I believe that they may be looked upon as capable officers. Evelyn Wood and Redvers Buller I know are excellent men, and your appreciation of them only bears out all I have heard or know of them. I have, however, my doubts as to whether Wood has not received his full reward with a K.C.B. and a Good Service Pension. Too early promotion is not, to my mind, beneficial either to an individual or to the Army generally, for it damps the ardour of many good men who are thus superseded, and it is far more difficult to find employment for a good man in the General’s rank than in that of Full Colonel, in which there are many positions that would suit Wood admirably. We must see what can

be done for Buller, who merits the greatest consideration at my hands. You speak well of the Regiments composing Wood's Flying Column; but you must remember that the 13th is an *old* and *seasoned* Corps¹ as to men, and so are, to a great extent, the 80th and 90th, there being still many old soldiers in their ranks. The 57th is another Regiment with old seasoned men. I am afraid the younger Regiments sent out feel the effect of having had so many young men amongst them, and I am not converted at all to the idea that young soldiers are as reliable as the older class of men. There is a happy medium in these matters, which I hope the Committee now sitting may be enabled to find, for I think the present system without any modification is not the best for our requirements. Boys cannot be relied upon to march and stand fatigue like older men, and the best years of a soldier are between his fourth and twelfth year. Captain Carey has arrived in England. His Court-Martial has been quashed on legal grounds, and he has been released from arrest. It is unfortunate that the charge was not judiciously framed, and that therefore the matter has been left where it was. My observations on the case will be made known to you.'

It is necessary here to allude briefly to the closing incidents of the deplorable Carey affair. The unfortunate officer, who had abandoned the Prince Imperial to his fate, was brought to trial before a General Court-Martial; but, owing to various grave irregularities, the finding of the Court could not be confirmed. What these irregularities were, and how it came about that the officer escaped, are best told in the following letter from the Queen:—

FROM THE QUEEN.

'OSBORNE, 10 Aug. 1879.

'The Queen has attentively considered the Lord Chancellor's memorandum "on the finding of the Court-Martial on Lieutenant Carey, 98th Foot." By this it appears that, according to the evidence, there was no one in command of the party, and that the Natal troopers did not form an escort. These are the points which require further explanation from those who gave the order for the reconnoitring party.

'The Queen trusts that the Lord Chancellor's decision that Captain Carey was not in command will not injuriously

¹ It must be borne in mind that almost exactly four years had elapsed since 21 August 1875, when Sir Garnet Wolseley wrote unfavourably about the youth of this Regiment. Four years at the Cape 'seasons' a corps.

affect the military rule according to which a senior officer has hitherto been always held responsible for the act of juniors present, whether placed directly under his command or not.

‘But since the Lord Chancellor is of opinion that there is no evidence in support of the charge, the Queen of course accepts his advice, and will not confirm the finding.

‘The Queen cannot help, however, thinking and feeling strongly that this is a most unsatisfactory termination to the proceedings of this Court-Martial, the members of which were bound to find a verdict according to their consciences and the custom of war in like cases, and the Queen would have much preferred that the Court should have been re-assembled so as to reconsider their finding, and condemn the prisoner according to the forms of law, or to acquit him entirely of the odious charge.

‘Convicted by his brother officers of the most serious crime a soldier can commit, and freed solely on account of legal technical errors, the Queen fears that in returning to his Regiment with the fearful accusations against him still not disproved, Captain Carey can never enjoy the confidence of his superiors nor the respect of his subordinates.’

The Zulu trouble was hardly over before the Boers once again began to agitate, and Sir Garnet was directed to march to Pretoria and endeavour to arrange matters there.

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘CAMP ULUNDI,

ZULULAND, 2 September 1879.

‘... The disaffected Boers are endeavouring to throw every difficulty in the way of our settlement of this and other Transvaal border troubles. They spread the most startling untruths amongst their credulous and ignorant compatriots, so much so that Captain McLeod, our diplomatic agent with the Swazies, reported the other day that in his neighbourhood it was currently believed that every British soldier in Zululand had been killed at Lord Chelmsford’s fight here, and that England had no more soldiers to send abroad—all the English Army having been sent to South Africa, and that all our money had been expended on the war. He added there was a great argument amongst the Boers as to whether England could afford another hundred pounds, but they all agreed that such a sum was certainly as far as she could now go, her resources in money as well as in men having been exhausted. This story will serve to show the ignorance of the people with whom I am now about to deal. . . .’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'CAMP NEAR PRETORIA,
THE TRANSVAAL, 26 September 1879.

'To-morrow I march into Pretoria, where I shall probably remain about two months, and then turn my force once more towards England. My present escort is a troop of the K.D.G.'s. They have been with me now for the last two months. . . .'

When at Pretoria, Sir Garnet received the Duke's letter of 18 August, and wrote in reply as follows, justifying the somewhat hurried manner in which he had sent back the Marines and other troops immediately after Ulundi:—

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'PRETORIA,
THE TRANSVAAL, 28 Sept. 1879.

' . . . Lord Chelmsford fell back a few hours after that fight, retiring behind the White Umvolosi River, and marched as quickly as he could to Kwamagwossa without awaiting any order from me. In my opinion this was a most unwise movement. The Cavalry Brigade and Buller's Mounted Force might have easily caught or killed Cetywayo after the fight, and the fact that I marched back to Ulundi as soon as I could make the necessary commissariat and transport arrangements for my march, and operated from thence with Cavalry, shows how necessary I felt it to keep a force at Ulundi until peace had been obtained, and how much I appreciated the use of the mounted arm of the service. . . . Their orders were to bring the war as quickly as possible to an honourable and satisfactory conclusion, and to reduce expenditure in all practicable ways. Lord Chelmsford had asked for three more Infantry Battalions, and Sir Bartle Frere had strongly supported the application. At a Cabinet Council to which I was summoned, my opinion was asked as to the necessity for sending out these additional Regiments. My answer was that having only recently returned from Cyprus, where all my thoughts were absorbed in the duties of my office, I had not followed the course of events in Zululand as closely as I should have done had I been at home; that I therefore felt some diffidence in giving an opinion, especially as my views differed, as far as I knew, on every point from those entertained by Lord Chelmsford regarding the plan of campaign and mode of operating in Zululand; and that, were I to be influenced exclusively by my own opinions, I should have said that there was there an ample amount of troops in Natal and in the field to finish the war, but that, as Lord Chelmsford had so earnestly

requested to be reinforced by three extra Battalions, I did not feel justified in recommending that none should be sent, and that, as the conduct of the war was about to be transferred into my hands, and that I *alone* would be held responsible for the result, I would recommend a Battalion of Marines being sent out. I proposed Marines, because, as I understood, a Battalion of Guards could not be sent, and because I had gathered, from a conversation I had had the honour of having a few days previously with Your Royal Highness, that the Regiments left behind in England were in a deplorable state from the number of volunteers drawn from them for the Zulu War. This is the history of how a Battalion of Marines came to be sent out.

‘I had not been long in Natal before I found out that there was a plethora of troops there. Indeed so many that one of the two Divisions was sent on a senseless project under General Crealock, who, as Lord Chelmsford has recorded officially, was never meant to co-operate with him in his advance upon Ulundi. Then came the fight at that place, and I at once saw that the great Zulu bubble had burst, and I felt I should not be justified in either landing the Marines or in retaining the services of Regiments or of officers beyond what I felt to be necessary to bring the war to a conclusion. That was a point upon which I had, as General Commander, to form my own opinion. Events have justified the decision I came to, and my only regret now is that what I did has not met with Your Royal Highness’s approval. The war is now over, and one may therefore express an opinion upon it; mine is briefly this, that when war was declared in January last there were ample troops here to have conquered the Zulus had a reasonable plan of operations been determined upon, and had those troops been properly handled. . . .

‘When I wrote regarding a man to succeed me in the event of my being disposed of, I naturally assumed it would be the object of the Government that the ablest and most fitting man should succeed me. When the interests of the State are, in my opinion, concerned, I always felt it to be my duty to speak very plainly, even although I may not, when doing so, be able to do all I would, under other circumstances, do for a man like General Clifford, whom I have long known as a friend and admired as a soldier. In my humble opinion, all private interests or liking should be ignored, and all questions of professional seniority entirely put on one side when the great interests of Her Majesty’s Empire are at stake. It was under the influence of these feelings that I recommended General Colley to succeed me in preference to any other officers who were senior to him in South Africa. He is *immeasurably* the ablest man here: this is a point upon which I know there are no two opinions on the part of men who know the officer I refer to, and Your Royal Highness is

aware of the high opinion I entertain of General Clifford. It is but due to Her Majesty and to the State that the country should have the services of the best man to command Her Majesty's troops in the field entirely irrespective of what his present rank may be. These, Your Royal Highness, are the views I entertain on this subject; they are the views that actuate me when I am entrusted with command; and I regret beyond measure that I have incurred Your Royal Highness's displeasure by my plain writing, and perhaps as far as my own personal interests are concerned by the candid and frank manner in which I have communicated to Your Royal Highness as Commander-in-Chief my views, opinions, and recommendations. If I have erred, I have erred from feelings of patriotic earnestness. I have had but one object in view, namely, the good of my country, in whose service I have now seen a good deal of war. I should have despised myself if I had hesitated to put Your Royal Highness in possession of the conclusion I had arrived at on a point of national importance: as long as I was well myself, I knew that it was upon *my* shoulders all the blame would fall in case of reverse. I am always prepared to accept that responsibility, and when it is put upon me, I naturally use my own discretion in selecting the men I employ on important duties. I am not the Pope, and like all other men, must therefore make mistakes occasionally; but as a rule I am tolerably successful in my selections.'

Shortly before Sir Garnet arrived at Pretoria, the Boers had dispatched a commando against a native chief Sekukuni. They suffered, however, a severe defeat, and applied to the British commander for assistance. This Sir Garnet gave by marching into Sekukuni's country with a flying column.

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'CAMP NEAR FORT WEEBER,
THE TRANSVAAL, 10 November 1879.

'... I believe that all the minor chiefs on the Leola Mountains will submit if I can manage either to kill or to capture this fellow Sekukuni. I want also to finish the business as quickly as possible, as the Boers have called a general meeting of all the discontented, to assemble on the 10th prox. at some point between Pretoria and Heidelberg, and they loudly swagger about the deeds they there mean to carry out in an attempt to fight for their independence. I wish to be back in Pretoria as near that date as possible. I have felt obliged to order up the remaining five Companies of the 80th Regiment from Wakkerstroom to Heidelberg; from there three

or four Companies will push on to Pretoria. In this country the unexpected seems always to occur, and the most careful calculations are frequently overthrown by some threatening movement on the part of either the Boers or the natives. If the Boers mean mischief, I may be detained a month longer in the Transvaal than I had calculated upon; but if all goes on well, I still hope to be in England about the end of next January. Having this little war on my hands whilst the political position in the Transvaal is in its present critical condition is very embarrassing, and adds to my responsibilities extremely. The military business, were it alone to be considered, could be easily disposed of, but coming in the midst of political troubles as it now does, the problem is not so easily solved.'

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'SANDRINGHAM,
NORFOLK, 12 November 1879.

'I have received your letter of 28 Sept. from Pretoria, in answer to mine of August 12 and 18, which I observe have caused you some annoyance. I have referred to the letters I wrote, and really do not see why you should be annoyed at anything they contain. I certainly expressed my anxieties to you about the speedy break-up of the force in South Africa, and though doubtless the result has proved the correctness of the views you adopted, there was nothing to cause you annoyance as regards the legitimate anxieties I expressed, and which I know were equally entertained by many others besides myself. As to your having retained the King's Dragoon Guards in preference to the 17th Lancers, as one Cavalry Regiment had to be dismounted from the sad condition of the horses, I think you were quite right to retain the "*Heavies*," thus giving them a chance, and I should have done the same; and I rejoice to hear from you that you are able to report so favourably of the manner in which they have performed their rough duty. I can assure you I take no exception to your giving me your opinions freely in your private letters, only I cannot see that the public service is benefited by our going out of our way to put some officers prominently forward on all occasions, however valuable they may be, when there are others available quite equal to perform good service also if chance be only given to them. I quite admit that the public service is the *first consideration*, and I *invariably* look to this myself. But I consider the public service is much *depressed* if certain officers are constantly brought to the front, and that the whole body of officers suffer in their *esprit de corps*, which is so essential and valuable, if care is not taken to avoid the suppression of men who have worked hard and well in their

respective spheres of action. I am the first to admit that Brigadier Colley is a very able man and superior officer, and it is quite right to place every confidence in him; but there are plenty of opportunities for making his abilities of use to Her Majesty and the State, without, by so doing, injuring the feelings of others, and this was the observation I made, and to which I see no reason why you should take exception. I therefore hope that you will continue to write to me without reservation on these subjects, and if you could modify your general views in the sense indicated above, nothing would give me greater pleasure. No man has the public interest and service more at heart than I have, and I have nobody specially whom I wish to serve, but the *whole Army and body* of its officers in general. The accounts you give me of many matters in South Africa do not surprise me, for they are opinions which, to a very considerable extent, I had formed myself, and which I find corroborated by what I hear from the numerous officers I see on their return from service in those parts. I was well aware that the Cavalry horses were starved by orders issued previous to your arrival; my annoyance was merely expressed to you in general terms, not as regarding anything you had directed to be done, but as regards the orders which *had been* given, and which I thought most unfortunate. I hope sincerely that your settlement of Zululand may turn out permanent, but I fear you have still much trouble to contend with in the Transvaal, and I doubt your being able to bring it to as early an issue as you seem to expect. Hoping to hear from you as usual on all matters of interest in your command, and in the same unreserved spirit as heretofore.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'HEADQUARTER CAMP, NEAR FORT WEEBER,
THE TRANSVAAL, 18 November 1879.

'... The aspect of the Boers is so threatening that I have thought it advisable to concentrate all my disposable force near Pretoria, hoping by a display of military strength to overawe the turbulent, and to impart some courage into the hearts of the desponding and demoralised. All my efforts are bent upon preventing a collision between the discontented Boers and the military, and a display of strength is, in my opinion, best calculated to secure this object. I have felt it necessary to bring up the 94th Regiment from Newcastle, where I had concentrated it previous to marching it to Durban for embarkation. I cannot allow the 80th or the King's Dragoon Guards to leave the Transvaal as long as the Boers are collected together as an armed body threatening to disturb the peace of the country.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘HEADQUARTER CAMP, FORT ALBERT EDWARD,
THE TRANSVAAL, 24 November 1879.

‘. . . Colonel Russell will have between 8000 and 9000 native soldiers, about 400 Cavalry of sorts, nearly all white men, the 2nd 21st, the 94th, and two Companies of the 80th, and four Guns, and Detachment of Royal Engineers. Altogether it will be a far larger force than any employed by us in any of the recent battles in Zululand, and it will be the first big *offensive* battle fought by us, as in all those we fought in Zululand we were attacked, and acted on the defensive. I shall be curious to see how the much-abused young British soldiers will do when *attacking* a very strong position under a heavy fire. I have myself every confidence in them if they are well led by their officers. I have received the Adjutant-General’s peremptory order desiring the immediate return of Lieutenant-Colonel B. Russell to India, and informing me that, unless that officer rejoins his Regiment forthwith, he will be seconded. I presume this has been brought about by the India Office, who have been pressed by the military authorities to send Colonel Russell back, and I can well understand how much his presence is required with the 13th Hussars. He will leave in a few days; but I feel bound to inform Your Royal Highness that the public service will suffer considerably in consequence. I cannot remain here myself, as my presence is absolutely necessary in Pretoria when the great mass meeting of the Boers comes off next month, and the commanding officers of the Regiments now in the Transvaal can only be given any responsibility with great risk to the public interests.

‘I sincerely trust that some really able man may now be on his way to the Transvaal to command the troops as a Colonel on the Staff. The position for years to come will be one of great responsibility, so a man a great deal above the ordinary run of Field Officers is really necessary here. . . .’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘HEADQUARTER CAMP,
SEKUKUNI’S TOWN, 1 December 1879.

‘Our operations have been completely successful. Although I had fortunately provided myself with a very strong force so as to be safe in all possible circumstances, I had no idea that the nut to be cracked was so tough. This is the first action in which Her Majesty’s troops have been engaged in South Africa for some time past in which we were the attacking side. In all actions fought in Zululand we acted on the defensive, and awaited the enemy’s attack in laager or behind shelter-trenches. It is very

demoralising to troops to accustom them to such a condition of things; it is of itself enough to break the military spirit of any army, and I have always thought that it contributed a good deal to create and foster that dread of the Zulus which I found pervading the Army of South Africa when I assumed command. I was very glad, therefore, to have the opportunity of this campaign to show every one here that the British soldier, when led by men of Colonel Baker Russell's stamp, had in no way deteriorated, but was quite as capable of attacking now as he had ever been. There was, I am sorry to say, a very general feeling abroad that the British soldier would never storm the "Fighting Koppie" here. The Volunteers believed that if it were to be done at all, it must be done by them. As for the Boers, they simply laughed at the notion of the "Red Soldier" attacking the strong position in these mountains. Since 28 November, when Colonel Russell led his men at the charge up the "Fighting Koppie," a very different opinion is entertained of the fighting qualities of the British soldier. Politically in the Transvaal this change of feeling will be a great assistance to me.

'As a great deal has recently been written and spoken publicly about the inferiority of our present soldier to those we formerly had in our ranks, I am sure Your Royal Highness will be glad to hear from one who has commanded and personally led the soldiers under the old system, and under our existing organisation, that I have never seen our men steadier in action than they were last Friday. Their fire discipline was all that could be desired, and they followed their officers as well as any veterans could or would have done. . . .'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'ARMY HEADQUARTERS,
PRETORIA, 2 January 1880.

' . . . I have just heard by telegraph from India of General Roberts's brilliant victory at Cabul on 23 December, and am delighted to find that he was following his success up in an able manner. I succeeded him as Sir Hope Grant's Quarter-master-General in 1858, immediately after the taking of Lucknow. He was then a most promising officer. . . .'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
TRANSVAAL, SOUTH AFRICA, 21 January 1880.

'I hope to reach my destination in four or five days if the weather, and consequently the roads, are favourable for travelling. My present intention is to return here the first

week of next month, as I have promised Mr. Pretorius I would meet him here in the event of his being able to bring over the leaders of his party to our side. He was once President of the Transvaal when it was a Republic, and he has also been President of the Orange Free State. He is not a wise or a clever man, but as his father was always looked upon as *the* representative Boer amongst those who fought against us in Sir Harry Smith's time, the son has always had much weight in public matters here. He is now Chairman of the "*People's Committee*" by whom all these seditious meetings are "got-up." As I had made up my mind to try some of the Boer leaders for high treason, I fixed upon Mr. Pretorius and a Mr. Bok: the latter is not a Boer, and has little influence, but he is the paid Secretary to the above-mentioned Committee.

'Since these gentlemen were committed to stand their trial for high treason, I have had several interviews with the former, as he expressed a great wish to see and confer with me. My interviews have been very satisfactory, but as he is a weak man and very changeable, I do not attach great importance to his promises. However, things have never worn a more peaceful complexion than at present—the arrests have done an infinity of good, and many of the leaders of the seditious party have left the country and bolted into the Free State to avoid being arrested, as they think I intend trying all those who have taken an active part against us.

'These two men who have been committed for trial cannot be tried for some time: indeed I do not think it would be desirable to try them until after the date they have fixed for their next monster meeting, which is about 10 April next. . . . I have sent to the Secretary of State a letter with numerous enclosures on the subject of the behaviour of the troops generally, which had been so grossly libelled by Dr. Russell in the *Daily Telegraph*. I have found it necessary to publish locally extracts from this dispatch of mine, as Mr. Russell's letter was being commented upon in the press generally throughout South Africa. I can only account for the libel by imagining that he was the victim of some practical joke. He had constantly lived either at my table or at that of Colonel Lanyon, the Administrator, and was always treated with every possible kindness. He never mentioned to either Colonel Lanyon or myself that he had heard reports impugning the soldiers' conduct, nor, as far as I can ascertain, did he take the trouble to make any inquiries on the subject from any Staff Officer or other person who could have given him any authoritative information regarding it. To say the least, it is to me the most incomprehensible behaviour I have ever heard of. It is a warning to me, however, never in future to allow any newspaper correspondent to live at my table. . . .'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

' ARMY HEADQUARTERS, MARITZBURG,
NATAL, 16 February 1880.

' . . . Everything is very quiet at present in the Transvaal, but letters like those which the pestilent Mr. L. Courtney, M.P., writes to the *Times* are calculated to do much mischief there. . . . '

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

' GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
TRANSVAAL, S. AFRICA, 2 March 1880.

' The last post from England brought me Your Royal Highness's gracious letter of 29 January. By it we also received a report that it was intended to restrict the clasp for Zululand to those engaged in the field between 11 January and 4 July 1879. I do not credit this rumour, as I cannot imagine that any such decision would be made without some sort of consultation with me, who was then in command of the troops in Zululand, nor can I believe that any Government could come to such a decision when they must know fully well that, after Chelmsford's ill-judged retreat on 5 July, I was obliged again to take the field and move with a force upon Ulundi for the purpose of ending the war. In my dispatch announcing the termination of the war, dated the beginning of September, I was careful to give Lord Chelmsford every credit for the battle of Ulundi; but that he ended the war I must most emphatically deny. Should this rumour be true, and 4 July be maintained as the date when the Zulu War was *officially* brought to an end, I shall feel deeply aggrieved at having the military operations I conducted, which led to the capture of Cetuyayo and to the making of peace, entirely ignored. I am bound to protest against this decision in the strongest terms I may presume to use, should the report be true, and I must presume to make a personal appeal to Your Royal Highness against it, begging for Your Royal Highness's protection against a slight of the most serious nature which the proposed arrangement would impose upon my reputation as a General. Lord Chelmsford commanded personally at the battle of Ulundi, but I, and I alone brought the Zulu War to an end, and that end was not accomplished until Cetuyayo had been captured on 28 August and peace made with the Chiefs of the country. To adhere to such a decision would be to ignore my services, and the services of those under my command from the date when I moved into the Ulundi valley with a strong force to finish the war. I must remind Your Royal Highness that there were some sharp skirmishes in Zululand subsequent to 4 July, in one of which two British soldiers were killed and several natives wounded. I have written

the strongest remonstrance on this point to the Secretary of State for War, and sent a copy of it to the Colonial Office, and I take the liberty of begging for the protection of Your Royal Highness, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to shield me from an indignity, an act of injustice that has seldom, if ever, been offered to a General Officer in my position. Credit to whom credit is due; I have no wish to detract from Chelmsford's credit for the battle of Ulundi, but I protest most solemnly against his being given the credit for ending the Zulu War, which fixing 4 July as the date when it was supposed officially to be over, certainly does. This matter is one so seriously affecting my reputation, that I cannot allow the matter to rest, and I am writing to Sir M. Hicks-Beach requesting that if, after the receipt of my dispatch on the subject, H.M. Government still decide upon adhering to the date (4 July 1879) I appeal against, that he will be good enough to accept my immediate resignation of my present office, as I shall then feel it necessary to take steps in England for correcting an error into which the public will be led by their, to me, most injurious decision. No honours or rewards would ever compensate me for a loss of military reputation, and as I cannot sit quiet under a General Order emanating from Your Royal Highness which would seriously damage that reputation, it will be necessary for me to return home without delay. Hence my letter to the Colonial Office on the subject.

'I am well aware that I very often weary Your Royal Highness with letters about the services of others; but I think this is the first time that I have ever written at any length about my own personal interests or reputation as a soldier. I am therefore led to hope that, as a soldier, Your Royal Highness will feel for me in this matter, and pardon the length of my letter in which I express my wounded feelings upon it.'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
TRANSVAAL, 5 March 1880.

'The ordinary run of officers are so unfit to hold any position of responsibility that it is always with the utmost pleasure and satisfaction I bring to Your Royal Highness's notice, in the interests of the State, men of Captain Stewart's¹ stamp; we have not many of them.

'Everything is very quiet in the Transvaal; the trials for treason, I have just been informed by the Attorney-General, cannot come off here until May next. The influential men, with very few exceptions, are growing weary of these political

¹ Afterwards Major-General Sir Herbert Stewart, K.C.B. He died of wounds received at the battle of Gubat, fought in the Bayuda Desert, 19 Jan. 1885.

meetings and the agitation they tend to keep alive, so if Mr. Leonard Courtney and his followers at home can be but silenced, all will go well here.'

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'HORSE GUARDS, 8 April 1880.

'... I am somewhat surprised by the contents of your letter of the 2nd.

'The period from which the war in South Africa was thought here to have come to an end was taken from your own dispatch of September 13, in which you say that the battle of Ulundi had finished the campaign. It was absolutely necessary to take some specified period, and the date was taken from what you yourself reported. Nobody had the slightest idea of casting any slur or imputation on you in taking this date, and I hope you will admit, when you look back at your own views as expressed, that this was the official period that it would be proper to adopt. Nobody ever dreamed of leaving out Sekukuni's affair. All those who were engaged in those operations will, as a matter of course, be entitled to a clasp; but this is looked upon as a distinct operation, and not as specially belonging to the campaign which, according to your view, had closed with the battle of Ulundi.

'Your own letter admits that only two British soldiers were killed after 4 July, and some few natives. Surely this fact bears out the correctness of the view you had put forward in your dispatches. I think on further consideration you will see that your letter of 2 March was written under some misapprehension. Moreover, nothing has been done officially in the matter. No general order has been issued, so if any misapprehension has occurred it can be easily corrected.

'We have received your recommendation of officers for the campaign. You will find that a good many of the officers recommended on your list had already been selected for rewards by myself, and their names are at this moment before Her Majesty to be gazetted immediately on their being approved by the Queen.

'Amongst the number of those who have already been gazetted you will find the name of Captain Stewart, your present Military Secretary, who was added subsequently to the first *Gazette*. I am well aware that he is a most excellent and very valuable officer, and I am always glad to see such officers brought forward; but at the same time I cannot think with you that the general run of officers in the Army is so much below what it ought to be as to render them unfit for any position of responsibility. I believe, if you compare our officers to those of other countries, including Germany, they will be found equal, if not superior, to them

in most of those excellent qualities which have made our Army fully equal to the demands made upon it on so many occasions, and which has created for us that great Indian and Colonial Empire of which we have a right to be so proud.

‘That there are bad officers amongst them there cannot be a doubt; but you will find the same to be the case in all armies, and no officers or men have to go through the amount of hardship and bad climate that ours have to submit to. I would indeed grieve to think that you or any other officers of standing took a different view from mine in this respect. . . .’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
TRANSVAAL, S. AFRICA, 13 March 1880.

‘. . . The meeting of the Boer Committee which took place last Monday was a failure from the agitator’s point of view. There was a great want of unanimity amongst those present, and the result is the postponement *sine die* of the mass meeting that had been called for 6 April next. To secure this postponement has long been one of the objects I aimed at, and the policy I adopted in making the arrests I did, was chiefly to put a stop to the projected monster meeting that had been called for that date. At it, the malcontents said they meant to elect a president and set up the machinery of a government for themselves. I hope this happy result may silence those timid people at home who shook their heads over what they termed my *military violence*. Whenever a soldier Governor adopts any strong measures, civilians are glad of the opportunity to decry the employment of military men as Colonial Governors. . . .’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘PRETORIA, 2 April 1880.

‘. . . Politically everything goes on very satisfactorily, and the Transvaal may now be said to be supremely quiet. I see no good reason at present why the K.D.G.’s should not go to India next November.’

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘29 June 1880.

‘. . . As regards recommendations for any of the other officers serving under you, I wish you would send any such as you wish to mention to *me*. The Adjutant-General has nothing to do with these matters, which rest with the Commander-in-Chief and Military Secretary, as you know, and

even the Secretary of State should be communicated with in this respect through *me*. You must at all times be prepared for some disappointments, for it is not always right or just to others to consider only the individual case brought to notice, but you may depend upon it, that whenever I can carry out the recommendations of General Officers, with strict justice to the general body of officers, I always do so. . . .

CHAPTER XXVII

THE BOER WAR—1881

Sir George Colley commands in Natal. Critical State of Affairs in Transvaal. Collision at Potchefstroom. Bad Feeling amongst Cape Dutch. Surprise of 94th Regiment. Reinforcements dispatched from India. Sir George Colley advances. Situation in Cape Colony. Sir Leicester Smyth's Letters. Laing's Nek. More Reinforcements. Sir George Colley's last Letters. Majuba. Sir Evelyn Wood succeeds Sir George Colley. Sir Frederick Roberts starts to command. Armistice arranged 'Peace' declared. H.R.H.'s comments. Sir Leicester Smyth's forecast.

UPON Sir Garnet Wolseley's departure from South Africa in May 1880, the chief command at the Cape was placed in the hands of Lieut-General Sir Leicester Smyth, with Sir George Colley in Natal to administer the affairs of the Transvaal. The latter officer, on assuming command in December 1880, wrote to the Duke describing his dispositions in Natal and in the Transvaal.

With our present knowledge of the numbers and fighting capacity of the Boers, Sir George Colley's strategical disposition of half-battalions and odd companies strikes one with sheer amazement. But in justice to his memory, it must be remembered that at the time he wrote the elements of rebellion were, though deep-seated, but comparatively limited in their powers for evil; and that to stamp out a smouldering fire, and to arrest the progress of a huge conflagration, are very different operations.

FROM SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
NATAL, 10 December 1880.

I am very grateful to Y.R.H. for your kind letter, and for the permission to write freely of what is passing here. Since my return from the Transvaal matters have not

improved in South Africa. The Basuto outbreak has spread, and now includes nearly every tribe between this and the old Cape Colony. I still hope and believe that the colonists will be able to overcome this rebellion, widespread as it is, without Imperial aid—if they will adhere to their present determination to fight it out, and will submit to the necessary sacrifice. . . . I am sorry to say affairs in the Transvaal are not at all in a satisfactory condition. After remaining unusually quiet for some time, the Boers have suddenly broken out again in a series of threatening meetings. I believe the annual collection of taxes is the chief cause of this disturbance. . . .

‘In Zululand all is perfectly quiet; and the Zulus, far from sympathising with the Basutos, rather resent their presumption in trying to resist a power which was able to defeat and crush the Zulu nation. . . .’

Two weeks later Sir Leicester Smyth reports how the prolongation of the Basuto troubles was leading to the most serious unrest throughout South Africa. In the same letter he announces that the Boers have broken into open hostilities.

FROM SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

‘CAPE TOWN, 23 December 1880.

‘. . . This morning the first telegram has arrived announcing that a collision has actually occurred between the troops and the Boers at Potchefstroom. Though not strictly official, it is feared that there can be no doubt about it. It is quite impossible to foretell the political consequences of this most lamentable and unfortunate incident. A bad state of feeling will be raised amongst the entire Dutch, whose sympathies will of course be with those of their own nationality. . . .

‘The longer the Basuto struggle continues the more dangerous becomes the situation of the Colony. . . . They are a formidable foe, superior in every way to the Zulus. They are well armed, with a considerable amount of organisation; they understand the flashing of signals, and from being all mounted possess great celerity of movement, which is especially dangerous to small bodies and the line of transport and communication. . . .

‘28 Dec.—Since writing the above we have received the bad news of the death and capture of 250 of the 94th Regiment, on march from Lydenburg to Pretoria. It is impossible not to feel anxious about the Company detachments that are in the Transvaal, who may be overpowered by numbers.

‘I have to inform Y.R.H. most *confidentially* that an

uneasy feeling prevails relative to the Dutch, not only in the Orange Free State, but even in the Colony. I beg to submit to Y.R.H. the prudence, in a military point of view, of increasing the troops in the Cape Colony. One cannot tell what may be the consequences of this disaster in the Transvaal, and the presence of more troops would at all events comfort the loyal. . . .

On 9 January Sir George Colley wrote to the Duke an account of the surprise of the 94th Regiment. He confesses astonishment at the rapidity of the Boer concentration, and discusses the chances of the detached garrisons of Potchefstroom, etc., being able to resist until he can relieve them, and the difficulties and dangers of an advance before he receives reinforcements.

FROM SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

‘GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
NATAL, 9 January 1881.

‘. . . I have sent home all the accounts I have yet received of the attack on the 94th, and Conductor Egerton’s statement seems an accurate version, except that our casualties were heavier, as it appears that eighty-six were buried at once, and twenty-six died before the burying party left the ground. I fear also that all the officers have succumbed to their wounds. Colonel Anstruther will be a great loss. He was a very fine soldier, and though shot down at the first volley, retained the command, and only ordered the surrender at the last when he saw that resistance was hopeless, and wished to save the remainder of the men and give a chance to the wounded. The prisoners, some sixty in number, are now on their march in here, and expected in two or three days. . . . Regarding the Boers’ force and positions, it is not easy to gain accurate information. These numbers (16,000) are, however, to a great extent hearsay, and I think must be considerably exaggerated, as the whole male population of the Transvaal hardly exceeds 12,000. Other, and as I think more reliable accounts, obtained from scouts, etc., place the main body at 4000 to 5000, the force at “Mecks” at 800 to 1000, and the advanced post near Newcastle at 200. There can, however, be no doubt that all these forces are well armed and well mounted, and as a rule good shots, while the success gained over the 94th has greatly encouraged them. Whether I shall be able to effect anything with the small and somewhat mixed force at my disposal I cannot yet say. If I have to wait for all the expected reinforcements it will delay the relief of Pretoria for at least another month or six weeks, which may be longer than that place can hold

out. If I advance with insufficient force and meet with a check, it will do immense harm. The circumstances are difficult and anxious, but I know that I can rely upon Y.R.H.'s support and indulgent judgment, and that knowledge gives me confidence. . . .'

The Duke wrote in reply to Sir Leicester Smyth's letter of 23 December, and announced the dispatch of reinforcements from India. His reiterated adverse criticisms on the undue haste with which our troops were hurried back from the Cape after the defeat of the Zulus are not without significance. It is obvious that the Government still failed to realise the grave condition of affairs in South Africa, or how closely the disaffected Afrikaners of the old Colony sympathised with the cause of the rebel Dutch in the Transvaal.

TO SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE,
20 January 1881.

' . . . I entirely share your anxiety as to the state of affairs in South Africa, which are most serious, and the importance of which have in no respect diminished by recent telegrams. Indeed, I may say they have, if anything, increased, for we hear that Colley is going to make an effort to advance *at once*, and before any of the reinforcements can reach him, and we further are told that Potchefstroom will hardly be able to hold out many days longer, or until relief can reach it. All this is most serious, and causes me the gravest anxiety. Meanwhile all the reinforcements we could rapidly lay hands upon have been sent to South Africa. The 97th you know went out at once from Gibraltar; the 6th Dragoons, a Field Battery, and 100 Mounted Infantry are well on their road from here, and the 15th Hussars, 60th, 83rd, 92nd, and a Field Battery have all sailed from India.

' More we could not do for the moment, and I sincerely hope these troops may be sufficient to meet the pressing wants and immediate dangers. The real fact is, that too many troops were hastily sent away from the South African Colonies, and the result is what we have now so greatly to deplore. I hope the Basutos may be brought to terms, but I fear the Transvaal difficulty will increase the opposition of the Basutos and other tribes. I don't think the Government would be disposed to send out more Imperial troops specially for the Cape, but all Transvaal and Natal requirements will doubtless be complied with. . . . I am sure you will give Colley every assistance in your power, but you cannot, of

course, send him any of your troops, and the numbers you have are barely sufficient for your own wants and requirements, more particularly with the large Dutch element you have to deal with at the Cape itself. . . .

Writing to Sir George Colley on the same day, the Duke says :—

TO SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

‘HORSE GUARDS, 20 *Janauary* 1881.

‘Your interesting letter of 10 December has reached me. Our anxiety on your account is very great, more particularly since we have heard from you, by telegraph, that you propose at once to make a forward movement from Newcastle without waiting for reinforcements.

‘Of course, if successful, this will be a great relief to the isolated people that are being repeatedly attacked, and not well off, but should you not be in sufficient strength to get well ahead, the risk will be very undesirable.

‘What we cannot as yet understand is, as to how this outbreak should have taken place with so little warning to you all; or if you were aware of it, why you did not take immediate steps to concentrate the small force at your disposal before the Boers were prepared to act.’

During the month of January Sir Leicester Smyth wrote to say that he considered more Imperial troops of all arms were required at Cape Town, both in view of a possible advance on the Transvaal *via* Beaufort and Kimberley, or of the placing of ‘a column of observation on the borders of the Orange Free State, which has as little reason to love us as the Boers, and where sentiment may prevail over the laws of their own Government.’

Throughout Sir Leicester’s admirably clear letters to the Duke it is made perfectly plain that he thoroughly grasped the complex difficulties of the South African problem, and that he was especially well acquainted with the dangerous sympathies of the Boers of Cape Colony and of the Orange Free State with the Transvaal. It is difficult to understand how, in the face of these letters alone, our Government could have allowed things to assume the proportions they did in 1899. Only in England it would seem that the advice and opinions of competent military authority are

received but too often as matters not deserving of serious public attention. Sir Leicester's allusions to the predominant features of the Boers being their 'piety and ferocity' is singularly descriptive of a certain class not unknown to our troops.

FROM SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

'THE CASTLE, CAPE TOWN,
18 *January* 1881.

'... The published accounts of the disaster of Bruncker's Spruit, and of the cruel murder of Paymaster Elliot, cannot fail, I think, to cause a revulsion of feeling amongst the more intelligent Dutch, and will, I trust, alienate something of the intense sympathy with the Boers that has hitherto prevailed amongst them. I fear, however, that but little effect will be produced amongst the general mass in the Colony or the Free State, for they are ignorant and churlish, and imbued with a strange mixture of piety and ferocity....'

On 28 January occurred the disastrous repulse of the British troops under Sir George Colley in the attempt to force the Boer position at Laing's Nek. This was followed a few days later by the affair on the Ingogo River. The following letters from the Duke show that, whilst appreciating Colonel Colley's difficulties, he was greatly averse from his attempting serious operations with such small numbers:—

TO SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 3 *February* 1881.

'Since writing to you the other day, we have heard of the events which have occurred in advance of Newcastle, and the heavy losses which you have sustained in trying to force the passes, strongly occupied and defended by the Boers, who seem to have fought with great energy, and, being in great force and having the superiority of numbers also in their favour, were thus enabled to arrest your onward progress. Of course this is an event much to be regretted, and it is very probable that it will cause the prolongation of a contest which we all so greatly deplore. It is impossible to judge accurately of what has occurred from mere telegraphic reports, but it appears as if the 58th behaved with great gallantry, but having no sufficient support were unable to make good their advance, and the Staff Officers seem, unfortunately, to have especially exposed themselves, resulting

in their being all shot down. We have thus lost many good officers and brave men of all ranks, and we feel this strongly. Fortunately the reinforcements, ordered from India, were already arriving at the very date on which the check took place, and the second vessel is also telegraphed as having arrived and as landing the 83rd and 92nd Regiments. The 97th are also telegraphed as having arrived at the Cape and proceeding at once for Natal. I hope, therefore, that you will receive these reinforcements before any serious mischief may result from what has occurred.

'At the same time, our anxiety is great on your account. It is presumed that you were anxious to lose no time in pushing on, with a view to prevent the detachments, isolated in the Transvaal, from being compelled to surrender to the large bodies of Boers surrounding them; otherwise, certainly the feeling would be that the attempt to advance was made with a very small force comparatively, and that it would have been more prudent to have awaited the arrival of the reinforcements known to be *en route*. However, all that matter can only be judged of on the spot, and criticisms at a distance and without knowing all details are premature, and often not borne out by facts. We have telegraphed to you that we would send you out further help, if required. . . .'

TO SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 10 February 1881.

'I have received your very interesting letter of 9 Jan., with full particulars of all that had occurred up to that date, and since then we have heard by telegraph of your new encounter with the Boers, to the first of which I referred in my last letter to you, and the second of which reached us yesterday. The heavy loss of the 60th sustained in the action of the 8th is most distressing, and though I have no doubt you will be fully able to justify the necessity for the step you took in endeavouring to clear the road towards Newcastle in your rear, I own it is sad to think how very small a force remained at your immediate disposal, and I only hope you will be enabled to ward off any serious blow till the reinforcements are well up to the front, and I trust a strong body will be assembled before they attempt an onward movement, for the Boers are desperate and gallant men. The fighting will be, as it already has been, severe, and it is essential that the next blow to be struck should turn out an absolute success, with the possibility of our following it up to ultimate and complete victory. We have again telegraphed to you proposing further reinforcements, and I hope you will consider it desirable to accept them, for I must candidly own I do not think your force is in sufficient strength to bring the contest to an end with any degree of certainty

with the troops now at your command. Officers too may be required in addition to those already sent. All *these points will* be at once attended to on your demand, and I trust there will be no hesitation on your part on making it, for, however deplorable it no doubt is to bring so large a military force together, when we have so much on hand, still a prolonged delay in the issue of the contest is worse than all, and therefore the sooner we can dispose of the war, by bringing it to a successful issue, the better for the interests of the Empire. We continue to be very anxious on your account.'

TO SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 17 February 1881.

'... We are in hopes that you will be enabled to hold your own, with your very reduced force, till Evelyn Wood can come up with the Reserves rapidly pushed on, and I hope by to-day or to-morrow to be assembled at Newcastle. We have at once given directions for two Cavalry Regiments, one from India, 14th Hussars, and another from home, 7th Hussars, both with horses, besides drafts for the Infantry Battalions in the field, to make them up to the full strength, besides other details, to embark with the least possible delay as a further reinforcement, and we would have sent you also more Infantry Battalions, had you not said in reply to our telegram that you did not require them. My own feeling is that it would have been quite as well had you asked or rather accepted the offer made for these additional Infantry Corps, but of course you must be the best judge of what you think should be done in this respect. We shall give you every support, but it is for you to let us know in full time what you think you really want. . . .'

The story of Majuba needs no re-telling here, but the following letters, the last written by Sir George Colley, evince the extraordinary difficulties of the situation of that unfortunate Commander, and the remarkable steadfastness of the troops under him, despite their repeated defeats. It is of pathetic interest to note that the letter of 12 February is endorsed in the Duke's writing—'Received after Sir George Colley's death and not answered.'

FROM SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

'CAMP, MOUNT PROSPECT,
1 February 1881.

'I deeply regret that I should have to report to Your Royal Highness the failure of my attack on the Boer

position on the 28th, and the loss of so many good officers and men. . . .

FROM SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

‘ARMY HEADQUARTERS,
MOUNT PROSPECT, 12 *February* 1881.

‘Since I last had the honour to write to Y.R.H., this force has again been severely engaged, and our losses, I regret to say, have again been heavy. But I trust that the losses suffered by the Boers, and their failure to make any impression on our position, will have produced a good effect. . . . I do not think that Mounted Infantry are very well suited to this work. The Boers are better shots, quicker at mounting and dismounting, better rough skirmishers and riders, and have better trained horses than our Mounted Infantry, and it is not that sort of skirmishing fighting, but the straight rush of Cavalry that can ride them down, that they fear.’

FROM SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

‘CAMP, MOUNT PROSPECT,
16 *February* 1881.

‘. . . Since I last wrote, the Boers in considerable force have moved round behind the mountains on left and behind Newcastle, and taken up a position near the Ingigani River to intercept the reinforcements coming up under Sir E. Wood. Sir Evelyn, however, has a strong position on the Biggarsberg, the chief range of hills crossing the Newcastle-Maritzburg road, which I had caused to be occupied by the Natal Mounted Police, and where I halted the 15th Hussars, as soon as I got reliable news of such a movement being contemplated by the Boers. He has a picked force, the 2nd 60th, 92nd, and 15th Hussars, now concentrated there, and other reinforcements coming up in rear, and under his leadership I have no doubts as to the result should the Boers dispute their advance. I still retain my position here, having a strong camp and plenty of supplies, as my immediate proximity to the Nek engages the attention of the Boer leaders, who dare not weaken their forces at that point to any considerable extent for fear of a sudden move on my part. I shall, however, be very glad when I receive reinforcements, and especially some Cavalry, the want of which I have felt cruelly. . . .

‘The men are in excellent health and spirits, and not the least disheartened by the severity of the fighting. The sick list, exclusive of wounds, has never yet gone above one per cent., and the men are having a great day of athletic sports to-day.’

FROM SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

'NEWCASTLE, 18 February 1881.

' . . . I was able to meet and discuss matters with Sir Evelyn yesterday. In further operations I propose to divide the force into two columns, one somewhat the largest numerically, and especially strong in Infantry and Artillery, under my personal command, the other not so strong numerically, but a good deal stronger in Cavalry, and altogether more moveable, under Sir E. Wood. I do not propose to undertake any further operations until the arrival of the second Regiment of Cavalry and of the Mounted Infantry, as no decisive success can now be obtained without the aid of a large mounted force. When the two columns are formed, I propose to attack the Nek again with my force, while Sir Evelyn, advancing by the Wakkerstroom road, relieves that place, and then takes the Boer position in rear. I trust this plan of operations, in which Sir Evelyn quite concurs, will recommend itself to Y.R.H. and may lead to decisive success; at present the general impression is that the Boer leaders will not be able to hold their followers together after one decisive defeat, and when the Nek has been carried. Sir Evelyn accompanies me to-morrow to reconnoitre the Wakkerstroom road, and after that returns to Maritzburg to supervise the base arrangements and organise his column. He has already been of great service to me, and his presence relieves me of a great load of anxiety, as, till his arrival, there was no one of sufficient rank and experience to take over, even temporarily, the command in the event of any accident happening to me, a contingency which one has to contemplate in this sort of warfare. . . .

FROM SIR GEORGE COLLEY.

(His last Letter).

'MOUNT PROSPECT, 22 February 1881.

'Since I last wrote I have returned from Newcastle to this camp with the 92nd Highlanders, a Squadron 15th Hussars, and a large convoy of supplies. I took the 60th part of the way with me in case of opposition on the road, but have sent them back to Newcastle until I am ready for a further advance. I inspected the Regiments from India, 15th Hussars, 2nd 60th Rifles, and 92nd Highlanders at Newcastle, and think myself indeed fortunate to have such splendid Regiments under my orders.

'I am sorry to say the Boers succeeded in shooting one of our vedettes while I was away. They laid an ambush on a hill which overlooks the post, though at long range, and fired as he was being posted in the morning. They withdrew as soon as a small party was sent out, leaving an ill-

written jeering letter addressed to me asking why we did not come on, as Pretoria was getting short of supplies, and they, the Boers, were all tired of waiting for us.

'The Boers have been busy further strengthening their position during my absence, and I see a good many fresh trenches and stone schantzes thrown up. It is reported that a certain Mr. Aylward, a noted Fenian, who has had a curious career in Africa, and until lately edited a very abusive paper at Maritzburg, has joined them; at any rate it is certain that he slipped away suddenly from that place after having talked a great deal of joining the Boer forces, and perhaps he is their guide and instructor in this respect.

'The reinforcements are now all rapidly pushing up country, and so far the supply and transport arrangements have always worked very satisfactorily, the ample help I have received from Y.R.H. and the War Office in the matter of departmental officers, etc., and will now relieve the strain of work, which at times has been very heavy on them.'

Sir Leicester Smyth, writing on the same day as Sir George Colley's last letter, summarises the feeling of the Cape loyalists, from which it is evident that a general rising of the disaffected Dutch in South Africa was at the time by no means an improbable event. This is borne out by his allusions in later letters:—

FROM SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

'THE CASTLE,
CAPE TOWN, 22 February 1881.

'... The feeling amongst the loyal people in the Colony is very strong against making peace at the present time, and the eventual loss of the Colony is openly talked of in such an event. It is, indeed, a fearfully difficult question; for if the war be continued, its area will most certainly be extended. Nothing can exceed the bad feeling amongst the Dutch, both in the Free State and in the Colony, and we are most unfortunately situated in Natal, because for a vast extent of distance the Boers in the Free State could debouch on the flank and rear of our communications, and it would take almost an army to watch the passes alone. . . .'

FROM SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

'THE CASTLE,
CAPE TOWN, 1 March 1881.

'... What the object of this fatal expedition was, unless for a mere reconnoissance, it seems difficult to conjecture; as it turned out, it seems a great pity that all available troops

were not held ready to attack the Nek in the event of the hill-top being surmounted, in which case the day would probably have been won.

'Irrespective of the bad effect these successive reverses cannot fail to have upon the *morale* of the troops, that upon the Dutch population is even still more serious. I assure Y.R.H. that the Colony is in a most critical condition. Treason is rampant, and the successes of the Boers are openly triumphed in. . . . I trust Y.R.H. will graciously pardon my plain speaking; but there seems to me to be nothing between two alternatives—(1) *at the very least another 10,000 men*; or (2) a humiliating peace. . . .'

How on the news of the defeat at Majuba strong reinforcements were hurried out, and how Sir Frederick Roberts was dispatched to take command, is now ancient history.

Suffice to say that Mr. Gladstone concluded a 'peace' with the victorious Boers rather than continue a war which threatened to become universal throughout South Africa. It would be out of place here to discuss whether the decision was due to considerations of magnanimity or was merely pitiful temporising; at any rate the results were, in the outcome, alike disastrous to the Transvaal as an independent State, and to this country as regards both lives and treasure. The Duke, writing to Sir Leicester Smyth at the time the news of the disastrous peace reached England, did not conceal his chagrin and regret at the turn affairs had taken, which, with his soldierlike instincts, he knew but too well must eventually land us in disaster:—

TO SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 24 March 1881.

'My letter to-day is full of melancholy thoughts; but I had rather say nothing as to what my feelings and views are on the extraordinary ending of the Transvaal contest. I am afraid my ideas are too old-fashioned rightly to understand the meaning of what has occurred; meanwhile you are well out of the business, and must thank your stars that you had the good luck not to be mixed up with what *I* should feel, for a soldier, would have been a most painful and distressing position. . . .'

On the death of General Colley, Sir Evelyn Wood succeeded to the command, and to him the Duke wrote on 31 March:—

TO SIR EVELYN WOOD.

'31 *March* 1881.

'I have received your letter of 27 February with enclosed telegram, referring to the death of poor Sir G. Colley. I am at loss even now to understand clearly how this sad disaster took place, and what could have induced so able an officer and fine a soldier to make what would appear so grave an error; but possibly we may yet have some explanations which at present have not reached us. Since then, peace has been arranged between you and the Boer leaders. Of this I can only hope that it may prove more advantageous to our interests than at present seems to be the case. We have decided to leave you for the present all the troops you have in the Transvaal and Natal, so that you may not be taken at a disadvantage should matters not go right. All the details have been telegraphed to you, so I shall not repeat them here. Buller will receive the rank you were anxious he should have, and you have excellent Brigadiers in Bellairs, Lowe, and Baker. I shall at all times be glad to hear from you. I deplore the loss of poor Colley far more than I can express in words. Pray be very watchful, for you have very difficult people to deal with.'

The overt hostility of the Orange Free State to British ascendancy in South Africa is well shown by the following letter from Sir Leicester Smyth, as well as is the feeling inspired among the Dutch and English colonists by Mr. Gladstone's surrender:—

FROM SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

'THE CASTLE,
CAPE TOWN, 12 *April* 1881.

'... Hardly anything short of declaration of war could have been more unfriendly to us than the attitude taken by the Free State Boers, as distinguished from their Government; the march of a Kimberley column might have had the effect of keeping them at home instead of enabling them to invade Natal, and to assist in shooting down our troops as they did. ...'

FROM SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

'THE CASTLE,
CAPE TOWN, 26 *April* 1881.

'... The Dutch party in the Colony is quiet and triumphant; the English vexed and bewildered. Every-

where a republic is talked of, and one of the most prominent merchants in Cape Town alluded to it in Parliament, observing that in such a case the steamers to England would be full. . . .

FROM SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

‘THE CASTLE,
CAPE TOWN, 31 *May* 1881.

‘. . . All the best-informed people whom I meet admit that the outlook is extremely gloomy. I fear that the English interest in South Africa will never recover from the effects of that disastrous campaign. The Dutch despise and the English execrate the policy that has been pursued. . . .’

The Duke, in his correspondence with the Generals in South Africa, is ever most lenient in his criticisms on failure, as is well evidenced in his earlier letters to Sir George Colley. The following opinion as to one of the mistakes made at Majuba cannot be omitted, since there has been a tendency in our Army of late years to neglect all the teachings of military history, and to advocate the employment of mixed detachments of troops for critical operations:—

TO SIR EVELYN WOOD.

‘COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S OFFICE, 26 *May* 1881.

‘. . . I am inclined to the belief that a panic seized all the troops concerned, and thus ended in a disaster without any real loss to the attacking party.

‘It was, moreover, a dreadful mistake on the part of poor Colley to have taken up with him on such a difficult duty portions of various Regiments. Far better it would have been to have taken an entire Corps in which men and officers were thoroughly acquainted with one another, and could rely on mutual support at the moment of danger. . . .’

Few incidents have roused more bitter feelings among military men than the armistice after Majuba, and the subsequent cessation of hostilities.

Sir Evelyn Wood, whose misfortune it was to have to take a leading part in this miserable transaction, has stated that he had the best grounds for believing that the question of the retrocession of the Transvaal had been virtually

decided on in January before Sir George Colley left Maritzburg for the front; but it is certain that the conclusion of the armistice at the psychological instant it was effected afforded the Government the opportunity, of which they were not slow to take advantage, to patch up a peace at any price, regardless of the feelings of the Army or of the rights of the loyal colonists and natives.

On this vexed point the Duke wrote to Sir Evelyn Wood, and also to Sir Leicester Smyth:—

TO SIR EVELYN WOOD.

‘HORSE GUARDS,
WAR OFFICE, 15 *June* 1881.

‘... I quite understand from your enclosed memo. the position of affairs when you succeeded to the command on poor Colley's death, and I have no doubt the military position was not a good one, and that in that respect the delay by way of an armistice was of advantage; but unfortunately the armistice was the very thing needed to carry out the peaceful policy in contemplation, and though that was not at all what you yourself intended, it resulted in the present unfortunate peace without our having had an opportunity of defeating the Boers in a good action, which would have retrieved our military position, and would have placed us on a really good and safe footing to do anything we liked with the Transvaal afterwards; in short, to give it up or practically retain it, on our terms. Now, alas, this is far from being the case, and the whole position has become a very delicate and a difficult one, the end of which I, for my own part, cannot at all foresee, and which may lead to many grave difficulties and complications. . . .’

TO SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

‘COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 23 *June* 1881.

‘Your letters up to 31 May have reached me, and though I have really nothing of importance to write about, I send a line to say that I quite feel with you that matters in South Africa are far from satisfactory in any point of view, and that I much fear our position there, including that at the Cape, has been greatly damaged by recent sad events. What you tell me as to the formation of an Afrikaner Bond is a very unpleasant feature in the case, and if this principle once gets hold of the Colonists, the worst will have to be anticipated as a result. Hitherto we have been respected and feared for our powers, now we are looked down upon

for our sad reverses unretrieved; and whilst we are disliked, as we always have been, by the Dutch element, we are equally detested, and perhaps even more so, by the British and formerly well-disposed classes, who consider themselves as abandoned and ruined by the indisposition of the Mother Country to give them any further support or assistance. One good defeat after poor Colley's death would have prevented all this, and the Government might then, without difficulty, have made any terms they liked with the Boers, even to the extent of giving them self-government, if they so desired.

'The Free State, in the Volksraad, having refused to give any further permission for Colonial troops to pass through their territory is another very grave matter, and may place the Cape Government in great difficulties. In short, matters are very ugly all round, and I hear the Commission are not getting on very swimmingly, and Evelyn Wood is not at all in accord with the views of his two fellow-Commissioners. . . .'

Meanwhile the Basuto troubles had gradually been overcome. Before quitting the painful subject of the Transvaal War of 1881, it may be of interest to quote one more of Sir Leicester Smyth's letters to the Duke, in which the subsequent conduct of the Dutch party was accurately predicted.

All acquainted with South African affairs during the twenty-four years that have elapsed since Sir Leicester Smyth wrote these letters, will agree that seldom has a forecast been more literally fulfilled:—

FROM SIR LEICESTER SMYTH.

'THE CASTLE,

CAPE TOWN, 13 September 1881.

'I have the honour to inform Y.R.H. that Basuto affairs seem at last to be in a fair way of settlement, the latest information being that Masupha has quite given in, and professes contrition for his obstinacy. No doubts seem now to be entertained that the Transvaal Parliament will approve of the Convention. . . . Certainly nothing could have been fairer or more sensible than Mr. Hofmeyr's advice to the Boers during the negotiations for peace. But the Sprigg politicians maintain that the Dutch are playing a deep game, and that they are steadily and slowly trying to get everything made more Dutch, professing their attachment to England just so long as suits their convenience. That is what one of Mr. Sprigg's most trusted friends told me quite lately.

‘Moreover, whatever may be the opinion of the intelligent Dutch, there is, I fear, no doubt but that our prestige has received a heavy blow from our recent defeats, and what used to be respect, produced by fear, is now changed to something very like contempt amongst the coarse and ignorant lower orders. And this is the more deplorable, because all sides in this country agree that the conduct of the 58th at Laing’s Nek, and the 60th at Ingogo, was excellent.’

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE TERRITORIAL SYSTEM

Mr. Childers becomes War Secretary. Colonel Stanley's Committee. Queen Victoria's views. H.R.H.'s speech on subject in 1878. His letter to Colonel Stanley. Mr. Arnold Forster on Linked Battalions. Lord Airey's Royal Commission. H.R.H.'s Minute to Secretary of State on military situation. Memo. to Mr. Childers, and his views. Sir C. Ellice's Committee on territorial names. H.R.H.'s advocacy of Territorial System in Mr. Cardwell's time. H.M. on proposals of Sir C. Ellice's Committee. Final steps. H.R.H.'s Memo. on dangerous state of inefficiency during Zulu War. Mr. Cardwell's haste, and subsequent difficulties *re* promotion and retirement of officers. H.R.H.'s Annual Report on Army in December 1881. Sir Frederick Roberts offered the Q.M.G.-ship. Mr. Childers's Farewell.

WHEN Parliament was dissolved in March 1880, the Imperial aspirations of Lord Beaconsfield had grown unpopular, and Mr. Gladstone, emerging from a self-enforced retirement, came into power with a large majority. He was pledged to reverse the policy of his predecessor, and, as might perhaps have been expected, such a course soon involved the new Government in a network of embarrassments. It is true that the Afghan War was brought to a successful conclusion; but in South Africa the situation became the source of much trouble then, and the policy pursued eventually led to untold expenditure in men and money.

As regards the War Office, the new Secretary of State was Mr. Childers, who had, in Mr. Gladstone's previous Cabinet, been First Lord of the Admiralty. His Parliamentary Under-Secretary was the Earl of Morley, and his Financial Secretary Mr. Campbell-Bannerman. Mr. Childers's appointment as Secretary of State in succession to Colonel Stanley was dated 28 April 1880; and he at once proceeded to add the finishing touches to the military policy inaugu-

rated by Mr. Cardwell during the preceding Liberal administration. His private secretaries were Captain (now Lieut.-General Sir Neville) Lyttelton, and Captain G. FitzGeorge.

Mr. Childers's administration will be chiefly remembered on account of the introduction of the Territorial system, a measure which gave rise to more friction and ill-feeling in the Army than perhaps any other introduced during the last century; the effects of which were still, in some cases, apparent when the great Boer War of 1899-1902 broke out. The introduction of the Territorial system, apart from the wars of the period, which are dealt with separately, being thus the most notable feature of Mr. Childers's tenure of office, will now be treated as a whole in so far as it affects the period under review. It will be remembered that Mr. Cardwell had introduced, during the years 1872-73, the localisation scheme, under which plan Battalions were linked together in pairs in Brigade Districts and the latter numbered consecutively. Even this, however, was unpopular; and the internal cohesion of Regiments for many years suffered in consequence. Two Militia Battalions were also to be affiliated to the Line Battalions thus linked together, the whole of which was to form a Brigade with a Brigade Depot behind it.

In 1876, whilst Mr. Gathorne Hardy was Secretary of State, a committee was appointed under Colonel Stanley¹ to consider the Militia and Brigade Depot system; and the outcome of their recommendations was that four Battalions (two Line and two Militia), should be formed into a territorial Regiment, bearing the same name and having the same Depot. One of their main ideas was to cement more closely the connection between the Line and the Militia; and they stated that this could best be effected by these units being treated as one Regiment bearing a territorial designation, 'the Line Battalions being the 1st and 2nd, and the Militia Battalions the 3rd and 4th, etc., of such territorial Regiment, the Depot being common to all, and being the last battalion of the series.'

Three and a half millions had already been expended on

¹ Afterwards Secretary of State for War and Earl of Derby.

Mr. Cardwell's localisation scheme; and Colonel Stanley's Committee emphasised the desirability of being able to expand the *Depôts* automatically. Needless to say, their ideals were never realised. The Line and the Militia have not been, and never can be, completely assimilated; and in no sense can *Depôts* be regarded as the common home of both. The differences between the Line and the Militia are of too far-reaching a nature to be bridged over by any such measures; and though they bear the same territorial name and practically wear the same uniform, they are no more united to-day than they were thirty years ago. Nor have the Committee's ideas as to automatic expansion been realised; and during the South African War, when the strain on these establishments naturally increased considerably, dire confusion was in many cases the result. Most of the regular officers of the *Depôt* were soon absorbed to satisfy the pressing needs of South Africa, with the result that the *Depôts* were mainly manned by inexperienced militiamen.

Her Majesty and the Duke of Cambridge looked with some alarm on the extension of Mr. Cardwell's system as recommended by Colonel Stanley's Committee, as the following letters testify:—

FROM SIR T. BIDDULPH TO THE MILITARY SECRETARY.

‘WINDSOR CASTLE, 16 *March* 1877.

‘I enclose a letter for you to give to the Duke. I can say privately that the Queen is *most* anxious to support His Royal Highness in the question of Territorial Organisation.

‘From what I hear, Mr. Hardy is not at all anxious to move in the matter. How would it do to have a Committee of the most distinguished officers to report on the probable effect on the Army of destroying the Regimental system?

‘I cannot help thinking that the composition of the Committee hardly warranted so important a change as they recommend.’

FROM THE QUEEN.

‘WINDSOR CASTLE, 25 *April* 1877.

‘MY DEAR GEORGE,—. . . I am anxious to have your opinion on the proposed arrangements for uniting Regiments into one Brigade. I feel so strongly the necessity

of preserving the Regimental system and the *esprit de corps* that I could not consent to the adoption of any plan which would destroy the one or the other. I trust therefore that the scheme put forward will not affect the Regimental titles, nor remove the badges and distinctions which are so prized by soldiers.

'I understand the two Regiments of a Brigade are to be assimilated in dress so as to facilitate the change of officers and men. I fear that in some instances the changes in the colour of their accustomed facings will lead to some discontent.

'But in the cases of my Highland Regiments, this assimilation will be impracticable, the tartans of each Corps being the tartan of the Clans whose name it bears; and to direct the 42nd to wear the Cameron Tartan, or my own Cameron Highlanders to wear that of the Black Watch, would create the greatest dissatisfaction, and would be unmeaning.

'I shall be glad if you will let me know how it is proposed to deal with these points, and if you will let me know your fullest opinion on the whole question.'

TO THE QUEEN.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE,
PARK LANE, W., 27 April 1877.

MY DEAR COUSIN,—I have received Your letter of 25 instant, and in reply to the question put to me I have no hesitation in saying, that anything more distasteful to me than the recommendations of the recent Committee with reference to the Territorial Regiments I cannot conceive. The whole of my evidence before that Committee was against that one particular change, and I stated clearly and decidedly, in the original Memorandum, upon which the linking of Regiments was advocated, that I hoped it would not be extended to the officers, but would only affect, by means of a change in the system of recruiting, the necessary interchange of men between the two Corps, when, in consequence of the introduction of the short service system, such interchange became unavoidable.

Unfortunately in the general order embodying all the changes introduced in 1873, it was laid down that new appointments of Sub-Lieutenants should be made subject to being placed on one combined list of the two linked Battalions. I deeply regret that this part of the order was ever issued; but I confess I was in hopes that, being prospective, it would never come into operation. In this unfortunately I have thus far been mistaken, and hence the unfortunate recommendations, according to my views, of the recent Committee. I hope that the modification of the arrangement now contemplated may to a great extent miti-

gate the evils I so much dreaded. The Regiments are to retain their numbers and distinguishing marks, *including* their facings and uniforms, though the officers will gradually be shown in one list, though on separate lists in another portion of the Army, but linked Highland Corps will retain their tartans, so that I trust in this respect all mischief may be avoided; but I should have greatly preferred that no change had been recommended whatever, but that Regiments, though linked for the unavoidable interchange of the men, had been left as at present, quite distinct as regards the officers. In this way mainly can *esprit de corps* be properly maintained, and, after all, what is it that makes an Army really valuable and efficient, but this sentiment carried out to its very fullest extent? I trust that this explanation may meet the doubts and hesitations that You so reasonably put as to what is going on in this respect, and the more You will kindly back up the sentiments I have ventured to put forward, by Your own views in a similar sense made known to the Secretary of State, the more likely are we to escape the danger which has been threatening ever since this unfortunate report was presented to Parliament.'

From the above it will be seen that Her Majesty was more in touch with Highland sentiment than her political advisers, and Sir Thomas Biddulph's suggestion as to the advisability of forming a committee of authoritative General Officers was eventually adopted by the formation of Lord Airey's Royal Commission, which will be alluded to anon.

In the meantime the Duke somewhat pertinently summed up the situation in a speech which he delivered to the Fishmongers Company in 1878. Speaking of localisation in the Continental sense—that is to say, the system by which the Territorial Regiments, partly in order to diminish the hardships and inconveniences entailed by conscription, are permanently located in their own recruiting districts, and consequently in close touch with their *dépôts*—he pointed out that such a system in its entirety could never be carried out in the British Isles. In our case, such an arrangement would obviously be impossible. Our Battalions from time to time have to proceed abroad or to Ireland; and it would be totally impossible to devise a system by which they could always be quartered in their own territorial districts. Our difficulties as regards mobilisation are consequently much

greater than those which exist in foreign armies; and mobilisation is with us, therefore, a much more difficult matter. Regiments, on moving from one station to another at home, could not conveniently carry about with them their own mobilisation stores and equipment. So with us it is to the depôts that these appurtenances can most conveniently be consigned.

Moreover, the Territorial system has in many other ways been an unreal device, apart from the fact that localisation can only be applied to the depôts, and to some extent to recruiting. It was indeed no part of the scheme that Regiments should, like those abroad, be quartered in their own territorial districts.

To take instances, the 63rd, West Suffolk, and the 96th Regiments were thrown together and styled the Manchester Regiment. Yet their dépôt is not, as it should be, in Manchester, but at Ashton-under-Lyne, and they are now not even allowed to recruit in Manchester, which is a general recruiting district distinct from the Cardwell and Childers schemes!

Again, the 60th Rifles and Rifle Brigade, misnamed Territorial Regiments, happily are recruited from all parts of England, albeit their affiliated Militia Battalions are drawn from the centre and south of Ireland and the north and east end of London, whilst their dépôt is at Winchester. Could anything possibly be more grotesque!

The Duke was a great believer in the 'incomparable British Infantry' of the olden days, the bulk of which was composed of a 'judicious mixture' of English, Irish, and Scotch, a blend which, both for war purposes and for discipline in quarters, has ever been found to work so admirably.

In his speech at the Fishmongers' Hall, H.R.H. summed up the situation as follows:—

'I have heard a good deal of localising the Army, but the man who urges that does not know what he is talking about.

'The Army of England could not be localised. A great portion of it has to be abroad. . . .

'I have ventured to point out the variety of service for which our Army is called upon. We may look upon ourselves as an Army in a mobilised state, and if it is mobilised, you cannot make it a local Army. The Militia and Volunteers are essential for local service, whereas the Army of England can never be local beyond its depôts, therefore I think it a pity to attempt to imitate foreign armies, because our conditions of service abroad are necessarily different from those of any other country.'

Again, in writing to Colonel Stanley in 1879, whilst the latter was Secretary of State for War, the Duke reverts to the subject, and points out the defects of the scheme :—

TO COLONEL STANLEY.

'LONDON, 28 October 1879.

'I believe that you will shortly come up to town for Cabinet and Estimate business, so before you do so, and whilst you have still more time at your disposal, I think it well to refer to the conversation we had together the other evening. This conversation, however amicably conducted and friendly in all respects, has left the impression on my mind that a wide difference exists between us as to the sort of modification which it may be deemed necessary to adopt in the present organisation of the Army as introduced by Lord Cardwell. We are all agreed, more or less, that the present arrangement is unworkable, with our wants and requirements, and on this account you assembled a very good Military Committee under the Presidency of Lord Airey, to advise or report such changes as they might deem necessary or desirable. This report we are anxiously awaiting, and whatever it may be, no doubt it will carry with it great weight. But when talking matters over, and considering the direction in which changes might be made, should the Committee not report in time for the coming Estimates, I observed, with great concern, that your tendencies were to go even beyond what had yet been done, and to be greatly alarmed at the very idea of *unlinking Regiments* and *Battalions*, and in fact suggesting, more or less, that some *Regiments of Infantry* might fairly be reduced altogether, so as to give second *Battalions* to other *Corps*, and thus carrying out to the fullest extent that fatal General Order about the amalgamation of officers in *Linked Regiments*, to which I took such strong objections from the very outset as expressed in my original Memorandum on Lord Cardwell's plan, which I think has been so fully and, I venture to think, rather *unfairly* quoted as the basis of all the arrangements subsequently made. Now I take a very different view, and

hope the changes the Committee may be disposed to adopt may be in a completely *opposite* direction.

‘I should like to see Regiments *unlinked*, and even Double Battalion Regiments worked in *single Battalions*, because I feel satisfied from long experience of our service, and its requirements at home and abroad, that unless Battalions are worked in their *individualness*, the *Home Battalions* of a double or Linked Battalion Regiment must at all times degenerate into a *Depôt* for the Service Battalion, and that consequently, our whole Army at home, even including the thirteen First Army Corps Regiments, must be in a constant transition state by passing the Drafts through to the Battalions serving abroad. Therefore virtually in this state of things you can never have the Home Army in anything like a respectable or efficient condition,¹ which I consider extremely unfortunate for our general interests as a nation, or rather an Empire with vast demands in all parts of the world. Therefore I think we should arrive at some arrangement by which the Home Battalions should be made more effective than they are admitted on all hands to be now, and for this purpose I should like to see the fixed establishment of the Home Battalion maintained intact, which can only be done by its being worked separately from the one on Foreign Service. At the same time, believe me I am not unreasonable, and I am quite ready to admit that the Government would be imprudent in giving any unnecessary offence to those who planned the scheme, and therefore if the word “*unlinking*” is unpalatable, do not use it, but let us modify present arrangements to meet the case; and whatever we do, let us not on any account destroy the existing Regiments, which would so much damage the *esprit de corps* of the Army, as still happily existing, and would at the same time be so injurious to the individual interests of those unfortunate officers whose Regiments would be thrown together into the joined corps. Now, I think this might in a great measure be attained if you had a certain small number of reserve and amalgamated Battalions from which you could draft men to the Regiments abroad without calling on the men in the Home Battalions for their own men; or if you thought that plan undesirable, you might, as at present, send the drafts for the Foreign Battalions to their linked Regiment, but quite independent of the men serving in that corps, and when the time arrived for sending them abroad they would be the men to go out as drafts, but not those hitherto belonging to the affiliated corps. The *Depôt* Brigades having been established might be allowed to go on, but with only one-company Staff, the remaining officers being always with the Headquarters, and the second *Depôt* Captain would

¹ The accuracy of this forecast was singularly borne out by the condition of our Home Army twenty years later, on the outbreak of the Great Boer War.

be with the Home Battalion and in charge of the young men preparing for the next draft. These are simply ideas, which require of course working out, and I only throw them out as hints to prove to you that I am not insensible to the difficulties that beset your path in making changes. But still I firmly adhere to my view that to go further in *advance* of this present arrangement would be a *fatal error*, and I do most sincerely and anxiously hope you will not deem it necessary to take such a course unless it is urged upon you by the Committee now sitting, whose recommendations will certainly have to be carefully weighed and considered, but who, I feel persuaded, are not likely to arrive at any such conclusion. I am sure you will accept my remarks in the friendly spirit in which they are intended; but I feel so *strongly* in the sense in which I write, that I should be distressed beyond measure if, before forming any conclusions, I had not pointed out the fatal effects of any such changes as must inevitably result from a further advance in the direction originally taken, and which, in practice, is so injurious to the service.

Apart from any opinion on the recent scheme proposed by Mr. Arnold-Forster, it is interesting to find the Duke's forecast endorsed in the following extract from a speech on the subject which was delivered in the House of Commons by the present Secretary of State for War on 15 July 1904:—

‘What we want is an Army which will hold India and our Colonies, which we can reinforce for war, and for which we must maintain the proper depôts and institutions in this country. But the adoption of that view is incompatible with the existence of the Linked Battalion system. . . . I said it would never work, that it never did work, and that it ought not to work. I have said that it was impracticable, illogical, and an unsatisfactory system.’¹

In 1880 the Royal Commission under Lord Airey, than whom no soldier at the time knew more about the Army, issued their Report. In the course of this they recommended that Battalions should be unlinked, and large Depôts created, a plan which is again being urged at the present time by the Secretary of State for War and others.

It was maintained at the time that this recommendation of the Airey Commission had exceeded the terms of

¹ The *Times* Parliamentary Report, 16 July 1904.

reference, which stated that the Government had no intention of departing 'from the general principles of reorganisation which had been accepted by the country since 1870'; and, as is well known, the Government did not adopt their proposals.

When Mr. Childers came into office, however, the state of affairs was alarming; and on 17 August 1880 the Duke put the situation plainly before the Secretary of State for War, and urged 'the calling for volunteers from the Army and Militia Reserves.'

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'17 August 1880.

'1. I consider it advisable, under the somewhat anxious state of affairs in Afghanistan and in Europe, to bring to notice the present resources of our Army, should more troops be required for active service in the field.

'2. The accompanying return includes the six Battalions which could be most conveniently sent to India should it be found necessary to despatch more troops to that country. Of these, five have their linked Battalions at home, and one has its linked Battalion in Afghanistan.

'3. The linked Battalions and Brigade Depôts are not in a state, with one exception, to complete the six Battalions named to Indian strength; after draining every available man from these two sources, volunteers to the number of 682 men would be required from other Corps.

'4. In view of possible complications in Europe, it is most desirable that we should have an efficient force available for active service at a moment's notice. Taking the first fourteen Battalions for service abroad, which number would be required to form two Divisions, it appears that they have 5463 trained men available for service in the field, or an average of 390 men per Battalion.

'5. The establishment of these Battalions is as follows:—

The first six,	800
The second six,	720
The two remaining,	640

'Their total, according to these establishments, would be 10,400, and consequently 4937 trained men would be required to place them on an efficient footing; or, if they were all to be raised to the 800 establishment, then 5737 men would be required.

'6. It would be a most undesirable proceeding to obtain this large number of men by volunteers from other Corps. The evils of such a course have been frequently pointed out, and in the present instance it is only necessary to look at the

total number of men available to see what serious depletion would be caused to the Battalions from which the volunteers must be taken. We have now a total of 35,508 Infantry soldiers, exclusive of the six Regiments going to India, and the ordinary drafts (including medically unfit and sick) present in the United Kingdom; from this number, 14,276 men under one year's service must be deducted, leaving 21,232.

'7. If again from this last number we deduct the efficient men (5463) of the first fourteen Battalions for foreign service, and the (4937) men required to complete their establishment with trained soldiers, the total trained Infantry remaining in the United Kingdom will be 10,832. This would give an average of 258 men for the forty-two Battalions remaining in the country. In these numbers no allowance has been made for possible Indian requirements.

'8. In fact, our Infantry has been reduced so dangerously low in number that, in view of possible emergencies, it is no longer safe to ask for an increase of establishment, as has been done on the numerous previous occasions to which reference is made in the Adjutant-General's Memo. of 23/6/80, as recruits would not meet our present requirements.

'We require seasoned men and trained soldiers, and these can only be obtained by calling for volunteers from the Army and the Militia Reserves. I beg strongly to urge that 6000 of these men be at once called up.'

Mr. Childers maintained that if Mr. Cardwell's system was to be carried out at all, it was absolutely necessary that this should be done in its entirety, and that the creation of territorial Regiments was its necessary accompaniment.

Her Majesty, however, had grave doubts as to the wisdom of this plan, as the following documents demonstrate:—

FROM SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

(Enclosing a Memorandum from the Queen to Mr. Childers.)

'BALMORAL, 16 November 1880.

'I am commanded by the Queen to let Y.R.H. know that Her Majesty was much pleased with Mr. Childers during his stay here. He explained to the Queen the Military questions now under discussion, and left a Memorandum upon the leading points. The Queen has written some remarks upon this Memorandum, and has sent them to Mr. Childers. I enclose by the Queen's command a copy to Y.R.H.

'Her Majesty desires me to add that Mr. Childers made

no mention of a separate Indian Army. Indeed his proposal for Indian reliefs implied that the present organisation would be maintained. The Queen, therefore, did not allude to this subject.'

'BALMORAL, 15 November 1880.

'On reading over the Memorandum sent to her by Mr. Childers, the Queen thinks it right to make the following remarks on the questions under discussion.

'The addition of one year to the term of an Infantry soldier's service with the colours is a gain; but is it necessary to reduce the Cavalry soldier's service for no other purpose than to assimilate his term with that of the foot soldier?

'The Queen cannot deny that she much regrets it has not been thought advisable to unlink Battalions. The Regimental system has always proved itself to be the best under very trying circumstances, and the Queen hesitates to adopt a new organisation which must weaken the *esprit de corps* of most of the existing Regiments. The Queen trusts that the new names will be purely territorial, and that the proposed formations will not adopt the numerals which have become hallowed in the Army.

'The Queen was glad to learn from Mr. Childers that he would do nothing to injure the feelings of officers and men who have so worthy a pride in the historic glories of their corps, and she understood that he intended to appoint a committee to inquire into this subject. The Queen would like to hear the names of the officers selected for this purpose. Whenever the suggestions respecting the retirement of officers come under discussion, the Queen trusts that existing interests will be cared for.

'The Queen fears that promotion by selection will be very difficult. It will, of course, be very desirable to retain the services of non-commissioned officers. The Queen is not sure how far the granting the rank of Warrant Officer will effect the object desired.

'The Queen has much confidence in Mr. Childers's judgment on these matters, and would be glad to hear from him occasionally as matters proceed.

'He will of course come to no decision without first submitting the plan when completed to the Queen.'

The following three letters will perhaps throw more light on the views respectively held by the Secretary of State and Commander-in-Chief; whilst at the same time they testify, in spite of certain differences of opinion, the friendly relations which subsisted between the two:—

FROM MR. CHILDERS.

'17 PRINCES GARDENS, S.W., 21 November 1880.

'... As to linking, my final decision must await the report of Sir C. Ellice's Committee; all that I have said as yet being that I see no alternative except absolutely to unlink and go back on all that was in this respect done by Mr. Cardwell and since, or to adopt Colonel Stanley's proposal, or even to go further, and make all Regiments like the Rifle Brigade and 60th. I cannot forget that Lord Airey's Committee in reporting (by a majority) in favour of unlinking, deliberately exceeded their instructions, which forbade them to discuss such a proposal, and only asked them to consider the expediency of carrying linking still farther. I am most anxious to consider this question most fully with Y.R.H., but we must not shut our eyes to what are really the alternatives before us. I know no other question of organisation which is not in a satisfactory state of discussion. That I have enormous difficulties before me I am very conscious; but I have received such generous support from Y.R.H. that I do not doubt that they will be surmounted.'

FROM MR. CHILDERS.

'17 PRINCES GARDENS, S.W., 8 December 1880.

'... I will leave this note to say that I certainly shall not mention to Lord Hartington any proposal that Battalions should remain in India for twenty-five years. After my last conversation with you, Sir, I was quite satisfied that the stay there of a Battalion should be considerably less. ...'

FROM MR. CHILDERS.

'17 PRINCES GARDENS, S.W., 14 December 1880.

'I received yesterday evening the box containing Y.R.H.'s private note to me, and also the two Memoranda in which Y.R.H. so strongly urges the unlinking of the Line Regiments.

'I hope to see you, Sir, at twelve to-day; but meanwhile I desire to assure Y.R.H. with what extreme reluctance, and indeed pain, I ever differ from any recommendation about the Army which you, Sir, make, and how anxious I always am to concede any point which does not appear to me inconsistent with an adopted principle.

'I sincerely thank you, Sir, for the assurance, so thor in harmony with the kindness and consideration yo always shown to me, that Y.R.H. will do all in your to carry out changes, although they may not meet wi

concurrence. You will find, Sir, that I am most desirous to reciprocate this feeling, and to give the most loyal support in my power to Y.R.H. in the administration of the Army.'

The Committee, which has already been referred to in connection with the territorial names, assembled under the Chairmanship of Sir Charles Ellice, the Adjutant-General, its other members consisting of Generals Radcliffe, Bulwer, Elkington, and Sir A. Alison, two regimental commanding officers (Colonel Macpherson, 42nd Highlanders, and Lieut.-Colonel Briggs, 96th Regiment), and the Director of Clothing.

In drafting their terms of reference, Mr. Childers informed them that it had become necessary to decide, whether or not the proposals of Colonel Stanley's Committee should be adopted.

If these proposals were adopted it became necessary to decide:—

1. The territorial designations to be adopted, on the assumption that the existing plan of linking of Battalions was to be continued.

2. The records to be inscribed on the colours.

3. The arrangements which were to be made in order to secure the uniformity of the clothing both of the amalgamated Line Battalions and the affiliated Militia ones.

This task the Committee performed by drawing out an elaborate scheme of territorial designations, designed so as to wound as little as possible Regimental sentiment. At the same time they reported that they could not conceal from themselves 'that the fusing together of so many Regiments hitherto separate, and the consequent alteration of titles and abolition of numbers surrounded with associations, will inflict a shock on the feelings of officers and men of those Battalions which will thus lose their cherished designations.'

They trusted, however, that this effect would only be temporary; and that the hope expressed by the Stanley Committee that 'an enlarged *esprit de corps* will grow up' might in time be realised. The Militia uniforms were to be assimilated with those of the Line, and one general set of facings adopted, white for England and Wales, buff for Scotland, and green for Ireland; a plan which has now been

departed from, since, when linked battalions can agree, they are now permitted to revert to the old facings.

It can hardly be realised nowadays how bitter was the feeling engendered by the imposition of the new territorial names—a feeling which did not die out till the South African War had, at any rate in some cases, conferred upon them some sort of prestige.

On 20 December 1880 Sir Henry Ponsonby again writes to the Duke:—

FROM SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

‘OSBORNE, 20 December 1880.

‘Y.R.H. will shortly hear from the Queen in reply to your letter which Her Majesty received this morning; and I have in the meanwhile received the Queen’s commands to repeat the following extract from Mr. Gladstone’s report of the last meeting of the Cabinet. “Mr. Childers’s propositions were considered and approved, with the understanding, however, that in the formation of the double-battalioned territorial Regiments the numbers and the special designations of the old single-battalioned Regiments, and as far as possible any other valued traditional peculiarity, shall be preserved.”

‘The Queen therefore trusts that this will so far meet Y.R.H.’s views. It has been stated that the linked battalion system emanating originally from Y.R.H. was warmly adopted by successive Secretaries of State of both parties, and that it would now be impossible to revert to the old single-battalion system. When the Queen was assured that the only possible change from the existing organisation, which does not work well, must be in the direction of drawing the Line Battalions more closely together, she assented, though very reluctantly, on the condition that the old numbers and designations were to be maintained. The Queen was supported in this wish by Y.R.H.’s expressions. The Cabinet having agreed to this, it now remains to be seen how they intend to carry into effect the somewhat complicated organisation which this involves. The Queen has heard nothing with respect to the other questions of Army reform, and consequently understands that the organisation of the Territorial Regiments is the only matter as yet discussed by the Cabinet. The Queen is reading the Report of Sir Charles Ellice’s Committee, and cannot approve many of the suggestions contained therein, especially those affecting the Highlanders and placing them all in the Royal Hunting Tartan.

‘The Queen hopes that the 72nd may be rewarded for their conduct in Afghanistan by being given the kilt as their dress instead of the trews.’

In answer to Sir Henry Ponsonby, the Duke relates the attitude which he has adopted all through as regards the territorial question. It will be remembered that whilst Mr. Cardwell was Secretary of State, he had addressed to him a memorandum more or less in favour of a Linked Battalion system; and now he explains that he only did so in order to find an excuse for saving the Home Army from wholesale destruction. In any case he did not then realise the extent to which the Territorial system would eventually be carried.

TO SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

‘HORSE GUARDS,
WAR OFFICE, 21 December 1880.

‘Your letter of yesterday has just reached me, and I am grateful to Her Majesty for having informed me, through you, of the exact position of affairs.

‘In self-justification I am bound to say, that though I was the unfortunate proposer of the Linked Battalion system, I only made this proposal to escape from the destruction of half the Regiments of the Army, which was suggested at that time by Mr. Cardwell in a long conversation I had with him on his originally putting forward his scheme of reform. I then felt that this destruction of Regiments was so fatal, and would, in my opinion, be such a complete failure, as it has since proved itself to be according to my view, that I suggested we should, before adopting so sweeping a measure, try the experiment of the double-battalion system by linking the men of two Regiments, *leaving the officers intact in their respective corps.*

‘This was accepted at the time as a compromise, and when the plans came into general operation, exactly what I had foreseen occurred; the organisation of one Battalion at home feeding the other linked Battalion abroad utterly and hopelessly broke down, and we had to resort to all sorts of shifts and expedients to make up extra Battalions ordered suddenly abroad both to India and South Africa.

‘The outcry then became general. Lord Airey’s Committee assembled and recommended, on the strong evidence given, that Regiments should be unlinked, the difficulties being quite the same whether for linked or double-battalion Regiments. This is the exact position of affairs in which we now find ourselves, and it has now become a matter of consideration whether this utterly hopeless system should be continued, or that we should unlink and revert to each Battalion of double-battalion Regiments looking to itself

alone for obtaining recruits and supplying its individual wants. There would not be the smallest difficulty in carrying out such a proposal as I have shown in my papers, and my prudence in not destroying Regiments when I was originally asked to do so would have been rewarded by finding each corps holding its own position in the Army List. Mr. Childers with his advisers decided otherwise, and the Cabinet have accepted his views. My province will be to carry out this plan to the best of my ability. But anything more distasteful or detrimental to the *esprit de corps*, and therefore the best interests of the service, I cannot imagine. What makes the matter worse is, this change will in no respect improve the condition of things, while it has been found that the plan has broken down. The same system exactly is to go on of feeding one Battalion by another, and the result is that the whole of the Infantry at home is one vast dépôt fit for nothing but to supply drafts for the Battalions abroad.¹ Look at what is now going on: a Battalion is wanted at the Cape suddenly, we are obliged to send on a Regiment from the Mediterranean, as we have not *one* at home really fit to send out with fairness to itself, the men being all *boys*. Again, for Ireland, we are compelled to send those corps returning from Foreign Service after long absence from home, which is hard in the extreme on them, because these Battalions are the only ones that still have men in their ranks and *not boys*. Again, two Battalions of Guards have to be sent, and a large body of Marines, because they have also seasoned men. Surely if all this will not convince practical men, I don't know what will; and that the Army should be thoroughly disgusted by such a condition of affairs, which is now to be perpetuated by the proposed order of things, is not to be wondered at. I, alas! can only *warn*, and I do so, I fear, even at the risk of appearing obstructive, but *I am not so*, and I am only doing my duty as entrusted by the Queen with the chief command of the Army. I believe myself that Mr. Childers put forward the whole of his proposals to the Cabinet, but on this I cannot speak with certainty. As regards Sir Charles Ellice's recommendation for carrying out Mr. Childers's scheme, I am not surprised at Her Majesty not approving of many of the recommendations. Many were most distasteful to the Committee, but they had no alternative given to them. The 72nd are to become a Kilted Battalion.

The territorial names and other matters recommended by Sir Charles Ellice's Committee were adopted by the Government, and form the basis of the Territorial system as it now exists.

¹ A condition of things which has, unfortunately, endured to this day.

Some of the arrangements proposed, as regards the Highland Regiments at any rate, were not very satisfactory ; and once more Her Majesty showed that she knew more about the subject than her political advisers, or indeed than did Sir Charles Ellice's Committee :—

THE QUEEN TO MR. CHILDERS.

‘ OSBORNE, 21 December 1880.

‘ The Queen has heard from Mr. Gladstone that the Cabinet, in adopting Mr. Childers's proposals for the new double-battalioned territorial Regiments, have *stipulated* that the *numbers* and *special designations* of the old single-battalioned Regiments should be *preserved*.

‘ The Queen was glad to receive this assurance, which she believes accords with Mr. Childers's own feelings on the subject, and without which she could not have given her consent to the proposals, which she still fears is a dangerous experiment.

‘ The Queen has received from Mr. Childers the report of Sir Charles Ellice's Committee. Many of the proposals contained therein are apparently inapplicable in consequence of the retention of their old designations by existing Regiments.

‘ And the granting of a badge to such Regiments who do not now possess one seems scarcely necessary. The Queen, however, can decidedly not approve the proposal made with reference to the Highland Regiments. These are, most of them, representatives of old Clans, and even in the present proposals *new* clan names are suggested. To take from them their clan tartans would be a great mistake, and to place them all in the Royal Hunting Tartan, which is a sort of undress Royal Stewart, will not be at all appreciated by the Highlanders, nor considered at all advisable by the Queen. . . .’

In spite of all opposition the Government decided to carry out the Territorial system, although it was undoubtedly antagonistic to the opinion of the majority of those officers of the Army who understood regimental life. It can hardly be said that the plan has been a success, if the utterances of the present Secretary of State for War, Mr. Arnold-Forster, afford any guide in the matter.

The following three letters relate the closing phase of the controversy :—

FROM SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

'OSBORNE, 26 December 1880.

'As I am not sure whether the Queen herself answered Y.R.H.'s letter last Thursday as Her Majesty intended to do, I think it right to say that I laid it before the Queen as soon as it arrived, and that Her Majesty was much occupied by its contents. It seems to me that if Y.R.H. and others think the present organisation bad, we must either revert to the single-battalion system or draw closer the Linked Battalions. Mr. Childers and the Secretaries of State for War lately, refuse to return to single Battalions; therefore there is no other course open but to proceed with Mr. Childers's new proposals. This, I think, is the Queen's opinion, but Her Majesty will no doubt speak to Mr. Childers on the subject when he comes on Wednesday.'

TO THE QUEEN.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE,
27 December 1880.

'MY DEAR COUSIN,—I have received a letter from Sir Henry Ponsonby just now on the Army question which gives me much anxiety. The sad news from the Transvaal only adds further to my anxiety, for, without taking Infantry Battalions abroad, we really have no Infantry Battalions at home in a fit condition to send out. All are mere *boys* and of *no solidity*, and most of them are under establishment and would have to be made up by Volunteers from other Corps—the most objectionable arrangement that can be devised. And yet so it ever will be if this terrible double-battalion system is to be carried out. I hear Mr. Childers is to be with You at Osborne in the next few days. I do hope You may yet have an opportunity of preventing the mischief that must result from his Territorial Regiments, with the entire destruction of *esprit de corps*. These are not days to play tricks with the Army. I fear we shall only have to look to it too much to restore order in Ireland, and for other purposes, such as this fresh outbreak in the Transvaal. I hope, therefore, You will see Your way to making some stand upon the old Regimental system of our glorious Army. It has stood many shocks, and has done its duty nobly by the Crown and by the Country. It is worth saving.

'However, You are so well-informed upon all these matters, that I need not remind You of them.

'All I can say is, that nothing can be worse than the present prospect, and the new proposals are to my mind, as regards Territorial Regiments, graver than anything that has yet been done or suggested, for it breaks up all antecedents of the service, and will be most unpalatable to the Army as a whole. I can well imagine Your distress at this

fresh blow to our prestige by what has happened with the 94th. We as yet know no details, but it seems as if it was an unjustifiable act of aggression on the part of the Boers, who had just broken out in rebellion. We are doing our utmost to send out reinforcements with the least possible delay.'

FROM SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

'OSBORNE, 30 December 1880.

'Mr. Childers came here yesterday, and the Queen spoke to him on the several questions connected with the Army.

'As Y.R.H. had previously explained to him the proposal for appointing a Commission to report on the Linking system, he was fully aware of all the arguments in its favour. But he maintained that it would be quite impossible for him, as a Minister, to leave such a question in the hands of a Committee. I have no doubt he will have repeated his reasons to Your Royal Highness.

'He understood the objections to the amalgamation of the Linked Battalions, but said it was the only plan possible in the existing state of affairs, and as it had the support of the leading persons of both parties, no Government could expect to carry a reversal of the system which was now in force, and which was only a stepping-stone to the plan he proposed.

'His proposals on selection for the rank of General were much modified, and he said that the system of Indian reliefs would only be an extension of that now in force.

'He was ready to listen to any suggestion for keeping the badges, decorations, or any of the traditions of Regiments, and he had full confidence that the *esprit de corps* would not be seriously affected.'

The demands of South Africa had at this period reduced the Home Army to a dangerous state of inefficiency; and, as on many other occasions, from the time of the Indian Mutiny onwards, the Duke had to raise his voice against the danger which was being incurred:—

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'4 Feb. 1881.

'It is my duty to represent to you the absolute necessity, which to my mind has now arisen, for making up the requirements of the Battalions on *Active Service* in the Transvaal, and their linked Battalions or *Depôts* at home, from volunteers to be called for from the Reserve men of the Army.

'It is essential that these several corps should be kept up to full strength, and that, whilst those in the field are maintained at fighting strength, those at home to supply them should be in a condition to do so without absolute and entire destruction to their own efficiency—all the more so as most of these linked Battalions are quartered in Ireland, where heavy duties of a delicate kind are at the present time imposed upon them. Moreover, the mere raising of Recruits, however numerous these may be, will not supply our wants, for we require *seasoned men*, and not boys or even young men, who for many months cannot be looked upon as soldiers, and would really add little if any actual efficiency to their corps, whether actively employed in the field or called upon to do severe duties at home. Besides, the whole theory of short service is based on the supposition that in cases of emergency or war a large proportion of the Battalions so employed should be composed of Reserve men. I consider that these Reserve men should be engaged to the extent required for the purposes of Field Service, and should be in *addition* to the Recruits to be raised for filling up the casualties reported.

'Otherwise the Reserves would be diminished without our giving ourselves the means of again filling it up in ordinary process.

'I attach a Return for reference, to show the requirements of the Regiments in South Africa.'

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'3 March 1881.

'I feel it necessary to draw your attention to the present condition of the Home Army when the reinforcements of six additional Battalions now ordered to South Africa have embarked for Foreign Service, and the large drafts to Battalions in the field are also taken into consideration. It is absolutely necessary, in some way or other, to fill up the gaps thus created, and the best and most correct way of doing so would be by carrying out that portion of the Organisation Scheme which has hitherto never been tested, though the scheme itself is supposed to be in operation. By this, I mean that all those Regiments in the field, where both Battalions or linked Regiments are abroad, should at once have their Depôts made up to the strength of a *third* Battalion, and the affiliated Militia Battalions of those Depôts should be embodied for *permanent* duty. Unless this is done, it will be quite impossible to keep up the Battalions in the field.

'Should this course not be deemed possible, the only alternative seems to me to be that the Depôts of Regiments where both Battalions are abroad, and one in the field,

should also be considerably increased, as they have been entirely depleted in duty men by the heavy drafts sent, or going out.

'I also consider that some arrangement should be made by which some Militia Regiments should be called out and embodied, as the ordinary duties cannot be properly performed by the weak Battalions now at home, and which are, for the most part, composed of men either under one year's service or just above one year, which to my mind renders them quite unfit for work connected with detached duties, or even ordinary guard duties in garrison.

'A Reserve of Cavalry will also have to be thought of. Depôts of Cavalry Regiments in the field must at once be formed, and the whole of the Home Regiments should be put on a larger establishment of both men and horses, taking into consideration how largely the Home force of Cavalry has been or is being diminished, more particularly should two more Cavalry Regiments be sent out.

It will be remembered that Mr. Cardwell had introduced the so-called short service system by the Army Enlistment Act of 1870;¹ and by a subsequent arrangement² the term of service had been fixed as six years with the Colours and six in the Reserve. But during Mr. Childers's tenure of office the term of service was again altered.

On 3 March 1881 Mr. Childers introduced the Army Estimates in the House of Commons. During the course of his speech he explained the effect of the Territorial system, and he also, at the same time, announced a change in the conditions of service. By a General Order, 80 of 1881, it was provided that the term of service was for the future to be seven years with the Colours and five in the Reserve. In his speech, Mr. Childers alluded to the fact that a term of seven years with the Colours had formerly been proposed by Sir Charles Napier, and by Mr. Godley,³ whose memorandum on the subject has been quoted in a previous chapter. Moreover, it was provided that a proportion of the soldiers completing three years' Colour service were to be allowed and encouraged to pass into the Reserve for a further period of nine years. In addition, power was taken to enlist men

¹ 33 and 34 Vict. c. 67.

² *Army Circular*, 10 August 1870.

³ Assistant Under-Secretary of State for War, 1857-61. See chap. xxi. p. 33.

for a further period of four years' Reserve service at fourpence a day after they had completed their ordinary period of Colour and Reserve service.

Amongst other features of Mr. Childers's War Secretaryship was the passing of the Army Act of 1881,¹ under which were consolidated the Army Discipline and Regulation Act of 1879 and the subsequent Acts which amended the same.

When Mr. Cardwell's great changes, dealt with in a previous chapter, were introduced, an undue amount of haste was undoubtedly displayed. But this is, unfortunately, an ever-recurring feature of all our so-called military reforms. Hence it followed, in this particular case, that some burning questions were left over as a heritage for subsequent administrations to settle. Thus the question of the promotion and retirement of officers was bound, in view of the hasty and sketchy manner in which the Purchase question was settled by the Administration of 1868-74, to be a source of difficulty in the future.

TO THE QUEEN.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE,
22 January 1881.

'MY DEAR COUSIN,—Mr. Childers has, as I learn from him, forwarded to You a statement of further large alterations and changes in the mode of Army promotion necessitated by the abolition of Purchase with consequent compulsory retirement, and as a result of making all Captains of Artillery and Engineers substantive Majors in the Army. I was strongly opposed to both these measures, and resisted them to the last, but was, and unfortunately generally am, overruled; and now the mischief I foresaw has arisen, and necessitates naturally the changes proposed. As a matter of organisation there is a very great deal to be said against the large increase of Field Officers in the Army generally as proposed; but it is impossible to allow the grave matters that now present themselves to be left to go on as they are, and therefore there is nothing else to be done but to accept the plan suggested. The grave inequality now existing in the Service cannot be better illustrated than by finding, on actuarial calculation, that whereas no Captain of Engineers will be compulsorily retired out of every 1000 officers who join the service, and only 77 per 1000 in the Artillery, no less than 600 officers out

¹ 44 and 45 Vict. c. 58.

of every 1000 will have to be compulsorily retired as Captains from the Army and ruined in their profession unless very large relief be given, and there is no other mode of giving this relief but that now proposed. To my mind, this only bears out more fully my very strong conviction that all these enormous changes ought not to have been adopted without calling for the opinion of a Royal Commission, composed of able Statesmen and Generals, and should not have been looked upon as the mere corollary of Mr. Cardwell's original plan, which at the time it was started was extremely crude in its conception, and never really entered into vast details which have since been found to spring out of it. I am well aware that it is now deemed too late to reopen the question, but in vindication of my own position as connected with the enormous changes now about to take place, I feel bound to point out to You that they all have arisen in direct opposition to all the Military advice originally given by me, and are only now accepted by me as a necessity from which it is impossible, at all events as regards the present proposed alterations, to escape. Matters look bad in all directions, and our Home Army is in a most reduced condition for useful work, but with our present system it cannot be otherwise. Our Infantry Regiments are proposed to be somewhat increased in the coming Estimates, but at the expense of our Cavalry and Artillery, who are to be reduced in men and *horses*, and even in the number of guns, to meet the increase in the Infantry. The increase of Infantry is absolutely necessary, and therefore it is better to make the other reductions if by this means alone it can be obtained, but I leave it to You to judge whether this is a proper moment to make any reductions at all, or whether it would not be necessary, as a matter of ordinary prudence, to make a considerable increase in the available Home forces of the country. I venture to hope that You will forgive me again troubling You on this painful and difficult subject, but my duty to You prompts me to keep You fully informed of the real state of the case. May I beg that my communication may be considered as most confidential?'

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'24 October 1881.

'I fully accept the principle that seniority alone should not rule the promotion of Colonels to the rank of Major-General, and that in the case of a Senior Colonel whose merits and qualifications, as well as services, are of an exceptional character, he may be selected for promotion over the heads of others of less distinguished merit; but in the present instance there is no officer within a reasonable distance of the head of the list of Colonels whose qualifica-

tions are superior to the Senior Colonels on the list, and to select one of their juniors—not more meritorious or eligible, and on no special grounds but merely to assert the principle of selection—would be an act of great injustice to officers against whom there is no complaint, who have seen considerable service, and are fully capable of performing their duties in the higher rank, for which they are well fitted.

‘It must be borne in mind that, now that compulsory retirement is a consequence of age or non-employment, supersession may act most injuriously on the officers superseded, and therefore it must be exercised with the greatest caution and with due regard to justice. I am quite prepared to take the responsibility of the selections made by me, being confident that those whom I recommend are efficient officers and deserving of promotion to the higher rank.’

On 15 December 1881 the Duke presented to the Secretary of State his annual report on the state of the Army. This affords so clear a summary of the events of the year and the prospects for the future, that it will perhaps be desirable to present it as a whole:—

MEMO. FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.

‘HORSE GUARDS,
WAR OFFICE, 15 December 1881.

‘In submitting my usual annual report upon the state of the Army, I have this year to allude only to one war in which our troops have been engaged—that with the Boers; but this has been a most unfortunate one.

‘During the short period of one month we suffered three defeats. We were repulsed in an attempt to storm the defences of Laing’s Nek on 28 January; we failed in an endeavour to reopen our communications with Newcastle at the Ingogo River on 8 February; and after, on 27 February, obtaining, by a difficult night march, possession of the Majuba Hill—a decisive tactical point rendering the permanent retention of the Laing’s Nek position by the Boers impossible—we were driven headlong from it in a rout so complete and disastrous that it is almost unparalleled in the long annals of our Army.

‘When this last victory of the Boers was won, a force had been collected in Natal from this country and from India sufficient to have crushed with certainty the insurrection and restored the tarnished prestige of our arms; but for reasons other than military an armistice, followed by a peace, was concluded with the Boers upon terms which were certainly depressing to our troops, and upon which I abstain from making any observations.

'The celerity and precision with which the large reinforcements ordered from India and from home were conveyed to Natal was very satisfactory.

'During this year great changes have been made in the organisation of the Army. The most important of these as affecting the Infantry generally have been:—

'1. The increase in the service with the colours of the men from six to seven years, and when on foreign service, to eight years.

'2. The increase in the pay and position of the non-commissioned officers.

'3. The conversion of linked Battalions into double-battalion Regiments.

'4. The increase in the establishments of the Battalions first for foreign service at home, and in those serving in the Colonies.

'The *first* will, I am convinced, give a great increase to the stability of the efficiency of our Battalions, particularly those on foreign service.

'The *second*, the increase in the pay and position of the non-commissioned officers, I regard with unqualified satisfaction.

'In regard to the *third*, I trust it may be found that the *esprit de corps* of the old Battalions now fused into new Regiments has not been thereby destroyed, or at least seriously weakened. Its advantage in the economical maintenance during peace—and so long as the even balance of the home and foreign establishment is undisturbed—of our foreign Battalions, is alone in its favour.

'In regard to the *last*, the increase of the establishment of the twelve Battalions first for foreign service (to 950 rank and file each), and the graduated increase of the next eight (four at 850, and four at 650 rank and file) will, when it gets into working order, be a great gain. But I regret that it has, for economical reasons, been found necessary to place so many as forty-three of the last-returned Battalions upon the inefficient establishment of 480 rank and file.

'The present year has been a very trying one for the new system thus introduced.

'In South Africa we have been obliged to maintain a force of twelve Infantry Battalions and four Cavalry Regiments, in place of the usual peace establishment of four Battalions, to meet the very possible contingency of a renewal of the Boer War. And in Ireland we have been obliged to accumulate two Guard and twenty-four Line Battalions with seven Cavalry Regiments, all requiring as far as possible to be kept ready for prompt action in aid of the Civil Power either in the great towns or in flying columns of all arms in the country.

'The normal state of matters has thus been entirely subverted, and a great strain thrown upon the new system, with

an effect which is just now very apparent in the state as regards efficiency of the Battalions first for foreign service.

'Taking the seven senior Battalions on the 950 rank and file establishment, the general result is that out of 6808 men present with the Colours in these Battalions, only 3921 are efficient soldiers; and were they required for service on a small war where the Reserves were not called out, at merely the Indian establishment of 820 rank and file, they would need 1305 additional men, all of whom would have to be obtained by calling for volunteers from the home Battalions on the low establishments, as recruits in this case would be of no use.

'Nor does this even represent the full state of the case, for when it was required to raise the five junior Battalions now on the 950 establishment to that nominal strength, it became necessary, owing mainly to the absence (in South Africa) of four of the home Battalions on the intermediate establishments, to take them up at one bound from the lower establishments.

'Thus one had to be raised from the 650, and the other four from the 500 rank and file establishments—that is, the first required at once 300, and the other four 450 recruits each.

'The result on the efficiency of the Battalions is painfully apparent from the following table:—

No.	Regiment.	No. with the Colours on 1 Nov.	No. excluding those under 12 months' service.	Present Establishment.	Establishment from which raised.
8	Royal Munster Fusiliers, 2nd Battn.,	570	406	950	650
9	Essex, 2nd Battalion,	479	292	950	500
10	East Surrey, 1st. Bn.,	521	425	950	500
11	Royal Irish, 2nd. Bn ,	427	396	950	500
12	Royal Sussex, 2nd Bn.,	531	208	950	500
		2528	1727	4750	—

'This shows that the five last Battalions on the 950 establishment, instead of having 4750 men present with the

Colours, have now (1 November) only 2528, and that out of these only 1727 are really efficient soldiers.

'This unsatisfactory state of things is, it is to be hoped, however, owing only to temporary causes, and will in time, should peace continue, work itself straight.

'Four Battalions in each year are to be raised from the 500 establishment to the 650, four from the 650 to the 850, and four from the 850 to the 950.

'But as there are twelve on the 950 strength, and four only are in future to go abroad as reliefs each year, each Battalion on the 950 establishment will remain for nearly three years at that strength before being called upon to embark.

'The steps by which the Battalions are thus raised from the lowest to the highest establishment being moderate in amount and with a year between each, and when once the highest is gained three years being given to consolidate before embarkation, the four at the top of the list should always be in a good and efficient condition, and quite able to go abroad at the Indian or Colonial establishment of effective men—making all allowance for casualties.

'But it must be borne in mind that this state of matters will only continue so long as

'(1) No more than four Battalions are annually called for; and

'(2) The exact balance between the number of Battalions at home and abroad is preserved unimpaired.

'To make this clear, if four Battalions are suddenly called for, for a small war, *in addition* to the regular four prepared for the reliefs:—

'1. Eight Battalions must be taken from those on the 950 establishment; but only four can be raised up through the regular annual steps of 650 and 850 to replace them on that establishment. Consequently four out of the eight who have to replace (on the 950 establishment) the eight going abroad will need to be raised at one bound from 500 to 950—that is, they will require an addition of 450 men to each at once. What the result of this is, the carrying out of this measure this year has decisively proved.

'It is assumed in the above that on the outbreak of any war at all likely to become serious, steps would be taken to immediately replace, on the highest establishment, the Battalions sent abroad—otherwise the country would remain without any Battalions in excess of those required for the usual reliefs, ready at once to reinforce the army in the field.

'2. But the even balance of Battalions at home and abroad required for the smooth and effective working of the two-battalion system being thus upset, each of the four Regiments from which the four last Battalions have been taken can have no other Battalion from which to draw trained and somewhat seasoned soldiers. It has nothing but the *Dépôt*

to look to, and it can furnish only raw untrained recruits. Half, therefore, of these Battalions must of necessity be composed of newly-enlisted lads, unfit for a year, at the very least, and really, when thrown in in such a large proportion, unfit for two years to come to be brought into the field.

'Should this seem to be too great a risk to run, then the only other possible resource is the call for volunteers from the already attenuated low-establishment Battalions — the most improvident and fatal step which can be taken.

'It may perhaps be said that this evil might be diminished by raising the four Battalions remaining on the 650 establishment to the 950, and replacing them from below. But this would still leave 300 recruits to be added to each of the four at one step, and would, besides, by sweeping away *all* the Battalions between 500 and 950, make the matter in the end worse.

'I have thought it necessary to enter fully into this subject because, when an exceptional number of Battalions has to be sent abroad, and the result above pointed out takes place, the public prints are full of attacks upon the military department of the Army for not fairly and with goodwill carrying out the established system; whereas this state of matters is the inevitable, direct, and necessary consequence of any exceptional call from abroad for Battalions under the existing system.

'And this leads me to remark upon what seem to be the two practically weak points in that system, viz.—

'1. The want of elasticity to meet the case of any number of Battalions above four being sent abroad in any one year;

'2. Its want of any self-acting machinery to provide for the drilling of recruits and training of young soldiers in double-battalion Regiments, when both their Battalions are abroad.

'The *first* of these would be greatly diminished were an addition made to each of the *intermediate* links on the graduated scale.

'If instead of four there were eight Battalions upon both the 650 and 850 establishments, the result would be that in ordinary years Battalions would remain for two, not one, year upon each. They would thus be two years at 650, two at 850, and three at 950 before being called upon to embark.

'It is impossible to overrate the importance of the consolidation in each successive step which this change would give.

'What prevents this, when the steps are rapid, is the heavy call upon a home Battalion in having at once to keep up its own numbers and to feed its foreign Battalion.

'As I pointed out in my last annual memorandum, a Battalion of 820 rank and file requires 127 recruits annually to keep it up to that strength.

'But having a Battalion abroad, it requires to send to it

FROM MR. CHILDERS.

‘117 PICCADILLY, 14 *December* 1882.

‘. . . I hope, Sir, to see you to-morrow; but it is possible that I may have to go to Windsor in the afternoon. I am to be Chancellor of the Exchequer, but no other appointment is yet settled. I shall leave the War Office with many very sincere regrets, especially in bringing to a close the official relations in which Your Royal Highness has honoured me with so much confidence.’

FROM MR. CHILDERS.

‘117 PICCADILLY, 17 *December* 1882.

‘Will Y.R.H. do me the honour to accept a photograph of myself, as a souvenir of my work with you at the War Office?’

TO MR. CHILDERS.¹

‘GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 18 *December* 1882.

‘I am intensely gratified by your amiable thought in sending me your photograph, which is excellent, and which I greatly prize, as also the very nice note accompanying it. Rest assured that my feelings are in entire accord with your own as regards the amicable relations so happily subsisting between us. Had you been in England, I should have asked you to accept a photo. of myself as a little memento of the period when we were brought together in close official connection. As it is, I will get one framed for your return, which I should like to know occupies a place on your writing-table. I hope your health and strength may be entirely restored to you by your foreign trip, and with kindest regards to Mrs. Childers . . .’

¹ *The Life and Correspondence of the Right Hon. Hugh C. E. Childers*, by Lieutenant-Colonel Spencer Childers, vol. ii, p. 145.

CHAPTER XXIX

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION—1882

Critical State of Egypt in 1882. Riot in Alexandria. Reluctance to take action. Massacre at Alexandria and Bombardment by British Fleet. Tentative attitude at first adopted. Decision to send Expedition under Sir Garnet Wolseley. Duke of Connaught to command a Brigade. The Prince of Wales volunteers for service. Illness of Sir Garnet Wolseley. H.R.H.'s Diary of the Campaign. Draft of arrangements between Sir Garnet Wolseley and Sir Beauchamp Seymour. Sir Garnet's Letters telling story of Campaign. Secrecy as to real objective. Sir Garnet determines to strike a blow which will at once finish Campaign. Victory of Tel-el-Kebir. Her Majesty's and H.R.H.'s congratulations. Duke of Connaught's tribute to Sir Garnet. Settlement of Egypt and creation of Egyptian Army.

IN the spring of 1882 the situation in Egypt gave rise to serious anxiety.

Under the rule of the Khedive Ismail, the financial condition of the country had become much embarrassed; and in 1875, whilst realising his assets, the Khedive disposed of his Suez Canal shares to the British Government. England consequently began to take more interest in Egyptian affairs, and a commission was sent to make inquiries, with the outcome that Egypt gradually came more and more under European control, and English and French Ministers served in the Cabinet. Ismail, however, attempted to get rid of these irksome checks on his power by means of a revolt which he had secretly instigated; upon which England and France determined to depose him by means of his suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey. Accordingly, in June 1879 the latter removed Ismail in favour of his son, Tewfik.

But as the country was still in a disturbed state, England and France re-established the Dual Control, which lasted for two years. Discontent and mutiny, however, were rife; and

Arabi Pacha, a native officer, came to the fore as the leader of the party which professed its intention of saving Egypt from the control of Turkey and Europe. The existing Government was too weak to suppress the disorder; and so was obliged to compromise with Arabi, who accordingly became a member of the Government. In May 1882 a riot in Alexandria brought the English and French fleets on the spot; but the French Government at the last moment refused to take part in operations which were clearly inevitable, and in consequence France, as regards exercising control over Egypt, placed herself out of court.

It had now become evident that nothing short of external pressure from the Powers exercising the Dual Control over Egypt, viz. France and England, would restore affairs to their normal condition. Despite this, the statesmen of both countries concerned continued their efforts to avoid taking any action.

So late as 13 May, Mr. Childers wrote to the Duke that 'no military action has been decided upon either by us or by France. I shall be able to tell you, Sir, more when I see you.' Though it was perfectly clear to all the world that serious troubles were brewing, and that these must inevitably land us in hostilities in Egypt, Mr. Gladstone declared that he was unaware of anything which demanded military preparations.

On 11 June came the long-expected explosion, in the form of the Massacre at Alexandria. This, at least, it was impossible to ignore, and in consequence the Government tardily decided to take steps to protect our vast interests in Egypt.

Even then, however, it will be noted that the Government feared that if they took any such step 'another outburst of violence might take place.'

FROM MR. CHILDERS.

'117 PICCADILLY, 16 *June* 1882.

'The Cabinet met yesterday evening about Egypt; and one of the matters which was discussed was the propriety of making some preparation for the possible contingency of

having to send a British Force *via* the Mediterranean to Egypt. The fear, however, is that, if it oozed out that any preparations were being made, another outbreak of violence might take place; and this is at the present moment apprehended, as the consequence of the dispatch of the Channel Fleet from Gibraltar. But it was my intention to-day to make some most confidential inquiries as to the steps which would have to be taken should Government decide to send any troops; and if Y.R.H. could be at the War Office at one (the House meets at two, and I have several questions to answer) we could make some inquiries. They should be of the most secret character, but I will warn Wolseley and Adye.'

After much time had been wasted in deliberation, in vacillation, and abortive negotiations with the Khedive and the Porte, came the news of the bombardment of Alexandria on 11 July.

War was now of course inevitable; but the operations contemplated by the Government were at first only with a view to safeguard the Suez Canal—an idea of making war by compartments, and with the passive assent of the enemy, against which the Duke at once entered a strong protest.

TO MR. CHILDERS.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE,
13 July 1882.

'From what I hear from Sir Garnet Wolseley, it is intended to hold a meeting at twelve to-morrow, to discuss with the Admiralty officials the propriety of some plan, by which Ismailia and the Suez Canal are to be held by the Fleet and the two Battalions at present awaiting orders at Cyprus, together with all available men that could be landed from the Fleet. As I have not heard the full details of such an operation, I am, of course, unable to give any very decided opinion upon it; but after conferring with the Adjutant-General, I am most decidedly of the opinion, as is Sir Garnet Wolseley, that such an operation, unless immediately backed up by a body of troops amounting at least to 15,000 men, would be not only most hazardous, but really quite unjustifiable, by all the rules of war. The moment our troops take up a position on shore, such operation can only be looked upon as one of direct hostility, and we must be prepared to meet it as such, even though the object of the Government may only amount to the protection and keeping open of the Suez Canal. That is the view which we, as a Government or nation, may be disposed to take of it; but other countries, especially the

country most interested, which would be Egypt, would certainly form a very different opinion, and for this it is absolutely necessary to be in all respects prepared. To my mind, therefore, and speaking in a military sense, I feel assured that we ought not to be a party to such a proposal, and I can advise no other course to be adopted than that originally contemplated, the occupation of Port Said and Ismailia by the small force suggested, and Suez, to be instantly followed by large reinforcements, to bring up the Army in the field to at least 15,000 men from Home and the Mediterranean, and 5000 men from the side of Suez and India. I think it best that I should at once communicate to you this my opinion, so as to prepare you for what the Adjutant-General and myself will, at the meeting to take place to-morrow, say.'

Finally an expedition of a complete force of all arms, of the strength mentioned by the Duke above, was decided upon; and H.R.H. and Mr. Childers were soon busily occupied in making arrangements for the same.

FROM MR. CHILDERS.

'10 DOWNING STREET,
WHITEHALL, 20 *July* 1882.

'The Cabinet have approved of all we propose, and of Sir Garnet Wolseley being recommended to the Queen for the Chief Command, and Sir John Adye for the office of Chief of the Staff, with a dormant Commission. . . .'

The news of the expedition being decided upon naturally caused the greatest stir in the country and in the Army, and innumerable applications were received from officers to be permitted to volunteer for the service.

H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught was appointed to the command of the Brigade of Guards; but it is not generally known that His Majesty the King, then Prince of Wales, was among those who strove to be permitted to take part in the coming campaign.

The Duke of Cambridge duly forwarded the Prince's application, albeit he did not urge its acceptance, and among his papers is the following letter:—

FROM LORD GRANVILLE.

'18 CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,
30 July 1882.

'I have to thank Y.R.H. for your note.

'It is highly creditable to the pluck and spirit of the Prince to wish to run the risks both to health and to life, which the campaign offers, but it is clearly undesirable that H.R.H. should go.

'This is one of the penalties which attach to his high position.'

At this critical period, Sir Garnet Wolseley, whose services were in such imperative demand, was seriously unwell in London with an attack of fever. Hence the following:—

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'6 HILL STREET,
Tuesday, 1 August 1882.

'I have had Jenner and Paget to report upon my body, and both say I must not think of going overland by Brindisi next Friday. Both, however, agree to my embarking to-morrow to go to Alexandria by sea. If Y.R.H. has no objection to this arrangement, I propose to embark in the *Calabria* to-morrow. I am told I shall be at Alexandria within about twenty-fours of H.M.S. *Salamis*.

'When I go on board, I am to be locked up in my cabin to prevent people from talking to me, as both Jenner and Paget have forbidden my seeing any one before I start. Assuming Y.R.H. has no objection to this arrangement, I must ask you, Sir, to accept this badly written scrawl as my farewell. When I am in a better condition for writing, I shall write fully, thanking Y.R.H. for all the consideration shown to me and for the gracious kindness I have met with. I intend concealing my departure until I have actually left, so as to avoid the visits of those whom the doctors forbid me to see.'

At this point it is desirable to present the diary which the Duke kept on the events of the campaign, the story of which is subsequently told by the letters which passed between him and Sir Garnet Wolseley.

H.R.H.'S DIARY OF THE WAR IN EGYPT, 1882.

'After lengthened negotiations and delays with the Government of Egypt under the Khedive, Tewfik Pacha, the combined Fleets of England and France proceeded to Alexandria

to demand that Arabi Pacha, the head of the military party in revolt against the Khedive, should be removed from his post as Minister of War, and in fact Prime Minister, and should be compelled to leave the country. This he refused to do, and raising the spirit of religious fanaticism amongst the Arabs, he brought about, on 11 June 1882, the massacre of the Christians in Alexandria. Reparation for this fresh insult was demanded by our Admiral but refused, and a Conference was assembled at Constantinople to try and adjust the difficulty that had arisen between the contending parties. Meanwhile Dervish Pacha, sent by the Porte to endeavour to calm the spirit of insubordination among the people generally and the Army in particular, failed completely in his special mission, and large and heavy batteries being erected all bearing on the roadstead of Alexandria, Sir Beauchamp Seymour got permission from the Home Government to bombard the works, bearing on the Fleet in harbour. No notice having been received in reply, the bombardment commenced on 11 July, and speedily the guns of all the principal works were silenced with but slight loss or damage to the Fleet, and the entire Garrison, headed by Arabi himself, retired out of the works and took up a hostile position outside Alexandria, at Kafr Dowr. The town of Alexandria was partially destroyed by fire and pillaged by order of Arabi, and the Khedive himself was rescued with the greatest difficulty, but reached Ramleh in safety, and placed himself under the protection of the British Admiral. The French had meanwhile entirely withdrawn from all active co-operation, and their Fleet was removed from Egyptian waters, even from Port Said, where it had at first proceeded on leaving Alexandria. Singular as this change of policy certainly was, it gave us the advantage undoubtedly of acting entirely for ourselves, all the more so as the Sultan also refused to enter into any connection with us for military assistance, though we constantly pressed him to join in the enterprise for the restoration of order.

‘Just before the bombardment took place, four Regiments—the 3rd Battalion 60th and 38th from Malta, were sent on with a Garrison Battery and a Company of Engineers to Cyprus to be at hand to support the Fleet if required, and the 46th and 49th were pushed on to Malta from Gibraltar to replace them. Major-General Sir Archibald Alison was sent direct to Cyprus to take charge of these troops. Hearing of the bombardment, he proceeded at once with the two first Battalions named to Alexandria, and on the arrival of these troops they, in conjunction with a large body of Sailors and Marines from the Fleet, were landed in order to protect the Khedive, and to protect the town from danger and pillage both from without and within. The 46th and 49th were also sent on at once from Malta to reinforce him. The Garrisons of Gibraltar and Malta were filled up by an equal number of younger Bat-

talions from England. Alison performed his duties under very trying circumstances with great prudence and discretion. He narrowly watched the proceedings of the enemy, but did not attempt to force the works which Arabi was daily strengthening, but contented himself with some skirmishes brought about with the view of obtaining a clear insight into all that was going on. The preparations for sending out a *Corps d'Armée* from home under General Sir Garnet Wolseley, and Sir John Adye as Chief of the Staff, were decided upon; a vote of credit was granted by Parliament, and an Order in Council was issued calling out about 11,600 men of the 1st Class Army Reserve, who came forward with alacrity, though unprepared in large numbers, showing that thus far the new system was decidedly successful. Two Divisions were now formed, the 1st to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Willis, with the Duke of Connaught and Major-General Graham as Brigadiers under him, the former having the command of a Brigade of Guards; and the 2nd Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hamley, with Sir Archibald Alison and Sir Evelyn Wood as his Brigadiers, the former having charge of a Highland Brigade. Major-General Drury Lowe was placed in command of the Cavalry, a combined Household Cavalry Regiment under Colonel Ewart, 2nd Life Guards, 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards, and 19th Hussars. Colonel Goodenough was sent out as Brigadier of Artillery, with two Horse and six Field Batteries; Colonel Nugent as Brigadier of Engineers, with several Companies of that corps; Colonel Dormer was appointed Deputy Adjutant-and-Quartermaster-General, to assist Chief of the Staff. The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, 2nd Coldstream, and 1st Scots Guards formed the Guards Brigade; the 1st, 18th, 35th, 38th, 46th, 49th, 84th, 87th, 3rd 60th, and a Battalion of Blue and another of Red Marines formed the two Infantry Brigades; the 42nd, 74th, 75th, 79th, the Highland Brigade; the 95th and 96th forming the Garrison of Alexandria, under General Harman. An Indian Contingent was also formed under Sir H. Macpherson, with Brigadier Wilkinson to command the Native Cavalry, 2nd, 6th, and 18th Bengal; and the Infantry, 72nd, 63rd, with 7th and 20th Bengal, and 29th Bombay Native Infantry, under Brigadier Tanner. The troops direct from England began to embark on August 1, Sir Garnet Wolseley going by long sea on August 3, Sir John Adye preceding him.

'After the arrival of the latter on August 10, and the former on the 15th, preparations were at once made for an advance upon Cairo, after seizing and holding the Suez Canal by the Fleet, now largely reinforced by the Channel Fleet under Admiral Dowell, the Flying Squadron under Admiral Sullivan, and a portion of the East India Squadron under Admiral Sir M. Hewett, who occupied Suez on 2 August, and thus enabled the Indian Contingent to enter the Canal with-

out opposition, whilst Admiral Hoskins occupied Port Said and Ismailia on 20 August. The landing of the troops at Ismailia commenced the following day, 21st, and the first Division having completed this operation on the 22nd, on the 24th the advanced guard was pushed on to Magfar and Mahuta, General Graham's Brigade being in advance. The Cavalry had meanwhile also landed, and had gone on to Kassassin under Lowe and Graham; having been sharply attacked on the 28th, the Cavalry were brought up late in the evening and made a splendid charge in the dark, routing the Egyptians completely, and with considerable slaughter.

'On 13 September Wolseley attacked Arabi's very strong position at *Tel-el-Kebir* with his whole force, after a night march, at break of day, carried all the Egyptian entrenchments, and routed Arabi's Army completely. The Highland Brigade under Alison was the first to come in contact with the enemy and suffered most severely; but otherwise our loss was much less heavy than might have been expected from the strength of the position and the large force that defended it. The works carried, the railroad with stores and supplies of all descriptions fell into our hands, and the Cavalry under Drury Lowe having been at once pushed on, entered Cairo on the 14th, taking Arabi, and completely finishing the destruction of his rebellious forces. This virtually brought the campaign to an end, our Army from thenceforth becoming an Army of Occupation under the command of Alison, Wolseley returning as Adjutant-General to the Horse Guards, and the force being gradually very considerably reduced. Cairo and Alexandria alone were occupied by our troops; and later on, Alison becoming very unwell, Lieutenant-General Stephenson was sent on to take the command, with Dormer as his Chief of the Staff.'

During Sir Garnet's outward voyage, the Duke wrote to him as follows:—

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 10 August 1882.

'... You got my message, I know, at Gibraltar through Lord Napier, who has telegraphed to me to say that *Calabria* had passed the Rock, that he had seen you, and that you were quite recovered and in excellent spirits, which I was delighted to find was the case. It was most fortunate that you decided upon going by long sea, as I feel assured that the rest and quiet on board was a far better preparation for the hard work you are likely to have to go through than the rapid and heated journey overland. . . . I have all along had the firmest conviction that there should be no military advance on the Canal, by which I mean a landing at Ismailia

till there was a sufficient force assembled to strike a really effective blow and at once advance to the front; at all events for the troops thus landed to be able to take up and hold a position sufficiently forward—not to be exposed to the heat of the fifteen-mile desert between Ismailia and the portions which fringe the railroad in the direction of Cairo. I am in hopes that this may yet be the upshot of the deliberations now taking place at Alexandria between Beauchamp Seymour and Adye; of which as yet we have not heard the result.'

Sir Garnet arrived at Alexandria on 16 August, and at once had an interview with the British Admiral, Sir Beauchamp Seymour (afterwards Lord Alcester), at which the scheme embodied in the following memorandum for secretly transferring the base of operations from Alexandria to Ismailia was arranged.

ROUGH DRAFT OF ARRANGEMENTS AGREED TO AT A MEETING
BETWEEN SIR B. SEYMOUR AND SIR G. WOLSELEY, 16
AUGUST 1882, FOR THE OCCUPATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL
AND FOR SEIZING ISMAILIA.

'All the transports carrying the troops to be employed in this operation will leave the harbour of Alexandria on Friday, 18th, and early on Saturday, 19th, and will rendezvous outside: the Fleet will do the same.

'Khedive and every one here and with the Army and Navy to be told we are to bombard the Forts at Aboukir, and land there for the purpose of taking Arabi in flank from that direction. Fleet and transports (with the exceptions noted below) to anchor at 4 P.M. on Saturday in Aboukir Bay to make a demonstration as with the intention of landing.

'When the Fleet leaves the rendezvous outside the harbour of Alexandria, H.M.S. *Helicon* and *Salamis*, and the transports carrying the 2nd Brigade, will proceed to sea, and when out of sight of land will turn towards Port Said, so as to reach that place before daybreak on Sunday morning.

'As soon as it becomes dark on Saturday evening the remaining transports will weigh and sail for Port Said, to reach there as soon as possible after daybreak, each vessel to go individually as fast as possible, and to enter the Canal at once upon arrival.

'On Sunday morning Admiral Hoskins will occupy Port Said and take possession of both telegraph stations there, allowing no message to be sent on any pretence along either line.

‘He will then occupy Kantara, and will cut the telegraph to Syria.

‘Captain FitzRoy will seize Ismailia and its telegraph-office at daybreak on Sunday morning, also the waste weir there; and Admiral Hoskins will arrange for seizing all dredging machines, etc., that might possibly interfere with traffic through Canal if sunk by M. Lesseps.

‘Admiral Hewett will send on Seaforth Highlanders at daybreak on Sunday morning to Serapeum with fourteen days’ supplies, to seize the lock and railway station there, and fortify his position, assisted by the Navy, who will perhaps land a couple of guns there.

‘He will prevent all ships from entering the Canal on *Saturday*, with further orders, having previously taken possession of Canal telegraph.

‘Admiral Hoskins will arrange for stopping all ships from entering Canal at Port Said on Sunday until further orders.’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘ON BOARD THE “SALAMIS,”

ALEXANDRIA, 17 *August* 1882.

‘. . . I found everything quiet. Arabi has pushed forward his position to within long range of our advanced posts, and is working away, throwing up batteries and works, etc. etc. He evidently expects to be attacked here, for the lakes on both sides of him are drying up fast, and indeed we could even now attack him here with a tolerable certainty of success, but the game is not worth the candle; we should be merely attacking him at the end of his line of communication, along which he would retreat from one fortified position to another. Yesterday evening I inspected our outposts, and had a very good view of the enemy’s lines; and this afternoon I go out for another look at them. I could see numbers of men working at his batt, eteriesc. etc.

‘I have made my arrangement with Beauchamp Seymour for the occupation of the Canal, and the seizure of Ismailia next Sunday. The enclosed very rough draft gives a general outline of my proposed movement. The plan I drew out on board ship had to be greatly modified, as it was based on the assumption that the Indian Contingent would have been able to co-operate, and that the distance between Port Said and Ismailia could have been done in about six or seven hours. Now I find it cannot be done in safety in less than ten hours. I had written so far when I received news that the enemy has broken up his camp at Nefiche, near Ismailia. This may prevent me from having a satisfactory skirmish with Arabi’s people on Monday; it is very provoking, because I had hoped with the Household Cavalry to have been able to cut him off from his great position in rear at Tel-el-Kebir.

‘PS.—H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught very well: looks the picture of health, and seems to enjoy his work very much, and he does it very well.

‘He is as brown as Russian leather owing to his frequent rides in the sun.’

The preceding draft was sent by Sir Garnet to the Duke on the following day, accompanied by this letter. The story of the advance on Tel-el-Kebir and Cairo will be best followed by a perusal of the subsequent correspondence between H.R.H. and Sir Garnet Wolseley, in which many interesting sidelights are thrown on this memorable expedition:—

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘18 August 1882.

‘. . . We hear by telegraph that you are to commence serious operations to-morrow by bombarding and, I presume and hope, taking the Aboukir Forts; but I apprehend that this is the smallest part of the business to be undertaken, and that the main force will be taken by yourself into the Canal and up to Ismailia, to be there disembarked with a view to an advance upon Cairo. . . . Do not take on the strength any officers who go out on their *own account* in the hope of getting employed. All these sort of men should be sent home, and only those allowed to join who have my permission in the first instance, and who go out with it. . . .

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S OFFICE, 22 August 1882.

‘Just a line to say that I am glad to find that thus far your entry into the Suez Canal seems to have been so successful; and God grant it may so continue. I think it right just to warn you as to what your Staff Officers say to Correspondents. I think you are *very wise* and *right* in giving out generally that you were going to attack Aboukir, whilst your real point was Port Said and the Canal; but I don’t know if it was quite judicious of the Staff Officer to assemble the Correspondents and by authority tell them this; I would not have told them anything; but if they proposed to telegraph something you did not wish known, I would have desired them to omit this from the telegram. It is a different thing to give out that you are going to do something you do not propose to do, and to give out information by *authority* which it is not intended to carry out; I only name this to you as it strikes me, and it has been taken up by the Press. . . .’

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'LONDON, 25 August 1882.

'... I am satisfied that you have decided very wisely in making the Suez Canal your base of operations towards Cairo, which is of course your objective point, and not having attempted to attack Arabi in his lines before Alexandria—that would have been a very tough job—and though I make no doubt it would have succeeded, still you must have lost a great many men in the effort, and the injury inflicted on the enemy would have been less damaging, than your getting behind his main force from the side of Ismailia and thus forcing him to abandon the strong position he had taken up, and which I presume he will now be compelled to abandon in order to reinforce the other position he has got at Tel-el-Kebir. I quite agree with you in the regret you feel in not having been enabled to cut Arabi off from this position; but I always thought you would have great difficulty in doing so, as he has the railroad at his command, whereas you have to go by sea to Port Said, and then to disembark the whole of your force at Ismailia, which must at best be a long operation. . . .'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'ISMAILIA, 28 August 1882.

'... In going round the wounded the other day, I asked a Life Guardsman who had a nasty sabre cut over his right arm how he came by it? He said in their first charge on the 24th inst., he found himself in broken ground separated from his troop, when a man on foot shot his horse, and then came at him with a sword, with which, as he was getting up, the Egyptian cut him over his guard across the arm. "Well," I said, "and what became of your friend?" He replied without moving a muscle, "I cut him in two, sir." In several instances these great giants with their heavy swords cut men from the head to the waistbelt. . . .'

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'ISMAILIA, 1 September 1882.

'... I want my next move to be a final one, so as to avoid any more of these little engagements that lead to nothing decisive. We shall have a very very hard nut to crack at Tel-el-Kebir, as the enemy are hard at work upon a line of entrenchments running from thence to Karaim, about five miles to the north-west of that place; he has extended his left out this distance to prevent my turning it, as I did on the 25th inst., when he had to bolt, leaving his camp, etc. etc., in my hands. Until I have thoroughly recon-

noitred his position, I cannot say by which flank I shall turn him. If I have a good fight, and its results are such as those which I consider probable, our Cavalry will probably go to Belbeis, and some of our Infantry to Zagazig. My object will naturally be to cut him off from Cairo. I have just answered a telegram from Mr. Childers saying I should very much like to have three extra Battalions for garrison work at Alexandria, as I really want Wood's Brigade here. My expenditure in Cavalry horses has also been considerable, and I am sadly in want of horses for the Mounted Infantry. Upon this small handful of men has really devolved the hardest work and most serious fighting—and such fellows as they are! Believe me, Sir, there is nothing like volunteers; one company composed of volunteers under carefully selected officers is worth two ordinary companies; the more I see of war, the more I am convinced of this. These men of the Household Cavalry are teaching me a lesson, and that is, that it would pay us well as a nation to obtain men of a better stamp for our Army than those we now enlist, by offering double the pay we now give. The system of paying the soldiers badly gives us the lowest stamp of men for our ordinary Regiments, whilst this Household Cavalry have such good men that crime is unknown amongst them. . . .

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'ISMAILIA, 7 September 1882.

'... I have now seven locomotives at work, and the army in front is consequently well supplied, and the foundations of a Reserve Dépôt have been laid down. I am consequently about to bid farewell to Ismailia and form my camp at Kassassin on Saturday—the day after to-morrow. Every one will be in motion for the front at the same time, and by the time I have pushed my reconnaissances sufficiently well home and made my first plans, all will be concentrated and ready for an advance upon the enemy on Tuesday or Wednesday week (the 12th or 13th inst.) as the date of our "grand event," and I hope to keep my appointment if I do not forestall it. Arabi has about 30,000 regular troops at Tel-el-Kebir, besides an unknown number of Bedouins: but of these regular troops many are old men recalled to serve after many many years passed in civil life. who know nothing about rifles or any sort of new drill. We have taken some of these poor old creatures prisoners, and they can be of no use to Arabi whatever. In guns, I am not yet certain of his strength: some weeks ago he had only 36, but I am inclined to think he will now have over 60, perhaps 72. If he has not any large guns in position I don't mind; but if he has heavy guns in his works, I shall rush them at night. I have not yet told any one here this, but I have made up my mind that it is

best to do this with my inferior numbers: to attack a battery of large guns entrenched by daylight would entail a very heavy loss. I calculate that I shall take into action between 11,000 and 11,500 infantry, 2500 sabres, and 60 guns. If he were only out in the open, I should only laugh at his numbers; but then he has been for months past entrenching this position of Tel-el-Kebir, and he knows every inch of the ground, as it used to be at one time the place where the annual manœuvres took place. My troops, man for man, are equal and quite equal to ten times their own number of Egyptians, so notwithstanding advantage in position, etc. etc., I have no doubt whatever of the result. An old billiard-master who taught me to play billiards used to impress upon me never to play for any stroke I was not prepared to bet 6 to 5 on being able to accomplish, and I should say the betting was much more than that now in our favour. I never saw troops in better spirits, or looking better or healthier. The percentage of sick to-day was 2·9, which is about one-half what it is in England, and the climate is daily improving. To please the Navy I am taking a Naval Brigade with me: Sir Beauchamp Seymour and all under him have been helping us so cordially that I thought Your Royal Highness would like me to ask for their services.

‘Long before this can reach England the result of our attack will be known at home, so I feel like a sort of Rip Van Winkle in writing what I have.

‘PS.—The military representatives of Foreign Powers are now beginning to put in an appearance.’

The following telegrams announcing the victory of Tel-el-Kebir, and some of the congratulations which the Duke received, are here given:—

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

‘WAR OFFICE, 3.45 P.M., 13 September 1882.

Following telegram received from Sir Garnet Wolseley:—“Ismailia, 13 September. Struck camp at Kassassin yesterday evening after having bivouacked on the high ridge above camp till 1.30 this morning, then advanced upon the very extensive and very strongly fortified position held by Arabi with 20,000 regulars, of which 2500 cavalry with 70 guns and 6000 Bedouins and irregulars; my force was about 11,000 bayonets, 2000 sabres, and 60 guns. To have attacked as strong a position by daylight with the troops I could place in line would have entailed very great loss. I resolved therefore to attack before daybreak, doing the six miles that intervened between my camp and the enemy’s position in the dark. The Cavalry and two Batteries Horse Artillery

on my right had orders to sweep round enemy's line at daylight. On left Cavalry, First Division, Second Brigade under General Graham leading, supported by Guards under Duke of Connaught on their left, 7 Batteries of Artillery, 42 guns in line with supporting Brigade, then the Second Division, Highland Brigade leading, Indian Contingent south of Canal, with Naval Brigade on railway at intervals. Great emulation evinced by Regiments to be first in the enemy's works. All went at them straight, the Royal Irish Regiment particularly distinguishing itself by its dash and the manner in which it closed with the enemy. All his works and camps now in our possession. I do not yet know how many guns have been captured, but it is a considerable number, several trains captured, immense supplies and stores, enemy ran away in thousands, throwing away their arms when overtaken by our Cavalry. Their loss has been very great. General Willis is very slightly wounded; Colonel Richardson, Duke of Cornwall's Regiment, severely wounded; of the Highland Light Infantry, Major Colville, Underwood, and Somerville killed, Lieutenant Edwards wounded; Colonel Stirling, Doctor Banning, Armourer-Sergeant Snelling of Coldstream wounded. Colonel Balfour wounded in the leg, and Colour-Sergeant Holmes killed in Grenadiers. Lieutenant McNeill, Black Watch, killed; Captains Coveny, Cumberland, and Fox wounded; Captain Hutton, A.D.C. to Sir A. Alison, wounded. Fuller particulars later on. Conduct of troops everything that could be wished. Cavalry now on march to Belbeis. Indian Contingent on its way to Zagazig, and will be followed this evening by Highland Brigade. Arabi escaped on horseback in direction of Zagazig, Rabad Pacha wounded in foot, and Ali Pacha Fehmi in arm in attack last Saturday. The Cameron Highlanders: Lieuts. Blackburn and Malcolm wounded, and Lieut. Macdonald, attached to same Regiment, also wounded. Canal has been cut in some places, railway intact."

TELEGRAM FROM THE QUEEN.

'BALMORAL, 2.30 P.M., 13 September 1882.

'Just heard from Wolseley. Tel-el-Kebir taken, forty guns, many prisoners. Arthur led Guards, who stormed most gallantly; is safe and well, thank God.'

TELEGRAM FROM THE QUEEN.

'BALMORAL, 12.5 P.M., 14 September 1882.

'Many thanks for kind telegram. We are indeed thankful for the glorious victory of yesterday, and at darling Arthur's safety; and that our loss seems comparatively not so heavy, though I deeply grieve for any loss, and fear some wounds may be very severe.'

TELEGRAM FROM THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I.

‘Loo, 7.38 P.M., 13 *September* 1882.

‘... My most heartfelt congratulations on the happy news of the victory of Tel-el-Kebir. Sincerely hoping that your brother-in-law, the Duke of Teck, has remained unhurt; my best compliments to your mother and to your sister Mary.’

TELEGRAM FROM MR. CHILDERS.

‘2.15 P.M., 15 *September*.

‘Following telegram received from Sir G. Wolseley:—“Cairo, 15 Sept.—Received here with open arms by all classes. There were about 10,000 soldiers here, who are laying down their arms and are gladly returning to their homes. Our Cavalry did extremely well in taking possession of Cairo by a very long forced march yesterday afternoon. I am arranging for the surrender of the troops, Kafr Dowr. Arabi and Toulba Pachas both prisoners in our guard-room here. The war in Egypt is over; send no more men from England; will now change my base from Ismailia to Alexandria. Health and spirits of troops excellent; all ranks worked hard and done their duty well. Midshipman De Chair is safe.”’

TELEGRAM FROM THE QUEEN.

‘BALMORAL, 10.50 A.M., 15 *September*.

‘... You will rejoice with me at the good news of Cairo being taken, and Arabi surrendered.’

TELEGRAM FROM THE EMPRESS AUGUSTA.

‘BABELSBERG, 3.20 P.M., 15 *September*.

‘... I wish to congratulate you on the brilliant victory of the brave English Army. You know the constant interest I take in the welfare of your country, and in everything that concerns you personally.’

TELEGRAM FROM MR. CHILDERS.

‘WAR OFFICE, 3.55 P.M., 15 *September*.

‘Many thanks. You may well, Sir, be proud of the Army which you have commanded with such distinction.’

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘15 *September* 1882.

‘Most heartily and warmly do I congratulate you on your great success of Wednesday, when the strong position of

Tel-el-Kebir was so gallantly stormed by the troops under your command. It seems to me that nothing could have been more admirable than the conduct of all arms and the able manner in which you conducted the operation, and in which it was carried out by the General and other officers under you; and even though the loss has been severe, it appears very small for the importance and strength of the position that had to be carried. This no doubt was chiefly due to your excellent arrangements.

'The silent preparations after dusk, the advance during the night, and the rush in the morning just before daybreak, was exactly the plan which was best adapted for dealing with the bulk in front; whilst your pushing on the Indian Contingent around their flank and on Zagazig, which Macpherson occupied during the afternoon, was a most happy thought, as putting the Native troops in the front line—not for attack, but for pursuit—the very thing for which in that climate they were most qualified.

'Believe me, my dear Wolseley, I am thoroughly delighted, and I know Her Majesty and all England share my feelings in this respect. I look upon the fighting part of the business as now nearly if not quite over, and all that will now have to be done is to occupy Cairo and all the important positions in the country, and then set to work to regulate the new order of things in such a manner as to have the Government in the hands of the Khedive, whilst the Power of Control in all things, and the management as well of the Suez Canal, rests with us.

'To this I consider we are fully entitled considering the exertions we have now made to maintain our influence in the country, and though doubtless other Powers will give us trouble and restrict our efforts in that direction, we have the right, and ought to have the will, to maintain the advantageous position we have, through your able direction of our Army, created for ourselves.

'Your letter of 1 September reached me. Your accounts of various incidents are most interesting, and I rejoice to think you have formed so high an opinion of the Household Cavalry, which I fully share with you, as you know; I fear, however, that the country never would stand the higher rate of pay for all our troops, which you suggest. As regards the Mounted Infantry, I quite share your views as to their great ability, but I would have a certain number of them volunteers belonging to every Regiment of Infantry, not Mounted Regiments of Infantry, which I think would be a mistake; for purposes of this kind I admit the advantage of selected men or volunteers, but for ordinary purposes an Army would be reduced in its spirit, and its general tone lowered, if you took them from general duties.

'An Army should be so composed and drilled, and the troops forming individual corps should be trained to

meet fully the requirements demanded of them. . . . This moment received your telegram that Lowe entered Cairo yesterday, and that you proceed to-day, and that Arabi and Toulba have surrendered, and 10,000 men laid down their arms.

‘Thank God for this happy result !

‘You will now have a difficult task before you in reorganising the country. You always said you would dine at Cairo on September 15, and singularly enough your prediction has proved to be correct to the *day*.

‘It is a well-earned triumph. . . .’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘ABDIN PALACE, 16 *September* 1882.

‘Before leaving England I fixed upon this date as that when our war here would be over; it was really over yesterday. The splendidly rapid advance of our Cavalry, for which I had all along been preparing, saved this city. Those who are best entitled to form an opinion here tell me that Arabi and his friends would very certainly have begun to burn the palace, etc., had not our Cavalry appeared on the afternoon of the 14th instant. When Your Royal Highness remembers that the Cavalry Division paraded at midnight on the 12th and 13th instant, and before our action of the 13th instant was over must have done from fifteen to sixteen miles, and yet got to Belbeis that same night, and marched into Cairo before 5 P.M. (about thirty-five miles) on the 14th, I think it will be admitted they did very well. Sixty-five miles over a deep country with no roads, was not bad. They would have been into Cairo earlier had it not been for their two batteries of Horse Artillery, which stuck everywhere, although I had given them extra horses, so that nearly every gun had eight or ten horses to drag it. Lowe has done very well; but he has first-rate men with him in Stewart and Baker Russell. Indeed, I cannot speak in too high terms of Stewart, and Lowe swears by him. I wish I knew of a few more like him. . . .

‘Macpherson from India is the best man here, quiet and determined, and knowing exactly what he wants himself and what is wanted of him. Graham is also very good, Alison the same, and after their recent experience of commanding in the field will both make good leaders. No Brigadier or General here looks after his men better than H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught: indeed, I might almost say as well as he does. No one could be keener for action, and all that saw him in action tell me he was cool, collected, and most forward, in fact everything that he should be, setting a princely example to all around him. Should it ever be again my good fortune to command troops in the

field, I should always like to have him with me, and, in my blunt way of putting it, that is the greatest praise I can ever bestow upon any one. Of course it is a source of anxiety having one of the Queen's sons with me: as the roar of musketry went rolling on to our right where the Guards were, the horrible thought that he might be killed came up before me, and my mind was greatly relieved when, upon crossing the enemy's works myself, I learnt that he had not been hit. Upon another occasion, now that he has been under fire and shown his aptitude for command, I should be less nervous about him. I can assure You, Sir, I had a very painful and anxious hour on H.R.H.'s account when we approached the enemy's lines in the dark on the morning of the 13th instant: no one knows, and few can perhaps appreciate, what I then felt.

'I hope Your Royal Highness will be kind enough to convey to the Queen what I have told Your Royal Highness about the Duke of Connaught. Were I to say what I have written in a letter to the Queen it might seem as if I wrote merely to give pleasure, but I have merely written what I think, and if Your Royal Highness approves, I should like very much to have my opinion—for what it may be worth—communicated to the Queen by the Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief.

'McNeill and Lane, who have been with the Duke of Connaught, have done their work right well. It is a great pity that McNeill has not a command, for there are not many like him to be found. Goodenough, C.R.A., has done very well: he had a splendid command during the action of forty-two guns all in one line; they formed my centre, and had I been repulsed, were to have been my stand-by to crush with their fire everything in front of them, whilst I reorganised the Infantry for a second attack. A night march—as Your Royal Highness knows—is a difficult operation, especially when it has to be followed up by a night attack which must be so accurately timed that it has to be delivered at the first streak of dawn; my front from right to left was about four miles, and, in a country without any landmarks to keep up the touch between the columns, was no easy matter: that it was successfully carried out, and that the two attacks were delivered in the nick of time, and just where I intended them to be made, reflects the highest credit upon the Generals and the Staff generally. The enemy, although completely surprised, fought better than I had anticipated; many of their bastions and batteries were literally filled with dead, bayoneted and shot where they stood: all along their line of entrenchment at about every three or four yards was a large box of ammunition, each containing about 1500 rounds. Poor Lieut. Rawson, my Naval A.D.C., was dangerously—I am afraid—mortally wounded in "steering" the Highland Brigade to the point selected for their attack; he has a good

knowledge of the stars, and had been very useful to me whenever I marched over the desert at night. At one moment the North Star was obscured by a cloud, and as all regimental officers are not good at finding their way about by the stars—which were our only guide—I felt a little nervous, especially as just before this, when I was with the Guards, I found their Brigade Major in error as to which was the Pole Star. . . .’

FROM H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT.

‘CAIRO, 20 September 1882.

‘DEAR UNCLE GEORGE,—I got your kind letter in answer to mine at Tel-el-Kebir after our big fight. I am sure you must have been as much surprised as we were at the total collapse of Arabi and his army after their tremendous defeat. The truth is, most of his men were heartily sick of it, and were only induced to fight by threats, promises, and lies. Wolseley deserves all credit for his night advance, which was most skilfully planned and most carefully carried out. It is no easy matter to march an army of 15,000 men across an entirely open desert without anything to guide you, and this by night, and for a distance of seven miles. It required such care to keep the touch between myself and the 2nd Brigade in front of me, that I was obliged to break a whole company up into files at twenty-five paces’ interval between the rear of the 2nd Brigade and my front; I had also files between my left and the Field Batteries, and between my half-battalion columns.

‘We kept our distance and direction so well that at dawn we found ourselves exactly in the right position, and exactly in front of that part of the entrenchment which we were to attack. The instant the enemy discerned us they opened a very heavy shell-fire upon us, soon accompanied by a tremendous fusillade of musketry; it was folly to halt under this heavy fire, and I only did so under a little ridge just long enough to form for attack.

‘I was only 800 yards on the right rear of the 2nd Brigade. I think the fact of knowing how steadily and closely they were supported by the Brigade of Guards very much conduced to the success of the 2nd Brigade. My Brigade were very steady under fire, especially as I did not allow them to fire a shot, considering the heavy fire we were under, and that the clouds of smoke entirely hid from our view those who were firing upon us. The men were very cool and, thank God, our losses very small, two N.C.O.’s killed, and two officers and thirty-five men wounded. The enemy’s losses were very heavy; their dead were positively piled up in some parts of the entrenchment. I don’t suppose that there has

ever been a night advance so successfully carried out and attended with such brilliant results.

'The Cavalry deserve all praise for their rapid and brilliant advance on Cairo after the battle, which alone saved it from massacre and fire. I can't tell you how glad I am that our short and very arduous campaign has been brought to so successful a termination. Arabi is now in my charge in a barred room in the Abdin Infantry Barracks. He looks thoroughly broken, and walks very slowly and with his head bent. He is a powerful-looking man, but much older than I expected: I have an officer's guard over him, and every precaution is taken. I have one half of my Brigade up at the Citadel, and two Battalions in the Abdin Barracks, which are very fine buildings, but so filthy that I have been obliged to encamp the Battalions. Cairo is very quiet, and I think that all but the very *fanatical* inhabitants rejoice in having us here, and are really grateful to us. I had hoped to have written to you oftener, but it was impossible. I was so often without a tent, and when one had one, the heat, flies, and sandstorms made it almost *impossible* to write a letter. We have often been through great hardships, and owing to the *enormous* difficulty of getting wheeled transport across the desert, we have several times had to go with little or no food. . . .

'The clothing supplied to the men—viz. red serges and blue serge trousers—was thoroughly inappropriate to this climate, and the men suffered terribly from the want of a cooler and more comfortable dress. Khaki is the only sensible fighting dress for our men, and had they been dressed in it like the troops from India, it would have been an inestimable boon to all. At the present moment the clothes of the troops from England are in such a state that you would be horrified to see them, whereas the troops from India look just as clean to-day as when they disembarked.

'I hope you will forgive the private and unbiassed opinion of one who only has the efficiency and well-being of the Army at heart. My opinions may not be worth much, but still I know that you like hearing things, and have always allowed me to tell you what I think. I have no notion how long we may be left out here yet, but I suppose that next month will see us in England. I am quite well, and have kept so all the time. I think in this climate the less you eat and drink the better, and one has certainly not been able to do much of either.—I remain, your very affectionate nephew
'ARTHUR.'

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'WAR OFFICE, September 21, 1882.

' . . . Great events have taken place since your letter was

written, and all England is full of joy and delight at your success, as I had the pleasure of telling you in my last letter. What I am now most anxious about is that you should not reduce your force in Egypt in a hurry: you may depend upon it no greater mistake could be made than this. The Khedive has disbanded his army; consequently our troops are the only acknowledged armed force in the country. Anything that is to be created must be formed under our auspices, and our redcoats ought to be made the visible emblem of our power in all the larger cities of the Delta; therefore retain the troops, they are healthy, the climate will daily become cooler and more healthy: thus everything is in favour of staying. The Queen thinks strongly in this sense, for she has communicated to me to this effect. The Government, I believe, take the same view. Possibly a portion of the Indian Contingent might be allowed to return home, but even in this respect I should not be in too great a hurry. The Queen, I believe, does not wish the Guards to come home too soon. The Household Cavalry Regiment, however, might be one of the first to move homewards. Their reception will, I think, be very enthusiastic and cordial from all classes. I quite agree with you as to your views regarding these splendid fellows. I wish we had more of them, but I am afraid we should have a difficulty in this respect. I quite think with you that a better class of men is a great advantage, but the country would never stand the expense on a large scale, and hence the difficulty. I am glad to be able to congratulate you on what I hear is proposed for you, as a most proper and fitting reward for the great services you have rendered on this occasion, in the shape of a Peerage. A Military Peerage as the result of a successful campaign is the highest honour a soldier can aspire to at the hands of his Sovereign. I rejoice that this is intended on the present occasion.

FROM SIR ARCHIBALD ALISON.

‘TANTAH,

EGYPT, 21 September 1882.

‘I cannot sufficiently express the gratification which I received from Your Royal Highness’s most gracious and kind letter of 28 August, which was put into my hand when I entered Arabi’s camp on the conclusion of the fight at Tel-el-Kebir. I am indeed most grateful for such an expression of opinion from Your Royal Highness in regard to my short command at Alexandria. As I know the deep interest which you, Sir, take in the steadiness and discipline of the troops, I will venture to mention one or two instances

which came under my personal observation during the night march on Tel-el-Kebir.

'Sir Garnet Wolseley's orders were that the night march was to be conducted in silence. During the five miles which it lasted, I never heard a sound save the slow measured tread of the men.

'At a halt the passing of the whispered word caused the centre to stop a good deal before the wings.

'When the march was resumed, this led to the wings converging inwards till they almost met. The moment this was perceived the Brigade was halted, the Company of direction accurately dressed, the Battalion of direction redressed upon it, the other Battalions brought back into line. Your Royal Highness knows what a difficult movement this is in daylight. It was executed in perfect order and silence in the darkness of a moonless night.

'Sir Garnet's orders were that when we got close to the entrenchments the men were to charge with a cheer, but not a shot was to be fired until the summit of the parapet was gained. When the enemy poured in their first volley we were about 150 paces from the parapet, the position of which we first knew from seeing the flash of their muskets. I ordered the bugler to sound; with a ringing cheer the men sprang forward, but not a shot was fired by us until the summit of the parapet was gained.

'I am afraid that the proportion of deaths amongst the wounded will be very great. This is caused by the close nature of the contest.

'From the time when the men threw themselves into the first ditch until the summit of the hill looking down on Arabi's camp was gained, we were never twenty yards from the enemy, who stood admirably.'

TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

'6 October 1882.

'... I have seen Lord Morley, who has been carrying on the business of the office during Childers's absence, and have heard from him all that has been agreed on as regards the return of the troops. To my mind the withdrawal seems to me to be much more *rapid* than I like. We cannot forget that Egypt is in a very critical internal condition, and that it must take time before matters settle down. The Khedive has *disbanded* his Army, the Police are either not extant or, as at present constituted, unreliable, and the natives seem to have great dislike both to the Khedive and to ourselves. Moreover, the number of disbanded soldiers with arms, and good ones too, in their hands is very large, and they may therefore give local troubles, which will have to be met by

some force, and the only available force now consists of our troops. Have you a sufficiency, particularly of Cavalry, to carry out such duties? I hope you may have, and as the question has been settled by the Government, I say no more; but I own I have my doubts and fears in this respect. Then, again, as regards yourself, I should greatly rejoice to see you home at the time you name; but here again I should say it would be running a very great risk for you to return at present. You are a very *important person*, and your opinion will carry great weight with all local or even home authorities. Sir Edward Walsh is a very able man; but he will have a hard task to perform if he has not some man of your weight by his side. I think you ought to wait and see Baker Pasha's scheme properly launched before coming away. This will, moreover, have the further advantage that it will meet the susceptibilities of the two Lieut.-Generals to return home. These will at once proceed home on the present organisation of the force being broken up. You would continue General in command and on the spot for some little time longer. On your departure you could then hand over the chief command to the senior officer present, Sir A. Alison, who no doubt would be a most efficient chief. I cannot help hoping that this may be the decision arrived at, and this is certainly what I should myself recommend on every account. Coming direct from seeing Her Majesty at Balmoral, I know she is very anxious that you should not return to England too hurriedly, as she fears complications may yet arise, which it will be very important for an officer in your high and influential position to deal with. . . .

FROM THE QUEEN.

'BALMORAL CASTLE, 10 October 1882.

'DEAR GEORGE,—As you gave me that gratifying report from Sir G. Wolseley, I think you will like to have his (Arthur's) account of his Chief, which is so *very* satisfactory, and which I have had copied for you. I shall be in England (D.V.) about 16 or 17 November: by which time the Guards will be back, and shall be most anxious to see and receive them and the Household Cavalry, and any of the other troops who return *as soon as possible after that*. Perhaps you will talk it over with Sir H. Ponsonby before he returns here on the 18th.

'Then there will be the Indian troops and the giving away of the medals, etc. All this should be at Windsor. Pray forbid *shaving* and too much *pipeclay*, etc., *before* I see them. I should like to see them *as they are*; I did after the Crimea.'

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT
TO THE QUEEN.‘KASR-EL-NOUZZA,
CAIRO, 26 September 1882.

‘I cannot thank you sufficiently for all your congratulations on the success at Tel-el-Kebir. The part I took in that very successful battle was a very small one; but I am glad that Sir Garnet was satisfied with the conduct of the Brigade. Here in Cairo they have been behaving uncommonly well, and have set a very good example to the remainder of the Army. Sir Garnet has been most kind to me all the time I have been under his orders, and I don’t wish to serve under a pleasanter chief, or one in whom I feel greater confidence. He is the least fussy General I have ever served under, and his orders are short and clear: he never interferes with one, and always gives one credit for what one does. Being Commandant of Cairo, and my Brigade being the only one quartered in the town, I am quite independent, and give whatever orders I like; and take my orders direct from Sir Garnet.’

FROM SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

‘6 HILL STREET, W.,
Sunday, 29 October 1882.

‘I brought home for Y.R.H. one of the three rifles that were taken in Arabi’s bedroom, which I hope, Sir, You will accept as a small souvenir of the late war. . . . Your Royal Highness was good enough to give me the choice of two dates to have the honour of dining at Gloucester House. With Y.R.H.’s kind permission, I should prefer Monday, 13 November. I hope to be at the Horse Guards on Wednesday next, the 1st instant.’

FROM SIR BEAUCHAMP SEYMOUR (LORD ALCESTER).

‘CORFU, 17 December 1882.

‘I beg to thank Your Royal Highness very sincerely for your kind letter, which reached me *via* Brindisi last evening. It is most pleasant to receive Your Royal Highness’s approbation of my endeavours to serve the country, and to assist, so far as lay in my power, the Service in which so many of the Seymours have endeavoured to do their duty. The results Your Royal Highness is so well acquainted with that I will say nothing more than that I shall never forget to my dying day the *camaraderie* which existed between the Army and Navy of all ranks during the Campaign so happily terminated. I have experienced more than kindness from

Wolseley and those under his command, and, as I think, they will know there is nothing in the world that I would not have done for them—that the Navy could do.

‘As Your Royal Highness is possibly aware, my period of command will finish in two months from now, and I shall be relieved by Lord John Hay. I have had a very good time of it indeed, and have reason to thank my stars that the late King sent me into the Navy. I shall do myself the honour of waiting on Your Royal Highness when I arrive in England.’

FROM THE QUEEN.

‘OSBORNE, 20 December 1882.

‘DEAR GEORGE,—Before I answer your letter of the 17th, let me say how much pleasure it would give me now if you would accept the office of Personal Aide-de-Camp to me, connecting it with the successful termination of the short and brilliant Egyptian Campaign, in the preparation and carrying out of which you did so much. . . .’

Before closing the subject of the Egyptian Campaign, some reference should be made to the creation, under the auspices of Sir Evelyn Wood, the first British Sirdar, of the Egyptian Army as it now exists. In such cases the great difficulty is always to make an effective start; though it is comparatively easy to carry on the work when once its initial difficulties have been overcome. Sir Evelyn Wood’s arrangements were exceptionally sound, and, in the main, they exist up to the present day. Thus it was he who created the machine, the organisation of which was subsequently developed by Lord Grenfell, the second Sirdar, and eventually wielded with the greatest effect as an almost perfect fighting force by the third Sirdar, Lord Kitchener. Lord Hartington succeeded Mr. Childers as Secretary of State for War on 16 December 1882, and he addressed these letters to the Duke on the subject:—

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

‘INDIA OFFICE, 23 December 1882.

‘. . . I have written to Granville about the probable duration of the occupation of Egypt, but I do not expect anything very definite from him for some time. I know that he has already telegraphed to Dufferin to ask him to state his

views, but a great deal must depend on the progress which Sir Evelyn Wood is able to make with the organisation of the Egyptian Army.'

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

'WAR OFFICE, 31 *December* 1882.

'... Y.R.H. will probably have received Lord Dufferin's telegram of the 26th on the subject of the proposed reduction of the force in Egypt. The Queen wished that before an answer was sent, Y.R.H. and Lord Wolseley should be consulted. I have written to Lord Wolseley on the subject. Private letters which I have received from Dufferin show that, in the present state of the country, which he considers to be rapidly settling down, he feels convinced that a force of 6000 fighting men is amply sufficient, but that this force should be maintained until it is sure how Sir E. Wood's organisation of the Egyptian Army proceeds. Apparently Sir A. Alison, wishing to be on the safe side, does not recommend quite so large an immediate reduction; but I gather that, if it is considered politically expedient, he does not practically oppose it. Dufferin considers it of the highest importance to lighten the burthen on the Egyptian Exchequer as much as possible. . . .'

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

'6 *January* 1883.

'I have sent extracts from Sir A. Alison's letter, as Y.R.H. desired, to Granville, and I return the letters themselves.

'I expect that we shall receive an official dispatch from Dufferin next week, when it will be necessary to arrive at a decision as to the prospective and immediate reductions to be made.

'Sir A. Alison very properly looks at the question entirely from a military point of view, and naturally desires that so long as troops remain in Egypt, they should constitute a strong and efficient force equal to any possible emergency. But it does not appear to me that, even from this point of view, he is strongly opposed to such a reduction as Lord Dufferin has recommended. . . .'

CHAPTER XXX

THE SOUDAN—1884-85

State of Egypt after 1882. Proposed Demonstration near Suakin. H.R.H.'s Diary. El Teb. General Gordon at Khartoum. Expedition decided upon. The Nile Route *versus* the Suakin-Berber one. The formation of the Camel Corps. H.R.H.'s objections to denuding Regiments. Unforeseen difficulties encountered. Lord Wolseley's letters. Dispatch of the Desert Column. Sir Herbert Stewart at Gakdul. Abu Klea. The Queen's telegram. H.R.H.'s letters to Sir Herbert Stewart and Sir Charles Wilson. Death of Gordon. Fall of Khartoum. Sir Redvers Buller's Retreat. Abandonment of Campaign.

FOR some time past, and before the Egyptian Expedition of 1882, trouble had been brewing in the Soudan. In 1881 the fanatic Mahomet Achmed had declared himself to be the expected Mahdi of Moslem belief. He rapidly obtained a following, and, after sundry minor successes, defeated and annihilated, in October 1883, an Egyptian Army under Hicks Pacha in Kordofan. At the time it was impossible for the Khedive unaided to attempt the re-conquest of the Soudan; and since the British Government declined to aid in such an undertaking, it was finally agreed that the Egyptian garrisons should be withdrawn and the country abandoned to the Soudanese, Major-General Charles Gordon proceeding to Khartoum early in 1884 to carry out this unfortunate arrangement. Meanwhile the trouble had spread, and the seaport of Suakin was threatened by the tribes who had thrown in their lot with the Mahdi. Valentine Baker Pacha, then in the service of the Khedive, proceeded to Trinkitat from Suakin with 4000 men to attempt the relief of Tokar, surrounded by the Mahdists. This force, on 4 February 1884, was attacked on the march and destroyed.

The British Government were now forced to dispatch an expedition to protect Suakin and relieve Tokar, and

Lieutenant-General Stephenson at Cairo was ordered to organise the same without delay.

At this stage of the narrative it may perhaps be desirable to insert the Duke's short diary of events in the Soudan, which will have the additional advantage of making clearer the course of subsequent events:—

H.R.H.'s DIARY OF THE SOUDAN CAMPAIGNS.

FIRST SUAKIN EXPEDITION, 1884.

'Matters went quietly with the Army of Occupation till the early spring of 1884, when the short campaign on the Suakin side came upon us suddenly in March of that year. Osman Digma threatened our naval station at Suakin seriously, and it was felt that something must be done to try and put a stop to these constant threats and alarms by dealing him a severe blow. Accordingly in the end of February, Major-General Graham was sent around from Cairo to Suakin to take charge of this expedition, General Hicks's local Egyptian Army having been destroyed in the autumn in the Soudan, and General Baker Pacha's Native force having also been destroyed at El Teb on the Red Sea Coast, not far distant from Suakin. Graham's force consisted of 19th Hussars, 42nd, 75th, and 3rd Battalion 60th and Royal Marine Battalion, all troops quartered in Egypt, and was reinforced by 10th Hussars, the 65th, and 89th on their way home from India. Redvers Buller joined him as Chief of his Staff and second in command. Two severe actions were fought, one at El Teb and the other at Tamai, in both of which the Arabs were completely defeated, though with considerable loss to our troops. Osman Digma having thus met with a severe check, and the hot weather setting in rapidly, it was thought advisable to withdraw the expeditionary troops again as soon as possible, and they were accordingly dispersed, part of them returning home, and others reverting to their Egyptian stations, leaving Suakin garrisoned only by a strong Battalion of Marines, some Artillery and Engineers, and a strong force of Egyptians, backed by a portion of the Fleet under Commodore Molyneux. At first the senior officer commanded the troops, but in July Major-General Fremantle was sent out to take over the general command.

It was decided later, in August 1884, to make an effort to save General Gordon, who was still holding out in Khartoum, and who had now become absolutely isolated. Colonel Stewart, 11th Hussars, and some European Consuls who accompanied him, having made an attempt to come by steamer down the Nile, in doing so their steamer became wrecked; they were murdered by the Native inhabitants.

As a result of this decision in August and at the breaking up of Parliament the

NILE EXPEDITION OF 1884-1885

was decided upon, and the command of it entrusted to Lord Wolseley, who started on his mission with the least possible delay. Most of the troops were sent up the Nile from Egypt, others being to some extent sent out to replace them. Sir Redvers Buller went out as Chief of the Staff. Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood had charge of the line of communication, and Major-General Earle and Colonel Sir Herbert Stewart were sent out as Brigadiers. The troops went up the Nile by boats specially built in England for the purpose, Nile steamers assisting as far as it was possible. The expedition reached Korti towards the beginning of January. A specially formed Camel Corps formed into three Divisions, one of Heavy Cavalry Regiments, one of Light Cavalry, one of Guards and Marines, were specially sent out from England under the command of Colonels Talbot, 1st Life Guards, Colonel Stanley Clarke, and Colonel Boscawen. At the beginning of January a move was made across the desert for the special relief of General Charles Gordon, who was surrounded and shut up in Khartoum. This force under Sir Herbert Stewart fought a most critical and gallant action on January 17 at Abu Klea, where it was attacked by overwhelming bodies of Natives, which, after a fierce struggle and heavy loss, the square having been broken at one angle, it repulsed. In this action Colonel Burnaby, R.H.G., and many officers and men were killed. The troops then, after getting water at Abu Klea Wells, again advanced to reach the Nile, and on January 19, after Herbert Stewart had been fatally wounded in the early morning, advanced again under Colonel Sir Charles Wilson and Colonel Boscawen, and again defeated the superior forces of the Arabs at Abu Kru, as a result of which engagement they reached the Nile at Gubat near Metemmeh, and there entrenched themselves, with abundance of water from the river available. Metemmeh was found too strong to be taken, and Sir Charles Wilson, after a reconnaissance the following day, pushed on in two steamers sent down by Gordon to Khartoum, taking only some Bluejackets and a small detachment of the 35th Sussex Regiment. They got up to Khartoum in two days, and found on nearing the place that it had fallen into the hands of the Mahdi, and no intelligence could be obtained as to the fate of Gordon, though it was stated by Natives with whom they communicated that he had been killed, which subsequently proved to be but too

true. Being unable to land, Sir Charles Wilson endeavoured to return to Gubat, his vessels were wrecked, and but for the timely assistance rendered by Lord Charles Beresford in a third steamer, he and his party never would have returned to the remainder of the force. Happily, however, by Lord Charles's extreme gallantry, the rescue was effected, and the party rejoined their comrades with but slight loss. Sir Redvers Buller was now sent up by Lord Wolseley to the rescue of Gubat force sorely pressed by the enemy, and running very short in supplies, and having taken up the whole of the 18th Royal Irish and Sussex Regiment, succeeded in extricating himself out of the dangerous position in which the force was placed, and at length rejoined the main body of the Army after another halt at Abu Klea and Gakdul, at Korti, to the intense joy of Lord Wolseley. It was on the return march, as they neared Abu Klea, that poor Sir Herbert Stewart died of his wound. The 19th Hussars formed part of the Desert Force, and performed their difficult and harassing duties with the greatest credit to themselves.

'Lord Wolseley meanwhile pushed forward General Earle with a strong Brigade of Infantry up the Nile towards Berber. Earle attacked the enemy at Kerbeka on February 12, and completely defeated them with heavy loss, but unfortunately was killed himself by an accidental shot from a party of rebels who held out in a house after the rest of the force had fled. His death was a very serious loss to our Army, for he was a brave and good soldier, and would have risen to great distinction had he survived. On Earle's death, Brigadier Brackenbury took up the command and pushed his force on up the Nile in pursuit.

'Lord Wolseley now felt that it was impossible to reach Khartoum this season, and also gave it as his opinion that Berber would not be attained at present from the Nile side, and the Government thereupon decided to withdraw the Nile force as far as Wady Halfa, holding the head of the Nile railroad with strong detachments pushed forward from Halfa, and abandoning Dongola. Lord Wolseley and Sir Redvers Buller objected very much to the abandonment of Dongola, which they thought ought to be our advanced post, and as such should be held in force; but the Government adhered to their decision, and though later they rather hesitated in their resolve, the withdrawal had then gone too far, and was accordingly carried out, General Grenfell being left in command of the force thus left on the Nile, and Lord Wolseley and his Staff returning home, as did Sir Evelyn Wood, who resigned the office of Sirdar or Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army. Whilst all these proceedings took place on the Nile

THE SECOND EXPEDITION TO SUAKIN UNDER SIR GERALD
GRAHAM—1885

was undertaken early in the year, and was intended as a diversion on the Suakin side, and with a view to opening out a railway towards Berber from the Red Sea shores. A Brigade of three Battalions of the Guards, with two Squadrons each from the 5th Lancers and 20th Hussars, the former commanded by Lieutenant-General Fremantle, the latter by Brigadier-General Ewart, late 2nd Life Guards, were sent out from England, with a proportion of Artillery from Egypt proper, whilst a second Brigade of Infantry, consisting of a Battalion of the Shropshire Light Infantry and 70th, went from India on their passage home on relief with a Battalion of Marines and the 49th from Egypt, this Brigade being under Sir John McNeill; the force was further strengthened by a Native Indian Brigade under Brigadier Hudson, consisting of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, the 15th Sikhs, 17th Bengal and 28th Bombay Infantry. Major-General Sir George Greaves was named Chief of the Staff. The whole force amounted to about 10,000 men. Shortly after landing, an advance was made to Hasheen on February 19, where a smart little encounter took place without, however, producing very satisfactory results. Indeed it amounted more or less to a reconnaissance in force. On the 21st another advance was made in the direction of Tamai of part of the force under McNeill. He was in the act of preparing a Zariba for his first halt, when attacked in force by the Arabs, who were beaten off, after desperate fighting, and with serious losses on our side as well as to the enemy, who had to retire in complete disorder and did not rally again. The encounter was unsatisfactory and unfortunate, and did not entail any credit upon those in command, though, with some exceptions, it redounded to the credit of the troops involved, and who fought with desperate gallantry. It can only be looked upon as a decided surprise, and gave rise to considerable heart-burning as to the amount of blame to be attached to certain quarters. Some days later the advance on Tamai was continued, but the enemy offered no serious resistance, and the troops were therefore withdrawn to Suakin. Political differences at home, and Russian movements in Central Asia, brought the whole operation to an early conclusion. The Berber railroad, the plant for which had been prepared, and had been sent out and even commenced for a short distance, was given up, and the troops were dispersed, most of them being removed to Egypt proper, whilst the Brigade of Guards went to Cyprus, and the Indian Contingent alone, with one European Regiment, was left under Brigadier Hudson to hold and defend Suakin, Sir Gerald Graham and most of his Staff returning to England.'

On 13 February 1884 the Duke wrote to the Queen as follows:—

TO THE QUEEN.

‘COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S OFFICE, 13 February 1884.

‘MY DEAR COUSIN,—It was decided suddenly by the Cabinet to detach a force from the troops serving in Egypt to make a demonstration, landing at or near Suakin, with a view to still saving the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat, and to ensure the position we have taken up with the Fleet at Suakin.

‘Sinkat has unfortunately since fallen, and the prospect of saving Tokar is very doubtful; but at least we put on a bolder front than what we have hitherto done by such a movement, and therefore I can only approve of it. I presume all this has been made known to you by the Government, but I think it right to let you know that I had no time to communicate with you on the subject before all the necessary orders were given, and these had to be made out and were sent off yesterday. Major-General Graham, now commanding a Brigade in Egypt, has been directed to take charge of this Expedition, and the Lieutenant-General in Egypt has been ordered to select three Battalions of Infantry and the Regiments of Cavalry in his command, besides a Mountain Battery and some Engineers, to be embarked at once for Suakin. Some Royal Marines have been sent out from home; others on their return home in the *Orontes* from China have been sent off at once from Suez to reinforce those already landed from Admiral Sir W. Hewett’s Fleet; and the *Jumna* with the 10th Hussars (dismounted) and the 89th Foot, on their voyage home from India, have also been directed to proceed and land their troops at Suakin. Thus a respectable little force will be assembled there shortly, which will, I trust, be enabled to carry out the duties required before the intensely hot weather of that part of the world has set in, when it may be hoped that they will be enabled to return to their respective duties in Egypt and elsewhere. It has been thought advisable to send out Sir Redvers Buller, who, as you know, is a man of considerable experience in the field, as Brigadier of Infantry, and second in command to General Graham, and he proceeded by the mail train last night from here *via* Brindisi. Colonel Herbert Stewart, of whom Lord Wolseley has a very high opinion as a leader of Cavalry against irregular levies, has also been sent out from home to be placed in charge of the mounted portion of the Force. . . .’

Upon the news of Graham’s victory at El Teb the Queen wrote to the Duke:—

FROM THE QUEEN.

‘WINDSOR CASTLE, 6 *March* 1884.

‘MY DEAR GEORGE,—. . . This brilliant success at El Teb was a great source of pride and gratification to me, though I deplore valuable lives lost and the many wounded. Considering, however, the ferocious fanatical bravery of the Arabs, we must be thankful that it was no worse. General Graham and Admiral Hewett are two admirable and determined men, and I am glad that this Proclamation has been issued and another blow prepared to be struck before the effect of the victory is over, and before the hot season begins.’

The second blow was struck seven days later at Tamai on 13 March, when Osman Digma’s forces were routed but again at the cost of very heavy losses in British officers and men. With reference to these and the general conduct of the fight General Stephenson wrote to the Duke:—

FROM SIR FREDERICK STEPHENSON.

‘CAIRO, 25 *March* 1884.

‘. . . The handling of the 2nd Brigade is open to criticism—in breaking up the square by ordering the front face to charge at the critical moment of coming into contact with the enemy, at the time of all others when a compact formation and steady bearing of the men were most essential.

‘This movement does not appear to me to have been a judicious one, but to have been the primary cause of the subsequent confusion. I am afraid it showed a disposition to underrate the enemy, though the experience of the first action showed the necessity for more caution.

‘The Staff seem to have done good service in rallying the men; this rally and the subsequent advance, with its good results, seems deserving of much praise.

‘The success of this rally is mainly due to the excellent handling of the Cavalry, which, by threatening the right flank of the enemy’s advance, checked that movement and gave our men time to recover themselves.

‘Buller seems to have handled his Brigade admirably, and by keeping its formation compact and delivering a cool and steady fire, sustained hardly any loss, and effectually prevented the enemy from getting too near.

‘The Mounted Infantry I am informed did particularly well, and their commander, Captain Humphreys, has been reported to me as having shown all the requisite qualities of a good commander of Mounted Infantry. It is very

satisfactory that this newly-formed corps should have made so good a start.

'The medical arrangements in the field throughout this expedition seem to have been thoroughly well conducted, and I was much struck with the rapidity and absence of suffering to the wounded with which their transfer from the field to board ship was effected. . . .'

After the withdrawal of the Suakin Expedition in March 1884 a strong feeling arose in the country that steps should be taken to relieve General Gordon at Khartoum, which was known to be invested by the Mahdi's forces. Mr. Gladstone, however, declined to move; but eventually public opinion became so strong that the Government was reluctantly compelled to arrange for a British relief expedition.

At first this was placed in the hands of the British military authorities in Cairo; but a serious difference of opinion arose as to the choice of the line of advance, whether by the Nile or by Suakin to Berber. Eventually the former route was decided upon, and orders were given for the construction of a flotilla of 'whalers' to convey men and stores from Dongola to Khartoum.

General Stephenson, who was entrusted with the arrangements at Cairo, was an advocate of the Suakin route; but eventually it was decided to send out Lord Wolseley, who had come to the conclusion that an advance by the Nile was preferable.

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

'23 August 1884.

'I have been here almost all this week, as the telegrams from Stephenson and apparent misunderstandings and distrust of our plans, make me extremely uneasy. With reference especially to his telegram of the 21st, when, having been put as fully as was possible in possession of our plans, he says: "Believe expedition to New Dongola by means of small boats impracticable. Difficulties on this river too great." I entertain the most serious doubts whether we are justified, in justice either to ourselves who have decided on the plan, or to those in Egypt who have to carry it out, in leaving its execution entirely in the hands of those who do not believe in its practicability. I propose, therefore, to ask Lord Wolseley to undertake temporarily the command of the troops in Egypt—not necessarily the command of the

expedition, but to superintend the operations and general directions.

‘As this is a measure of considerable importance, not only in a military but a political point of view, it was necessary for me first to consult Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, and Lord Northbrook. . . . I entirely share what I know will be Your Royal Highness’s feeling, that this practical supersession of Sir F. Stephenson will be hard upon that officer; but when the success of the expedition may be at stake, and when we consider General Stephenson’s repeated expressions of disbelief in the practicability of our plans, I think that this feeling must not be allowed too much weight.’

Lord Wolseley proceeded to Egypt early in September, and on his way out wrote to the Duke asking for the formation of a Camel Corps of men from the Household Cavalry, Foot Guards, Rifle Brigade, and Cavalry of the Line, to consist of two officers and forty men from each unit. He alludes to the men composing two of the Infantry Battalions placed at his disposal as being very young, and adds, ‘I confess I see no other plan of giving proper consistence and stability to the force that must be ready to fight if necessary, except that which I have proposed.’

On his arrival at Cairo he again wrote on the same subject, and the following correspondence ensued, in which the views of the Duke are expressed with much cogency:—

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

‘CAIRO, 13 *September* 1884.

‘. . . The young soldiers under twenty-three years of age will not be able to stand the hard work which will fall upon all ranks after Wady Halfa is left behind. It is for this reason that I attach so much importance to the Mounted Infantry Your Royal Highness has lately sent here, and to the Camel Corps from the Guards and Cavalry I have asked for. They will all be picked men, and for the work of this expedition two men so selected are fully equal to three taken at random from any Battalion.’

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

‘19 *Sept.* 1884.

‘I have received your letter of the 8th, dated on board the *Iris*; also the draft dispatch which was enclosed in it. I confess, on first hearing of your proposal, it almost took my

breath away, for it virtually cuts away from under one's feet the possibility of sending you from home in future any Cavalry or Guards Regiment or Battalion really fit for service, the forty rank and file taken from every Regiment being in fact and in reality the life's blood and heart of such Regiment. I would therefore have infinitely preferred sending you out a Battalion of Rifles and Regiment of Hussars complete, to convert into a Camel Corps on their landing in Egypt; however, upon making full inquiry, I found that we had not a Battalion of Rifles that we could possibly send out in anything like reasonable strength, and even the best Hussar Regiment in point of strength would have to be made up largely from the number of very young soldiers in their ranks. If, therefore, a Camel Corps was needed, there was no other way of making it up than that suggested, and as it is most desirable not to run the risk of anything like failure, I have given my assent to the proposal, though I confess with a somewhat heavy heart, as I own I think it leaves us in a wretched position at home for any further reinforcements. . . .

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'26 Sept. 1884.

'Yesterday I inspected the contingents of men from all the Cavalry Corps at home and Battalions of Guards for service in Egypt, and to-day they have embarked, so I think you will admit that no time has been lost in carrying out your recommendations. They are a very fine body of men, and no doubt will form a valuable body of soldiers for the special object you had in view, but they are the *cream* of every corps to which they happen to belong, and I must confess I regret the necessity which has arisen in sending them so constituted. The principle is *unsound*, and not one to be accepted when it can in any way be avoided. It destroys the *esprit de corps* of Regiments, and, after all, that is the life and soul of this Army and every other Army. It is most distasteful to Regiments and officers and men; especially the Commanding Officers are disgusted at seeing their best men taken from them, and themselves being debarred from sharing in the honours and glories of the service upon which they may happen to be engaged.

'You know that has always been my view, as a soldier of some experience in matters of organisation, and I am more than ever satisfied that I am correct in my judgment. However, for the present purpose there was no alternative, and so the scheme has been carried out in as effective a manner as it was possible to do so.

'I wish we had left it to Commanding Officers to select their own officers to accompany their men. The directing

certain officers to be sent is what has given especial offence, and much heartburning, so I trust you will never ask me to do this again.

'It is quite right for me to select those to have this sort of mixed command, but the Regimental Officers must on any future occasion be left to the Commanding Officers. . . .

'The difficulty you will have will be that of inducing Gordon to leave Khartoum; and indeed in this I think he is not altogether wrong, for to my mind Khartoum ought to be retained, with a line of railway from Suakin *via* Berber up to that place, which would then become the centre of trade and civilisation for that portion of Africa. . . .'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'KASR-EL-NIL,
CAIRO, 26 Sept. 1884.

' . . . These Camel Corps will really be worth any Brigade of troops I could collect here. In fact they will be, in reality, the very finest troops in the world. When one has to fight large numbers of barbarian warriors in countries where the question of supplies is one of great difficulty, as it must always be in desert countries, the cheapest result and best plan to adopt is to use selected corps like this Camel Corps Regiment.

'In large wars it is very different, and our weakly and indifferent men are as good as the weak and useless men in your everyday Army. . . .'

TO THE QUEEN.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 19 September 1884.

'MY DEAR COUSIN,— . . My impression is very strong that Wolseley has found it more difficult than he supposed to carry out his Boat Expedition, which so many had told him before leaving would be impracticable, but to which he determinedly adhered, and he therefore wants to have a body of fine soldiers with whom to make a dash across the desert should his boats fail him. I was on the point of writing to you before this had all come upon us, to point out to you in the *strongest terms* that the Army is now in a *deplorable position*. Every available corps has been sent out to Egypt, and the places of some from Mediterranean Garrisons have been filled up by Battalions absolutely unfit from physical causes to be sent abroad at all. We have now detailed, I may say, the two last Battalions that could be sent, and our Army at home is not fit to give either further reinforcements, or indeed to meet any emergency which may arise; and yet we have

anxieties enough on hand, whether we look to South Africa, where matters are very uncomfortable, or to China, where the Garrison of Hong Kong is quite unequal to cope with any serious emergency, or to India, where we shall not be able by the usual drafts to fill up the normal establishments of Regiments up to full strength; and yet no steps are taken to meet these increased and increasing demands. I conceive that a portion of the Reserve men ought to be called to the Colours, and some Battalions of Militia ought to be called out for embodiment. I have named this over and over again to Lord Hartington, who, I have every reason to believe, quite sees the difficulties of the situation, but I presume, for political reasons, the Government have not sanctioned any increase of force beyond the ordinary establishment for the year. . . .

So far back as May the Cabinet had decided upon beginning a railroad from Suakin to Berber, and Lord Wolseley had strongly urged that a competent General should be dispatched thither to supervise all arrangements. Early in October the Duke once again calls attention to the desirability of not losing sight of the value of the Suakin route when opened up.

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

‘10 Oct. 1885.

‘. . . My own opinion is that an effort should now be made to open out the road from Suakin *via* Berber, as well as the one upon which you are now moving yourself up the Nile. Osman Digma’s force seems to have greatly, if not entirely diminished of late, and if the friendly tribes could now be induced to press forward, aided perhaps by some of our officers and the money we could advance to them, the railroad might be commenced and pushed forward under cover of this protection, and the trade route opened, upon which I lay great value, more particularly as bearing upon the retention of Khartoum, which I hold to be essential to our interests, and those of Egypt, and which would dominate, if in good hands, all the surrounding tribes, and hold them in proper subjection, besides extending civilisation to those benighted parts of the world.’

The following letters which passed between the Duke and Lord Wolseley give a graphic account of this, one of the most remarkable military expeditions ever undertaken:—

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'WADY HALFA,
NUBIA, 11 October 1884.

'... I cannot yet, nor do I expect for some time to be able to express any opinion worth having on the all-important subject of whether it will, or will not, be necessary to send any expedition to Khartoum, and if necessary, whether we must operate all the way along the Nile Valley, or may be able to cut across by some desert route from Debbeh or Ambukol to either Shendy or Khartoum. Until I reach Debbeh with at least a respectable advanced guard, and so get the touch of Gordon and of Soudanese affairs, I can really know very little as to the true condition we are in, or what it is that we have before us to do. I am in daily expectation of hearing from Gordon in answer to the letter, or rather telegram, I sent him from Cairo. I shall then perhaps see a little more daylight through the maze ahead. ...

'The more I study the question on the spot, the more certain I become that this Nile route is the only one that could ensure Khartoum being reached by a British force, and that, owing to the smallness of the native boats above this, no sufficient force could ever have reached that place by water unless the boats were sent in large numbers from England. The total number of boats of all sizes above this, that is, between Hannek and the bottom of cataract at Barkal-en-Nurri, is said to be between *sixty and eighty*.

'Most of them are wretched craft that leak horribly and founder at the least provocation. We are doing all we can to push provisions and supplies to the front; but it is heart-breaking work with the men at our disposal. What sums of money might have been saved if the Government had purchased some of those stern-paddle steamers I recommended to their notice months ago. It is always, and under our present form of Government must, I suppose, always be the same. No Ministry will expend a thousand pounds to-day to save the expenditure of £5000 which people can see will be inevitable in six or eight months' time. ... The longer I live, and the more I see of active service, the more I realise how very very few men there are in the world with brains so organised as to enable them to look at affairs from a war point of view.

'Indeed I believe it to be an instinct, for I do not think it requires any great intellect; it is simply a peculiar organisation of the brain, which is a rare gift, and can with difficulty, if at all, be acquired by education. Sir Redvers Buller has it, and therefore is invaluable as a Chief of the Staff; but I could count over on the fingers of one hand all the men I know of in our Army who possess this invaluable gift.

'Lord J. Hay in his report on the proposed expedition in boats to Khartoum proved to his own satisfaction that our

"whalers" could neither be sailed, rowed, nor poled up the river. After the first batch of boats had been taken up the first or Assouan Cataract, the telegram I received reporting the circumstances said that they had been successfully "rowed, tracked, and poled" up that cataract. I am sure Your Royal Highness will be glad to hear this, for it is but natural that all who have never poled up rapids in Canada should have felt nervous as to our success after such a positive statement from an Admiral in Lord J. Hay's position. I am sending Sir C. Wilson from Dongola in an armed steamer to-morrow to Merawi to inquire as near the spot as possible into the story of Stewart's supposed murder in that neighbourhood. . . . I have now seen a good deal of the Egyptian Army, and I think that any one, accustomed as I am to study the creature man when dressed as a soldier, more as a fighting animal than a mere theatrical lay figure, would arrive at the conclusion that I have, which is, *they have no fight in them*. I am convinced they would never stand in the open if charged by any one, even by a herd of old apple-women from England.

'Sir E. Wood pretends *now* to believe in them, when he knows there is no chance of his ever being allowed to go into action with them, unsupported by our bayonets; he would sing a very different tune if I told him he was to attack the Mahdi's troops without any British soldiers to help him.

'I believe these black fellows who inhabit this country would make good soldiers; they are a manly set, so unlike the wretched slave from Egypt proper.'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'WADY HALFA,
NUBIA, 27 October 1884.

' . . . My earnest endeavour will be to push this operation through with all speed, so as to free at least six or seven Battalions for home or for the Cape. Nothing could be worse than our position there, and it is, and to those who knew South Africa when we hauled down our flag in 1881, it always was, quite certain that the day would soon come when we should have to reassert our sway there by an Army of 20,000 men, or to clear out of the Colony altogether.

'Our men here look well and healthy; but their life is trying and uninteresting. I am leaving General Buller behind me to carry on the work when I go.

'The boats are a great success, and if they had been provided two months ago, we might have dispensed with all these wretched native craft that were purchased before my arrival, which are always being wrecked and giving perpetual trouble. . . .

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

' 14 November 1884.

'I have received your most interesting letters of the 23rd ultimo, and I quite understand the difficult position in which you find yourself placed from the unfortunate delay which has occurred in deciding upon the onward movement towards Khartoum. The difficulties in sending stores and supplies suddenly to the front must be overwhelming; but of course you cannot really push your advance till you feel secure of being able to feed your troops and your animals if pushed forward. You may therefore be assured that, appreciating to the fullest extent your difficulties, I shall do all in my power to give you every support, even when at times the demands made do not accord with the views I entertain on some of the questions that have to be dealt with. I certainly dissent from your principle of taking volunteers from a variety of Regiments and making one Corps of them. No doubt the officers and men selected for volunteers are themselves well satisfied at the result of their anxiety to see active service; but let me ask you, What becomes of the feelings of the great bulk of those Corps from which these men are taken? They remain behind annoyed at their ill-luck, and this destroys regimental *esprit de corps*, upon which all armies must rely in the hour of danger. I agreed at once to your request, feeling that at the moment, with the suddenness of the demand, there was no other mode of forming the Camel Corps, and it was done; but I should have infinitely preferred taking an Infantry Battalion and a Cavalry Regiment and converting them for this special service, had I had time to do so, had the Regiments at home been in a position to furnish efficient Corps within themselves; but this was not the case, from the extreme youth of the men of the Infantry, and even, to a less degree, of the Cavalry, though possibly we could have turned out three efficient Squadrons of whatever Cavalry Regiments stood first for service. Then again as to the quality of the superior or Staff officers for purposes of war: you say very few men have the absolute requirements for active service in the field in the superior grade, so that you could tell the number off your fingers. I confess to having a better opinion of our officers in general than the view you take; of course, if the same officers are invariably employed, you have no area for selecting others, and give no others a chance of coming to the front. The more fresh blood is tested on these occasions the better, and I think it a most unfortunate system to confine yourself to only a very limited number of men. You have an excellent Staff about you, I have not the least doubt; that you should like to have a certain number of these men whom you know intimately, and are therefore up to what you want, is most natural, and indeed essential. But if you

never go beyond this particular batch of men, you work these and bring *nothing* on; and this I think another serious misfortune to the interests of an Army called upon like ours to serve in every part of the globe. You must forgive this little dissertation; but your observations, if unchallenged by me, might seem to be accepted, and I think it would be wrong of me were I not frankly to tell you where I differ. I am afraid you will have to do what you say, leave a good many men behind you as you push along, belonging to different Regiments. The fact is, that you have far too young men in many of your Corps; but as you know this has not arisen from any fault of ours, but has been entirely caused by our having to send out the drafts very suddenly and with the least possible preparation. . . . The boats are, I hope, doing well, though their difficulties seem very great, the Nile having become so reduced that the rapids are thus almost impossible to ascend. The anxiety I feel is as to your expedition getting back again, even if it attains its destination in due time, for at that period of the year the heat of the weather will make all movements of troops virtually impossible. No doubt this point is uppermost in your mind; but I cannot help just referring to it. . . .

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

‘DONGOLA, NUBIA, 11 Dec. 1884.

‘I am very grateful for Your Royal Highness’s very kind letter of the 14th instant, and for the good advice it contains.

‘As regards the Staff of the Army now here, as yet no officer has been appointed to it who served on the Staff in 1882—Sir J. Adye, General Dormer, Colonels Clery, Grenfell, Butler, Grove, Maurice and others formed the Headquarter Staff in 1882. All have now been replaced by men who were *not* on the Headquarter Staff then. This time, as was also the case in 1882, I have, and then had, a host of new men. My idea is to give every Staff College officer and every one strongly recommended by a good commanding officer a chance in a subordinate position of showing what he can do and what he is worth. If he does well, employ him again in a better position, and if badly never have anything more to do with him; but above all things never employ a man in a high position either of command or on the Staff who has not proved his efficiency in the field. If a reputed very good man has never had a chance of seeing service, then if he wants to take part in a campaign he should be content to serve under those who have already proved themselves to be able men in front of an enemy. To do otherwise, in my opinion, is neither fair to England nor to the reputation of our Army, nor to the splendid gallant fellows whose lives are at stake and may at any moment be sacrificed by the unfit-

ness for command of those to whom the protection of their lives has been confided. The matter is, as I have always understood it, too serious to be treated lightly and in an off-hand manner. I can assure Your Royal Highness one of my great objects has always been to bring forward young men, and I never forget any one of whom I have a good report until I give him a chance of showing Your Royal Highness what he is worth. There are plenty of good young men, the great majority of whom do excellently well in subordinate positions; but out of every hundred of them the Army is indeed fortunate if one man is found fit for any independent command or high position. All those whom I have about me generally on service in important positions have been eliminated from a crowd of men I have tried.

'When I was a very young man I was brought into intimate relations with Generals and Staff Officers of high position, who were absolutely useless, many of them worn-out old gentlemen, as brave as lions, but whom physical infirmities alone prevented from being more than an encumbrance to the Army they served with. By degrees, since Your Royal Highness has been Commander-in-Chief, this old system has been altered, and the Army is gradually becoming one of the great professions into which a man of great ability can enter with the certainty of either being shot or of rising to a high position. That "dull cold shade" to which Napier, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, refers as destroying the spirit of our Army in his day, is now a thing of the past. Our officers, thanks to the regulations published by Your Royal Highness, must now study their profession if they wish to rise in it, and, when not on leave, have now sufficient real military duty to perform to keep them fairly employed all the week. When I think of the British officer as he was in 1853-54-55, and compare him with the officers I see around me here, I am lost in admiration of the improvement effected by Your Royal Highness.

'Rewarding officers after a campaign is a very difficult affair.

'Many a man makes a good junior who would be lost in a senior position, so if a major be made a lieutenant-colonel whom one would not like to see in command of a Regiment, and who would be useless and hopeless, say as an Assistant Adjutant-General, it is impossible to employ him again in war, although, if he had not been promoted, he could have done very well in his former subordinate position. I have always thought it a pity we had not more decorations for this reason. If we had, promotion might then be reserved for those men whom it was for the interest of the nation to push on to high positions when they were still young and vigorous, and those who had worked hard and zealously, but by whose promotion the State would gain nothing, might be decorated with crosses and stars and medals.'

By December it became apparent that the difficulties encountered in ascending a falling Nile with the flotilla of whalers were far greater than military men had predicted. Lord John Hay had named six weeks as the time from Halfa to Dongola, whereas sanguine soldiers had asserted that two weeks were sufficient.

The Duke once again recurs to the importance of securing the Suakin route as the best line of communications with Khartoum, and alludes to General Fremantle, who had in the interim been sent out as a capable man for seeing to that matter. So far this matter of a railway had not been pushed, as it was urged that the tribes near Suakin would not permit of it. Hence the letter from General Fremantle, following on that of the Duke, is of especial interest.

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

‘12 December 1884.

‘I feel *most anxious* about your forward movements. Time presses, and the delay in advance, though inevitable, is painful to us who look on at a distance. What I fear most is, that if you have to go to Khartoum, as I expect, it will be too late for the force to return this season after reaching their destination. This would be a most serious matter. I am strongly of opinion that the Suakin-Berber Railroad should even now be pushed on as far as possible. If detained at Khartoum the force left there will be far more easily supported from the shorter route by Berber than by the Nile, and I am satisfied it would be a wise and prudent move. The difficulty is, to find the additional troops required for such an advance off the rail, for it will need protection. But we must try to find these troops somehow should such a course be decided upon, and Fremantle would be an excellent man for carrying out the necessary orders in that direction. He is prudent and discreet and determined, and no better officer could be found for the duty. I hope that Gordon will be able to hold his own till you meet him, but the Mahdi seems, from the last accounts, to be more disposed again to fight than he has been for some time past. Altogether I shall rejoice when the object in view has been accomplished, and still live in hopes that you will be enabled to persuade the Government not to give up Khartoum, which on that side is decidedly the key to Egypt, as far as concerns its future prosperity, and the security of its commercial interests and frontier. . . .’

FROM SIR A. FREMANTLE.

'SUAKIN, 17 Dec. 1884.

'Your Royal Highness will already have been aware that if the expedition had come this way, and the commencement made three months ago, there would have been little or no resistance on the part of the tribesmen, the great majority of whom were heartily sick of the war; Osman was at that time comparatively deserted, the rebels starving, and a large section of the Amarras in open revolt against his authority.

'Since that time our inactivity has enabled Osman to win back part of his influence by his astuteness and consummate hypocrisy; and by the ripening of the Tokar crops, which renders grain at Tamai cheaper than at Suakin.'

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE,
PARK LANE, W., 26 Dec. 1884.

'I sent you yesterday a telegram in my own name and that of Lord Hartington to wish you and the troops on the Nile the compliments of the season, and I repeat them now personally to yourself, with my best wishes for your speedy and entire success. I have received your letter of the 4th from Dongola, and I know you are now at Korti. As far as it goes, all seems to be well, but the operation is a very tedious one, and I own I feel very anxious as to the period when you may be enabled to reach Khartoum, for on that depends not only the relief of Gordon and his associates, who have stuck by him so manfully, but also the possibility of your getting our troops withdrawn again to the Nile and down that stream before the intense heat of the coming summer commences.

'I sadly fear that if this cannot be done, the sufferings of the force will be very great, and we may lose many men. Probably you may think it right to make a dash with your mounted force across the Desert; but this is a very delicate and difficult action, which must mainly depend on the information which may reach you, and I feel assured you will do nothing rashly and unless you feel confident of success. Meanwhile in Egypt proper, things do not look well. The other European Powers are extremely pressing on the financial questions, and our Government seems perplexed and doubtful as to the course they should pursue. . . .

'... I have been urging the Secretary of State to look to the sad condition of our home force, and to give us more men for the coming Estimates, but I fear I shall not be very successful in this respect, which to my mind is most serious, and much to be deplored. I should myself have liked to see a force sent to Suakin to act from thence on Berber, pushing

on the railroad as they proceed; but I don't see where we can find troops to lay our hands on for such an undertaking, which otherwise would, I think, have had the advantage of aiding you in your onward as well as in your returning course. From Cairo we cannot draw any more troops, and at home, or even in the Mediterranean Garrisons, the Battalions are too young to send on such an expedition. Altogether it would be a great relief and comfort to see your expedition satisfactorily completed, as then we should have some force at hand with which to deal elsewhere, but I am afraid we cannot look to such a result till the summer is far advanced, when no further military operations can be undertaken in a very hot climate.'

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'2 January 1885.

'Yours of the 11th ultimo from Dongola has reached me, and we heard yesterday of Gordon's last verbal *message* by messenger, which causes us a good deal of anxiety. Being on the spot, you will of course be in a better position to judge of what it may mean than we are here; but to us it sounds rather ominous, his recommending you to advance with a very strong force, and not to scatter it more than you can help. No doubt you will do this as far as you are able, but unfortunately I do not see how you can collect a really large force, for you are compelled to scatter it sufficiently to keep up your communications, and to protect your flank. However, no doubt all this has been fully and carefully considered by you, and we must now look forward with hope to the success which has so frequently and, I may say generally, attended our Arms under God's gracious providence. The account you give me of the condition of the troops you have with you is so far very satisfactory, as also the general intelligence and efficiency of the officers. My own impression is that the latter have certainly not deteriorated, and that a large number of them have devoted more time to the study of their profession than the young men of other days used to do; but you must also bear in mind that our great Empire was really won for us by the officers and men of the old stamp, and that, consequently, I don't think there is much to be said against those who were enabled to carry out such glorious achievements, even though they may have owed their success more to *dash* than to the studied knowledge now acquired of the art of war. Practice, after all, is the great teacher, and the experience gained by such practice. In this I agree with you, but then, unfortunately for the acquirement of this knowledge, though happily for the interests of the world and humanity in general, peace is our *normal* condition; war the *exceptional* substitute. Therefore the know-

ledge and experience to be acquired would be limited to a very small area if you confined yourself to those only who had been able to benefit by this experience, and left all the rest who had not the advantage in the cold. Therefore I still contend that, as far as possible, you should give every man a chance, and not merely pick out the plums of the military cake. You ought always, and can always, have a sufficient number of these places available without injuring the susceptibility or the prospects of the great bulk of the officers of the Army, and it is for this reason that I am strongly for upholding the Regimental system, and *esprit de corps*, and am not in favour of much selection excepting for very special duties. Believe me, my dear Wolseley, this is the best way of maintaining the efficiency of the Army, and it is this principle which I am so desirous of *on public grounds* to see upheld.'

Before the end of December it became evident that, if Gordon was to be relieved, a Column must be dispatched across the Bayuda Desert. Lord Wolseley had from the first had such an eventuality in his mind, and hence the formation of the famous Camel Corps.

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'KORTI, 28 December 1884.

'The South Stafford Regiment leaves to-day in the boats they arrived in, and will pass up the next cataract to the village of Hamdab, there to await the arrival of the remainder of the Brigade of all arms which I intend to concentrate there under General Earle. I am sending off Colonel Brackenbury to-morrow to that place with a squadron of Cavalry to arrange for their camping-ground, and to collect supplies, etc. I hope General Earle will reach this to-morrow to receive his orders and arrange all further details. He is a first-rate man of business, but as this is his first military expedition, and as he has had no experience in such matters, I have named Colonel Brackenbury to be his principal Staff Officer and second-in-command. In the event of any accident occurring to Earle, I can thus depend upon the command falling into able hands. Colonel Brackenbury is the senior Colonel doing duty with this army. I have therefore thought it but fair that he should have the rank of Brigadier-General, which I hope will meet with Your Royal Highness's approval.

'If the enemy fight before Abu Ahmed is reached, it will probably be at the native village of Berti, or in the Shukuk pass, which is still further up. I don't think, however, they

will make a stand at either place. On Tuesday next, the 30th instant, Sir Herbert Stewart will move with a strong convoy of provisions to the Gakdul wells half-way between this place and Shendy. There he will leave the supplies under the protection of one Battalion, and return here. On the 7th I hope to move forward myself to that half-way station, and so on to Metemmeh (opposite Shendy) with all my Camel Corps, and after a few days' halt there to bring up supplies, to push on rapidly to Khartoum. It is a venture that I do not at all relish. In all previous campaigns that I have had charge of, I have always been able to calculate out with tolerable accuracy the result of movements before I decided upon them, but I cannot do so in this instance, for it is a sort of leap in the dark. All I know is that I shall have with me a small body of the finest soldiers in the world, who are game to try anything I ask them, and who will fight like demons in any difficulty. With this Column, and in command of it, will be Sir Herbert Stewart, the best soldier all round I know. If he is killed, Sir Redvers Buller will assume command; and if both are killed, I shall be there myself. It is not expected that all three will be knocked over. Metemmeh is held by a few thousand Dervishes with some guns. If they make a stand, I shall endeavour to make an example of them. I should prefer, however, getting into Khartoum with little fighting, so as to reserve all my troops for an attack on the Mahdi from Khartoum, which I intend, please God, making as soon as I can get into position.

'I feel the utmost confidence in our complete success, and hope that within about a week of Your Royal Highness receiving this, the news of our arrival in Khartoum will have reached home. If I do not stop Earle before he gets to Berber, he should have fought near that place and occupied it in the last week of February.

'As soon as I leave this, I shall no longer be near a wire, and the Stock Jobbers and Club Newsmongers in Cairo and at home will be sure to start the rumour that I have been defeated, and my force destroyed.

'I hope no one will credit such a story, or believe any story until my own telegram reaches England. I shall have to send a messenger back here with it, and he will take a full week to get here from Khartoum.

'There are always a certain number of people at home anxious to announce my death and destruction: they have done so upon previous occasions, but I trust Your Royal Highness will turn a deaf ear to all stories of this nature. Every one here is in first-rate health, and the best possible spirit permeates all ranks. I am extremely grateful for all the support I have received from Your Royal Highness since I landed here, and whenever I do anything of which Your Royal Highness does not fully approve, I hope it will be remembered that I have no easy time of it, and that I have

only one thought and object in view, to serve England and the Queen to the best and utmost of my poor ability.'

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'16 January 1885.

'... We are all anxiously looking forward to news from you as to the result of the force under yourself and Stewart crossing the desert to Shendy. The troops ought to-day to be near that point if they meet with no opposition, and hitherto all seems to have gone as smoothly as possible. I shall indeed rejoice when I hear of your being safely established on the Nile again at the place indicated, and I trust you may then at once get into direct communication with Khartoum, and consequently with Gordon.

'There was a project put forward for some force to be assembled at Suakin to act as a sort of diversion as regards Berber and the hostile tribes assembled there, thus drawing them off from Earle's advance upon this latter place, which I presume you contemplate, and besides that, there would seem to be considerable advantage in pushing forward the Suakin-Berber railroad, which has been for some time contemplated, but with which no progress has been made. Politically this railroad will I think in the future, if ever undertaken, open out the whole of the interior of the Soudan for commercial purposes in that direction, and on this ground alone I should like to see the work taken regularly in hand. Incidentally it would also have the effect of reassuring the tribes that it is not our purpose, commercially, to abandon those parts of the world, and would, moreover, facilitate any retrograde military movement that you might feel disposed to make on your withdrawal from Khartoum.

'We hear from you that you attach but little importance to an advance from Suakin, and it is even doubtful if anything is to be undertaken there or not. What made us think very favourably of the scheme was your suggestion of the Fleet making a demonstration on the coast off Suakin. Surely if this is to produce an effect, the sending of some reinforcements to Suakin itself, with the additional proposal to proceed with the railroad, would produce a far greater effect than any demonstration the Fleet could make. I am glad to find the boats have been doing so well, and that their soldier crews have worked so cheerfully and determinedly. I did not doubt that they would, with the good example set them by their officers; but at all events it is gratifying to find that the result was quite equal to what could be expected....'

From the moment the Desert Column plunged into the Bayuda Desert, an impenetrable veil fell over the whole scene of operations. As events turned out, it seems a pity

that the field-telegraph stores, of which there were plenty above Dongola, were not pushed forward and utilised for laying a line across the Desert, a work which we now know would have been perfectly feasible. Such a proceeding would at least have saved the country intense anxiety, and possibly have improved the military situation. As it was, the news that reached England had to be sent by camel across the Desert to Korti and thence telegraphed home by Lord Wolseley.

The Duke, upon receiving the news of the successful fight at Abu Klea, wrote as follows; and, whatever may have been the surprise and disappointment of the public when some days later the news arrived of the second heavy fight at El Gubat and of Sir Herbert Stewart's wound, it must be conceded that H.R.H. shows by this letter that he was at least fully aware of the grave dangers and wellnigh insuperable difficulties which lay before the column struggling onwards towards Khartoum:—

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'23 January 1885.

'I have received your letter dated Korti, December 25, and on Wednesday we received your important telegram informing us of Sir Herbert Stewart's severe action near the Wells of Abu Klea and his defeat of the Mahdi's forces, though with heavy losses to our small force. I have telegraphed my hearty congratulations to yourself and Stewart's troops, and it is evident that the fighting has been most creditable to the fine fellows composing that force, and to their gallant leader. But I must confess the fact of these Arabs having fought so bravely and determinedly fills me with great anxiety, as Stewart is very isolated and a very long way from support, and every man that can be sent to him, with all supplies and ammunition, must pass across that formidable desert, requiring an enormous number of camels to enable the passage to be accomplished. It may be that the neck of the resistance may have been broken by this severe encounter, and if so, Stewart may be able to hold his own in comparative security, well entrenched as he is sure to be at Metemmeh, but that we can only know with any degree of certainty by the events of the next few days after the action was fought, and of this as yet we here, of course, know nothing. Another serious consideration is the fall of Omdurman into the hands of the Mahdi. I feel this will give him the entire

command of the river up to Khartoum, and further, may prevent Gordon's steamers from running up and down the river for the future, and thus the means of communicating with Gordon from Metemneh may be altogether cut off. It is a most serious drawback that Earle's force must move forward by the river. He will probably have to fight a serious action before he reaches Abu Hamed, and then he has Berber before him, now strongly occupied by the Mahdi; and here again another action may have to be fought, and all this delay will render it impossible for Earle's force to join hands with Stewart's till, as you suggest in your letter, the end of February, and this is a very long period to look forward to. I enumerate all these difficulties to show you that I am quite alive to the anxious position in which you find yourself placed, and that every effort would be made from hence to render you all the support in our power. The worst of it is that we can render you but very little, if any, help. We cannot reach you for months with reinforcements, even if you required any, the distance from the base of operations and the serious obstacles to be overcome on the road upwards being so prodigious. I should like to see your gaps in the men at once filled up, but we cannot get them there, I fear, in time to be of the slightest use.

‘However, officers must be sent, and these shall be at once called for, though as yet you have not suggested that they should be sent. I deplore deeply the loss of so many gallant officers and men. Evidently the tribesmen in some way or other, probably by the weight of numbers, crushed in one face of the large square that Stewart was obliged to form; and this accounts more particularly for the grave loss in officers, all of whom I mourn from my heart. Burnaby was certainly a most gallant man, and courted death. He had peculiarities which I could not appreciate, but I am deeply grieved at his being killed, though he certainly died a gallant death. Carmichael, I remember him at the Intelligence Department; the others I did not know personally, except Lords St. Vincent and Airlie, of whom I had a slight acquaintance, and who I hope may recover from their wounds. Stewart himself seems to have had a narrow escape. The question of a force at Suakin presents itself to my mind. I would wish we had such a force there, for it would decidedly act as a diversion in the direction of Berber, which at the present moment would be of a very great advantage to your two advancing columns, and if judiciously handled, might produce most beneficial effects in occupying and drawing off a portion of the enemy there concentrated. No doubt it is late in the day for sending such a force even now, but, though this be so, I should for my part gladly see it sent, and we *could* make the effort of collecting a force, though, as you know, our means in this respect are greatly restricted. I am daily, I may say

hourly, pressing upon the Secretary of State the necessity for a general increase of our Army, to meet any further difficulties that may arise, even the necessity which may present itself of your continuing to hold Khartoum during the coming hot season should there be any unexpected delay in attaining that object of your forward movement.'

Four days later came the news of the desperate fight at Abu Kru, near Metemmeh, and of the successful march of the 'tiny square' through the hordes of fanatics to the river above El Gubat.

The Queen, on receiving the news of this, telegraphed as follows to the Duke:—

TELEGRAM FROM THE QUEEN.

'OSBORNE, 8.50 A.M., 29 Jan. 1885.

'Thankful for congratulations; these two actions, with severe fighting, have been most brilliant and successful, but grieve for losses, and for the gallant Sir H. Stewart's wound, which distress me much.'

Upon the receipt of the news of the successful fights the Duke wrote to Lord Wolseley, and also to Sir Herbert Stewart and Sir Charles Wilson, upon whom the command of the Desert Column had devolved. On the same day Lord Wolseley also wrote to the Duke.

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'30 January 1885.

'I have your letter of the 4th, written before all these great events have occurred, which have filled us all with much anxiety. You warned me not to believe any rumours, which were sure to be started if nothing was heard from you for some days after leaving Korti. But we knew you had *not* left Korti, and evidently a very grave action had been fought by Stewart's Column; and we also knew the difficult position in which, after this first action, it found itself placed, and consequently our anxieties were very great till we heard the good news that, after the very severe fighting and heavy losses, including the dangerous wound of Stewart himself, and his incapacity from continuing in command, the little column under Wilson and Boscawen was safely established at Gubat above Metemmeh, the Arabs having meanwhile been again defeated and severely punished. I name this to you to explain whence our anxieties originated.

‘Let me now congratulate you on the happy result that has attended this delicate and difficult operation across the Desert thus far, and the very able manner in which it has been conducted by Sir Herbert Stewart and the splendid fellows serving under him. That Stewart should have been so seriously wounded is a most serious loss to you, as he is now incapacitated from rendering you any further assistance, in this operation at all events. But I trust he may recover and continue an ornament to his profession, and I am delighted to think that Her Majesty has at once, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, and with my full concurrence, promoted him to the rank of Major-General. Our losses have been extremely heavy, and the care of so many wounded men will be an additional anxiety to you, and to those in command on the spot. Sir Charles Wilson seems to me to have acted with great vigour and firmness on assuming the command, as next senior officer, and the good sense and judgment he showed in handing the actual charge of the square to Lieutenant-Colonel Boscawen of the Coldstream Guards, an excellent officer, reflects the greatest credit upon him. I only hope he has been enabled to reach Khartoum by steamer, and to enter into personal communications with General Gordon; but on this point I don’t feel quite assured as yet, as in our account in to-day’s papers it is stated that the steamers on the Nile have not actually been up the Nile as far as Khartoum for the last month. Will they, then, be able to reach that destination now? God grant it! I see you are marching the 18th Royal Irish and 50th West Kent across the desert—a serious undertaking, but I make no doubt it will be accomplished. I fear you have had a great loss too in Camels, and this will be a great difficulty in the movement forward of convoys of provisions and stores, including ammunition. I only trust you find no insuperable difficulty in keeping the force so far in advance well supplied in these respects. That Sir R. Buller has been sent on to take charge is very judicious. I only wish we could send you reinforcements and fill up gaps, but it could not, I fear, be done before great heat set in. We could of course send some officers and men, but they would not be able to reach you in time to be of use. Officers may possibly have a chance of getting up, and these will be sent. Earle’s Column meanwhile seems to have made a good start, and I hope they will be able to reach Berber without any great obstruction; but the incidents of this contest are so peculiar that one cannot look forward to anything with confidence. That you should feel the weight of all this responsibility very sensibly, as referred to in your letter, I can well imagine, and enter fully into your anxieties in this respect. Only keep me well informed, and anything and everything in my power shall be done to assist you in your difficult and complicated task.

'*PS.*—I have sent congratulatory letters to Stewart and Wilson, which I hope will be forwarded to them on the earliest opportunity. Did you receive my telegram congratulating Stewart and his gallant force? I have not had an acknowledgment up to present time.'

TO SIR HERBERT STEWART.

'30 January 1885.

'It is with feelings of the greatest admiration that I write to you to-day to express my congratulations to you on your splendid successes, and on the admirable manner in which you conducted your gallant and comparatively small column of troops through the Desert and up to the Nile above Metemneh.

'I only wish that you had escaped from the severe wound from which I grieve to hear you are now suffering, and which unfortunately disables you from any further activity at the present moment; but I hope God's merciful Providence may soon restore you to complete health and strength, and thus that you will be enabled to continue to exercise high functions in that splendid profession of arms of which you have proved yourself so distinguished an ornament. Her Majesty has at once decided, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, in which I entirely concurred, to raise you to the rank of Major-General, an honour of which you have a right to be justly proud, as it has been entirely due to your own admirable military qualities. No words can describe to you the admiration I feel for the gallant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men whom you have had the advantage to command, and who have so nobly maintained the honour of their Queen and country, and I only deplore the heavy losses that have necessarily resulted from the difficult and dangerous task it has fallen to their lot to carry out.

'Hoping and praying that further successes may attend you and them, individually and collectively . . .'

It is hardly necessary to add here that the foregoing letter never reached the gallant Stewart, who succumbed to his severe wounds on 16 February during the subsequent retreat across the Bayuda Desert.

TO SIR CHARLES WILSON.

'30 January 1885.

'It is with feelings of great admiration and satisfaction that I congratulate you on the success of Sir Herbert Stewart's gallant column of troops after the severe wound

received by that distinguished officer, the operations being conducted by yourself as next senior officer; and I further must assure you that I highly appreciate the judgment and good feeling you evinced in handing over the actual charge of the square in which you advanced towards the Nile to Colonel Boscawen of the Coldstream Guards, to whom all credit is due for the manner in which he carried out your instructions. God's merciful Providence supported your splendid fellows, and enabled them to surmount the great difficulties and dangers with which you had to contend, and you and they are rewarded with complete success, and I trust with comparative security in your position on the Nile above Metemneh. I trust you have been enabled personally to communicate with General Charles Gordon in Khartoum, and that we may soon hear of your safe return thence, and the result of your mission.'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'CAMP KORTI, 30 January 1885.

'Since I last wrote to Your Royal Highness on the 4th instant, events have been marching more quickly than they seemed to outsiders to have been doing during the month of December. Information received and other circumstances which I shall not encumber this letter with have made me modify my plans, and not push forward on Khartoum with the mounted troops alone as I had intended doing. I am now working in a more methodical manner and upon more cautious lines, which, although less agreeable to the fiery spirits amongst whom I now live, is, I am sure, the best, and indeed the proper course to follow. We are so far removed from all possible help in the event of any check, that it is better not to run any risk that can be avoided. Our recent fights, the account of which I have telegraphed home, will soon, I hope, bear good fruit. If Earle can but have one really good action near the point of the river, where he is now working his boats up, the Mahdi will begin, I think, to feel rather unpleasant in his stomach.

'What I have to lament is the loss of Stewart's services; certainly a man not only after my own heart, but he was the life and soul of every force he was associated with. . . . All accounts agree upon one point: no Arab who got into the square or close enough to engage our men got away, or is now alive to say what he did. It is very significant that the charges of the enemy on the 19th—that is, in the second battle—were not delivered with the same determination as were those made at Abu Klea on the 17th inst.

'On the latter-named day our men were not able to deliver their fire as early as advisable on account of our skirmishers being in front at the time when the enemy's

charge began. This Arab fighting is rather a difficult problem. You must receive their charge in square, pouring out from it a murderous fire. If you don't, they will destroy you by sheer weight of numbers; but then, when you are in this close formation, you become a terrible target for their guns when they bring them into action, and also for their riflemen. In the last day's fight all our loss was from rifle fire, whereas at Abu Klea our chief loss was from spear and sword. The Dervishes and black riflemen from Khartoum have now had so much good training in fighting Gordon at that place, that they have learnt their trade well from their enemy. They fully understand the value of their determined charge and the great power given to them by their long-ranging rifles.

'I am sending on the Royal Irish and West Kent across the desert to Metemmeh; but it is difficult to feed even our small force at that place. Although I can buy camels all along my line, I cannot obtain camel drivers, and the loss in camels is very great. From this place to Gakdul is 100 miles. Of every convoy I send there I lose from 5 to 10 per cent. of the camels employed in going and returning. Now, if the good people who write flippantly about moving an army over the 250 miles intervening between Suakin and Berber would only calculate out the number of camels that would be required for that operation, and for the feeding and military supply of that army when it reached Berber, they would soon find that it would be simply impossible to obtain the number of camels required, or to feed them, supposing one did obtain them. I never remember a subject about which so much nonsense has been written as about this route from Suakin as a possible line of communication for an army when the tribes are hostile. Of course if one could lay down a railway along it, the aspect of the problem would be entirely changed; but a railway would take fully a year to construct, and a fighting army to protect the army of labourers provided for its construction. The whole idea is the vision of a visionary; and the more one campaigns here the more one realises its absurdity. Colonel Furze is doing very good work here as Director of Transports. The result of our recent actions is to give the tribes greater confidence in us. When you ask a native now his opinion of the position, he says it is all over now with the Mahdi—and yet we are tolerably certain, I believe, to have some hard fighting yet before that impostor is disposed of.

'I have had to send General Buller on to replace General Stewart. Your Royal Highness will understand how dangerously inconvenient this is to me. It would be impossible for any stranger to step in and take up the running, so I have put General Wood in Buller's place, and am bringing on Brigadier-General Grenfell to take Wood's former duties

replacing Grenfell at Dal by Colonel Clery from Cairo. As I am now very short of tried officers to whom I should be justified in committing the lives of our soldiers, I have privately asked General Stephenson to let Dormer come on here as if for the purpose of seeing the country. I have told him I cannot promise him employment; but in the event of further losses amongst the senior officers, I should be glad to think I had a good man available on the spot. Dormer is a good Staff Officer, so theoretically he is just what I want; it remains to be proved whether practically he has the proper nerve, determination, and those fighting qualities so essential to the leader of men in action. I have asked Stephenson not to mention my proposal to any one, except Your Royal Highness and to Dormer himself. All the troops here are very keen to get to the front; I have kept back the Essex Regiment to find garrisons for the various posts on our line of communications in this province. . . . The Royal Irish is a splendid Battalion; it is now marching on foot across the desert. The 1st Battalion West Kent is also very good. Indeed, although we have not called out any of the Army Reserve this time, nothing could be better than the Battalions serving in this little army. We have very little sickness. The men who were obliged to go into hospital with sore hands are now returning to duty. Their hands were in many instances very bad from constant rowing and tracking. Our nights are still very cold. Indeed the doctors tell me that our wounded the first night suffered much from cold, their blankets being behind with the baggage in the zeriba. Even the days are pleasantly cool, with a strong fresh breeze blowing from the north.'

'Sunday, 1 February.

'Yesterday evening I heard from Earle, who is working slowly up the river to get within striking distance of Berti, where the enemy have collected some thousands of men. His news was dated 7 P.M., 30 January. Colonel Butler, who commands his advanced guard, had reconnoitred Berti and found it strongly occupied. A deserter had given them most satisfactory information, although, like all natives, he exaggerated the number of the enemy in our front. The native cannot estimate numbers. The important part of his information was, that the Emir of Berber had written to the Sheik in command at Berti telling him we had occupied Metemmeh and sent on soldiers and food by steamer to Gordon. He said Earle's Army was too strong to be opposed, and he advised the Sheik in command to retire. If he accepts and acts on this advice, it will be very unfortunate as far as I can see. The nearer to this place Earle can have his fight the better, as we can more easily arrange for the care of his wounded.'

And now came the mysterious lull which caused such anxiety in England.

How hopeful every one at home had become that Khartoum would, after all, be reached 'somehow' by Lord Wolseley is now a matter of history.

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

'1 Feb. 1885.

'It is more clear than ever that a Suakin movement now can have no possible effect on Wolseley's operations for reaching Khartoum. All that it can do will be to facilitate the return.

'Now that in all probability the successful relief of Khartoum is assured, and that we may begin to think of the return, it will be desirable to put this view of the question before Lord Wolseley.'

On the same day that Lord Hartington wrote thus to the Duke, Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley, who had accompanied Sir Charles Wilson in his memorable attempt to communicate with Gordon, arrived at the British Fort at El Gubat bringing the terrible news of the Fall of Khartoum and the death of the heroic Gordon.

The news of this disaster was sent by camel across the desert to Lord Wolseley at Korti, reaching him on 4 February, whence it was telegraphed by him to the Secretary of State for War, Lord Hartington.

Much controversy has raged as to who ought rightly to bear the blame for this appalling catastrophe, and ungenerous attempts have been made to charge it to minor delays of hours in the long-drawn-out effort of many months which the stupendous struggle against Nature in the Nile Campaign involved. It fell to the lot of the present writer to be in charge of the Intelligence Department at the front during these critical weeks of our history, and he has never doubted that the responsibility for Gordon's death rested, not with the leaders or soldiers, but with those in England who, despite urgent military advice, declined to allow preparations to be made for the Nile Campaign, until it was too late.

Lord Kitchener (then a Captain and Brevet-Major), who arrived at Metemmeh previous to the retreat across the

Bayuda Desert, and whose knowledge of the Soudan at that time and since is second to none, emphatically expressed his opinions to the writer to the same effect at the time, and subsequently in a written report.

It should therefore be placed on record that these were the views held by the Duke when in possession of all the facts of the case. After the return of the present writer from the Soudan, H.R.H. closely questioned him on the subject, and many years afterwards, when engaged in discussing the compilation of this book, he reiterated the same opinions which are set forth in his letters of 1885.

These views were, however, not accepted by all. Hence the following telegram from Queen Victoria to the Duke on receipt of the dreadful news is of unusual interest, showing as it does how well Her Majesty appreciated the dangers of the delay to send out an expedition sooner, and how quick she was to grasp the true cause of the catastrophe.

TELEGRAM FROM THE QUEEN.

‘OSBORNE, 2.30 P.M., 5 February 1885.

‘What awful news: to think a few months’ action sooner would have prevented this maddening disaster.’

The Duke upon receiving the bad news wrote to Lord Wolseley as follows:—

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

‘6 February 1885.

‘You can well imagine how distressed I was yesterday morning when the sad news reached us of the Fall of Khartoum, which of course as a result entirely changes the position of things in the Soudan, and leaves you and your force in a very altered and not very pleasant position. Thank God this misfortune has befallen us from no default on the part of the splendid force under your command, and it is a bright speck in this unfortunate business that the fine column under Stewart has fought two very severe, most brilliant, and very successful actions; so that the honour of the Army stands higher than it ever did in the estimation of the public and of the world in general. I believe the Government have decided upon putting a bold face on it, and only holding their hand to the necessities of the climate, leaving it to you to concentrate where you may think most desirable, possibly, as you suggest, at Debbeh. For my own part I should be glad,

after securing the safety of the Gubat Column, by drawing it in towards you, to see you push on to Berber, there to fight a big fight and defeat the Mahdi's followers, and then to open out the line of communication thence to Suakin, where a strong force would have to be sent to meet you and assist you in driving away Osman Digma's people, who are now certain to fight again, and no doubt very fiercely. I am very curious to hear the details which led up to the fall of Khartoum, and I think on this point we are still greatly in the dark. I don't know what to hope as regards to Gordon. I should rejoice to see him saved with honour; but if he is only a melancholy hostage in the Mahdi's hands, I would greatly prefer to hear, for *his sake*, that he had been killed in action. Everything that can be done to support you in any direction you may indicate will be at once attended to, and you may rely with confidence on the fullest support from the Government and myself. The difficulties of supplying the troops will now become doubly great, for the tribes will now all go over to the Mahdi's cause, and will do all in their power to facilitate his movements, and take a very strong antagonistic line to our troops. I am very anxious too about Sir Charles Wilson, and only hope most sincerely that he and his party will reach Gubat in safety. The loss of both his steamers on the passage up and down the Nile seems to me most remarkable. Was there any treachery connected with these events?'

The fall of Khartoum vastly modified the military situation. The remnant of the Desert Column, which had been holding its own on the Nile above Metemmeh, awaiting reinforcements both by the desert route and the river, was now placed in a position of great jeopardy. It was one thing to push on and lend a hand to Gordon in Khartoum with his garrison of some 6000 men, and another vainly to dash with less than 800 British soldiers against that town when held by 50,000 fanatics maddened by success and the slaughter of the unfortunate defenders and inhabitants.

A point which few, save those who know the Soudan and its tribes, seem ever to have realised, is that when the Mahdi brought down the pure Arab Baggara tribes to attack Khartoum, the fighting entered upon an entirely new phase. Gordon had hitherto held his own easily against the local tribes, but with the arrival of these fighting tribes the fate of Khartoum was sealed, and it is an unfortunate fact that our victories at Abu Klea and Gubat hastened the catastrophe.

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'CAMP KORTI, 14 Feb. 1885.

'... Having two columns out, one 180 miles towards the S.E., the other 100 miles off to the N.E., increases correspondence most seriously, especially as I am trying to effect a combined movement upon Berber with these two columns; they also can only communicate one with the other by sending back through me. This operation on Berber is consequently the most difficult scheme I have ever had to work out. If Khartoum had fallen a month earlier I should not have sent any one across the desert at all, but would have stuck to my original plan of a steady advance up the Nile valley to Berber with all my fighting force. I divided it in the hope of being able to rush upon Khartoum to save Gordon should such a risk become a necessity.

'I am very glad to learn, from Reuter's telegrams, that such a considerable force is being sent to Suakin, and that General Greaves is to be with it. . . . I expect Buller to take Metemmeh to-morrow.'

Sir Redvers Buller, who arrived at El Gubat with reinforcements on 11 February, charged with the express duty of taking Metemmeh, after receiving reports from the present writer on the 12th, on the defences and garrison of Metemmeh and of the dispatch of a number of dervishes from Khartoum to attack the force at El Gubat, ordered a retreat to the wells of Abu Klea. The wounded and sick were sent off the following day, and the small force, after throwing their supplies into the river and disabling Gordon's remaining steamers, marched out at dawn on the 14th. A halt was made at Abu Klea wells for some days, whilst the wounded were being sent back to Korti.

On the 23rd a very large number of dervishes sent by the Mahdi from Khartoum to envelop and destroy the small British force, appeared on the scene, and it was obvious that an attack was imminent. The same evening after sundown General Buller, having first filled in the wells at Abu Klea and thereby secured the delay of the dervishes' pursuit, led his troops off quietly in the dark and made good his retreat. Seldom in our history has there been a narrower escape from disaster.

Meanwhile the River Column had fought, on 10 February,

a sharp action at Kirbekan, in which General Earle was killed. The following letters, however, give full details of the operations subsequent to the fall of Khartoum:—

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

‘13 February 1885.

‘ . . . I do not like the mail to close without sending you a line, that you may not think that I am in any respect neglecting you in the present difficult circumstances in which you find yourself placed. I rejoice in the success of Earle’s Column, but mourn his loss, for he was a worthy man and excellent officer, and he was on the road to further distinction in the field, had he been spared. Colonel Eyre too was, I understand, a good officer, although I did not know him personally. I am afraid our superior officers expose themselves more than is judicious. It is a splendid feeling, and I must and do admire it, but I think they should not be too dashing, as we can ill spare them, and I feel our men do not want being urged on to do their duty nobly, as they have carried all before them. Thank God! Wilson and C. Beresford are safe back, for I own I was very anxious about them. Their conduct was splendid and dashing, and worthy of all praise. We are now moving heaven and earth to get off the Suakin force. Graham, in whom I know you have every confidence, will command this force, and Greaves will be an excellent Chief of his Staff. Fremantle with the Guards, and McNeill with the Line Brigade, will be active and useful Brigadiers; and Ewart will look well after the Cavalry sent out, two good squadrons from two very nice Regiments—5th Lancers and 20th Hussars; not a man or a horse had to be transferred from another Regiment, which is satisfactory. I do not enter into further details. A Brigade of Native Infantry and one Regiment of Native Cavalry will join the European Force at Suakin. I rejoice to think that the Government have given you *carte blanche* to conduct the operations as you may think best. The Suakin people will, I hope, first destroy the power of Osman Digma, which seems again to have grown formidable, and then open out the route to Berber, which I hope you will be able to assist in doing when you have taken Berber, as I trust you may succeed in doing by the time you have named. I hear you want to go to Gubat to join that force. I hope, now that poor Earle is killed, you will decide not to do this. Redvers Buller is a most reliable man with that force, and your being altogether cut off from communication with us at home will, I think, be a great disadvantage; but it is left to you to do what you think wisest and best, and I am sure you will consider the matter well, and will do the right thing what-

ever your decision may be. The country is sound at heart and determined for action, and you will receive the fullest support from all quarters: of that I feel perfectly satisfied. . . .

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

‘20 February 1885.

‘The news which has reached us this last week is full of interest. To-day we have heard of the death of Sir Herbert Stewart—a most serious loss to the Army and to the Country, and one which I, in common with you all, *deeply deplore*. I feared this would be so from the first, from the remark I heard of the gravity of his wound, and felt anxiety for his being moved, which I thought might hasten the end, which appeared to me too probable. He has died a soldier’s death, and has done his duty nobly by his Queen and Country. I grieve for his poor widow. There seems also no longer a doubt that poor Gordon was killed at Khartoum when treachery opened its gates to the enemy—another splendid Englishman gone to his last home. He was a most remarkable man, and his name will be handed down to posterity as a hero sacrificed to duty.

‘We have now heard of Buller’s withdrawal from Gubat to Abu Klea. I rejoice at this movement having been made, and successfully accomplished. I own I felt in great anxiety about this force ever since the fall of Khartoum. With the Mahdi’s large army well supplied with guns and muskets coming down the Nile upon their position, and with Mettemeh in the front strongly garrisoned and defended, I could not see how they would have been justified to attempt to take that place by assault. Buller rightly judged the importance of extricating himself from the now false position, and has done wisely and well to withdraw to Abu Klea, and I presume you will now draw him back further still towards Korti. The taking of Berber this season has become an extremely difficult operation, and I shall not be the least surprised if I hear that you have been obliged to postpone it till the Autumn. But then comes the difficulty of your being able to supply your force during the hot summer months. Can you get supplies from the country, and if not, can you draw them to you from your rear up the Nile or across the desert from Korosko? Both these will be serious operations, but no doubt you have considered these matters very carefully. We are now hastening the expedition out to Suakin. Graham and Greaves start to-night, Fremantle will be on the spot. McNeill is coming from India, and Ewart goes out with the Cavalry troopship. The Guards, three very fine Battalions, will all be embarked and off by to-morrow. The great difficulty will be the transport on landing. Greaves declares that nothing can be done under 10,000 camels.

Graham supports this view; but for the present, at all events, we shall not be able to obtain more than about 6000 or 7000. If Osman Digma can be got to stand somewhere in the neighbourhood of Suakin, this will do. If he slips away, Graham will have the greatest difficulty in following or picking him up. And then there is the railway line, that must be protected as it proceeds. It is altogether a serious undertaking, and will require all the talents and ability of those who are engaged in it.

'The climate is what I most dread, and that the Regiments will be so reduced by sickness and heat that during the coming summer they will not be fit for much when the season for active operations reopens.

'Therefore I hope that every *one* who can be spared after Osman Digma has been dealt with may be sent to the cooler and healthier positions near Suez or elsewhere, so as to be kept in good trim for future eventualities.

'I am glad to find you have brought Dormer and Clery to the front. We are embodying some Militia and Reserves, but to my mind not half enough. I trust, however, that gradually more will be added. At all events we are making a start. The feeling of the country is decidedly now being roused, and the Government could, I think, get anything voted they wished. The offers of several Colonies to send contingents for service in the field is most gratifying, and should most undoubtedly be *accepted* and encouraged. . . .'

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'27 February 1885.

' . . . I hope you will tell Colonel Talbot that I am quite satisfied that he and his officers did their duty most splendidly, and that the proof is patent from the fact of their heavy loss, the men cheerfully and gallantly obeying the orders they received. I confess I am much relieved to think that Redvers Buller has got out of the very isolated and awkward position in which he found himself placed with poor Stewart's Column at Gubat, and I hope from your telegram of to-day that we may shortly hear of his safe arrival at Gakdul Wells. Once there, I feel assured that he is in safe communication with you at Korti. I confess also to a feeling of relief that you have stayed Brackenbury's further advance, and that you now propose to concentrate your force more on the Nile, so as to take up a good and safe position for the summer months. The anxiety I feel is as regards your supplies, which I fear may not be easily procurable for the lengthened period you will have to rest on your own, and, moreover, I also have some apprehensions as to the health of the men. When moving and actively engaged, men stand the heat much better than when stationary and

without constant occupation to keep the mind employed, but you will, of course, take every precaution in your power to stay this mischief if it should arise. . . . I trust all is going on smoothly as regards the Suakin force; the troops have all sailed both from home and, I think, from India, so I trust they will be assembled in time to strike a severe blow against Osman Digma, and thus clear the ground for the railroad to be pushed on as far and as rapidly as possible. It will not be an easy matter to protect it during the hot weather, but Graham will do his best, I hope, and will save his European troops as much as possible.'

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'6 March 1885.

' . . . Thank God, Buller's force is safely returned to Gakdul Wells, and now I find you are withdrawing Brackenbury to Korti: that you are wise to concentrate under present circumstances I do not for a moment doubt, but I wish you could have attained and occupied Abu Hamed, or better still Berber, before you are obliged to go into *summer* quarters. I dread the health of the troops without occupation in that intensely hot climate, and I feel assured you will mitigate the ill effects to be feared from it to the best of your ability. But I fear the means at your disposal to effect this are extremely limited. That you wish for the railroad along the Nile to be prolonged I can well understand, but I fear the difficulty will be great of getting up to the front the required heavy plant. I cannot see why the Suakin railroad is not to be pushed on at the same time. Everything has now gone out to commence this at once, and I think it would be a great mistake now to give it up or return it, and I should imagine that the one on the Nile would not in any respect interfere with the other, or be retarded should both be taken in hand at the same time. As regards supplies, I feel anxious as regards fresh meat and vegetables. These will be absolutely needful. Can you be certain of obtaining them if the tribes become unfriendly, as they are not unlikely to become now that the advance is stopped? No doubt these subjects are uppermost in your mind, but I name them to you, to show you how thoroughly alive I am to the difficulty of your position. As regards officers, every officer you have asked for who could be possibly sent has been sent out to you, and if you require more they must be sent, of course, but you will be obliged to take some who may not have seen much active service so far, for the best reason in the world that our wars of late have not been numerous, and that the same officers have generally been employed; consequently your area of choice becomes somewhat limited. My own feeling in the matter is that the great bulk of our officers are good,

and that you will find a large proportion of them up to their work. Some of course will not answer expectation, and these must then be got rid of. I believe there are among the senior officers many who will do well, and if you will only give them a chance they will not fail you. Baker Russell is in South Africa commanding his regiment. I don't see how he could well be removed from there at present. I hear you want a Commanding, Royal Engineers, and Colonel Grant shall be sent. I am glad you have thought so highly of all our troops in the field. I believe the spirit of our Army is as good as it ever was both amongst officers and men. What the men want is a little more age among the last joined, and experience of the service. We have much anxiety about the Afghan frontier question at this moment, and we may have to send reinforcements to India, which will still further tax our energies. . . . Alison is now hard at work, and I find him an excellent man and of the greatest use to me. . . .'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'CAMP, KORTI, 23 February 1885.

'... I have stated in my previous letters my desert expedition was solely undertaken for the purpose of carrying help to Gordon at all hazards, in the event of my finding it necessary to do so. I always disliked the division of my troops it entailed, and the departure from my original plan for the relief of Khartoum by an expeditionary force up the Nile valley. In fact, my adoption of the desert route for a part of my troops was an attempt on my part—at great military risks—to make up for the time that had been recklessly thrown away by Mr. Gladstone last spring and summer when preparations for this operation towards Khartoum should have been deliberately made. There is no use, however, in looking back; we must now prepare for making the troops as comfortable as possible during the summer, and preparing for the autumn campaign, to which I look forward with the utmost pleasure. I shall no longer have my force divided, and I shall therefore be able to advance with it. This staying in the rear has been most trying to the nerves; it has been the first time I have had to undergo such an experience, and I trust I may never again have to repeat it. . . .'

FROM SIR CHARLES WILSON.

'KORTI, 2 March 1885.

'I trust Y.R.H. will allow me to thank you most sincerely for the very kind letter of congratulation on the part which I took in the fight for the Nile on 19 January, which I

received last mail. It is always pleasant to know that one's services are approved by one's superiors, and the approval of Y.R.H. is doubly welcome to a soldier. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the officers and men on 19 January; they were determined to win the Nile that evening, and when the Arab spearmen charged they gave them a cheer, and set to work as coolly and quietly as if they were on parade.

'We had to fight our way into Khartoum and out, through nearly four miles of continuous firing from Krupps, mountain guns, Mitrailleuses, and Remingtons; it was therefore a terrible disappointment to find all in the hands of the Mahdi, and Gordon dead. I trust Y.R.H. will read General Gordon's *Journal*, which goes down to Sir Evelyn Baring to-day; it is deeply interesting, and the remarks which he makes on the future policy with regard to the Soudan, and on the present condition of the country, are well worthy of the earnest consideration of H.M. Government.'

Lord Wolseley now proceeded to Cairo, and thence to Suakin, where the new expedition under Sir Gerald Graham was being assembled.

On 30 March 1885 the Russian troops from the Trans-Caspian district made an attack on the Afghans on the Kushk river and afterwards occupied Penjdeh, which was certainly within the Ameer's territory—an incident which brought England and Russia on the verge of war. This largely influenced the British Government in its subsequent decision to discontinue operations in the Soudan.

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'CAIRO, 19 April 1885.

'... 22 April.—The announcement made by Mr. Gladstone in Parliament is a death-blow to all our hopes in the Soudan. I am sending home by the steamer that will take this letter, Major Spencer Childers, who is in my confidence and understands all my views on the military situation here. I want him to see Mr. Gladstone and Lord Hartington, and I shall tell him to wait on Your Royal Highness. I regard any withdrawal of troops from the Dongola province as most unwise, and sincerely trust no such policy may be decided upon. . . . I am still without orders as to my own movements, but that is a matter of little moment. I would much prefer being in the Soudan to being in Cairo. I like living amongst soldiers, and here it is a sort of London life in a mild way. I keep the fact of being a soldier before me by never at any

time being out of uniform, but do as one may, in a place like this, a great city, one loses touch of the private soldier, and, after all, *he* is the important man to be studied, and with whom it is necessary to be in unison, if one wishes to get much out of the Army he belongs to. . . .'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'SUAKIN, 7 May 1885.

'To-day I am to receive Lord Hartington's final instructions as to what I am to do here, and to learn whether the Government is still determined to withdraw our troops from the Upper Nile. Now that the Russian scare seems to be passing over, there is no excuse for bringing away the troops now beyond Dongola. To withdraw them is, I conceive, a very foolish policy. No one can be more anxious than I am to rid ourselves of all Soudanese, and indeed of all Egyptian, difficulties, but to withdraw from the Province of Dongola, give it up to anarchy and the Mahdi, in fact to leave our present advanced positions until we have broken the Mahdi's power, is the very worst way of setting about the attainment of that object. The Turk is our only chance of settling matters here quickly; but I am afraid Mr. Gladstone is too far compromised about "bag and baggage," etc., to allow of any such solution to our Soudan troubles. If the troops are withdrawn from the Upper Nile, the policy pursued by the Government will be opposed to the views always expressed by the late General Gordon, to the advice given to the Government by Baring and myself, and the expression of opinion lately sent to them by telegraph by Sir Charles Wilson, Major Kitchener, and Sir Redvers Buller. It will also be in direct opposition to the views and wishes and opinions of the Khedive, of Nubar Pasha, and of all the Egyptian Ministers.

'To fly in the face of the advice given to them by every one on the spot is a strong measure, and bespeaks great confidence in their own judgment. I am afraid, however, their action is solely influenced by party politics. The party exigencies of the moment have more weight than the interests of our Empire. This is plain speaking; but I think the time has come for all men who love their country to speak out, no matter on which side of the House they may sit, or with which they may sympathise. I am quite sure that if we could get rid of Mr. Gladstone, Lord Hartington as Prime Minister would adopt a very different policy. . . .'

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 22 May 1885.

' . . . I cannot tell you how greatly I deplore the recent

decision of withdrawal from the Soudan, and the giving up of the Suakin-Berber railroad. To me this course seems almost suicidal, and I think it has been taken against the advice of yourself and Baring, and indeed all the local authorities, and I can assure you it is quite as much against my own and Alison's, who have endeavoured to point out the serious risks about to be run by such a course of action. I believe Osman Digma as well as the Mahdi were gradually collapsing, the tribes feeling that the power was in our hands and not in theirs after recent engagements, whereas now that we withdraw, these powerful elements of disturbance will come to the front again with renewed vigour, and all confidence will be shaken in our power and military strength and determination. It is most deplorable, and I grieve over it from my heart, and very much share the views expressed on the subject in your letter and telegram, which I have seen and supported as far as I was in a position to do so. I have no doubt you have been fully aware of this all along, but I am anxious that there should be no sort of misapprehension on the subject. . . .

The deplorable results of this action are now known to all the world. The Soudan was overrun by the fanatical hordes of the Mahdi, the tribes who had countenanced our advance and in any way assisted us were practically exterminated under circumstances of horrible barbarity, and the whole country laid waste. Eventually the reconquest of the Soudan had to be undertaken; and it is significant to note that in September 1898 Lord Kitchener found two strong British Brigades, with Egyptian and Soudanese troops, amounting in all to 25,000 men, supplemented by modern batteries of howitzers and field artillery, and ably supported by powerfully armed gunboats, none too strong a force with which to break the power of the Khalifa. Those who lightly blamed the survivors of the desperate fights of Abu Klea and El Gubat for not pushing on and 'smashing' the Mahdi, might infuse a little more thought into their criticism.

CHAPTER XXXI

LORD HARTINGTON, MR. SMITH, AND MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN—1882-86

Lord Hartington and Lord Morley. H.R.H. on state of Army, 1882-83. Proposed reduction of Cadres. Proposed Restoration of Regimental Numbers. Lord Wolseley's Memorandum on state of Army. H.R.H.'s Annual Report on Army, 26 December 1883. Indian Drafts at this period. H.R.H.'s statement on Estimates, 1885-86. Lord Hartington's Farewell. Sir Charles Warren's Bechuanaland Expedition. Mr. Smith assumes office. His Farewell. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman assumes office as War Secretary for the first time.

ON 16 December 1882 Lord Hartington, as explained in a previous chapter, succeeded Mr. Childers as Secretary of State on the transference of the latter to the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, and Lord Morley continued under the new régime to hold the post of Parliamentary Under-Secretary, as he had previously done under Mr. Childers. The new combination was a most happy one; and Lord Hartington pursued the excellent plan of handing over certain subjects to his second-in-command. Thus, when papers dealing with these came before the Secretary of State, he stamped them 'Lord Morley'; and after that the officials at the War Office knew that the latter's decisions were to be taken as authoritative. This plan had the advantage of securing that proposals should receive more careful consideration than is possible when the Secretary of State attempts to see everything himself, and is necessarily obliged to scamp his work.

On the occasion of assuming office as War Secretary, Lord Hartington wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

'INDIA OFFICE, 18 *December* 1882.

'I am extremely obliged to Y.R.H. for the kind expressions regarding myself personally contained in Y.R.H.'s letter of the 17th, and I look forward with much pleasure to resuming the intimate personal relations between us which formerly existed, and which I trust there will be no reason for disturbing in the smallest degree. While it will be my duty to endeavour to the best of my ability to maintain and to carry into effect in the spirit in which they have been adopted the great changes which have been made in military organisation since I was at the War Office, I can assure Y.R.H. that it will be my earnest desire to work in harmony with Y.R.H., and to avoid, as far as possible, unnecessary causes of difference.

'I have some matters to dispose of here which will probably detain me during the day, but I shall hope to come to the War Office to-morrow morning, when perhaps it may be convenient to Y.R.H. to talk over a few matters with me.'

A week later the Duke addressed a memorandum to the new Secretary of State, and called attention to the difficulties which had been encountered in meeting the requirements of the Egyptian Expedition of 1882. From motives of economy the Militia had not been embodied, as the Cardwell scheme required; and an unsatisfactory state of affairs resulted. The Duke refers to the vital necessity of an adequate supply of horses for the Cavalry and Artillery, and it is interesting to note that he also advocated 'one Company being at all times kept available for Mounted Infantry duties in the several Battalions of the Army.' Had this plan been adopted, how much trouble might have been saved during the Boer War! Then there was suddenly an urgent demand for mounted troops, and a large number of Mounted Infantry were consequently extemporised. Many of these at first proved to be of little use, although in time they became of the highest value; and a considerable proportion of the small columns, which in the later stages of the war were employed in crushing the Boers, were largely composed of them; in this rôle they in time proved themselves, as regards the particular class of work in hand, as useful as Cavalry soldiers. But this does not alter the fact that a large supply of Mounted Infantry at

the initial stages of the war would have been an asset of incalculable value.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'22 December 1882.

' . . . I annex a report on the condition in which Battalions will be left after the annual drafts have embarked for India and the Colonies; and I would invite the special and very serious attention of the Secretary of State to this document, from which it will be seen that, after the departure of the drafts, the Battalions of Infantry on the lower establishment become for military purposes next to useless.

'The ordinary garrison duties incidental to Home Service cannot be carried on without the greatest difficulty, and it will be felt to be even a more serious matter with regard to Ireland, taking into consideration the present requirements in that country and the heavy and constant duties that, as a result, are thrown upon the troops forming its garrisons. . . .

' . . . It therefore appears to me, that the necessity has been clearly demonstrated for an increase in establishment of the lower standards of the Home Battalions, and I believe that, unless these Battalions can be raised to 600 rank and file, the condition of the Army can only be looked upon as in a really dangerous state of weakness and inefficiency. If on the other hand the standard of 600 rank and file as the lowest establishments could be sanctioned, this would allow of about 400 rank and file always left in the Home Battalions after they had supplied the annual wants of the Foreign Battalion.

'In order to secure this most desirable result, an increase of about 6450 men would be required . . . and this is the recommendation which I would venture most strongly to make, and in which I know the Adjutant-General, Lord Wolseley, most certainly concurs, as absolutely essential and necessary with a view to maintaining the efficiency of the Infantry of the Home Army, and enabling the Home Battalions to keep up the establishments of those serving abroad.

'I must now request the Secretary of State to permit me to refer to another subject: the recent Expedition to Egypt. This very considerable operation has been happily carried out with complete success, and the results are before the world. But it cannot be denied that, whilst our successes have been complete, the difficulties we have had to contend with in fitting out the Expedition have been very considerable, as I shall now endeavour to explain. On the outbreak of hostilities the Army was on its ordinary peace establishment, and we had a large number of recruits in the ranks

of Battalions of the 1st Army Corps, as the last arrangement for the gradual increase of these Battalions during a succession of years had only lately been brought into operation, and was not developed on this account as to the good results which were anticipated.

'A large number of recruits and untrained men of these Battalions had therefore to be left at home, but their places were happily filled very effectively by the 1st Class Army Reserve men, who had been called out, under the authority of Parliament, to the amount of 13,000 men. Thus very fairly efficient Battalions took the field, and the young soldiers were pushed on as rapidly as possible at home to be sent out as drafts to replenish casualties from time to time. It is to be regretted that the organisation scheme as originally laid down and accepted was not carried out then in its entirety, for in that case the affiliated Militia Battalions of Regiments in the field ought to have been at once embodied to take the places of the troops embarked for special service, and to enable larger drafts to be prepared should the requirements of a prolonged contest demand them. Fortunately the shortness of actual hostilities enabled us to get on without the aid of these Battalions, but it was thought advisable to keep out for the full period of fifty-six days such Militia Battalions as were then undergoing their annual training, and now we find our home force greatly reduced in consequence of having been obliged to leave 10,000 to 13,000 men in Egypt, which form a portion of our peace establishment at home.

'Moreover, in order to meet this demand upon our resources, we have had to retain in the ranks a large number of the Reserve men originally called out. There cannot be a doubt that if it is possible to shorten the special service with the Colours of the Reserve, such a course should invariably be adopted, and nothing but the absolute necessity of the case could have justified any deviation from it. Whilst active service lasts, the Reserve men understand the necessity for their presence; when peaceful occupation ensues, they become discontented and disturbed at not being allowed to return to their ordinary civil avocations. Had the affiliated Militia Battalions been embodied, these would have met our wants, and the Reserve men could have been allowed to return, more rapidly at all events, to their homes and ordinary employment.

'I must here advert to the great paucity of Officers, which has caused us such serious difficulties. Last year the officers of our Depôt Cavalry were reduced throughout the service. This I always thought would be a great disadvantage, and would be much felt. It has been so on this occasion. From the first we had the greatest difficulty to fill up sudden war requirements of the Battalions going on service. We had further to find officers for the Depôts sent on to Malta and



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*F. H. R. H. The Duke of Cambridge R. G.
1806*

Cyprus, and to take charge of young soldiers, those necessarily left at home. Every available officer was taken from other corps, but this did not meet the case; we then had to draw on the Militia, and it is a fact that the drafts to be sent would not have had a single officer in the Regular Army to go out with them, only the Field Officer in command, the remainder being all taken from the Militia, a most serious state of things, and this, moreover, a few weeks only after the expedition had started. . . .

‘ . . . Having now dealt with the Infantry, I will shortly refer to the Cavalry. The force sent out was comparatively small, and we had no difficulty as regards men, but it was very different as regards horses. . . . Last year a proposal was made to brigade three Cavalry Regiments together for mutual support. To this plan I entertained then, as I do now, the gravest objection, and it was arranged that no action should be taken in the matter. Moreover, its unpopularity throughout the service was most marked, for it was felt really to involve the gradual destruction by amalgamation of *two-thirds* of the Cavalry Regiments of the Army. I trust, therefore, that this proposal will not be again brought forward, and I have directed the Inspector-General of Cavalry to draw up certain schemes for consideration, which I hope, after full investigation, may obviate the necessity for any serious change in this branch of the service.

‘ As regards the Horse and Field Artillery, the condition of things with reference to horses is very similar to that of the Cavalry. All the horses above fifteen years of age are better out of the service, and the amount of transfers which had to be made by complete Batteries for service was far in excess of what it would have been if my proposals, as set out above for the Cavalry, had been at the time in operation, rendering the Home Batteries very ineffectual, some of them indeed quite useless. . . .

‘ . . . I cannot, however, too strongly urge upon the Secretary of State the advantages which would be derived from keeping up, to some extent *permanent*, the Regimental Transport of the Army, as I feel convinced that no troops can take the field satisfactorily unless they have a certain amount of transport at their own disposal, composed of the men of the Regiment, and in which every individual composing the corps, both officers and men, would feel that they had a special interest. Whilst entirely objecting to the creation of Mounted Infantry Regiments, I strongly advocate a certain number of men in all Battalions, say one Company, being at all times kept available for Mounted Infantry duties in the several Battalions of the Army. . . .’

In answer to this communication the Duke received the following reply from the Secretary of State; and peace

having once more been happily restored, the old familiar struggle against reduction again began. In spite of the increasing weight of years, added to the great anxieties of the military situation at this period, which were now beginning to tell their tale, the Duke entered into the contest with much of his old vigour, although it was inevitable, as time went on, that his communications in this never-ending struggle should evince some diminution in force and persistence.

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

‘WAR OFFICE, 13 *January* 1883.

‘... With regard to the first and principal proposal for a considerable increase to the lower establishments of the Battalions of Infantry at home, Y.R.H. will easily understand that it is one which I should have very great difficulty in making to the Government, especially at a time when, as I have already pointed out to Y.R.H., I fear that a large increase to the Estimates of last year will be necessary, arising from automatic causes, and from decisions which have already been passed.

‘The proposal is certainly one which could not ever be entertained by the Government without much fuller and more detailed information than is contained in the Memorandum. The Return which accompanies the Memorandum undoubtedly shows that some of the Battalions of the lower establishment will, after providing the drafts for Battalions in India and the Colonies, be left in an extremely weak and inefficient condition. But I have always understood that it was a part of the new scheme of organisation that the chief duty of the lower-establishment Battalions was to be the training of recruits for those serving abroad, and that their comparative inefficiency for any other effective duty was an accepted condition of the scheme.

‘In order to make out a case for the permanent or temporary increase of establishment, it appears to me necessary to show, not only that certain Battalions are at present inefficient, but that:—

‘1. They are unable to perform their primary duty of supplying the necessary drafts.

‘2. That the force of Infantry now stationed in Great Britain and Ireland is inadequate, if properly distributed, to perform the requisite garrison duties.

‘With regard to (1) it is quite possible that at present, when, as I understand, a normal condition of the Army has not been reached, there may be some difficulty; but it would be better, I think, that some temporary inconvenience should be borne, than that, by an immediate addition to the numbers

and cost of the Army recommended to, and sanctioned by, Parliament, doubts should be excited as to the efficiency and soundness of the scheme.

'With regard to (2) no opinion could be formed without a careful detailed statement of the garrisons which it is considered necessary to maintain at home, of the smallest number of troops which should compose them, and of the deficiency which now exists in these numbers. If Y.R.H. would give directions for the preparation of the information necessary to clear up the points stated above, and should still think it necessary to press for an addition to the Infantry establishments, I think I should be in a position to discuss the question; but in the event of so large an increase being found necessary to the lower establishments, I do not think that it would be possible to avoid raising the question of some reduction of cadres. This indeed, as Y.R.H. knows, is a question which had already been raised in connection with the proposals of the Indian Government, and which it may not be possible permanently to avoid; I hope, however, that it may be found that the present difficulties are of a temporary character, which may be overcome by some management; and in any case I fail to see how they can be removed by a nominal increase of establishment when, in consequence of the slackness of recruiting, the Army is already considerably below its sanctioned establishment. . . .

TO LORD HARTINGTON.

'COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE, 20 *January* 1883.

' . . . I quite appreciate the difficulty of your position as regards some of the subjects referred to in my memorandum on the present state of the Army, and am well aware that you are bound to act in the matter with the greatest caution. I shall have all the information prepared for your return on Sunday, which you suggest as necessary to make out my case, and I shall be very much surprised if you do not find, in looking over the returns which are being prepared, that I have understated the actual condition of things, which are even worse than my memo. had made out. Of one thing, however, I must at once assure you: that is, that I look upon any reduction of Cadres of Regiments as the very *last* measure we ought to resort to, and the *worst* that could be devised with a view to meeting our difficulties.

'Bad as the small Regiments or Battalions may be, at all events they are in existence and can be expanded; but once done away with, it would take years to recruit them, and should great emergencies arise, we should not have the means of expanding our Army by the aid of the Army and Militia Reserves that we could collect, and which would be at our disposal to fill up the Cadres.

‘I send you herewith my last letter with the copy of an enclosure from Dufferin, from which you will observe that our present proposals really carry out the suggestions made for gradual reduction in Egypt.

‘Dufferin does not ask for hasty reduction of force, only for gradual extendings to the period I had named to you, the month of April next. By removing two Infantry Battalions now for duty in the garrisons of the Mediterranean, we shall go quite as far as Dufferin at present proposes, and by April, if matters go on as at present, we may be enabled possibly to carry out some of the further reductions contemplated.

‘But should matters go wrong in the Soudan, as yesterday’s newspapers seemed to me to imply, the chances are that Dufferin, and certainly Alison, might hesitate to carry out their present plans, and then, by letting matters stand over for a time, we shall be in a position to maintain ourselves far better than if we at once withdraw the considerable force, which ultimately it may be found possible and desirable to dispense with. . . .’

The following letter gives a good picture of the nature of the drafts which were at this period sent abroad:—

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

‘COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S OFFICE, 1 *March* 1884.

‘As a result of my Inspection at Aldershot on Thursday last of the two Battalions next for service proceeding to the Mediterranean, I feel called upon to state to you in the strongest possible terms that I consider it *impossible* for the Army to carry out the duties now required of it without a considerable addition of men, and if possible, of *seasoned soldiers*.

‘The two Battalions to embark were largely composed of mere boys and recruits, likely no doubt to become good soldiers in time, but for some considerable period quite unequal to take the field, I might almost say to perform garrison duties, where vigilance and intelligence is essential, as in garrisons like Gibraltar and Malta. Very large numbers of the men were under one year’s service, so that it is impossible to class them as reliable soldiers in any sense of the word.

‘Every exertion had been evidently made in both Corps to press the recruits forward and into the ranks, and one Corps especially appeared in a most creditable condition under the circumstances represented; but the rawness of the Battalions cannot inspire confidence in the solidity of either Battalion for severe duties in the field or in garrison duties.

‘And yet these are Battalions belonging to the 1st Army

Corps, and liable to be pushed on elsewhere should troops be required for special or unforeseen duties. The next Battalions on the Roster for service abroad are even in a worse condition; one Battalion (74th) had 470 men under one year's service, though complete in numbers of establishment; the next (82nd) is 350 men below strength. The next Battalion to these again, the 52nd, has about 500 men under one year's service, and so it will be found to go on downwards, whilst the Battalions on the lower establishment are mostly considerably under strength now that the drafts have been sent out to India and the Colonies for the Foreign Service Battalions. And even with these large drafts sent out, the numbers for India could not be supplied this trooping season, and the Indian establishment is left about 5000 men under its proper establishment. The Royal Artillery still require considerably over 1000 men to complete. We have an increased force in Egypt, and there is every chance of its remaining there for some considerable period; India ought to be kept up to its full establishment of European troops, with Merv handed over to Russia.

'Dynamite troubles are recommencing at home, which require much extra care and often extra duties, to say nothing of the state of Ireland; and yet, with the exception of the Guards, we have no really efficient Battalions of Infantry at home fit to be at once employed on any emergency arising, whether at home or abroad.'

From the following letter, it appears as if a return to the numerical designations were at this time contemplated:—

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

'WAR OFFICE, 22 April 1883.

'I have obtained copies of the correspondence between Mr. Childers and Sir H. Ponsonby in 1880 and 1881 on the subject of the numbering of Territorial Regiments, a portion of which I enclose. It appears to me that to revert to the old numbers and designations for Battalions would be nothing less than a return to what was called the "linking" system, which was admitted by almost every one, and I think by Y.R.H., to be a failure. It would perpetuate duality where unity is essential.

'I suggest that the proposal contained in Sir H. Ponsonby's letter of 4 May 1881 should be accepted in principle, but that it should not be put in force until a greater fusion between the Battalions of a Regiment shall have taken place by the cross promotion which is now in full force, and which before long will tend to obliterate the line which has hitherto separated them. In the meanwhile, the Army might be prepared for the adoption of these numerical

designations of Regiments by the addition of a column to page 8, etc., of the Queen's Regulations, showing the Regimental District number (which would eventually be the number of the Regiment) in prominent type. This, with the retention for the present of the number in brackets of the old Regiments in the Army List, should, I think, meet the wishes Her Majesty has lately expressed through Sir Henry Ponsonby.'

In his letter of 20 January 1883¹ the Duke alludes to some returns on the state of the Army which were being prepared for the Secretary of State's information. These were eventually presented in the form of a memorandum by the Adjutant-General (Lord Wolseley) on 20 October 1883. In this most interesting document, the length of which prohibits its publication in full, Lord Wolseley, after sketching out the various measures adopted in introducing the short-service system, alludes to the continual fluctuations in establishments which have already so often been alluded to in this work; and he also points out that constant changes were at that time a much more serious matter than formerly.

LORD WOLSELEY'S MEMORANDUM.

'20 October 1883.

'... This frequent fluctuation in the strength of our Infantry is most injurious to efficiency. It is a practice that has become habitual; formerly its injurious effects were not so fatal as they now are under our existing organisation. The reason is plain: if before 1872 the Government of the day decided upon reducing the Army Estimates, say by a quarter of a million sterling, which would represent about 8000 men, the War Minister practically stopped recruiting for Home Regiments by raising the standard of height so that few men could enlist, and he induced men to take their discharge until the reduced establishment had been reached. The *Depôts* of Regiments abroad were not reduced, and the small number of recruits required for them was easily collected. In this way, when our recruiting was carried under no regular system, but in a hand-to-mouth sort of way, the quarter of a million saving demanded by the Chancellor of the Exchequer for party reasons was effected without any machinery being thrown out of working order. The number of recruits required annually was so small that no fixed

¹ Page 307, *supra*.

machinery was required to obtain them. Of Army Organisation to meet national danger, we had nothing beyond a small number of Regiments and Batteries whose strength fluctuated annually, in accordance with the condition of parties in the House of Commons. Now, however, it is very different; we require about 30,000 recruits per annum, and to obtain them regularly a network of recruiting agencies had been created upon a now well-understood system.

'Upon each recruiting centre two Line Battalions depend to keep their ranks full. We know exactly what is the waste of a Battalion in India, in the Mediterranean, etc., and to provide for that waste the sister Battalion at home and the *Depôt* has been fixed at a minimum. If for the party exigencies of the moment these numbers are arbitrarily reduced, as was done in 1873, the whole of our recruiting machinery is thrown into disorder, and the Battalions abroad dwindle away in consequence.

'The number of our troops in India and elsewhere abroad during peace has been fixed at a minimum of safety and usefulness, and it can be mathematically proved that if we are to keep them up to their establishment we must not have a less number of Infantry at home than 52,560 rank and file, assuming it is agreed on all sides that we are bound to have a very small military force always fairly prepared to take the field in an emergency.

'I cannot lay too much emphasis upon the necessity of its being laid down as an accepted axiom that the Infantry of the Line at home must not be reduced below that amount. It is the minimum upon which we can work with safety and efficiency. . . .'

He asserts that no diminution of establishment was ever contemplated by the Localisation Committee of 1872, of which he was a member.

'Our present home establishment of the Line Battalions is 7250, or will be, as shown above, 5350 rank and file below that which was taken by the Localisation Committee in 1872 as the minimum strength for our Infantry of the Line at home. That Committee worked upon the assumption that the Regimental *Depôts* to be created should consist of 7000 rank and file, whereas those *Depôts* now form an establishment of only 5220 rank and file, or 1780 rank and file less than what was contemplated by the Committee.

'This diminution in establishment was never contemplated by the Localisation Committee, and as a member of it I may say that, in fixing the strength of each Regimental *Depôt* at 100 rank and file, the military members felt they sailed as near to the shoals of inefficiency as was possible without incurring actual danger, looking to the fact of the

large drafts that each Battalion would have to send annually to its sister Battalion abroad.

‘A great principle underlying the whole Localisation Scheme and the Short Service System was that at least one-half of the Battalions of the Line should be in Great Britain and Ireland and the Channel Islands, the normal distribution being seventy Battalions abroad and seventy-one at home. So strongly was this pointed out at the time, and recognised as the basis of the system, that the procedure to be adopted when this balance was in any way disturbed was clearly laid down in minute detail.

‘For financial reasons entirely unconnected with any military consideration, these establishments were considerably reduced the year following (1873), and since then, although we have had several small wars on our hands, the normal establishment upon which our existing military system was framed has never been reverted to. The military administration since then has been struggling on from hand to mouth, various temporary expedients having been from time to time adopted to meet the pressing wants of the moment, and to prevent the military machine from stopping altogether. One of the great ideas underlying the reforms adopted by Lord Cardwell was to create an automatically-working machine; and I stoutly maintain that such was then devised and described in the Committees of which General MacDougall, Colonel Stanley, and Lord Cadogan were respectively Presidents.

Here are some admirable remarks on the amount of the Army Estimates and the size of the Army:—

‘. . . Neither is it to my mind any sound argument to say that we must not do anything that will increase the amount of money annually voted as “Army Estimates.” The cost of living, the price of everything required by the civil population as well as by the Army, has greatly increased in the last twenty years, and still goes on increasing; the value of the realised property of our Empire stored in Great Britain goes on increasing, and there is a corresponding increase in the revenue of the country from which the premium of insurance on the property, in the form of an Army and Navy, is to be provided. In 1863-64 the Revenue was £70,208,964, and the ordinary Army Estimates £15,060,273, the net charge, when the Indian appropriations, etc., are deducted, being £13,696,227; in 1882-83 the Revenue had increased to £89,004,456, whilst the ordinary Army Estimates were £15,458,100. During the last twenty years the average amount of the ordinary Army Estimates, as voted, has been £13,843,110, and the average annual revenue has been £76,382,231. . . .

‘From these figures it will be seen that, while the proportion between Revenue and Army Estimates was 21·45 per cent. in 1863-64, it is now only 17·36 per cent., and that during the last twenty years the average amount of the annual Army Estimates has been 18·12 per cent. of the average annual Revenue. . . .

‘Since 1863 the proportion between the fighting soldiers of the Regular Army and the numbers provided for by Army Estimates has gone on steadily decreasing. In 1863, of the 148,242 of all ranks provided for by Army Estimates, 147,118 were regimental establishments, whereas now, of the 132,905 in our Estimates of last year, only 124,782 were belonging to regimental establishments. That is, the money voted in 1863 provided us with about 147,000 men, and now, although increased, only provides us with 124,000 men.

‘For the last twenty years we have been so accustomed to a vote of about fifteen millions sterling in the shape of Army Estimates, that we have come to regard that amount as the normal annual requirement for the military purposes of our Empire. We seem to have accepted as a Treasury rule long established, which it would be criminal to depart from, that this amount should never be exceeded except in the event of war. In the last few years it became evident that our Army expenditure could no longer be restricted; but to prevent giving that shock to the public, which it was thought such a confession would occasion, the cabalistic number of fifteen millions was still maintained by changing the form in which the Army Estimates were rendered, so that the “Appropriations in Aid” should be deducted from the gross cost of the Army. The interests of the Army have been subservient to the parliamentary or, more properly speaking, I should say to the party necessity of keeping its total cost down to this sum, which we have long assumed as the amount it ought to be. . . .

‘The world is not in a condition that warrants us to continue in a state of complete unpreparedness for war, much less to allow our military establishments to dwindle down into the inefficiency which now threatens them.

‘The introduction of the short service system has enabled us to be at all times prepared for the emergency of putting a small Army in the field by supplying us with a force in the 1st Class Army Reserve that is numerically stronger than the Army we disembarked in the Crimea in 1854, but it has, at the same time, greatly increased the difficulty of keeping up our military establishments in India and elsewhere abroad. Looking to those military requirements alone, it cannot be too often repeated that the short-service system means, as I have already said, increased home establishments. Your military cisterns abroad now require frequent replenishing, there is a constant drain upon them in consequence of having annually to send home the large number of men

who have completed their term of Army engagements with the Colours; and to enable you to ensure the constant supply to your distant cisterns, you must have an enlarged reservoir at home. . . .

Lord Wolseley compares the duties of the British as distinguished from the Continental soldier:—

‘ . . . The duties done by the two men are entirely ignored. The Continental soldier serves only in his own country—I might almost say only in his own village. By becoming a soldier he is not exposed to the destructive influences of bad or tropical climates, and he is very seldom engaged in warfare. With us, how different are all these matters! In round numbers half of our Army is always abroad, the great bulk of that half in the uncongenial climate of India, and the gates of our Temple of Janus are seldom closed. The result is greatly increased mortality, and an appalling amount of invaliding and consequent pensioning of men whose health has permanently broken down from the effects of our foreign service. The expense of moving our men from place to place, colony to colony, and the continual movement of our Regiments at home from town to town as a result of our military requirements, is an expense unknown to the War Ministers of other nations. To provide for an Army like that which we maintain beyond these Islands in the distant portions of our Empire is a very different, and very much more costly, matter than the maintenance of a similar number of men at home would be. Looking to the difference of system upon which our soldiers and those in Europe are obtained, and to the impossibility of comparing the duties done by our Army with those of foreign armies, I have always felt the uselessness, I might almost say the folly, of attempting any comparison between the cost in money of the British and of the foreign soldier: we can derive no useful lesson from it. . . .’

It will be remembered that in Lord Hartington’s letter of 13 January 1883 to the Duke an allusion is made to a possible reduction of cadres. Lord Wolseley’s remarks on this point are of exceptional interest, and might with advantage be taken to heart to-day.

‘ Before criticising this proposed reduction of cadres without reducing the number of rank and file, I would remark that to attempt any such redistribution of our Infantry would entail, I believe, a large expenditure upon the reconstruction of barracks both at home and abroad. In India it would seriously dislocate the whole distribution of the Army,

native as well as European. Blocks of barracks at large stations like Aldershot, that have been constructed to hold a battalion each upon the present establishment of battalions, would no longer be sufficient for that purpose, and consequently a great admixture and dovetailing of one battalion into another would be entailed, and the injury to discipline which this proceeding would entail would be considerable. At home stations where only one or two battalions are quartered, this difficulty would be very apparent, whilst abroad it would be still greater.

‘The whole organisation upon which our recruiting system and dépôts is based would be overturned, and that at a time when it had just taken root and was beginning to bear good fruit: I cannot picture to myself any greater administrative calamity befalling us. The discontent it would create in the Army would be intense, and the hardships and soreness of heart it would give rise to amongst the officers would exceed anything ever known before in our time. . . .

‘. . . Leaving for the moment Egypt and Cyprus out of the question, we shall have to increase the Mediterranean Garrisons by at least four Battalions: we should most probably be content to do this with Militia Battalions. The increased garrison for Halifax might also be furnished by sending Militia Battalions there, but the West Indian Garrisons and Bermuda would require to be augmented by at least four Battalions of the Line drawn from home.

‘To put two Army Corps in the field would require three Battalions of the Guards and thirty-nine Battalions of the Line, and that is assuming that we were content to find garrisons from the Militia for our base, advanced dépôt, and the stations on the line of communication between these two points.

‘These requirements being fulfilled, we should only have available for the protection of the dockyards and works in the Thames, at Dover, Portsmouth, Portland, Plymouth, Pembroke, Liverpool, the Clyde, Firth of Forth, Dublin, Cork, Belfast, etc., and to maintain order in Ireland, five Battalions of the Line and three of the Guards. . . .’

He concludes by saying:—

‘. . . I earnestly press this important subject upon the notice of the Secretary of State for War. The addition of 8000 men would add about £240,000 immediately, and would possibly entail an eventual increase of £288,000 per annum to the Army Estimates, and until this is done our military machine will go from bad to worse until it breaks down altogether.’

Two months after Lord Wolseley’s memorandum was presented, the Duke submitted his annual statement on

the Army. Since the Adjutant-General had written his account, the situation had become still more difficult, because affairs in the Soudan had prevented the withdrawal of any portion of our Army in occupation of Egypt, and had also necessitated the dispatch of additional drafts.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

‘26 Dec. 1883.

‘... Five Territorial Regiments have both their Battalions serving abroad, and there are at present no means of remedying this abnormal state of things, and no prospects of the early return of the Battalions which should be serving at home, yet up to the present time no increase has been authorised to their Depôts, nor has any special provision been made for supplying them with men. No doubt recruiting has of late been very good as regards numbers, but it must be remembered that height and chest measurement have been reduced to the utmost limit of physical efficiency, and the age of recruits has been again reduced to eighteen years of age from that of nineteen, at which it stood when the late orders on the conditions of recruiting were issued. I am one of those who think it was a very judicious step to lower the age of recruits in enlistments, as I have always felt that, however desirable it certainly would be to raise the standard of age, even up to twenty if possible, yet that the labour market will never supply a sufficiency of good men at these advanced periods, and that the age of eighteen is the particular moment when men are most disposed to enlist, thus enabling the recruiting to be maintained at the rate required by our demands. At eighteen a lad has not made up his mind to what particular avocation in life he would be disposed to turn his attention, and in his hesitation and doubt he is thus more likely to enlist in the Army. Later on he has engaged in some profession or calling, and once started in his career he does not feel any desire to leave it, unless by some misadventure he does not get on well in his special avocation. As a result I think we get a better-disposed man at eighteen than we should at nineteen or twenty, and I therefore do not advocate any change in the age of eighteen and upwards now laid down as the period for enlistment. But as regards height and chest measurements, I confess I take a different view, and am strongly impressed with the opinion that the sooner we can go back to 5 feet 4 inches as our lowest standard, and to 34 inches and upwards around the chest, the better it will be for the physical efficiency of the service.

‘As a result of these relaxations we have the Infantry of the Line at home 1015 supernumerary.

‘With the Home Battalions, however, there are only 34,379 men, which shows a deficiency of 4611 men on the establishment, and of these 6208 are *recruits* at *drill*. At the Depôts there are, on the other hand, 10,846 men, which shows 5626 supernumerary, but these are nearly *all* either recruits or old soldiers, and not available for foreign service.

‘From the above figures it will be seen that half the Infantry at home at the present time are not qualified for service, especially if allowance is made for men sick in hospital and in prison, or other casualties.’

The Duke then proceeds to deal with the question of the Depôts and Home Battalions; and whilst perusing his remarks it will be well to remember that, when the great strain came in 1899-1902, the demands of South Africa very soon necessitated the withdrawal of nearly all the Regular officers serving at the Depôts, the Company work at those establishments having then perforce to be done by Militia officers.

‘I think it right here to point out that the paucity of officers at the Regimental Depôts is much felt, the present establishment of officers being quite insufficient for the requirements of the Depôts, filled as they now are with recruits, who want a great deal more looking after than seasoned soldiers. To my mind there cannot be a doubt that the original establishment of four Majors or Captains and four Subalterns for Territorial Depôts was the proper permanent complement for all these Depôts, to be further augmented by two Companies should the Depôt require expansion. Unfortunately a reduction was made in officers some little time ago, which I think experience proves should now by degrees be rectified. Originally these Depôts were fixed at an establishment of 100 men, and they were merely intended to provide for the supplies of recruits and invalided soldiers, but of late, and as a result of recent arrangements, the average number of men at Depôts, exclusive of the Militia, is over 150, and the recruits are retained there for three months’ training.

‘I feel bound specially to draw the Secretary of State’s attention to the condition of things in our Home Garrison, where the paucity of duty men is so great that, with the ordinary duties reduced to a minimum, many soldiers have nothing like five nights in bed, and in some garrisons, as at Woolwich, where a Battalion is quartered in addition to Artillery, the General Officer reports he cannot carry on the guard duties without the assistance of duty men from other stations. The heavy duties thus thrown on the few duty men we have, militates very decidedly against our

obtaining the number of recruits we should like to see pass into the ranks, as it tends to make the Line decidedly unpopular. At the same time I do not deny that recruiting has been brisk during the present year, but then it must be remembered, as I have already pointed out, that the conditions for enlistment have been greatly relaxed, and recruiting for the Militia has been less good than it ought to be, probably caused by the numbers passed into the Line, which has resulted in the Militia Force being about 30,000 men below establishment—a very serious matter and one for the gravest reflection!

‘I trust that, as a result of these various important points which I have brought prominently to notice, the Secretary of State will not hesitate to give full weight to the recommendations contained in Lord Wolseley’s recent confidential memorandum, by giving us a permanent increase of at least 8000 men to our Infantry, bringing the force up again to what it was in 1872.

‘I am further of opinion, as regards the Territorial Regiments with both Battalions serving abroad, amounting at present to five, that the organisation scheme as laid down in Colonel Stanley’s Committee and accepted by Parliament at that time, may be at least carried out to the extent of forming a third or *Depôt Battalion* to each of such five Territorial Regiments by the addition of companies and officers sufficient for six companies to each such Battalion; and I should further like to see a second Territorial Battalion added to the 79th Cameron Highlanders, that being the only Battalion in the service which stands by itself and without support from a second Battalion. Should this be objected to, a thoroughly organised four-company *Depôt* should at least be given to this isolated Battalion, through which a sufficient supply of recruits might be passed into the Service Battalions.

As regards the Cavalry and Artillery, the Duke is able to give a more satisfactory account. His remarks, however, on the subject of ammunition columns are, in the light of subsequent events, of especial interest. It is now well known that, at the commencement of the South African War, no properly-organised ammunition columns existed. At the last moment, however, one was formed, which managed to reach Sir George White’s force shortly before the investment of Ladysmith began.

‘I think it right to point out that no Ammunition Columns at all exist at present, and that in the event of taking the field, these will have to be formed out of the present Field Batteries, thus reducing these to some extent

at the very time when every gun ought to be more than ever available. It would, however, entail additional expense if these Ammunition Columns are maintained in time of peace, even to a limited extent.

As regards the Transport, the Duke says:—

‘The Army Transport Corps is not at present in the condition in which it would be desirable to have it, and a Committee is about to assemble to consider the whole Transport question, into which, therefore, I will not attempt to enter, beyond saying that I greatly deplore that the nucleus for a Regimental Transport was unfortunately not allowed to be kept up upon the return of our troops from Egypt, and that I hope a strong recommendation for the maintenance of such Regimental Transport may form one of the suggestions of the coming Committee. . . .’

The Duke concludes by saying:—

‘. . . I have now endeavoured to enter into some details as regards the general condition of the Army. I am afraid it cannot be looked upon as producing a very satisfactory result. And yet I do think that the condition of things might be amended without any serious difficulties, excepting as regards expenditure. To place our small Army on a really efficient footing a certain amount of additional expenditure is absolutely required, and the very smallness of our force, when compared to that of other Great Countries, would, in my opinion, amply justify such expenditure, when increased efficiency would be the immediate result. Looking, then, at the condition of things in Egypt, in China, in South Africa, and if we come nearer home, in Ireland, I feel satisfied that a powerful case could easily be made out for greater preparedness of our force than can at present be expected from it; and on these grounds I cannot too strongly bring the whole subject to the serious and anxious notice of the Secretary of State.’

When, in 1884, December had once more come round, the Duke addressed to the Secretary of State his usual statement on the condition of the Army; from which document it will be seen that, in spite of his memorandum of the previous year, and the forcible indictment of our military policy which had been made by Lord Wolseley, nothing had been done to remedy matters.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

‘11 December 1884.

‘The period for framing next year’s Estimates having again arrived, I am anxious to draw attention to the

Adjutant-General's, Lord Wolseley's, Memo. of 20 October 1883, in which the then condition of the Infantry of the Line was described very fully, and which contained recommendations it was hoped would improve matters very considerably, if adopted. Little or nothing, however, has been done since that memo. was written, and the condition of the Infantry of the Line is therefore even less hopeful now than it was at that period, for the obvious reason that, whilst matters have been left to take their course, the demands in the Army have greatly increased, and the general aspect of the world has become even more grave than was at that time the case. . . . It is well-known that considerable additions have been suggested in India to the European force stationed there, by those most competent to judge of the requirements of that vast portion of the Empire, and the Government have decided upon fortifying our principal coaling-stations, which will require an additional number of troops for garrison purposes. In fact in every direction the outlook is serious, and leads to the conviction that such force as we have at home should be in a condition to be at once available should the necessity arise in one or other of the directions indicated above. It may be said that we have reduced to some limited extent our force in Ireland, but even here there is no sort of security that sudden increase may not at any time be required. The result of what has passed during the current year has been that we are left with a reduced force of all arms, which, putting aside the Horse and Field Batteries, now consists of thirty-six Garrison Batteries, of seven Companies of Engineers available for general duties only, sixteen Regiments of Cavalry, besides three of Household Troops, seven Battalions of Guards, and fifty-nine of Infantry of the Line. The latter force having eighty-two Battalions abroad on 1 January next, or twelve in excess of what was laid down as the normal for this branch of the service, thus there are twelve Regiments having *both* Battalions abroad and no Home Battalions as feeders.

'This in itself is a most grave difficulty in our present organisation, which is further rendered even more alarming from the state and condition of the Corps forming the Home Establishment. Even in the Cavalry we have 1941 men out of 7327 under one year's service, which, especially in mounted corps, is a very serious matter as regards efficiency; and in the Infantry, out of a total of 43,183 rank and file, no less than 18,487 are under one year's service. Indeed there are Battalions absolutely unfit for even the lightest home garrison duties, as, for instance, the Northamptonshire Regiment and Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

'It must further be taken into account that it is more than probable that drafts may be required to fill up field casualties in Egypt and the Cape Colony, should operations in either country be prolonged or likely to become serious.

'To meet these requirements nothing has been done further than nominal increase of Establishment for a portion of the current year of 2500 rank and file; and even with this nominal increase, the condition of things is such as I have described it, though recruiting has been better than could have been expected. . . .

' . . . It is therefore essential, by some means to be devised, to increase at once the Establishments of all Battalions serving at home to such a strength as will enable them not only to keep the Field or Foreign Battalions efficient, but also to have some consistency within themselves should a further number of Battalions be required for foreign service, and also to add largely to the whole of those Depôts of which both Battalions are serving abroad, should the organisation not be carried out this year, which was originally laid down, of raising a third Battalion for all Regiments thus situated. It would also be well to raise a second Battalion to the 79th Cameron Highlanders, which at present has only one. This would probably in round numbers require an addition of at all events say 10,000 rank and file to the Establishment, and if something of this sort is not done it seems evident that very serious danger, not to say peril, will be incurred. . . .

' . . . As regards the want of officers, it may be remembered that this was strongly urged in last year's memo., and the special demands for Egypt and the Bechuanaland Expedition are such that home Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry alike are denuded of them to such an extent that employment of Militia officers has been sanctioned for special duty with some of the Battalions and Depôts that have been so largely depleted of their officers. This arrangement is of course an assistance for the moment, but it can only be looked upon as a temporary measure, for as it is, the want of officers in the Militia is yearly growing more serious; and if the Militia were called out for duty, or even for *training*, the paucity of officers would be such that every available one, including those now detached to the Regular Army, would have to be present with his Corps. What is really required is an addition of officers to every Depôt, and the reductions which took place in this respect some time ago in these Depôts is greatly to be deplored. If it is impossible to restore the four-company Cadres of Officers at the Depôt, which in my opinion ought to be done, at all events an addition in Subalterns serving with Battalions at home ought to be granted, though the four-company Cadre arrangement at Depôts seems the most essential and advantageous for the public service, as forming a nucleus for the ready expansion of the Depôts into third or Reserve Battalions, the necessity for which exists at the present moment to the extent of twelve Regiments with both Battalions serving abroad. It must further be remembered, when treating of this subject, the paucity of officers, that the half-

pay list had almost entirely disappeared—at all events in the grades of Captains and Subalterns—and that therefore we have no longer that source to draw upon when emergencies arise, as was formerly done on all such special occasions. . . .

‘. . . There is one further point to which attention should be drawn. As regards an augmented force for the new coaling-stations, it would seem desirable that Gun Lascars should be raised for many of these stations to supplement the Companies or Detachments of Royal Artillery. The climate alone in several of these stations would render such an arrangement desirable, if not necessary, and no doubt it would considerably facilitate our means for procuring the additional number of men required for the ordinary duties at such stations.

‘It is with very great regret that I am bound to point out to you, in the most forcible manner in my power, that the condition of the Army at home and the power of reinforcing those portions of it which are serving abroad, and specially those on more active service, has become so critical, that I consider the time has arrived when it is absolutely necessary to take measures with the least possible delay to put matters in that respect on a more safe and reliable footing. I would again suggest, as I have done on former occasions, that the original scheme of organisation should be brought into operation. But should this be found impracticable, then at all events a proportion of Reserve men should be called back to the ranks till the special requirements in Egypt and South Africa no longer press so heavily upon us.’

After the death of General Gordon, Mr. Gladstone’s administration became unpopular in the country. But its actual fall was occasioned, on 8 June 1885, by a side-issue in connection with the debate on the Budget. Mr. Gladstone then resigned; and Lord Hartington, on once again leaving the War Office, addressed the following letter to the Duke:—

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

‘DEVONSHIRE HOUSE,
PICCADILLY, 23 June 1885.

‘I am very much obliged to Y.R.H. for your kind letter received yesterday afternoon. Notwithstanding my departure from office, I have been a good deal occupied during the last few days, or I had intended to have written Y.R.H. a few lines in explanation of and in addition to the official Minute which Y.R.H. has seen. I find that this is the first Minute

of the kind which has been written by a Secretary of State on leaving the War Office since the amalgamation of the War Office and Horse Guards which took place in Lord Cardwell's time, and its form therefore required some attention.

'It had been usual for the Secretary of State to name in such Minutes the principal Parliamentary and Permanent Officials to whom he desired to express his thanks, while referring more generally to the other more subordinate Heads of Departments and Branches of the Office; but it appeared to me that it would be more agreeable to Y.R.H., having regard to the exceptional position which You hold in the Department, if I was to depart somewhat from these precedents and to employ the form which I have adopted.

'I reserved, however, to myself the privilege of which I now avail myself, of repeating to Y.R.H. in a more private and unofficial form the expression of my thanks to Y.R.H., which I have already endeavoured personally to convey, for the great support and assistance which I have always received from You, and for the kindness and consideration which have enabled our official relations to be so harmonious; and finally, as I am glad to find, from Y.R.H.'s kind letter, they have been felt to be by Y.R.H. as well as by myself.'

Before closing the history of this period, a brief allusion must be made to Sir Charles Warren's Bechuanaland Expedition of 1884-85, which, though attended with important and satisfactory results, did not entail actual hostilities.

In 1884 the Pretoria Convention of 1881 was modified, and the Transvaal became the South African Republic. The Boer delegates who came to England at that time endeavoured also to induce the British Government to give up Bechuanaland. But in this effort they did not succeed, and a British Protectorate over Bechuanaland with a Resident was established instead.

The Boers replied by operating against a native chief Montsioa, whose rights had already been guaranteed by us; whilst at the same time an Englishman, Mr. Bethell, who had been acting as agent for the native chiefs, was murdered under circumstances of great cruelty. The British Government was therefore bound to move in the matter; and in November 1884 Parliament voted a sum of £750,000 for an expedition to be dispatched to restore order in Bechuanaland and to protect the interests of Montsioa.

Sir Charles Warren was appointed to the command of this force.

On 8 October 1884 the British Government protested against a Boer protection of territories which had already been declared as under British influence; and as Sir Charles Warren then advanced with a considerable force, the Boers were soon brought to a better frame of mind.

The Cape Premier and Mr. Kruger met, and on 5 December agreed to terms:—

1. The lands of Montsioa to be restored to him.

2. The claims of freebooters to lands in his country to be ignored.

3. Till the Cape Government was authorised by the Imperial Parliament to take over the country, Her Majesty's Government was to retain the administration of the country in its own hands, during which time Sir Charles Warren was to occupy it with an adequate force.

Sir Charles Warren was thus successful in having achieved the desired objects without the outbreak of actual hostilities; and in consequence Mr. Smith, at that time Secretary of State for War, paid him this well-deserved tribute in a letter to the Duke:—

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

'GREENLANDS,
HENLEY, 18 October 1885.

'... In the meanwhile, will Y.R.H. consider again whether something ought not to be done for Sir Charles Warren and some few of the officers under his command?

'He has conducted an expedition successfully, which, with less skill and tact, might have involved a sacrifice of life; and the refusal of any reward at all is open to this remark, that it is because the completeness of the arrangements made opposition hopeless.

'Uninstructed public opinion would say that this was a merit which in itself deserved recognition.

'As a matter of policy I am inclined to think that something should be done.'

When Mr. Gladstone resigned, a new administration was formed by Lord Salisbury, who appointed Mr. W. H. Smith Secretary of State for War. The Conservative Government,

however, was defeated in the following February, and Mr. Gladstone once more came into power.

In the following August he was defeated in the great issue of Home Rule for Ireland. Thus it happened that in the year succeeding Lord Hartington's withdrawal from the War Office, two different Secretaries of State held office and in turn retired. Their respective terms of office were, however, so short, that it was not possible for either of them to develop any fixed policy; and, except as regards the Egyptian and Soudan difficulties of this period, little of interest occurred whilst either Mr. W. H. Smith or Mr. Campbell-Bannerman was Secretary of State for War.

Mr. Smith's tenure of office, with the exception already noted, was comparatively unimportant; and consequently there is little to record beyond the farewell letter which he addressed to the Duke:—

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

‘3 GROSVENOR PLACE, 5 *February* 1886.

‘... Will Y.R.H. permit me to repeat in writing what I have already said verbally, how very grateful I am for the consideration which has marked every relation which I have had with Y.R.H. during my short tenure of office?’

‘I have had but one object, to serve my Queen and my Country, and to promote the efficiency of the Army by all the poor abilities I possess; and if I have in any measure succeeded in doing my duty, it has been very largely owing to the frank and cordial manner in which Y.R.H. has communicated with me from day to day in the conduct of the business of the Department; and I make this acknowledgment with pleasure, as my last act as Her Majesty's Secretary of State for War.’

Similarly, during Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's¹ brief tenure of the seals of office there is nothing to record beyond the following letter:—

FROM MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.

‘6 GROSVENOR PLACE, 3 *February* 1886.

‘I have a communication which I wish to make to Y.R.H. before the matter may become public through the papers,

¹ 6 February to 3 August 1886.

and although it is still secret, I am afraid to delay writing to inform You.

‘It is that Mr. Gladstone has, with the Queen’s authority, offered me the office of Secretary of State for War, and that I have with much diffidence accepted it. The kindness with which Y.R.H. has always treated me encourages me to hope that I may be able to discharge the duties of this great office with your co-operation and sympathy, and I trust I may be able to reconcile the substantial interests of the Army with those Parliamentary considerations which I have to respect. The great honour to which I am raised is both unsought for and unexpected by me; but it is with sincere pleasure that I find myself again connected with a Department with which I have so many pleasant associations. I propose to do myself the honour of waiting on Y.R.H. in the course of to-morrow morning.’

CHAPTER XXXII

MODERN SYSTEM OF WAR PREPARATION—1886-88

Lord Salisbury's Ministry returns to power. Mr. Smith again becomes War Secretary. State of Ireland. Sir Redvers Buller's Mission. Government's attitude towards Egypt. Renewed struggle against Reduction. H.R.H.'s Annual Statement, December 1886. Resignation of Lord Randolph Churchill. Mr. Smith's Farewell to the War Office. H.R.H.'s protests against reduction of Artillery. Mr. Stanhope open to conviction. Inauguration of modern system of war preparation. Short historical sketch of subject. Lord Wolseley's Memorandum. Mr. Stanhope's Memorandum. Comparison between the two. Re-grouping of War Office Departments. Extension of Lord Wolseley's time as Adjutant-General. H.R.H.'s Annual Statement, December 1887. A Director of Military Education. The Aldershot Command. H.R.H. and financial responsibility. H.R.H.'s Annual Statement, December 1888.

WHEN Lord Salisbury's Ministry returned to power in June 1886, Mr. W. H. Smith once again became Secretary of State for War, and on assuming office he wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

'3 GROSVENOR PLACE,
LONDON, 30 *July* 1886.

'I am grateful, as I have often been before, for Y.R.H.'s kind feeling towards me; and I can assure Y.R.H. that it is with very great pleasure that I am about to resume my seat at the War Office. . . .

' . . . I shall return to town on Monday, and I shall then hope to have the honour of waiting on Y.R.H. . . . '

During Mr. Smith's tenure of office, from July 1886 to January 1887, there was naturally no time to effect any great organic changes; although, during this brief period, the first step towards introducing a scientific mobilisation plan for the Army was taken. When the Government came

into office, the state of Bulgaria gave cause for some anxiety; and there was in consequence some fear of a European conflagration. The state of Ireland also, at the commencement of the anti-Home Rule Government's tenure of office, was a burning question, and the ministry adopted the novel expedient of sending a soldier to Ireland in a civil capacity to restore order.

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

'WAR OFFICE, 26 August 1886.

'... Redvers Buller goes to Kerry to restore law and order there.

'We think it possible that a new and strong man approaching the condition of affairs which prevails there, may, bringing a fresh, unprejudiced mind to bear on them, infuse a new spirit into those who are responsible for law and order, and by vigilance and activity in the use of the existing powers of the law, he may be enabled to put a stop to the moonlighting which has gone on. . . .'

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

'27 August 1886.

'Redvers Buller left for Ireland last night. No one thought of mentioning his appointment to Prince Edward, as it is entirely a Civil one. His functions will be those of a Divisional Magistrate, and his work will be to overhaul the existing system and arrangements for the protection of life and property, and to see where it can be improved, so as to ensure the detection of criminals and, if it is possible, put a stop to the evil-doings of the moonlighters.

'We think that a fresh, vigorous mind, accustomed to strict discipline, may be very useful indeed in revising the disposition and the actual operations of the Constabulary and the other Civil agencies which exist in those disturbed counties for the protection of law-abiding subjects of the Queen.

'I have written to Prince Edward to explain this. You will have seen that the Opposition heckle us considerably in the House, but we have come out of it so far without damage.'

The last letter also throws some light on the new Government's attitude towards the Egyptian question:—

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

'WAR OFFICE, 27 *August* 1886.

'I am glad to have had an opportunity of reading General Stephenson's letter. It is very much what I expected from him. He is naturally desirous of retaining as large a force as possible, and of making himself and Egypt quite safe; but I have pointed out to him, as you know, that we must cut down the expenditure or prepare to go out, and as this latter course would be disastrous to this country and to Egypt, it is better to run a less serious risk in making gradual but considerable reductions of force and of expenditure. . . .'

The new Government had not been long in office before the wearisome question of reductions again began. On this occasion Mr. Smith proposed a reduction in General Officers commanding Brigades at Aldershot, by which, of course, only a very small economy could be effected, though such a plan obviously made for unpreparedness for war.

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

'3 GROSVENOR PLACE, 18 *September* 1886.

' . . . There are two or three matters, however, on which I should wish to have some conversation with Y.R.H. before I leave, and I understand I may have that opportunity on Thursday.

'The first is the absolute necessity, as vacancies in command occur, to consider whether any economy can be effected which is not inconsistent with efficiency.

'On re-considering Aldershot, for example, it did occur to me that we might, without sacrificing efficiency, suspend the appointment of one of the three Brigadier-Generals for the autumn and winter.

'I put this forward as an indication of what might be done perhaps in other cases, and in other ways, but I am most anxious, as I am sure Y.R.H. is also, that if we are compelled to ask for large estimates, we may show a self-denying and strict economy in any branch of the service in which it is possible to effect it.

'There is every probability that a Committee of the House of Commons will be proposed next session on Army and Navy Estimates, and the inquiry is likely to be a very drastic one. I want to show that, before any such pressure came or was even talked about, we have put our own house in order. . . .'

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH TO THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY
FOR WAR.

'18 *December* 1886.

'I think I should have from the military authorities a report showing the extent to which it is possible to reduce the establishments of rank and file of all Battalions at home, having regard to the reliefs which have to be furnished to linked Battalions abroad; and the reductions should include the Guards to the extent to which they are practicable and possible, having regard to the success of the Short Service system applied to them.

'I should wish my military advisers to remember that, if recruiting is not checked, the effect of a reduction in establishments is to pass a much larger number of men into the Reserve, who, in the event of emergency, would be instantly available; and it is a matter of moment that, when the necessity for re-armament is very pressing, every farthing that can be spared should be devoted to the most urgent service.'

On 20 December 1886 the Duke submitted his annual statement on the condition of the Army. It did not differ from many of its predecessors. As usual, the keynote was a strong protest against the danger of reductions; and the vexed question as to what should be done with the one remaining unlinked Battalion, the Cameron Highlanders, was touched upon. On this point, it will be observed, the Duke had a very open mind.

It is interesting to note that he once more returned to the subject of Mounted Infantry, of the value of which he had so high an opinion. Thus he advocated the excellent plan of twenty horses per Battalion of those composing the 1st Army Corps being permanently maintained. This would have been of inestimable value thirteen years later!

In view of recent events, the Duke's remarks on the Army Corps system, which was not, as many suppose, inaugurated by Mr. Brodrick, are especially interesting.

As the Duke very truly demonstrates, a point which the opponents of the late scheme could not be made to see, the Army Corps organisation in no way interfered with a more complete realisation of the Divisional one.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

‘HORSE GUARDS, W.O., 20 December 1886.

‘Looking at the present condition of the various branches of the service, I am disposed to think that they are in many respects better than they were at this time last year, owing in a great measure to the improved establishments of the Infantry Battalions serving at home, which during the last year have been generally brought up to strength by satisfactory recruiting. At the same time, this very addition has rendered the Home Corps younger in point of age than they have ever been, the Infantry Battalions specially being largely composed of recruits, with a reduced number of seasoned soldiers to leaven the mass of youngsters, and in that respect rendering Battalions and Corps less efficient for foreign service. There has, moreover, been a very large drain on our Infantry Battalions by the large increase of the drafts during the last two years for India, to raise all Corps serving in that country to an increased establishment, and even our Home Cavalry Regiments have been drained to some extent in order to make up the fourth squadron of Cavalry now decided upon as the Cavalry Establishment in India for the future.

‘. . . The Secretary of State has, I know, before him plans for mobilising one, or if possible two, Army Corps, and I generally accord in the recommendations that have been placed before him with a view to carrying out this project. I shall not enter into the proposals specially connected with this scheme in this memorandum, but must remark that, whilst cordially supporting the desire to have at all times as large a force as possible in a condition to be made available by Reserves for any sudden emergency (which in these days may come upon us much more rapidly than in former times, in consequence of the great increase of strength and admirable organisation of Continental Armies, who are all in a condition to be rapidly placed on a war footing), the fact cannot be overlooked that our requirements as a great Colonial and Indian Empire are very different from theirs, and that consequently we shall have at all times to set apart a considerable portion of our Home Force for reinforcements to India and our Colonial possessions in the event of war, which *must* inevitably be met, but which, as a result, must considerably curtail our power to place any large body of troops in the field for foreign land operations.

‘We must therefore not sacrifice the substance for the shadow, and, whilst working up to the fullest extent towards the organisation of two Army Corps, be satisfied with one in a really efficient condition, the second being made available for the reinforcements for India and the Colonies, should that become the first necessity, as it most likely will be. It has been considered by some that a good Divisional organisation

would in many respects suit our requirements better than that of Army Corps; but as an Army Corps is composed of three Divisions, it will be at all times very easy to revert to such a plan, and nothing that has now been proposed for an Army Corps organisation will, I think, militate against Divisional organisation should it in the future appear to me more desirable as the normal of our Army.

‘As regards the alterations and changes that may become necessary for carrying out the proposed schemes of Army Corps organisation, no changes are required as regards our Cavalry. If Regiments of Cavalry could be maintained at a higher establishment it would be better, but I deprecate most strongly the reduction of any cadres to meet such an increase of strength, and rather than adopt such a scheme I would prefer filling up the present numbers of Cavalry Regiments by reserve men and by recruits, which no doubt would, in the event of war, rapidly come forward for enlistment. I would, however, draw attention to the necessity of having a stronger *Depôt* for Cavalry Regiments serving in India, as these are in future to be maintained at four squadrons with an enlarged and strengthened *Depôt* troop at home.

‘The present condition of our Horse and Field Artillery is as good as we can expect it to be, and I trust this force will be maintained on its present establishment and efficiency. There is an idea afloat that we could reduce by several Batteries our Horse Artillery, as more expensive than Field Batteries, converting the reduced Horse to Field Batteries; but I deprecate this course, and consider it would be a fatal error. Horse Artillery is a very delicate arm, which it is extremely difficult to create at short notice. It is the finest and most powerful force that we possess, and as such is the envy and admiration of all foreign military critics. It will be required *largely* in India in the event of any sudden emergency in that country, and it would be one of the first demands from that country should large reinforcements be required.

‘There is a strong feeling in many quarters that it would be desirable to separate the Garrison Artillery from the mounted portion of the force. I shall not enter into this large question in my present minute, for it must be fully considered in a strong committee intended to go into the subject. My own views are rather against such a change on account of the greater facility we now have of making Batteries of Artillery interchangeable for Garrison to Mounted, and *vice versa*, according to the sudden emergencies for augmentation of one or other of the several descriptions of the force consequent upon our Indian and Colonial requirements; but I am quite open to conviction should the evidence taken be in favour of so large a change. . . .

‘With reference to the Infantry, the mainstay of all

armies, I have already observed that, in point of actual numbers, considerable progress has been made by good recruiting during the last year; but the duties imposed on our troops have of late years greatly increased, and the men are exceptionally young in the Home Battalions, and many quite unfit to be sent on service abroad, though all likely to grow into good, useful soldiers in course of time. Any reduction in the establishments of Battalions would, in my opinion, be a fatal error, as those at home have annually to give heavy drafts to the affiliated Battalions serving abroad, on an average not less than 200 rank and file each, to which extent the Home Battalions are annually depleted of their best men, and there is barely time till the next trooping season comes round to fill up the vacancies thus caused by the annual, and we may say normal, drafts. Moreover, what with our force in Egypt and the additional Battalions abroad, such as a permanent increase to the European force in India, the relative proportions of Battalions serving at home to those abroad have been considerably diminished, and the original intention of feeding the Foreign by the Home Battalion has in many cases become impossible, the want having in such cases to be supplied by increased Depôts, very short of officers and altogether ill-suited for the demands of *two* instead of only one Battalion serving abroad at the same time. The organisation proposed by Lord Cardwell's scheme in such cases was to form a *third* Battalion to Corps thus situated; but this, though frequently suggested and pressed by myself, has never been carried out, and all that has been done to meet the absolute necessity of the case is by an increased and far from satisfactory Depôt, short of efficient officers and non-commissioned officers, and with next to nothing but recruits to compose it, thus rendering good training of the recruits almost impossible.

‘ . . . It has been suggested on former occasions that great advantage to the public service would be derived from an addition of two Battalions to the Brigade of Guards. At present we have seven Battalions of Guards, the Grenadiers having three Battalions, the Coldstream and Scots Guards only two each. If a third Battalion could be added to these two Corps, we should at all times be in a position to place six *Battalions* of Guards for service in the field at the shortest notice, the third Battalion complete in its cadre of officers and N.C. officers being still available at home for some duties, whilst forming the men to complete the two others in the field. This would be to our Army a most valuable Reserve, and as many three-years service men now pass through the Guards, their Reserves would be largely available to fill up the required casualties. As the 79th Cameron Highlanders are the only single-battalion Regiment, and if abroad at all times require a large Depôt to keep it up; as at present it is a matter for consideration if this Line Battalion could not

be made available with its present 1100 men as an establishment for embodiment into the Scots Guards as its third Battalion, whilst a third Battalion could be raised for the Coldstream Guards, the aggregate of the nine Battalions of Guards on this formation not exceeding the establishment of the present nine Battalions *plus* the 79th Cameron Highlanders. Some difficulties might arise in the transfer of officers and men of a Line Regiment to the Guards, and the susceptibilities of the Corps might be rather against such transfers, but it is to be hoped that this might be got over, and certainly the proposal is worthy of the most serious consideration. I am bound to remark that this would entail the loss of one Line Battalion for ordinary foreign service; on the other hand, it would give us two additional very efficient Battalions for service, more particularly in Ireland, where such Battalions would be of great value as not having to send out annual drafts which, especially for duty in Ireland, is a very serious drawback. I should much wish that we could devise some means by which three Line Battalions, forming a Brigade, could at all times be kept at home in a thoroughly efficient state for sudden service abroad, without the necessity for sending drafts to their affiliated Battalions; but I do not see my way to so desirable, I would almost say necessary, an arrangement without an additional number of Battalions to the permanent force of the Infantry of the Line. The advantage of such a step is obvious. It constantly has happened, during my period of office and command, that a sudden demand has been made for troops at the Cape, in South Africa, in former times in Canada, and frequently in India. For such smaller purposes it would hardly be right or desirable at once to send a Brigade of Guards, as their departure always forebodes greater events and graver complications. An available Brigade of the Line on these conditions would be of the greatest value, and would meet such emergencies in the most unostentatious manner. I think, therefore, it is worth considering.

‘One more point as regards the Infantry I would desire to name and recommend. I think it is generally assumed that Regimental Transport is essential for our Army. It is also felt that it frequently happens that Mounted Infantry are of great value. We do not at present possess the means of carrying out either of these requirements. What I would greatly desire to see is a small number of horses, say twenty per Battalion at all events of the force composing the 1st Army Corps, which would form the nucleus for the Regimental Transport of each corps, and would also be able to train up a small portion of men for the duties of Mounted Infantry. I am convinced that the greatest possible benefit would result from such an arrangement, and it is an expense which I do not hesitate to recommend as absolutely essential. A considerable body of men could thus be rapidly passed

through the required duties connected with these specialities, and the efficiency of all corps so situated would be greatly enhanced. . . .

‘The Reserves of the Army are gradually being considerably increased, and will become a valuable addition to our forces in the event of mobilisation. At the same time it is not desirable to call upon them to rejoin the ranks more frequently than the absolute necessity of our position requires, and therefore for all ordinary duties it is of the greatest importance to keep a sufficiently large number of men under the Colours to meet, not only the ordinary duties, but even to a considerable extent sudden and unforeseen eventualities. At the same time I would gladly see some arrangements made by which we could annually judge of the efficiency of the Reserve men, beyond merely being satisfied of their existence by their presenting themselves for payment. . . .

‘With serious complications abroad, with the European Armies, already large and powerful, being more particularly at the present moment in the course of considerable augmentation, with a portion of our small Army still in Egypt, with a permanent increase to our European force in India; lastly, with the condition of things in Ireland, it would be a reasonable hope that some increase, not an unconsiderable one, might be considered justified to the comparatively limited force at our disposal both at home and abroad; for our large garrisons such as Malta, as also Gibraltar, Halifax, and Bermuda, are lamentably short of men to defend their extended works. But should such increase be deemed impossible, I cannot too strongly put forward as my opinion that anything in the shape of reduction should not for one moment be entertained, and in the confidence that these views may meet with general concurrence, I have ventured to place the exact position of affairs clearly before you.’

The dramatic incidents of Lord Randolph Churchill's sudden resignation of the Chancellorship of the Exchequer will be within the recollection of many of the readers of this book. Hence the views of his destined successor as Leader of the House of Commons, as expressed in the following letter to the Duke, are of the greatest historical interest:—

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

‘GREENLANDS,
HENLEY-ON-THAMES, 25 December 1886.

‘I am not at all surprised that Y.R.H. was startled with the news which the *Times* gave on Thursday morning.

'I was quite prepared for it, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been urging me to cut down my estimates heavily for some time, and when I had arrived at an approximation to the amount I should have to ask for, he came to me on Monday to go through the figures, and for nearly two hours he used every argument in his power to persuade me to reduce them. I could not see that it would be consistent with my duty to do so, and he left me saying he should resign his post, which intention he carried out the next morning.

'I saw him on Tuesday, and again on Wednesday, and did my best to induce him to reconsider his decision, offering to go instead, if my colleagues would allow me to do so, but he would not hear of it.

'I did not think it right to mention the subject to Y.R.H., as there was always a possibility of his reconsidering his decision until it was published; and now I am afraid the Rubicon is passed.

'I had intended to take some rest here in any case, and therefore I did not go to the office after Wednesday night.

'It is of little use, at times like these, to expose one's self to the inquiries and remarks of political friends who want information one has not got one's self and cannot give, and therefore, unless Lord Salisbury wants to see me on Monday, I shall not go up to town until Tuesday morning, when we have a Cabinet at 12.30, but it is probable I shall be at Grosvenor Place by 10.30, and go thence to Downing Street.'

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

'WAR OFFICE, 23 *December* 1886.

'... There is no change in the political situation. We are all waiting for Lord Hartington's return; and it will be for your host and for others of his friends to put before him strongly the fact that the country looks to him now to take part in its government.'

Mr. W. H. Smith was a good type of the politician who took a more comprehensive view of his duties than the mere expediciencies of the moment demanded, and was one of the few who looked ahead.

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

'WAR OFFICE, 8 *January* 1887.

'... I have made a minute on the subject of the site at Portsmouth which I am anxious to realise, and an appro-

priation in aid to assist my successor to spend money at Shoeburyness and in building barracks.

'I am sorry Mr. Northcote did not, in the first instance, send for General Nicholson and talk over the matter with him, but that does not affect the merits of the question.

'There is always a reluctance to part with property when it has once been acquired, and many owners suffer from their inability to make up their minds to the severance; but the War Department, spending as it must, cannot afford to hold anything like this site, which can be turned into money, for a very problematical and uncertain future necessity.

'I hope Y.R.H. will be satisfied that, in giving these directions, I have only one object in view, that of applying all the resources which are available for the benefit of the service.'

On retiring from the War Office, Mr. Smith sent the following minute to Sir Ralph Thompson, the then Permanent Under-Secretary for War.

FROM MR. SMITH TO SIR RALPH THOMPSON.

'13 January 1887.

'I am anxious to express to the gentlemen with whom I have had the honour of being associated in the War Department, the extreme regret with which I part officially from them.

'I wish to put on record the fact that I have received the most cordial and loyal assistance from H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief, from yourself, and generally from the Department, in the endeavour to improve the efficiency of the Army and to administer the funds voted by Parliament with a real regard for the objects for which the Army exists.

'I believe the country to be well served by its officers in the several departments of the State, but there are none of whom I could speak more confidently than of those from whom I am about to be severed. It was my intention to have taken leave of the heads of departments yesterday afternoon, but the very sad death of my old friend and colleague rendered me quite unable to carry out my intention.'

Two years later Mr. Smith also addressed this letter to the Duke on his War Secretaryship:—

FROM MR. W. H. SMITH.

'3 Grosvenor Place, 10 April 1889.

'I must at once thank Y.R.H. for the further and quite unexpected proof of most kindly friendship afforded by the

letter of Y.R.H. this morning, written, too, at a moment when Your thoughts and Your time must have been fully occupied by the bereavement which has befallen You.

'I have always been sensible of the frank and favourable interpretation which Y.R.H. has placed on the communications which have passed between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief in times past, and whether my official life be a long or short one, I shall ever bear in mind the friendship with which I have been honoured, and the desire Y.R.H. has always shown to make relations between two high officers of State, which might sometimes be difficult, as easy as possible in the interests of the country.'

The resignation of Lord Randolph Churchill, and the death, on 12 January 1887, of Lord Iddesleigh, just when his resignation of the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs had been decided upon, necessitated some far-reaching changes in the composition of the Government. Lord Salisbury himself took over charge of Foreign Affairs, whilst Mr. Smith succeeded Lord Salisbury as First Lord of the Treasury and Lord Randolph Churchill as Leader of the House of Commons. Mr. Goschen became Chancellor of the Exchequer; and Mr. Stanhope, then Colonial Secretary, moved on to the War Office, his appointment as War Secretary dating from 12 January 1887.

Mr. Stanhope's career at the War Office was a memorable one, although none of those great organic changes which attract the attention of the public were effected under his auspices. But a great step in war preparation was made during his time, and the lot of the soldier materially improved by the erection of new barracks at Aldershot and elsewhere, and by the changes made in the system of feeding him.

It will be remembered how the Duke had impressed upon preceding War Secretaries the vital necessity of possessing a thoroughly organised force for over-sea purposes, with its proper complement of transport and departmental services, and how unsuccessful hitherto his efforts had been. But under Mr. Stanhope his ideals at last took a definite form; and though matters even then did not become entirely satisfactory, as evidenced by our state of unpreparedness as regards material and stores at the commencement of the

recent South African War, still much satisfactory work was at that time accomplished, the results of which endure to-day.

But before dealing with this most important subject, it will be necessary first of all to allude to one of somewhat less moment. Mr. Stanhope had not been long in office before the Duke deemed it necessary to enter a protest against the contemplated reductions of the Royal Artillery, the necessity for which protest is only too well justified by the enormous increase in that arm which has taken place during the last few years. From the following letters, however, it will be seen that the new War Secretary and the new Chancellor of the Exchequer looked upon the efficiency of the Army in a broad and generous spirit:—

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

‘WAR OFFICE, 30 *January* 1887.

‘I should be very sorry if Y.R.H. ever supposed that I did not on all occasions wish to hear the expression of the views founded on your very large experience, which you may entertain, even when opposed to the course I was pursuing.

‘The protest which you now enter, accompanied by such friendly expressions towards Mr. Smith and myself, against the recent order relating to the Royal Artillery, I regard of so much importance that I feel it to be my duty to consult upon it, without delay, with my predecessor. It was, however, adopted by him after great consideration.’

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

‘WAR OFFICE, 8 *February* 1887.

‘. . . I am glad to say that I can quite remove the impression as to Goschen’s action.

‘He is quite inclined to back us up strongly, and is not pressing for reduction of Estimates: a few small reductions have been made on examination of the details of some votes, and I have added a small amount to the Vote of Armaments in order to make a beginning with Table Bay, to which I feel sure he will agree. . . .’

This question of the reduction of Horse Artillery has now become an almost historical one. At that time a proposal was made to convert several batteries of Royal Horse

Artillery into Field Artillery, and to reduce one battery of the former altogether. It was contended that not only was Field Artillery a more powerful arm, but that it had the additional advantage of employing fewer horses. The difficulty in mobilisation would therefore be much greater in the case of Horse than of Field Artillery. The plan eventually adopted at a War Office Meeting at the recommendation of the Mobilisation Committee, was decided upon before Mr. Stanhope took office as War Secretary; and briefly it came to this:—

1. An increase of Field Batteries and consequent increase of our most powerful and effective guns.

2. An increase in the amount of Garrison Artillery, which was estimated to fall short of existing requirements by 1800 men.

3. The provision of ammunition columns, for which, up till then, no arrangements, even in the case of the 1st Army Corps, had been made.

4. The reduction of the strain upon transport arrangements, in consequence of the smaller number of horses to be provided and fed in the field as compared to Horse Artillery.

5. A gain in horses for general military purposes by the conversion of Horse into Field Artillery, which would enable new transport companies to be formed, and the nucleus of a regimental transport for batteries belonging to the two first Army Corps to be obtained.

Mr. Stanhope's initial attitude is shown by the following:—

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

'HOUSE OF COMMONS, 16 *February* 1887.

' . . . I hope, Sir, You will let me say quite frankly that my very careful consideration of all the evidence, marred (I am sorry to say) by sad want of experience, leads me to think, that the case for conversion of Horse Batteries into Field Batteries is a very strong one, if we look to the requirements of our small Army. It is the actual reduction of two Batteries altogether that has occasioned me more doubt. But I have been, and am, in communication with Mr. Smith upon it, and (if necessary) the Cabinet. . . . '

Mr. Stanhope was, however, quite open to conviction

and in a most generous manner gave way to the Duke's wishes.

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

'WAR OFFICE, 17 March 1887.

'I have given very careful reconsideration to all the representations which Y.R.H. has done me the honour to make to me on the subject of the change in the Royal Artillery. As you know, Sir, it was not my original order, but it was undoubtedly founded upon the Mobilisation Scheme which, when I came to the War Office, had been approved by the War Office authorities, and I was, and am, most reluctant to take any step which may interfere with carrying out, as far as our funds will admit, that scheme.

'That scheme contemplated the reduction of at least four Horse Artillery Batteries. I listened with great attention to all the arguments brought forward in the House on the subject, but I heard none which seemed to me to affect the position which had been deliberately taken up by the authorities at the War Office. But what I could not in the smallest degree concede to Parliamentary pressure, so long as I remained unconvinced, I feel bound, after your most urgent appeal, to reconsider once more. And I am prepared to make this one concession to the feeling so powerfully represented by Y.R.H. I think *one* Battery of Horse Artillery may be reprieved, and that, instead of the five ordered to be reduced, we should only deal with four Horse Batteries. I make this change at Y.R.H.'s representation with a pleasure which is made the more by the reluctance with which I have been compelled by my duty hitherto to resist the pleadings and vast experience of the Commander-in-Chief. I do not know whether it will involve our going to the Treasury, or whether we can meet the increased change by some economy elsewhere. I am sure that if the latter is necessary, that I may rely upon Y.R.H.'s kind assistance.'

MINUTE BY MR. STANHOPE—ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.

'17 March 1887.

'The changes proposed in the Royal Horse Artillery go in one respect beyond the direct recommendations of the Mobilisation Committee. They proposed to deal with four Batteries only, while the order now given relates to five Batteries. I am prepared to that extent, and to that extent only, to limit the orders lately given.

'Accordingly one of the Horse Batteries will be retained, three will be converted into Field Batteries, and one will be reduced.

‘These, with the other changes sanctioned, should proceed without delay.’

The great feature by which Mr. Stanhope's tenure of office will be remembered, as already explained, is the policy outlined in the celebrated Minute, usually called the Stanhope Memorandum. On numerous former occasions the Duke had called the attention of the successive Secretaries of State to the inadequacy of our system of preparing for war. He had also demonstrated the deplorable deficiency of stores and transport. Indeed, the departmental services generally had been wofully lacking for many years past, a state of things which for long had caused him much anxiety.

In a previous chapter¹ the Duke's desire to place the important subject of mobilisation on a satisfactory basis was shown; and also the curiously contradictory story which has been told of his views. But perhaps a brief sketch of this subject will not at this point be out of place.

Up to 1886 no mobilisation scheme existed, although, during Mr. Gathorne Hardy's and Colonel Stanley's War Secretaryships, H.R.H. had on numerous occasions called attention to this defect. It is true that a so-called mobilisation scheme was drawn up in 1875, and that it appeared as the ‘Eight Army Corps Scheme’ for several years in the Army List. But the scheme in reality was merely a framework; and most of the elements required for enduing it with life were totally lacking.

In 1886 Sir Henry Brackenbury, the head of the Intelligence Branch, called attention, as the Duke had frequently done before him, to the unorganised state of our Army at home. At the same time, Sir Henry Brackenbury drew the outline of a system whereby an Army Corps could, if necessary, be sent abroad, and a plan of defence organised at home. He also showed that at that time not even one Army Corps could have been placed in the field, either at home or abroad, with its proper complement of Commissariat, Transport, Medical, Ordnance, or Veterinary services; whilst as regards a second Army Corps, there would have been absolutely none of the above-mentioned services, and, in

¹ Chap. xxiv. pp. 94-96.

addition, a large deficiency in Artillery, Engineers, and horses. The result of this report was the appointment of a Committee of two, Sir Ralph Thompson and Sir Henry Brackenbury. They did not deal with the question of what field army we should have, but simply with the forces actually at our disposal. They issued their report in three parts, and Part I. laid down in December 1886 that the force which could be produced was two Army Corps and lines of communication troops. This force was not what, in the opinion of the Committee, the country should possess, but what it could produce.¹

No immediate result, however, took place. But on 8 June 1888 Lord Wolseley, the Adjutant-General, on behalf of H.R.H., addressed a Minute to the Secretary of State on the subject, in the 64th paragraph of which the Duke wished 'to place on record, that hitherto he has been more guided in his annual demands for men by what he thought he had some chance of getting, than by what he knew to be the total military requirements of the country.' In the course of this Minute, Lord Wolseley sketched out what might be considered the main requirements of our Army. This Memorandum was written on the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, and as Lord Wolseley observes, 'so far as the Commander-in-Chief is concerned, it is indispensable that provision must be made' for the objects for which we maintain an army. After setting forth the necessities of the Indian and Colonial garrisons, Lord Wolseley states that three regular Army Corps and six Brigades of Cavalry were necessary for home defence; and that in addition a large number of Auxiliaries was required for garrison duties. Lastly, he lays down 'that after providing garrisons as in previous paragraphs, for all our strong places at home and abroad, we should be able to embark as soon as the necessary shipping could be provided for them, two Army Corps, one Cavalry Division, and the necessary troops for protection of the base and lines of communication.'

On 8 December of the same year (1888), Mr. Stanhope

¹ Memorandum by Major-General Sir Coleridge Grove, K.C.B., dated 11 March 1897.

issued the celebrated Minute in which he states that 'a general basis for the requirements of our Army might be more correctly laid down by stating the objects for which we maintain an army.' A final summary of this now historical document was issued on 1 June 1891, and the statement as regards the object of our military organisation is now presented in its entirety.

EXTRACT FROM MR. STANHOPE'S MINUTE OF 8 DECEMBER
1888, ISSUED ON 1 JUNE 1891.

'(a) The effective support of the civil power in all parts of the United Kingdom.

'(b) To find the number of men for India, which has been fixed by arrangement with the Government of India.

'(c) To find garrisons for all our fortresses and cavalry stations at home and abroad, according to a scale now laid down, and to maintain those garrisons at all times at the strength fixed for a peace or war footing.

'(d) After providing for these requirements, to be able to mobilise rapidly for home defence two Army Corps of Regular troops, and one partly composed of Regulars and partly of Militia; and to organise the auxiliary forces, not allotted to Army Corps or garrisons, for the defence of London and the defensible positions in advance, and for the defence of mercantile ports.

'(e) Subject to the foregoing considerations and to their financial obligations, to aim at being able, in case of necessity, to send abroad two complete Army Corps with Cavalry Division and line of communication. But it will be distinctly understood that the probability of the employment of an Army Corps in the field in an European war is sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of the military authorities to organise our forces efficiently for the defence of this country.'

A comparison between Mr. Stanhope's statements and those of Lord Wolseley will well repay perusal. It will be remembered that on several previous occasions the Duke had impressed upon various Secretaries of State the importance of organising a force for oversea purposes, and this idea of the Duke's is clearly set forth in the Adjutant-General's memorandum. But Mr. Stanhope treats this as a minor consideration, and lays down that it is 'the primary duty of our military authorities to organise our forces

efficiently for the defence of this country'—the very antithesis of the very definite statement of the Adjutant-General, and likewise, be it said, of the contentions of the 'blue-water' school of to-day.

Who was right and who was wrong as to the primary necessity of a well-organised force of two Army Corps for expeditionary purposes can best be arrived at by considering that the demands of the recent South African War necessitated the dispatch of one Army Corps and five supplementary Infantry Divisions, as well as almost all the Regular Cavalry in the United Kingdom, and many batteries of Artillery, making in all three regular Army Corps, as well as many other auxiliary troops!

But the placing of this expeditionary force by Mr. Stanhope in the background would seem to have had far-reaching results; and it can hardly be doubted that the effect of his action was to discourage successive War Secretaries from obtaining funds wherewith to supply the needs of the force destined for foreign service, with the result that when the South African War broke out there was a lamentable deficiency in reserves of stores. It is true that the mobilisation branch worked hard to make the best of existing material; and that, although of course they had no power to insist upon the proper provision of stores, still, as regards personnel, their arrangements in 1899 were eminently successful.

The Duke's annual statement on the Army, presented 25 November 1887, contains little which is new. He again deprecates reduction, and urges the necessity of completely organising a force of two Army Corps in readiness to send abroad.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'HORSE GUARDS, W.O., 25 November 1887.

'... As regards the Royal Artillery, I think now, as I have done all along, that we require a sufficient number of Horse Artillery Batteries to complete out two Army Corps, and to have additional ones in hand for the reinforcements which are certain to be asked for in this special line in India, should trouble arise there. Indeed, the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Frederick Roberts, has hinted

to me that such would undoubtedly be one of his most pressing demands. We have eleven Batteries of Horse Artillery in India to get home; the latter will all be required for the two proposed Army Corps, consequently there will be none left for Indian reinforcements. I should therefore gladly see at all events two Horse Batteries again added to this our most delicate and most perfect arm, and such being my opinion, I feel bound to state it frankly. . . .

'All the departmental troops have been augmented of late, and have therefore become more efficient for sudden emergencies than they were last year, but a further extension would be of advantage, and is deemed necessary in order to carry out the present mobilisation scheme.

'Before bringing these remarks to a conclusion, I wish to press the enormous advantage which would result from some manœuvres being carried out this year, even on a limited scale, for which a concentration of forces would of course be required. The original gathering at Chobham, and the later concentration at Salisbury, produced the most marked results, and the rapidity with which great bodies of troops are collected now in foreign countries renders it necessary that England alone should not be left behind in the lessons to be thus acquired. Officers and men learn more in such concentrations in a few days than months or even years of theoretical study can teach them, and as a result the money thus expended is in no respect thrown away.'

Among the reductions urged at this period was the abolition of the post of Director-General of Military Education. It may be remembered how, in the early days of his Commandership-in-Chief, the Duke had worked hard to accomplish the creation of this office. As will be seen by the following letter, the recommendation of the Secretary of State to the Parliamentary Committee for its abolition was made against the strong opinion of H.R.H., who for the time carried his point.

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

'WAR OFFICE, 15 *December* 1887.

'... I have thought very carefully on the office of the Director-General of Military Education, and I do not think that it ought to be filled up at all. The work can be perfectly well performed, as I understand, by the two gentlemen who are now assistant directors, and I am afraid that it would have been a post very difficult to defend before the

Parliamentary Committee, and also that, if it were filled up, it would be impossible to keep on Sir E. Hamley.

‘In that case, of course, the Governors of the Academy and of the College will stand on stronger ground than they would do if the office of Director-General were retained.

‘I am afraid Y.R.H. will not be altogether pleased with the view that I have taken, but I cannot help feeling how much we strengthen our position in asking for what is necessary, if we do not press the filling up of appointments which can without any real difficulty be dispensed with.’

After the Duke’s retirement, the abolition was effected on precisely the lines indicated by Mr. Stanhope, and the work was carried on by the two assistant directors. It is now notorious that the abolition of this post was an undoubted disadvantage to the service, and indirectly led to much trouble, in that it unduly increased the powers of the governors of our military colleges, who were not at all times competent or qualified to deal with educational matters or capable of organising studies.

The evidence given before the Education Committee in 1902 clearly demonstrated this, and one outcome of the condition of things then exposed as existing at Sandhurst, was the complete reorganisation of that establishment and the reappointment of a Director of Military Education, an official who is now termed the ‘Director of Staff Duties.’

In February 1888 Colonel Stanley, formerly Secretary of State for War, and now Lord Stanley of Preston, was appointed Governor-General of Canada, and on this occasion he wrote to the Duke as follows :—

FROM LORD STANLEY OF PRESTON.

‘5 PORTLAND PLACE, W., *February 1888.*

‘Y.R.H.’s invariable kindness to me must be my excuse for trespassing upon your time with this note; but I feel that it is only right that Y.R.H. should hear first from myself of the announcement which the newspapers will have to-morrow morning, that amongst the changes I have been appointed to succeed Lord Lansdowne in Canada. I hope that I may take with me Y.R.H.’s good wishes; I could not leave official and political life without endeavouring to express, however imperfectly, my earnest and sincere thanks

to Y.R.H. for your goodness and consideration to me at all times, and especially when at the War Office in days now gone by.

‘When I go out, I hope that I may be allowed to ask Y.R.H.’s leave, as Colonel of the Grenadiers, for one or two young men of my dear old regiment to go out with me. But of course this will go through the proper channel.’

The question as to who should succeed Sir Archibald Alison at Aldershot was the subject of much debate at this time. It will be interesting to many to hear that it was originally proposed that Lord Wolseley should go to Aldershot. But, as is well-known, Sir Evelyn Wood was eventually appointed.

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

‘111 EATON SQUARE, S.W., 19 April 1888.

‘... I have been consulting about the command at Aldershot with some of my colleagues, as I told Y.R.H. I would do, and upon the whole they still think the best arrangement will be for Sir A. Alison to become Adjutant-General, and for Lord Wolseley to go to Aldershot. This was the view which the Cabinet was originally agreed in taking. I cannot help thinking that Y.R.H. will find in Sir A. Alison a thoroughly suitable man for the work at the Horse Guards, and we should all feel great confidence in his selection.’

On 7 December 1888 the Duke submitted his annual statement, of which the following extracts may be of interest:—

‘... Since last year’s Estimates, great additional responsibilities in their preparation devolve upon me, as I am now responsible for submitting what, in the opinion of the Military Authorities, is essential for the safety of the Empire, and it is impossible to view the state of absolute unpreparedness for war in which the Army has been allowed to drift for years past without the greatest alarm, which will account for the excess of the present submissions for Estimates over those of recent years, which I am ready to admit is far in excess of what I would have desired.

‘A central authority I consider to be urgently required to decide on all large questions affecting the Defences of the Empire, and on disputed points regarding plans to be arranged in conjunction with the Navy.

‘Our Field Batteries are still largely armed with obsolete guns, so that if the Army were mobilised, four distinct calibre of guns would be in the field.

'Our Reserves of Military Stores are altogether inadequate—indeed we have not full equipment for one Army Corps.

'The following points in reference to Equipment are of special importance and require immediate attention:—

'1. The introduction of the Magazine Rifle and its speedy production.

'2. The completion of the re-armament of the Field Artillery with the 12-pounders.

'3. The provision of a Reserve of Small-Arm Ammunition.

'4. A commencement to be made towards the formation of a Reserve of Stores for the 1st and 2nd Army Corps.

'From all I could ascertain during my visit to the Northern Ports last autumn, little disposition was shown locally to concur with the suggestions on the part of the War Office for contributing towards their own defence; until protected they can only be looked upon as a source of danger to the country.

'The want of proper and sufficient barrack accommodation is a serious difficulty and must involve large expenditure.

'The general health of the troops at home and abroad has been satisfactory during the past year, with the exception of enteric fever in Dublin, where it still exists, specially in the Royal Barracks; it has also lately been prevalent at Gibraltar and Bermuda.

'The recent changes in the organisation of the Quarter-master-General's Department are working satisfactorily, and will, I believe, result in considerable economy when completed; the delay in obtaining Treasury sanction to the issue of the warrant regarding the formation of the new Army Service Corps has been attended with great inconvenience, but I understand that it has now been approved.'

CHAPTER XXXIII

CHANGES IN THE STATUS OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF—1887-1892

H.R.H. appointed Commander-in-Chief. Re-arrangement of duties in 1887. Surveyor-General abolished, and sole military responsibility concentrated in Commander-in-Chief. Proposal to extend Lord Wolseley's time as Adjutant-General. Lord Wolseley's views on new arrangement. H.R.H. on financial responsibility. The Harrington Commission. Its recommendations and tribute to H.R.H. The Queen's views. Decision of Government on new proposals. Proposal to make Sir F. Roberts Adjutant-General. Sir Redvers Buller eventually chosen. Proposed Chief of Staff. Mr. Stanhope's views. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's views. H.R.H.'s Farewell to Lord Wolseley as Adjutant-General. Lord Wolseley becomes Commander-in-Chief in Ireland. His Letters. H.R.H.'s Annual Statements in 1890-1891. The Queen on Regimental Numbers. The Wantage Committee. Mr. Stanhope's Farewell.

IN November 1887 the Duke of Cambridge, in commemoration of his jubilee of military service, was, like his great predecessor the Duke of Wellington, created Commander-in Chief, instead of Commanding-in-Chief, which had been his title since 1856. Some other changes, however, as well as those of mere nomenclature, took place at this period in the status of that office. It will be remembered that under Mr. Cardwell the War Department had been grouped into three branches, the Commander-in-Chief, the Financial Secretary, and the Surveyor-General of Ordnance. In 1887 these duties were again readjusted by an Order in Council.¹ This in turn was again amended, though not very materially, by another Order in Council.² Under these, sole military responsibility to the Secretary of State was concentrated in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. The office of Sur-

¹ 29 December 1887.
350

² 21 February 1888.

voyor-General was abolished; and the Commander-in-Chief, in addition to the other military duties which he had previously performed, was charged 'with obtaining, holding and issuing to all branches of the Regular and Auxiliary Forces' all kinds of supplies and necessities of war, and 'with exercising a strict control over the expenditure of such supplies.'

Thus matériel as well as personnel came under the Commander-in-Chief's direct control; and, in the last resort, he was responsible for the clothing, feeding, equipment, and payment of the forces. Here, however, his responsibility ended; and the same Order in Council provided that the civil department under the Financial Secretary, also of course responsible to the Secretary of State, was directly concerned in the exercise of economy, and generally responsible for financially reviewing expenditure and proposals, accounts and contracts. The Financial Secretary was also charged 'with the control of the manufacturing departments of the Army (including the Clothing Department),' and with 'advising the Secretary of State on all questions of Army expenditure.'

This rearrangement of responsibility endured until the Duke retired from the command of the Army in 1895. At the period now dealt with (1887) Lord Wolseley's appointment as Adjutant-General should properly have expired. But it was felt that in the altered circumstances thus brought about, it was desirable that he should receive an extension, in order that his services might be available in launching the new scheme.

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

'WAR OFFICE, 9 November 1887.

'Since I spoke to Y.R.H. about Lord Wolseley, I have had the opportunity of consulting some of my colleagues upon the subject, and I think I may say that their opinion mainly coincides with my own.

'First of all, I think it would be of advantage to the success of the new scheme of reorganisation that we should continue to have the assistance of the present Adjutant-General, at any rate until the middle of next year, when it will have got into complete working order. I should therefore be very reluctant to let Lord Wolseley go to Malta.

‘But then I also cannot help feeling that these are not times when we ought to allow Lord Wolseley to be far out of reach, if it can be avoided. Nor would it be fair to him, or advantageous to the country, to leave him without immediate employment at the expiration of his term of service as Adjutant-General.

‘I would therefore suggest to Y.R.H. that the best solution of the difficulty would be that Lord Wolseley should either go to Aldershot when Sir Archibald Alison comes here, or that I should extend for a time Lord Wolseley’s term of service as Adjutant-General. . . .’

Lord Wolseley’s views on the new arrangement are set forth in the following letter :—

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

‘MANOR HOUSE,
HASLEMERE, 21 September 1887.

‘. . . I have just had a note from Sir R. Buller, in which he says Mr. Stanhope wishes him to be at the War Office on 17 October, on which date I presume the new functions of the Quartermaster-General will be considered. I do not think there should be much difficulty in settling this, if the broad line be drawn that the Adjutant-General’s Department was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for all the soldier did, how he did it, for his instruction in all its phases (officers of course included); and that the Q.M.G. was charged with providing the soldier with everything he required to enable him to do what he was ordered through the Adjutant-General. This is a very broad line, and very easily defined. The Q.M.G. would therefore have under him the Paymasters Department, Ordnance Store Department, Commissariat Department, Barrack Department, and all the Transport of the Army. In fact, he would move, feed, and *clothe*; for sooner or later the Clothing Department *must* be placed under him. He would supply him with ammunition and everything he required.

‘The Adjutant-General would convey to the Q.M.G. the movements of troops to be made. The Q.M.G. would carry this out. It must be distinctly understood that the Q.M.G. of the future, as the Q.M.G. of the present, is directly under the Adjutant-General. There cannot be two kings in Brentford. The Adjutant-General would thus get rid of a lot of routine work, and so be able to devote himself to the education of officers, and especially of the Staff. I think You might with economy and advantage make the head of the Education branch an Assistant Adjutant-General. But, at any rate, to make the whole system complete, that branch must be placed

directly—and in my opinion—under the Adjutant-General. The Adjutant-General should take Your Royal Highness's views on all movements and housing of troops, decide upon the cubic space to be allotted to man and horse; and the Q.M.G. should carry out the orders on all such points as communicated to him by the Adjutant-General.

'Your Royal Highness will thus have in reality a Chief of the Staff, without introducing that title into the Horse Guards, and whilst retaining the Q.M.G., but with new functions.'

Under the new arrangement the financial responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief was not quite clear; and in the first *Report* of the House of Commons Committee on Army Estimates, 1888, the following passage occurs:—

'The Commander-in-Chief, who, under former arrangements, had no connection with the Surveyor-General of Ordnance (a post now abolished), would appear under present arrangements to be responsible to a certain extent for the amount estimated under Vote 12,¹ and mainly responsible for the allocation of that amount under the different items of Vote 12.'

Now the Duke was at all times only too anxious to take responsibility, financial or otherwise. But he was not desirous to do so when subject to the minute supervision of the Financial Branch.

TO MR. STANHOPE.

'HORSE GUARDS, 19 April 1888.

'I was not aware, or rather I did not understand, from our conversation on the subject yesterday, that the first *Report* of the Select Committee on the Army Estimates had been actually adopted by the Committee, and that it was to be at once presented to Parliament. I find, however, by the paper being now officially before me that the Report has gone in and therefore stands as an official document. This being so, I lose not a moment in entering my *protest* against the view expressed in paragraph 2. I totally and entirely object to having "to a certain extent" responsibility thrown upon me for the amount estimated for under Vote 12; and I further object to being considered "mainly responsible" for the allocation of that amount among the different items of Vote 12. I am quite prepared to accept any responsibility that may be placed upon me; but in that case I must insist

¹ Vote 12: 'Miscellaneous effective services,' viz.:—Ordnance, explosives, rewards, etc., to inventors, commissions to bankers, compensation for losses, etc.

on not being in any respect interfered with by the Finance Department, which is now the case in every item of expenditure to be incurred, and I was certainly so fully impressed with that being your own view, and I may say your desire, that I never contemplated the possibility of any other being adopted. I must therefore beg that I may be either at once specially examined on this matter, or that some steps may be taken by yourself or by myself to put the matter right before the public, as I do not feel justified, even for a moment, to allow this false impression to remain unchallenged. Had I been examined, these facts would have been disposed of by my answers; but as I have not as yet been called before the Committee, I feel very much surprised that conclusions should be arrived at so entirely at variance with what I conceive to be the facts of the case.

The new distribution of duties at the War Office had not long been in force before the whole question was once more considered by a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Hartington. This commission was appointed to inquire into the civil and professional administration of the naval and military departments, and the relations of those departments to each other and to the Treasury. It was appointed in June 1888, and its first report was issued in May 1889. This dealt with the large question of the connection of the Admiralty and the War Office with each other, and need not here be entered upon in detail. The further report of the Commission, however, demands more attention. It was issued on 11 May 1890, and dealt with the 'internal administration of the War Office.' Though the Commissioners admitted that the evidence before them did not admit of their forming an adequate opinion as to the practical working of the new system 'so recently inaugurated and to some extent incompletely developed,' they held that it involved an undue concentration of responsibility in the person of the Commander-in-Chief, who was in fact the only officer who had any direct responsibility to the Secretary of State.

They considered that such a centralisation of power tended to weaken the responsibility of heads of departments, and thus 'to diminish their efficiency'; and they maintained that such a system could not provide adequately for the consultative duties of the War Department. Before pro-

ceeding, however, to formulate their proposals, they paid the following tribute to H.R.H. as Commander-in-Chief:—

‘While we have considered it necessary to indicate the defects in principle which exist in the present organisation of the War Department, we recognise that the unique position, so long held by the present Commander-in-Chief, may have rendered it undesirable to adopt any other system in making the recent changes, and that his great experience may have enabled the existing system to work with the success claimed for it during the short period for which it has been in operation. H.R.H. has on all occasions accepted with the greatest loyalty the changes which successive Secretaries of State have thought right to introduce, and he has brought to bear upon the work at the War Office a personal popularity with the Army in general which cannot fail to be of public advantage.

‘But it is clear that no possible successor could enjoy a position and influence which years of service to the State are alone capable of establishing. We therefore proceed to indicate the general lines upon which we think that the administration of the War Office should be based, and towards which, at the occurrence of a vacancy in the office of Commander-in-Chief, or at any favourable opportunity, further changes should be directed.’¹

They then proceeded to recommend the creation of a Chief of the Staff, freed from executive duties, and a central organising department, which they thought would ensure better consideration of the military defence of the Empire as a whole. The department was to include the existing Intelligence division, and such parts of the Adjutant-General’s department as dealt with the mobilisation of troops and the defences of the United Kingdom. His duties were to be as follows:—

1. To advise the Secretary of State generally on military policy, and as to strength.
2. To collect and co-ordinate all military information.
3. To propose and devise schemes for the defence of the Empire; and to prepare plans of action.
4. To communicate direct to the First Naval Lord on inter-departmental policy, and conduct correspondence with other Departments of State, and with General Officers commanding, on military policy.

¹ *Report of Hartington Commission*, p. xxii.

5. To lay before the Secretary of State an annual report of the requirements of the Empire.

Finally, they considered that the duties of the command and inspection of troops in Great Britain should be conferred upon a 'General Officer commanding the Forces in Great Britain,' who would carry on his work outside the War Office, and thus relieve the latter of much routine business; and that a permanent War Office Council should be created.

Needless to say, these proposals gave rise to much discussion, though, whilst the Duke was still Commander-in-Chief, none of the more drastic recommendations as regards that office were carried into effect. In this connection Sir Henry Ponsonby wrote as follows:—

FROM SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

'AIX-LES-BAINS, 5 April 1890.

'... I think Her Majesty will consent to no great change which is opposed by Y.R.H., and Lord Salisbury apparently does not approve of any alteration in the position of the Commander-in-Chief.

'Still, I cannot conceal from myself some anxiety that, when the ball has been set rolling, it will be impossible to stop the movement.

'I think it therefore wise to adopt, with some modifications, the proposals of the report; and this I think Y.R.H. has done in the Memorandum sent here. The question then is, will these modifications be accepted? In my humble opinion, it is most important that Y.R.H. should remain at the Head of the Army, whether with the present or any other title I cannot say. It may be desirable that Y.R.H. should be relieved of duties which at present are only placed under your responsibility without corresponding power, such as the manufacture of Ordnance. Whether these changes can be effected without damaging the position of the Commander-in-Chief it is impossible for any outsiders to say.'

The extent to which the Government were disposed to carry into effect the recommendations of Lord Hartington's Commission was briefly summarised by Mr. Stanhope as follows:—

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

'WAR OFFICE, 28 April 1890.

'I think that Y.R.H. will wish to hear from me directly as to the views entertained by the Cabinet upon the Report of

Lord Hartington's Commission, and upon the Minute signed by the Adjutant-General handed to me by Y.R.H.

'1. Without myself entering into any discussion as to the merits of the various proposals, I may say that the Cabinet decided that the post of Adjutant-General, which will be vacant in the autumn, should be filled up, without the intervention of a Chief of the Staff in any form.

'2. They decided that the "meetings" of the Secretary of State at the War Office should be more systematised by the institution of a Council to the Secretary of State. The precise form of this Council has not yet been approved by the Cabinet.

'3. They decided that it would be desirable to discontinue altogether the present Defence Committee, and to place the responsibility for proposing improvements in our defences primarily upon the I.G.F. and the D. of A., who will submit them for the approval of Y.R.H. Full provision will also be made for obtaining the views of the Admiralty.

'4. They decided that it was desirable that a promotion Board should be established. The precise constitution of this Board I must ask Y.R.H. to be good enough to discuss with me.

'These were the main points decided, so far as the internal organisation of the War Office is concerned. I am glad to think that they are so easy to carry out, and I earnestly trust that Y.R.H. may long have health and strength to assist in working them.'

TO MR. STANHOPE.

'HORSE GUARDS, 28 April 1890.

'I have received your two letters with reference to the decisions of the Cabinet on the Royal Commission; and in reference to the contents of your letters, I can only say that, *personally*, nothing can be more flattering to myself than the compliment which I consider the Government pays to me in wishing me to remain on as Commander-in-Chief without curtailment of its influence or power.

'At the same time I was under the impression that an assurance had been given to Her Majesty that no decision on the subject should be arrived at till the Queen's return from abroad, and I hardly feel justified in saying much till She has been informed of the views entertained by your colleagues and yourself on the several points referred to.

'I cannot help thinking that the Queen would wish it to be clearly laid down that whatever is now decided upon is to be the permanent arrangement for the future, and not merely to apply to the present condition of things; but of course I surmise this only from what Her Majesty said to me when I last saw Her.

'I should be glad to have some conversation with you on the whole subject as now suggested by the Government, as there are points upon which I should like some further elucidation, and with this desire I hope you will let me know when I should be able to see you in the course of to-morrow morning.'

The Government at first were of opinion that Sir Frederick (now Lord) Roberts should be brought home from India to occupy the post of Adjutant-General. But eventually it was decided that he should receive an extension of his command in India, and that Sir Redvers Buller should succeed Lord Wolseley as Adjutant-General.

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

'WAR OFFICE, 28 April 1890.

'After considering the Report of the Commission, and coming to the conclusion that the post of Adjutant-General should be filled up when it became vacant, without the appointment of a Chief of the Staff, my colleagues strongly and unanimously expressed the opinion that it was essential to ask General Sir Frederick Roberts to fill the post. I have before spoken to Y.R.H. on this subject, and I am sure that Y.R.H. will feel that we shall gain great advantage from his presence at the War Office. I should like, however, to discuss with Y.R.H. whether we should not in future make arrangements for taking from the Adjutant-General more of his routine work, and so freeing him from that of administration at Headquarters.

'The Cabinet were also of opinion that I should press Lord Wolseley to accept the post of Commander-in-Chief in India, subject to Her Majesty's approval.'

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

'WAR OFFICE, 23 May 1890.

'My colleagues would not be unwilling to extend Sir F. Roberts's term in India, if Sir Redvers Buller succeeds Lord Wolseley at the War Office in the autumn.

'I am sure that this will be agreeable to Y.R.H.. as Buller has been of very great value here, and I shall be very glad in this way to meet the objection raised by Y.R.H.'

Though Lord Hartington's Commission had recommended the creation of a Chief of the Staff, the Duke's continuance in the office of Commander-in-Chief rendered that appointment somewhat of an anomaly. Hence the conver-

sation between Sir Redvers Buller and Mr. Stanhope, as narrated in this letter:—

FROM SIR REDVERS BULLER.

‘ATHENÆUM CLUB, 20 *September* 1890.

‘I have just seen that I was gazetted the other day as “Adjutant-General to the Forces.” I had a conversation some time ago with Mr. Stanhope about a Chief of the Staff to Y.R.H., and he then said that he could not allow that name to be used in that conjunction, as, after the recent use of it for another purpose, it would seem like an attempt to deceive the public, but that he thought it might be desirable to gazette me as “Adjutant-General and Chief Staff Officer to the Forces,” and, as I understood him, he would do so.

‘I did not say therefore anything more about it: I am myself of opinion that the formal recognition of the Adjutant-General as Chief Staff Officer would in very many ways be of great advantage generally, and that it would specially be so to me, as I happen to be junior to several of the Staff Officers now at the Office; but in this matter I should like to act entirely as you may think best, and therefore, should Y.R.H. think it best to leave things as they are, I should say no more about it; though I do say now that in my opinion the little I ask for would be of advantage generally, and of assistance to me.’

These letters also elaborate the point:—

TO MR. STANHOPE.

‘HORSE GUARDS (*undated*).

‘I have thought a great deal over our conversations of late, and the suggestions which arise in my mind are these, that, on the retirement of Lord Wolseley from the position of Adjutant-General of the Army, his successor should be styled “Chief of the Staff and Adjutant-General,” and that this officer should exercise the Chief of the Staff’s duties to the Commander-in-Chief.

‘This change, together with an acknowledged Council to the Secretary of State, will focus the responsibilities of all the great officers more clearly and definitely to the public than is probably the case in the present arrangements, and to that extent meet the recommendations of the Royal Commission.

‘A more defined Board of General Officers might also be established to look carefully over the selections to be made for the higher promotions to General Officers in the Army for the Commander-in-Chief, the Military Secretary to form one of this Board.

‘Please consider this matter carefully, and if you at all enter into this view, I will put a formal scheme before you.’

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

'WAR OFFICE, 6 June 1890.

'I have, according to Y.R.H.'s wish, thought over the suggestions contained in your letter of the 3rd, which are in both cases very important.

'With regard to the more defined Board for Selection for the higher promotions, I am entirely in agreement with Y.R.H. as to the general character of the step to be taken; but I think that the higher officers here, such as the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, or at any rate the first-named, ought to be associated with the Board, so that we might have the advantage of their or his experience. It would be better to discuss this before any formal scheme is put forward.

'Y.R.H. also proposes that, on the retirement of Lord Wolseley from the post of Adjutant-General, an officer should be appointed to bear the title of Chief of the Staff to Y.R.H. To this I feel sure the Cabinet would not agree. They have not decided, and they do not now intend to decide, upon some of the grave questions raised by the Report of Lord Hartington's Commission; and to adopt the totally opposite policy to that recommended by the Commission, of appointing a Chief of the Staff, not to the Secretary of State, but to the Commander-in-Chief, is a step which they would not now be prepared to take. I am afraid, therefore, that we must limit the title of the new officer to Adjutant-General as before.'

Mr. Campbell-Bannerman was a member of the Hartington Commission, and, dissenting from some of the recommendations of his *confrères*, issued a supplementary report. In this he deprecated the appointment of a Chief of the Staff, which he held not only to be unnecessary, but likely to 're-introduce, perhaps in a worse form, some of the very evils which the organisation of a Council of General Officers would be designed to remove.' He maintained that no analogy existed between the functions of a Chief of the Staff in a Continental army, and those which such an official would be called upon to perform in ours. It was not necessary for us continually to be studying our neighbour's strength or weakness; and that 'in any of the smaller troubles into which we might be drawn by the interests of some of our dependencies, the plan of campaign must be governed by the particular circumstances, and would be left (I presume and hope) to be

determined by the officer appointed to direct operations.' For the defence of Great Britain, coaling-stations, etc., elaborate defence schemes had already been made; hence he could not see how in the larger branches of its duties 'the new department could find an adequate field' for its energies. Moreover, he held that, for giving advice to the Secretary of State, the officers who were in touch with the actual executive work of the Army were in a better position to do so than those who would 'sit apart and cogitate on the subject.'

On 6 July 1890 he wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.

'6 GROSVENOR PLACE, 6 July 1890.

'It was exceedingly kind of Y.R.H. to think of writing to me with regard to the observations I made in the House on Friday. The report of what I said is not quite accurate, but I can say with confidence that all the members present gave proof of complete sympathy with every word uttered in appreciation of Y.R.H.'s great services.

'My object was to disengage the general problem of administration from all personal considerations. I dare say you may have observed in the report of the Commission that I dissented from some of the main recommendations as to the War Office, and I imagine that upon those points at least I have the advantage of being in accord with Y.R.H.'s opinion. I am very sensible of the kindness which, on this as on all other occasions, you have shown me.'

On Lord Wolseley's retirement from the office of Adjutant-General, H.R.H. wrote to him as follows:—

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'FAIRFIELD,
YORK, 29 September 1890.

'As to-morrow is your last day of office at Headquarters, I feel, in my absence from London, that I must write to you to say how much I have at all times appreciated the assistance I have derived from you as Adjutant-General of the Army. The changes that have so constantly taken place—and alas, we live in an age of perpetual changes—have rendered the duties of your office specially arduous; and I have always admired the characteristic vigour and energy you have thrown into them. Though we have at times differed in our

military views and conclusions, we have still been at the same time thoroughly convinced of the sincerity of our relative wishes for the interests of the public service, and have been enabled to keep pace with the times, though perhaps, as far as I am concerned, we have gone rather faster than I have thought judicious. In leaving us at the Office to take up new and important duties, let me assure you that you will find me at all times ready to support you in a not altogether easy position. You know my views in this respect, and will remember the little hints I gave you, and I trust you will bear them in mind. You leave the Adjutant-General's Office in good hands in Sir Redvers Buller; and I doubt not that in the future, as in the past, our official intercourse will continue in the same agreeable footing as hitherto.'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'RANGER'S HOUSE,
GREENWICH PARK, S.E., 30 September 1890.

'I beg to thank Your Royal Highness for the very flattering letter I have just received.

'It is a very good thing that every one does not think alike about armies and war and all other great subjects: differences of opinion add zest to our daily labour. The one thing necessary is that all should work earnestly for the Queen, the State, and if a soldier, for the Army. I am sure, Sir, this we all do at Army Headquarters.

'A very remarkable book has just appeared in Germany, said to have been written under the inspiration of Count Waldersee, in which the author says the French Army is now the finest in the world, and is more advanced and go-ahead than the Army of Germany, which, the writer urges, is too old-fashioned and not up to modern requirements.

'I hope, Sir, You are having good sport. I start to-morrow morning for Ireland; but as nothing could be done to the faulty roof of the Hospital as long as Prince Edward's things were in it, I don't expect to be able to move into it until end of January at earliest. . . .'

After leaving the War Office in 1890, Lord Wolseley became Commander-in-Chief in Ireland; and during his tenure of that command he kept up throughout a constant correspondence with the Duke, which, as well as throwing light on the military questions of the day, is of absorbing interest in other ways.

The first two letters which are quoted throw much light on the manner in which H.R.H. and Lord Wolseley approached the subject of the Yeomanry.

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE,
PARK LANE, W., 26 November 1890.

'I have seen your private letter and official proposals as to a very considerable reduction of the Staff in Ireland. I am sorry you have brought this question forward on this large scale, as the Army has of late years had more changes than enough, and wants absolute *rest* from constant surprises. I shall not enter into details, as Harman's private letter to you deals with the subject from my point of view and gives my reasons for taking these views. I have further seen a very *strong* minute from you advocating an entire change in the organisation of the Yeomanry; and here again the changes you suggest seem to me *most objectionable*, and will, to my mind, absolutely and entirely break up this old and, as I believe, useful Constitutional force in times of danger or emergency, and which I consider has of late made very great progress towards improvement. For political reasons I believe it would be a very unfortunate thing to break up the Yeomanry, and I feel assured the force would break up if your proposals are to be entertained for a single moment. I am afraid you don't believe in *sentiment*, but I do so *strongly*, especially in military matters. I am fully prepared to do all in my power to induce the present Yeomanry Regiments to attend more to their carbines than to their swords, but don't attempt to make Mounted Infantry of them; that would simply destroy the force and completely take the heart out of them. I am old-fashioned, you will say; but I don't think I can be accused of having sacrificed any real efficiency to old-fashioned notions of the past. I have a long experience now in all military matters, and I think great organic changes are always dangerous, and that modifications to bring matters about to modern requirements, slowly and gradually, are far more advantageous and give time for reflection on trial.

'I hope that you will accept my remarks in the spirit in which they are offered to you.'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'CORK, 28 November 1890.

'Your Royal Highness's kind letter of the 26th instant reached me to-day as I was starting for Kinsale. Although my experience does not allow me to agree upon all points with Your Royal Highness, You, Sir, may always be certain that I shall accept any expression of Your Royal Highness's views in the kind spirit in which they are presented to me.

‘Your Royal Highness refers to two points upon which I have recently written—1st, the Yeomanry; 2nd, the Irish Staff. As you say, Sir, political considerations enter largely into the first-named—so largely that I did not and do not anticipate my views, which are purely military, would be given effect to. I know that my views on this point are shared by the large bulk of officers who have seriously studied the defence of England and who know a great deal of war. I am also of opinion that it is not fair to the heavily-taxed people of England, for purely political reasons, to pay a large sum annually for the maintenance of a force that, as at present constituted, would be little more than an encumbrance to the General who would be entrusted with the defence of England in the event of serious trouble.

‘Under these circumstances, for a man in the position I occupy to keep silent would be criminal, even although I did not believe my views would be accepted. I know that if the question were to be put to-morrow to those men who would have to command our troops in the event of invasion, all would agree with the general views I have enunciated in the minute in question, though possibly some might dissent on minor points of detail. . . .

‘As regards the number of officers to be maintained to do the Staff duty required in Ireland, I give my opinion for what it is worth. I have spent a long part of my life in all sorts of Staff positions in war and in peace: my opinions may be wrong, and so may be those of all men. . . .

‘Your Royal Highness thinks I attach no importance to sentiment. I could never have achieved even the little I have done in war had I been indifferent to sentiment. The only man, who having no sentiment in his disposition, and who scoffed at all sentiment, and was yet a successful soldier, of whom I ever read, was the great Duke of Wellington, the model of the modern English Army. . . .’

On taking over the Irish Command Lord Wolseley at once began to display his accustomed energy and enthusiasm. He made numerous and extensive tours over the area of his new command; and these by no means partook of the superficial and cut-and-dried character which usually distinguishes such performances. His primary object, as is evidenced by his letters to the Duke, was always to get a real insight into circumstances and men, and not to be content with the mere superficialities which the ordinary ceremonial inspections disclose. In consequence, he came into much closer contact with officers and men than usually falls to the lot of those who fill the highest military posts.

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

‘... How wonderfully restless he is; and when he has been all over Ireland once or twice, it is difficult to know what he will find to do. . . .’

The following letters, which throw such an interesting light on the condition of the Home Battalions during the closing years of the Duke's command, are but samples of many others of a like nature. One in addition contains an eloquent tribute to the memory of Sir George Harman, who from 1885 to 1892 was the Duke's Military Secretary.

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

‘THE ROYAL HOSPITAL,
DUBLIN, 25 June 1891.

‘I had no idea that Your Royal Highness would care for a periodical letter from Ireland until Sir G. Harman wrote to me on the subject. There is little to say here that is not reported in the daily newspapers, and I am glad to say they have little to write about the Army.

‘The Battalion (1st) of the Grenadier Guards now here is splendid and leaves nothing to be desired. Its appearance on parade is all that could be desired, its conduct is excellent, and its drill is, to my mind, perfection. It is an admirable example in every respect to the Line Battalions in Dublin. These latter are of course nothing more than very excellent Depôts for the Foreign Battalions of their Regiments which are abroad.

‘There is no Line Battalion fit for active service, but neither is there a German Battalion under arms at this moment fit for war. The fighting line of every nation is in Reserve. Our Army at this moment is in a very critical state, because the Government won't carry out the Army system inaugurated in 1871-72 and then approved of by Parliament. It was the first attempt ever made in England to establish any Army system. It was devised to meet the condition of the Army at the time, and it did so admirably. Those conditions have now been disturbed by the retention of three Battalions in Egypt and an increase to our Indian Army of three Battalions more. Consequently we have a permanent inequality of twelve Battalions between our home and our foreign Army, and as long as this is the case our Army machine cannot be worked. The proposal—a very Irish proposal it is—to regard the Battalions serving in the Mediterranean Stations as quartered at home is, to my mind, merely a ridiculous and unworthy attempt to throw dust

in the eyes of the British public, trying to persuade the world that no departure has been made from the Army system upon which our Army is based. I don't know who was the author of this proposal, but I hope Your Royal Highness and Sir Redvers Buller will show it up in its true bearings.

'One of two things must be done: (a) bring home these six Battalions; or (b), add twelve Battalions to the Home Establishment. We *cannot* do (a), and consequently the only healthy alternative is (b). Of course the Government won't do this, and with a General Election impending. . . .

'... I find the young officers so much better than their seniors wherever I go. The latter are so often grumblers and pessimists, and ignorant of everything relating to real war. The Barracks in Dublin do not progress as quickly as I should like. The War Office system of selecting contractors is, I think, a very faulty one. The consequence is that those selected here have not the capital to keep any large number of men employed constantly. The Grange Gorman (the Marlborough) Barracks are still very backward, and progress in the contract for demolitions in the Royal Barracks is very slow indeed. I hope, however, to be able to put up all the officers and their horses of the 10th Hussars in the Marlborough Barracks, and 300 men and 240 Troop horses by 1 October next.'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'ROYAL HOSPITAL,
DUBLIN, 12 March 1892.

'Quite apart from my own feelings for General Harman, I know what a loss he will be to Your Royal Highness. He will not be an easy man to replace, and he was such a good and faithful Staff Officer to You, Sir, that under any circumstances to begin afresh with a new Military Secretary must necessarily entail a great deal of extra worry and trouble upon Your Royal Highness. Believe me that I feel all this, and indeed everything that affects your comfort and happiness.

'I often wish I had something to write about; but beyond the ordinary routine of everyday life here I have little military work to do and still less to write about. I think it is very unfortunate the officers holding my berth in Ireland and the Generals commanding Districts are not given a little more power under War Office Regulations. It would facilitate public business, give the Generals concerned more work and more responsibility, and the work would therefore, according to my experience, be better done.

'Sir Redvers Buller is, I know, very anxious to decentralise all military correspondence, and at his request I am preparing a letter with an appendix of facts on this point, which, when

submitted, may I hope meet with Your Royal Highness's support.

'I have done all I can do to try and soften the hearts of the War Office Authorities on the subjects of pensions to old soldiers. I feel that nothing can be more injurious to recruiting than the presence in a workhouse of a number of men who have served the State for ten or fifteen years, many having served the Queen in action, perhaps in the Crimea or in India. I think that every man who did good service in the Army for even eight or ten years should be entitled to a pension at the age of sixty years. When we get rid of all the old twenty-one-years-men pensions, we shall, I hope, have enough money to give all these old soldiers of sixty years of age and upwards enough to live on outside of the workhouse.

'I find that when we work the horses—especially the young horses of a Regiment—much, the oats ration is *not* enough for them. They soon looked tucked up if worked much, and one cannot train them in Cavalry duties without working them.

'The recruiting is steadily improving under General Feilding's administration, and I am sure will be even better next year. I believe we do not exert ourselves to enlist men at Regimental and Battalion Headquarters as we should. I should like to see every soldier made a recruiter and given 7s. 6d. or even 5s. for every eligible recruit he brought into Barracks.

'May I again say, Sir, how much I sympathise with Your Royal Highness at the serious loss you have sustained by Sir G. Harman's death?'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'DUBLIN, 26 March 1892.

'As I am not in London to pay my respects to Your Royal Highness to-day, I presume to send You, Sir, a few lines to wish you health and happiness and every possible prosperity upon Your Royal Highness's birthday.

'Last Thursday ended our winter marches into the country, and we have already begun our Troop and Company training. The weather, however, is still very treacherous: one day we have a warm sun, the next a very cold and trying wind. Colonel Lascelles has begun his duties here, but it will be some time before he knows as much of Ireland as Colonel Duncan did. He is, however, such a good business man, and knows his work so well, that it is a pleasure to be associated with him.

'In Ireland generally, every one seems holding their breath, not knowing what the general election may do. A change of Government will amount to a disaster as far as

Ireland is concerned; and indeed it cannot be good for the Army either. Mr. Stanhope has done more for it than any Secretary of State has done for several administrations back.

'I am still in hopes that Lord Wantage's Committee will sooner or later obtain for us at least six extra Battalions. They would be a great relief to the present strain upon our military system.

'Again, Sir, wishing you every blessing upon this anniversary ...'

It is necessary to turn now once again to the more prosaic details of War Office history, and to allude to several of the Duke's annual statements on the condition of the Army.

The statement of December 1890 contains no new features of interest except one. It will be remembered that one of the great arguments advanced by Mr. Cardwell and Lord Northbrook in favour of removing the Duke and his Staff, with somewhat scant ceremony, from the Horse Guards to the War Office, was that all branches of the War Department should be located under one roof.

It is now almost a platitude, in the face of numerous Parliamentary and other reports which have been issued since the time, to remark that this was never done; and has not even been done in this day. It will be within the recollection of the readers of this book that, at the commencement of the South African War, the Remount Department was located in a small flat in Victoria Street, and that the Intelligence, Medical, and other departments were all housed away from the War Office.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'HORSE GUARDS,
WAR OFFICE, 23 December 1890.

'1. *Increase to Establishments*.— . . . It is a matter of serious importance that, owing to the immature age of the great bulk of our recruits, it is impossible to maintain our Foreign Drafts with the present Home Establishment. In order to keep up our Establishment abroad, we require an increase to the Home Establishment of at least 10,000 men. This has been constantly brought to the notice of Secretaries of State.

'2. *Rifle Ranges*.—There is an urgent necessity for increased Rifle Range accommodation adapted to the requirements of the magazine rifle. This will involve no slight expenditure, and a recommendation that £40,000 be granted for the purpose has been put forward.

'3. *Concentration of Offices*.—It is most desirable, for the convenient and satisfactory administration of the Army, that the principal executive branches should be concentrated together, instead of being scattered as at present.

'The general administration resulting from the present arrangement is most detrimental to the public service. . . .

'7. *Educational*.—In connection with the Educational Department, I trust that the question of the accommodation for the Cadets at the Royal Military Academy will not be lost sight of, and I have recommended that the course at the Royal Military College should be extended from two terms to three. . . .

In November 1891 H.R.H. addressed to Mr. Stanhope the last annual letter which the latter was destined to receive:—

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'20 November 1891.

' . . . I have on former occasions strongly urged an increase of the Establishment of the Army, and I now desire to point out that, unless an increase is made to the number of Battalions at home to balance the number abroad, the present system—which is now unworkable—must absolutely break down: it is only kept going now by disregarding the Foreign Service roster for Regiments. . . .

'3. *Stores*.—The Stores of the Army have been unduly depleted. The mobilisation store-houses are now nearly all completed and should be filled, but the material is not available. I regard this as very grave. . . .

'6. *Field Training*.—The money allowed this year for field training of troops has been spent to great advantage, notwithstanding the wet season, which necessarily prevented their being fully carried out. I recommend that these practices may be extended to all arms at home and foreign stations, as it is of the greatest advantage to all ranks that troops should be trained under service conditions.

'7. *Rifle Ranges and Magazine Rifles*.—A large sum of money is required for the provision of Rifle Ranges adapted to the magazine rifles. The issue of these rifles, and training the troops in their use, cannot be carried out to any advantage without these ranges. I regard it also as very advisable, in order to reduce the present extraordinary expenditure for

wear and tear of camp equipment that huts should be constructed at such ranges as Firbright, Baldoyle (Dublin), New Forest, Strensall, etc. . . .

'10. *Coaling Stations*.—Several of the fortified Coaling Stations lately armed are kept with dangerously small garrisons. This should be remedied as soon as practicable.

'11. *Cavalry*.—I would again urge that the fifty-four horses taken out of the establishments of Cavalry Regiments for use at the Royal Military College should be transferred to the Education vote, with a view to the strength of the Cavalry not being depleted of that number.

'16. *Clothing*.—I strongly advocate necessaries being included in the free issue of a soldier's clothing.

'17. *Medical Staff*.—The great concessions made to officers of this department it is hoped may have the desired effect.

'18. *Veterinary Department*.—The strength of this department is insufficient for Peace Service. An increase is recommended, as the deficiency would be serious in the event of mobilisation.'

Even so late as 1891 the restoration of the regimental numbers on the shoulder-straps was still considered.

FROM SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

'OSBORNE, 18 July 1891.

'The Queen told me that Y.R.H. has spoken to Her Majesty on the desirability of placing the numbers of Regiments on their shoulder-straps, in which the Queen entirely agreed. I believe that at present no Regiment of Infantry has a number, and that the words "late 52nd," etc., are only used for convenience sake.

'The Queen is anxious to know how this question can be brought forward, whether Y.R.H. could originate the movement, or whether Her Majesty should ask the Secretary of State?'

In 1891 a committee under Lord Wantage was appointed 'to consider the terms and conditions of service in the Army.' Their recommendations were of a very elaborate character. They urged an increase of Battalions in order to equalise the number of those serving at home and abroad; and they advocated an increase of the soldiers' pay. But the Secretary of State, as this letter shows, did not entertain a very high idea of the practicability of these plans, and accordingly he wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

‘WAR OFFICE, 28 *January* 1892.

‘I am very glad that Y.R.H. has yielded to the strong representations made by their Royal Highnesses, and has agreed not to come home yet. It would have been a long journey at a dangerously cold time, and Y.R.H. would have found the ceremony a cold one. I was quite sorry that Prince George took part in it, looking, as he did, pale, thin, and weak. But so, unfortunately, did his father, and no wonder, after all he has gone through. Certainly the sympathy of the English nation has been very real and overflowing.

‘There is nothing to call for Y.R.H.’s presence here. Estimates are much the same as last year, and there are no great points of principle to be raised. I have received the signed copy of Wantage’s report, but not all the dissents. As soon as we get them all in print the first copy will be sent to you. It is an over-ambitious, contradictory, and somewhat useless report, the effect of which will be felt in encouraging those who want to cut down the numbers of the Army. . . .’

At the general election of 1892 Mr. Gladstone once more returned to power; and on leaving the War Office Mr. Stanhope addressed these letters to the Duke:—

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

‘REVESBY ABBEY,
BOLTON, 24 *July* 1892.

‘I am much distressed at my stupidity in not realising the day of Y.R.H.’s start for the Continent. If I had done so, I should have made a point of going up last week on the chance of seeing Y.R.H.; as it was, there being no Cabinet, I postponed coming up till this week. I had no special points to bring forward, but it is very likely that, before the cure is over, my successor will be installed at the War Office, and I wanted to thank Y.R.H. for the many kindnesses I have received from you, and if I have not always been able to agree with the views put forward, I hope I have always expressed my differences in a manner which the position and experience of Y.R.H. so amply require. It is not a very easy thing to carry on the relations between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief at all times without friction. I can safely say that in my time it has been minimised; and I can look back with sincere pleasure to the kindly

relations which have existed between us. I hope that, when Y.R.H. returns, I may come and say a few words, although I may not then be officially connected.'

FROM MR. STANHOPE.

'WAR OFFICE, 9 *August* 1892.

'... I have to thank Y.R.H. very much for your other letter, which I shall keep as a most agreeable record of the kindly terms upon which I have had the good fortune to be with Your Royal Highness during my tenure of the War Office.'

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE DUKE'S RETIREMENT

Liberal Administration comes into power, 1892. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman again War Secretary. Lord Roberts and the Malta Command. Equalisation of Battalions at home and abroad. H.R.H.'s Annual Statement, November 1892. The Aldershot Command. Lord Wolseley and the Duke of Connaught Lord Wolseley's Correspondence with the Duke. Discussion again *re* a Chief of the Staff. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman no 'fanatic for economy.' H.R.H.'s last Annual Statement. Feeling that Hartington Commission's Report must be acted upon, and changes made in Commander-in-Chief's position. H.R.H.'s intense loyalty to Throne and Army. Feels it his duty to offer to retire. Letter to the Queen. Her Majesty's reply. War Secretary announces H.R.H.'s retirement and writes to him. Lord Rosebery's Government select as successor Sir Redvers Buller. Fall of Liberal Government. Lord Salisbury's Administration select Lord Wolseley. Lord Wolseley's Letter to His Royal Highness. Tributes of esteem and affection to H.R.H. on his retirement.

WHEN in August 1892 Mr. Gladstone formed his fourth administration, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman once more became Secretary of State for War, and proved to be the last of the long series of Ministers holding that office with whom the Duke was associated for any length of time as Commander-in-Chief.

No great organic changes in the constitution of the Army or the War Office took place during the years the Liberal Government was in office (1892-95), although some were contemplated towards the close of that administration's career. Thus the history of this period is mainly composed of various matters of interest which have little connection with each other.

On assuming office Mr. Campbell-Bannerman wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.

'6 GROSVENOR PLACE, 15 August 1892.

'It has been communicated to me that Her Majesty has been pleased to approve of my appointment as Secretary of State for War, and as I learn that Y.R.H. is still abroad, and I therefore cannot pay my respects in person, I wish to take this means of expressing to you the sense I entertain of the great honour conferred upon me in being called upon to co-operate with Y.R.H. in the administration of the Army. I have had so much experience of your kindness that I look forward to my term of office with the greatest pleasure, and I would assure Y.R.H. of my most earnest desire to do everything in my power in the interest of the Army.

'As soon as I can get away, I intend going to Marienbad for some weeks, and this being the holiday season, I imagine that there will be no urgent business requiring attention.'

Lord Roberts, prior to vacating the post of Commander-in-Chief in India, had some correspondence with the Duke, in which he urged his claims to be employed as Adjutant-General to the Forces at home, in succession to Lord Wolseley. H.R.H., however, did not consider this would be a suitable position for an officer who had held the chief command in India.

FROM LORD ROBERTS.

'SIMLA, 12 October 1892.

'I have to acknowledge Your Royal Highness's letter of 16 September last, in which you inform me that the offer of the Governorship of Malta was made owing to Your Royal Highness's wish that I "ought at once to be considered for a high post on return from India." I am very much obliged, Sir, for your kind thought of me, but as I have already explained, I have no desire to serve abroad after I leave this country.

'In December 1889, when first communicating with me about the Adjutant-Generalship, Mr. Stanhope said:—"To myself—and I feel sure to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief also—it would be exceedingly agreeable if I am able to secure you for such a post." It was this information, and the recollection that Y.R.H. had eight or nine years previously offered me the Quartermaster-Generalship at the Horse Guards, which made me reply to Mr. Stanhope in such a manner as resulted in my being given the Adjutant-General-

ship a few months later. Mr. Stanhope then telegraphed to me as follows:—"Your appointment as Adjutant-General is accepted by the Cabinet, who strongly desire your presence here this autumn. The Queen has not yet approved of the time, pending other arrangements, so treat this as confidential." It was, I think, natural for me to suppose that Her Majesty and the Cabinet would not have approved of my being made Adjutant-General without consulting Y.R.H. and obtaining your consent. I certainly thought that Y.R.H. knew all that passed between Mr. Stanhope and me, and in my letter to you, Sir, of 21 June 1890 I alluded to the circumstances in the following words:—

"I am aware from Mr. Stanhope's letters and telegrams that Your Royal Highness approved of my being offered the Adjutant-Generalship in succession to Lord Wolseley, and that you subsequently agreed to my being asked to remain in India for a time." . . . Whilst I am deeply sensible of Your Royal Highness's appreciation of my work in India, I trust that this very work, which has included the command of 70,000 British soldiers, may not be held to prejudice in any way my claim to a home appointment. I must own that, until the receipt of Your Royal Highness's letter under reply, such an idea never occurred to me, and even now I do not really believe that it was Your Royal Highness's intention to convey this impression when you say that you always considered India as my proper sphere of action.

'As Your Royal Highness remarks, Sir Patrick Grant and Lord Napier of Magdala were given the Governorships of Malta and Gibraltar respectively at the close of their Indian careers; but, on the other hand, Sir Hugh Rose and Sir William Mansfield became Commanders-in-Chief in Ireland, and, unless I am mistaken, Sir Hope Grant held the command in Aldershot.'

TO LORD ROBERTS.

'4 November 1892.

'Much as I should wish to see you in high command on your return from India, I should hardly have thought that the Adjutant-Generalship of the Army was a place that would be filled consistently with the high position by an Officer who has held the Chief Command in India.

'The Irish Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General of Malta and Gibraltar, are fit for late C.-in-C. in India. Lord Strathnairn, Sir P. Grant, Lord Napier, etc., occupied these.'

On 26 November 1892 the Duke addressed his annual letter to the Secretary of State, which deals with various subjects of interest at the time.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'HORSE GUARDS,
W.O., 26 November 1892.

'*Establishments.*—I have repeatedly urged the importance of increasing the Establishment of the Army, and I cannot too strongly emphasise this recommendation, as the present system cannot be maintained unless we are allowed an increased number of Battalions at home to balance the number abroad.

'*Rifle Ranges.*—A serious consideration of the question of Rifle Ranges is most necessary. There are still stations at which the troops cannot be exercised with the Lee-Metford rifle, and a large sum of money is required to allow of our troops being sufficiently trained.

'*Training of Troops.*—I would strongly urge that a larger sum of money than was granted this year should be given for military operations and manœuvres in the several commands at home and abroad, it being very desirable that we should have manœuvres in England on a larger scale than we have had during the past few years, and that the troops should work over new ground at a distance from Aldershot, especially the Cavalry. The Navy were also anxious this year to have had combined manœuvres with the troops, and it is for consideration whether it would not be of benefit to the two Services if a Division of troops complete in all three Arms were to be embarked and disembarked, the latter at a point supposed to be in an enemy's country.

'*Barrack Loan.*—Work under the Barrack Acts is progressing satisfactorily on the whole, although there has been great delay at Aldershot, and also in Ireland, caused at the former place by the dilatoriness of the contractors. It is greatly to be regretted that the Act did not provide for an expenditure of four and a half millions, or even five millions.

'The original estimate amounted to nine millions, but when it was directed that it should be cut down to £4,100,000, it was inevitable that at some stations where it was very much wanted, complete reconstruction or thoroughly satisfactory improvement could not be carried out.

'*Colonial Defence Committee.*—In my opinion it is very desirable that the question of the relation of the Colonial Defence Committee to the War Office should be more clearly defined and settled.

'*Artillery Establishment.*—It is proposed that the 14 "four" gun Field Batteries be raised to six guns, with an establishment equal to the six-gun Batteries not in the 1st Army Corps, thus having but two establishments for the Field Artillery at home, instead of three as at present. This

will involve an increase of 171 men and 186 horses. This question has been put forward for the past three years on the recommendation of the Mobilisation Committee.

'D. of Artillery Department.—Separation of Naval and Military Stores.—The joint-committee to determine the necessary accommodation to be allotted to both services at Malta and Gibraltar will assemble at the former station about the middle of this month, and as soon after as possible at the latter. I hope that the matter will receive careful consideration before the final decision is given, and that the Land Service requirements will not be sacrificed to the Naval.

'Ordnance Store Department.—I much regret that no progress has yet been made in the reorganisation of this Department, for at present the Department is in an inefficient state from the want of properly trained officers.

'New Armaments.—Light Field Guns for Horse Artillery Batteries.—The question of the provision of a gun for the use of Horse Artillery is a pressing one. This is all but worked out, although a difficulty arises in using the same ammunition with this as with the ordinary 12-pounder B.L. Gun—which has been laid down as a *sine quâ non*.

'Mobilisation Stores.—All Stores for the force held in readiness for immediate active service may be said to be either at Southampton or Aldershot as laid down in Regulations, and a certain amount of those required for service at home is in the several store-houses provided.

'Barrack and Hospital Stores.—Barrack and Hospital Stores are still as last year, very short indeed.

'Remount Establishment.—The Registration of the Reserve of Horses continues to find favour with the bulk of horse-owners in the country, and a large increase of numbers could be procured. I trust that provision may be made for the buildings at Lusk in Ireland and at the Woolwich Department.

'Clothing.—It is very desirable that a decision on the general question of the supply of clothing dealt with about two years ago by Lord Brownlow's Committee should be arrived at as soon as possible.

'Employment of Pensioners.—The organisation of a proper system throughout the kingdom of obtaining Employment for Pensioners, and especially for soldiers transferred to the Army Reserve, if possible prior to their leaving the Colours, is under the consideration of the Treasury, and I trust every endeavour will be made to ensure its being carried out.

'Militia.—The force is in a very efficient state—paucity of officers, and the absence without leave of the men, being the principal difficulties. Ten Battalions were brigaded at Aldershot this summer, and the report of the G.O. commanding is very satisfactory. I consider the time has come when it is desirable that the head-dress should be assimilated

lated to Line Regiments; among other advantages it might act as an incentive to Recruiting.

'*Yeomanry*.—An Army Order on the reorganisation of this force will be shortly issued, and it is trusted that the increased contingent grant will bring recruits, and that the expenses which now cause a want of officers will be reduced. In my opinion it is doubtful if the squadron system is applicable to all Regiments of Yeomanry.

'*Volunteers*.—Many Corps are below their strength in officers, but the force is steadily increasing in efficiency. 15,941 Volunteers were brigaded at Aldershot on August 30. The Brigade system worked well, and the conduct of the men was exemplary.

'*War Office Organisation*.—The internal organisation of the War Office still, in my opinion, leaves much to be desired; a rearrangement of the location of the various Departments with reference to their work would be a great advantage, and would, I feel sure, render a considerable reduction of *personnel* possible. The necessity for providing a new War Office is daily more evident, and I trust that the matter may be taken up without further delay.'

Lord Wolseley's correspondence with the Duke has already been alluded to, and some extracts from these intensely interesting letters are here presented. They touch on innumerable points connected with the general condition of the service, the efficiency of the various Regiments and Corps, the qualifications and tactical proficiency of officers and men, as well as the peculiar circumstances in which the Queen's Army served in Ireland during the last years of the Duke's tenure of the Command-in-Chief.

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'ROYAL HOSPITAL,
DUBLIN, 18 August 1892.

'... Our manœuvres here and at the Curragh have been somewhat depressing to me as yet, for they have displayed a sad want of tactical knowledge and military instinct on the part of all the Commanding Officers of Battalions and the Majors of Batteries. I cannot induce them to keep their commands together. At all the field days of importance that we have had as yet at the Curragh, the two Cavalry Brigadiers have invariably broken up their Brigades of two Regiments, one Regiment being generally over a mile or two from the other, and unable either to see it or co-operate in any way one with the other. The Artillery have been

badly handled, generally losing many guns during the action from want of tactical handling. The Infantry straggle all over the country in an aimless fashion, strong nowhere, and weak at all points. Their attacks are absurd in conception and futile in execution. After two seasons here now, I am convinced that our senior officers require to be well grounded in tactics. I have written previously on this point to Sir Redvers Buller, who I think agrees with me on this point. I think we might have in the winter months a selected Board of Examiners, who should now thoroughly test the tactical knowledge of our Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels: the Board to consist of two men specially selected for their tactical knowledge and paid so much for the job annually. We could thus have different men each year if necessary. I am sure we want something of the kind.

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

‘THE ROYAL HOSPITAL,
DUBLIN, 21 August 1892.

‘ . . . General Davies¹ deserves great credit for the admirable way in which he has managed his camp and all in it. On Friday we had the only really good manoeuvres I have seen in Ireland. Indeed I never saw better anywhere. The men were under arms from 8 A.M. until about 4.30 and 5 P.M. They all marched long distances over hilly, stony roads, through woods and over rough, heather-covered mountains, and scarcely a man fell out. Everything was done so deliberately, and so much time taken in the final advance, that the manoeuvre had more of the war character about it than any field day I have ever seen anywhere.

‘Commanding Officers still lack a good deal of tactical instruction, the want of which will certainly entail great loss of life upon their Battalions whenever we may be at war.’

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

‘ROYAL HOSPITAL,
DUBLIN, 23 April 1893.

‘I am sure Your Royal Highness will be pleased to hear that so far everything has gone off well at Belfast. By a telegram just received I find that last night the Orangemen broke a few windows, and the rebels a few policemen’s heads. The leaders of the loyalists are most anxious to keep their followers quiet; the real danger is from the other side, who might like to inaugurate a row so as to injure the repute of the men who sing “God Save the Queen.” There

¹ Major-General H. F. Davies, commanding Cork District, who inaugurated the Camp of Exercise at Kilworth.

was just a chance, however, that the workmen in the great shipyards might have told the rebels not to come back to work any more. Some of the wild men of the party would have liked to do so, but their leaders have, I am glad to say, induced them to keep quiet. The wise men amongst the loyalists know that ANY Home Rule Bill is impossible with a majority of seventy against it amongst the English members. No such subversive measure is by them believed to be possible until the English constituencies send a majority to Parliament in favour of breaking up the Empire. But it is only the calm men who reason thus here at present, and things are in that condition that any one man of weight or reputation might raise the whole Protestant North with ease.

‘Of this, Sir, I beg of Your Royal Highness to be quite assured, and that is, that Ulster is determined to resist, and *will fight à outrance* if at any future time she be cut off from England and placed at the mercy of a race which her people hate as much as they despise it. The organisation now being made of the loyalists will be kept up, certainly as long as Mr. Gladstone lives, and will be quite perfect in about a year’s time. The general belief in the North is that our troops, if ordered to fire upon men who will meet them with shouts of “God Save the Queen,” will fire over them. However, what I wish You, Sir, to realise is that the Ulster men mean to fight. I avoid going North myself, and unless things quiet down very much, I shall not inspect the troops in Ulster this year. Politicians have a pleasing way of believing only just what suits their own party exigencies, and I find that those who have now allied themselves with what Mr. Bright used to call the “rebel party” pretend to laugh if one mentions the determination of the Northern loyalists to fight. The ostrich with his head in a bush thinks he is screened from view, and has as much reason on his side.

‘We had all arrangements made in Belfast for cutting off the rebel quarter of the town from the other parts of it, but only some three parties of soldiers were called out for an hour last night. They did not come into collision with any mob. I have also 500 men here in Dublin ready to send off by train at the shortest notice if more troops should be required in Belfast. Half that number will be from the Gordon Highlanders, the other half from the Cornwall Regiment. I was prevented from sending any men from the Sussex Regiment because, I am sorry to say, we have had several cases of scarlet fever in the Battalion now in Dublin, and one fatal case. Curiously enough, the *Depôt* of that Regiment at Chichester had also suffered from the same disease lately, making one think we must have imported it from there. I was sorry I could not send the Sussex to Belfast if wanted, because the Battalion here is in excellent order, and because I have a high opinion of the good sense and soldier-

like qualities of its Commanding Officer, Colonel Courtenay. I purposely avoided sending the Guards, as I thought it would give too serious an air to the proceedings. I earnestly hope we may avoid all trouble, and I think we shall, for the loyalist leaders are determined, if possible, to do nothing until some foolish Parliament tries to hand them over to their hereditary enemies. If ever our troops are brought into collision with the loyalists of Ulster and blood is shed, it will shake the whole foundations upon which our Army rests to such an extent that I feel our Army will never be the same again. Many officers will resign to join Ulster, and there will be such a host of retired officers in the Ulster ranks that men who would stand by the Government, no matter what it did, will be worse than half-hearted in all they do. No Army could stand such a strain upon it. The Constabulary have no intention of getting their heads broken fighting for a Government that is about to destroy them, and that is our greatest danger at present. For a riot that a year ago would have been put down easily by the Constabulary, there will now be a tendency to call upon the military to act. However, I have such a high opinion of the good sense as well as of the loyalty of the Ulstermen, that I do *not* anticipate any serious trouble. But perhaps that may be because I don't believe we shall ever have Home Rule in Ireland, and because I am as sure as I can be of anything in the future, that to include Ulster in any such nefarious scheme would be to declare war against Ulster. I don't think John Bull is mad enough or wicked enough to allow any Government to pursue a line of action that would entail Civil War with all its horrors upon us. I have written what I hear on all sides: being no politician, and very indifferent to the squabbles of party, I hear far more than those in office do, and I have repeated it here, thinking it may interest Your Royal Highness.'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'THE ROYAL HOSPITAL,
DUBLIN, 30 May 1893.

'The day after the Queen's Birthday I started for a short tour in the counties of Cork and Kerry, and only returned here yesterday evening. I have been continually on the move, and have talked to all sorts and conditions of men during my journey. It is curious to note how invariable is the division between the rebel faction and the loyalists, including many who, though hating England, don't want Home Rule, who are in fact afraid of it. But the great division between the rebels and the loyalists is, that whilst all the scum, the uneducated—amongst whom I include the Irish priests—the paupers, and the designing politicians in

search of office, are Home Rulers, all the educated, intellectual, all that represent either refinement, civilisation, and realised property of any sort, are dead against Mr. Gladstone's policy. Of course it is needless to add that many profess to be Home Rulers from fear of the rebels in their neighbourhood. I was very much struck on the Queen's Birthday by the fact that no one cheered Lord Houghton. He came on to the Fifteen Acres and left them without a cheer from any one; indeed I might say without any recognition whatever except from the troops, who saluted him as for the time being Her Majesty's Representative. As the weather was fine, the crowd on the field was much larger than usual. But the corner-boy element was not present. Those present seemed to be too well-to-do and respectable to be rebels. For any one holding my views of England, it is not pleasant to see the Queen's Representative treated in this manner, and it must be very humiliating to any right-minded gentleman to find himself in such a position. I don't anticipate any outbreak of violence this coming winter because of the Disruption Bill being rejected by the House of Lords. As long as Mr. Gladstone is in office he will keep his Irish friends quiet, for it would be most injurious to *his* interests if the country became disturbed, and men were shot and women were ill-treated because of their loyalty. But we shall have a stormy time in Ireland when the Conservatives return to office and Home Rule is finally rejected by the nation.

'The troops looked very well and marched past steadily at the Queen's Birthday parade. The Greys looked magnificent, and the 3rd Hussars looked better than I have seen them look since I have been in Ireland. Colonel Helyar has improved them much, but there is still room for improvement. This Battalion of the Scots Guards is the finest body of men I have ever seen on parade. Of course they are not as portly as the Guards were before the Crimean War, but as a fighting machine it is in every way superior to any Battalion in the Household troops of that day. The Battalion of the Rifle Brigade is about the very smartest Battalion I have ever served with. Colonel Swaine has certainly left his mark upon it. If ever, Sir, you want an Officer to put a Battalion in order, I can recommend the officers of this Battalion as the body to be selected from. Their drill in fighting formations is infinitely superior to any Battalion we have yet had here in my time.

When Sir Evelyn Wood vacated the Aldershot command in order to take up the Quartermaster-Generalship at Headquarters, the question of who should succeed him arose.

On this subject Lord Wolseley wrote to His Royal Highness, expressing his views in his usual vigorous manner.

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'21 BRYANSTON STREET,
LONDON W., 23 June 1893.

'As in my humble opinion it would be greatly to the benefit of the Army, and would be most popular with all ranks in it, that His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught should succeed Sir Evelyn Wood at Aldershot, I presume upon Your Royal Highness's invariable kindness to me to write these few lines about one in whose future I must always take the deepest interest. His Royal Highness saw his first shot fired in anger when serving under my command, which fact may, I hope, be accepted as my excuse for venturing to address You, Sir, on the subject. In 1882 I wrote to Your Royal Highness saying that of all the General Officers who commanded Brigades during that campaign, none had done better, or taken a more real and useful interest in his men and in his work, than H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught.

'If this matter has to be considered by the Secretary of State, may I ask that my opinion as to the admirable manner in which the Duke of Connaught did his work in 1882 may be laid before Mr. Campbell-Bannerman? One word more I can conscientiously add, that if I had to select a successor to Sir Evelyn Wood, my selection would be H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught.

'Hoping Your Royal Highness will forgive my presumption in thus venturing, unasked by any one, to express an opinion on this matter ...'

In 1894 Lord Wolseley revisited the Crimea, and on his return the Duke wrote to him asking for his opinions on some points with regard to the conduct of the Crimean campaign which had given rise to so much controversy both at the time and since. To this Lord Wolseley replied, and it may be easily imagined with what interest the Duke read his vivid description of the scenes of the desperate fighting in which H.R.H. had taken so active a share just forty years previously.

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'THE ROYAL HOSPITAL,
DUBLIN, 9 November 1894.

'I enjoyed my trip to the Crimea extremely. We could not find time to revisit Aloupka and Livadia, which I have

always remembered as about the loveliest of lovely spots in the world. A very melancholy interest is now attached to it. I hope and trust the young Czar may follow in his father's footsteps and love peace as he did, and refuse to give representative institutions to his great country. Already every little Russian village is a Republic in itself, elects its own magistrates, and manages its own village affairs. Surely that is quite enough for most peoples! I saw nothing of the Russian soldiers or their camps or their defensive works at Sebastopol. This month it is exactly forty years since I embarked here in Dublin with my Battalion for the Crimea. What changes are to be seen everywhere except in that place itself! Your Royal Highness asks me several questions which it would take a small volume to answer fully. Had we marched directly upon the Star fort and works north of Sebastopol harbour we might, I think, have taken them by a *coup-de-main*. But as there was no harbour near them from which we could draw supplies of food and ammunition, the operation would have been, with our small allied army, too risky. What I have always thought we should have done was to have taken the works, then just begun, on the south side at the Malakoff, Bastion du Mât, etc. etc. This would have given cover to our men for the winter, and we could have drawn our supplies from Kamiesh and Kasatch bays. We unfortunately halted to wait for our siege guns to be landed to *knock down works* that did not exist upon our first arrival, and which were actually built during the time we squandered in landing guns, etc. etc., and in bringing them to the front for our *October* bombardment.

'I don't know if I am right, but I have always in my own mind blamed Sir John Burgoyne for this delay, and for not having gone in and taken Sebastopol on the south of the Harbour the morning after we had crossed the Tcheroyai River.

'Of course, in my opinion, *the* great fault of the campaign was having failed to pursue *at once* when we took the heights over the Alma. Had we driven the Russians before us all that evening of 20 September, we should have taken a great deal of the Russian guns, etc., and have so thoroughly demoralised their army that the assault of the Malakoff, Redan, and Bastion du Mât would have been comparatively easy. Once in our hands, we could very easily have destroyed the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the docks, etc., on which it depended. That is, we could, and I think ought to have done all this before the first week in October. We could then either have re-embarked for Turkey or have housed ourselves for the winter in Sebastopol city and its suburbs.

'At the Alma, it would seem, from the absence of any pursuit, in fact of any previous plan of operations in the event of victory, that we squandered the most valuable hours, perplexed as to how we should dispose of our

wounded. Did we expect to fight a battle and have no wounded? There was no forethought displayed from first to last in all this war, and our poor Army was ordered about by a number of politicians, so-called a Cabinet, who were about the most incompetent set of fellows who ever ruled over any country in difficult times.

'I was intensely interested by revisiting the Two Gun or Sandbag Battery where Your Royal Highness fought so hard and so successfully upon the eventful day of Inkerman. It is very much as I remember it in 1854. I found part of some poor soldier's thigh-bone close by it. The brushwood which we cut down the first winter for firewood has re-grown, making it somewhat difficult to find the Battery now.'

FROM MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.

'MARIENBAD, 23 September 1893.

' . . . As regards what I said on the subject of the Office of Commander-in-Chief, all I did was to read the passages in the Commission's Report on the subject and to express my conviction, shared I thought by all, that after that authoritative pronouncement joined in by two men of the well-known personal temperament as well as experience of Hartington and W. H. Smith, no permanent appointment to that office could be made. But this by no means implies all that Y.R.H. attributes to it. For my part, I share most fully the objections which you state so strongly to the creation of a Chief of the Staff to be a sort of *âme damnée* to the Secretary of State. I dissented from that proposal, and gave my reasons at length in the Report. If that proposal is dropped, what would follow from the rest of the Report would be a re-constitution and distribution of duties, analogous to that existing at the Admiralty, which, so far as my experience goes, seems to work well. I am entirely opposed to any political turn being given to it, and equally opposed to the introduction of any confidential adviser to the Secretary of State behind the back of the responsible chief Officer or Officers. I am glad, therefore, to be in complete accord on this important point with Y.R.H., whose intimate and long experience in these matters gives unequalled weight to any opinion on them you may express. . . .

When, towards the close of the year 1893, the time for considering the Estimates was drawing near, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman addressed a letter to the Duke, in which it is interesting to observe that this Secretary of State—than whom, be it said, few more sensible or open-minded men ever held that post—emphatically states that he is 'not a fanatic for economy.'

FROM MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.

'BALMORAL CASTLE, 24 October 1893.

'I note Y.R.H.'s remarks regarding Gibraltar and Dover, and will bear them in mind. Personally, I have always been an advocate of a great military harbour at Dover or in that vicinity. It was a great pity the scheme was given up some years ago, and the position of things, from the greater use of torpedo-boats, has become worse since then. I fear, however, that any big project will be impossible of adoption in the present state of the finances. I have not heard a word on the subject from any of my colleagues; but the published figures of the Revenue show such a state of things that I fear it will require all we can do to keep the military expenditure at the present level, not to speak of any increase. I am in fact very anxious as to *this* year's expenditure, and am only waiting for the precise figures. I fear they will show that we are exceeding our estimate at all hands, and that some check must be put on for the rest of the year. I hope in a few days to have the precise information, and I shall then have to take Y.R.H. and the Adjutant-General fully into consultation, with the view of finding some way of meeting the difficulty.

'The falling-off in the Revenue is quite extraordinary, and is most persistent, and I do not imagine that any Supplementary Votes can be thought of. I am not myself, as I think Y.R.H. is aware, a fanatic for economy, but I fear the situation is too strong. . . .'

On 31 December 1894 the Duke presented his last annual letter to the Secretary of State on the condition of the Army; and as, in consequence, this document assumes historical importance, it is here presented in its entirety:—

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

'HORSE GUARDS,
WAR OFFICE, 31 December 1894.

'According to my usual custom at the period when the Annual Estimates for the Army are being prepared, I desire to draw your attention to the matters which, in my opinion, require your special consideration.

'1. *Rifle Ranges*.—The necessity for Rifle Ranges and also for opportunities for the proper field training of troops, is a pressing and a growing need.

'Proposals amounting to a cost of £500,000 to remedy this

evil have been put before you, and I sincerely hope that you will be able to find the money in whole or in part this year.

'Land for Field Manœuvres.—Proposals have also been made for the preparation of a Bill authorising the use of Land for Field Manœuvres, to some extent compulsory. It is hoped this will be proceeded with, not necessarily to an Act of Parliament, though that of course would be best, but at any rate to a discussion which might awake the public mind and lead to a solution of our difficulties.

'2. Great results have been obtained from the Barrack Loan, but there are many stations, especially abroad, which it could not provide for.

'Proposals for a further loan of £2,000,000 have been put forward. The money is urgently required.

'3. A proposal is being put forward which, at very small cost, will increase our available force of Field Artillery by 7 Batteries.

'Royal Artillery.—It deserves most serious consideration.

'We now have 9 Service Batteries of Horse Artillery, and 38 of Field Artillery on the Home Establishment, giving us

in Peace, . . .	246 guns;
in War, . . .	282 guns.

Under the proposed arrangement we would have 10 Service Batteries of Royal Horse Artillery and 45 of Field Artillery, giving us a Peace Establishment of 256 guns, to be raised on mobilisation to 330 guns.

'Changes are also under consideration with a view still further to improve the Garrison Artillery and to increase the efficiency and usefulness of this important branch, which of late years has made so striking an advance.

'4. *Royal Engineers.*—I regard as highly important and necessary the following proposed increase of 530 men and 30 horses for the Royal Engineers Establishment.

'(a) An increase of two Fortress Companies, numbering 186 men, for Coaling Stations, to bring the numbers up to those recommended by the Colonial Defence Committee.

'(b) An increase in the Field Units to enable them to be rapidly and efficiently expanded on mobilisation.

'(c) An increase in the Submarine Mining Units; and

'(d) An increase for working Military Telegraphs and Telephones.

'Summary.—Fortress Companies, 186 men.

Field Units, . . . 203 and 30 horses.

Submarine Miners, . 96.

Military Telegraphs, 45.

Men, 530; horses 30.

'5. *Garrisons Abroad.*—The fact that it will be impossible

for us to reinforce our Foreign Garrisons directly on the outbreak of war is now well recognised. This emphasises the necessity of our always keeping these garrisons strong enough to withstand attack. They are not so at present, and the immediate augmentation of some of them is a matter of the first importance. Proposals to this end merit grave attention.

'6. *Armaments*.—The progress of our Armaments has been fairly satisfactory. The following are, however, pressing needs:—

'(a) Provision of reserve guns and ammunition for Gibraltar.

'(b) Completion of the armament of Lough Swilly, Berehaven, and Scilly.

'(c) Provision of quick-firing guns for the defence of Naval Harbours against Torpedo Boats.

'(d) Provision of two Batteries of B.L. Field Howitzers for use in expeditions against fortified places.

'(e) Continuation of provision of new guns for rearmament of Horse Artillery.

'7. *Sanitary Services, Barracks, Hospitals*.—Sanitary Services in connection with our oldest Barracks are demanded by public opinion, cannot be delayed, and absorb much money. I do not consider it fair to think that the alterations and repairs these involve can be provided by ordinary estimates.

'Although the general health of the Army has been good, there are some stations where improvements are much needed.

'I regret that the removal of the sewage farm at the North Camp, Aldershot, has not yet been carried out, and I trust every effort will be made to do this promptly in the interests of the health of the camp. Cases of typhoid still occur, both amongst officers and men.

'The construction of the new Hospitals is, I understand, about to be commenced, and their rapid completion is much to be desired.

'Both in London and Dublin additional Hospital accommodation is much required.

'At Shoeburyness the sanitary condition of the foreshore and of the neighbouring villages is bad, and several cases of typhoid fever have been attributed to this cause.

'At present there is an attack of typhoid at Newport, Isle of Wight, and the matter is being carefully examined into, in the interests of the troops at Parkhurst.

'*Medical Staff Corps*.—I may add that, with the existing numbers of the Medical Staff Corps, the establishments of the various Districts cannot be maintained during the troop-ing season, and a large number of the men now shown on the effective strength of the Medical Staff Corps are men who are not yet trained in nursing duties.

'I earnestly hope, therefore, that, in the interests of the sick, the increase of the Corps lately asked for may be authorised. I would also take this opportunity of drawing your serious attention to the fact that an enormous proportion of the sickness in the Army is caused by the want of some control over contagious disease.

'8. *Organisation*.—The organisation of the Forces of the Crown for Home Defence makes satisfactory progress: a good deal, however, yet remains to be done.

'9. *Manœuvres*.—With regard to Manœuvres, by which troops at home gain much practical instruction in their duties in the field, I trust that a sum of £20,000 may be allotted for this purpose.

'10. *Remount Department*.—I consider that the number of registered horses should be increased to the full number required on mobilisation, viz. 20,600: at present only 14,000 horses are registered.

'11. *Cavalry*.—The opportunities for the instruction and training of our Cavalry are not satisfactory. In our service, where many of the Cavalry Regiments at home are so scattered, from the want of Barrack accommodation and in consequence of being available to support the civil power, their training will always be difficult.

'One solution of the question might be the formation of a Cavalry School at which all subjects connected with the Army would be carefully taught, and by which a proper standard of Cavalry opinion could be maintained. Some steps in this direction seem worthy of consideration.

'12. *Militia and Volunteers*.—The organisation of the Militia and Volunteers presents difficulties. The deficiency of officers is serious, while the number of incomplete units is excessive. It is suggested that the question is ripe for consideration by a powerful Departmental Committee, and I recommend that this course be adopted.

'13. *Troopships and Transports*.—The general question of Troopships *v.* Transports is at present under consideration, and the careful notes being taken of the arrangements, etc., in the three hired ships now doing the Indian relief, will enable us to form a judgment at the end of the trooping season. My impression, however, is strongly in favour of retaining the system of Government Transport Vessels for Indian reliefs, and available for emergencies. Discipline is much better maintained in Government vessels.

'14. *Woolwich Cadets*.—Great inconvenience to parents, and also some injury to the service, is caused by the Cadets who pass out of Woolwich having to wait so long for their Artillery and Engineer Commissions. Proposals have been made to remedy at small cost this evil, and I hope they may be favourably received.

'15. *Chaplains*.—The Chaplain-General informs me that the present Staff is not sufficient to meet the applications

for *regular* Chaplains, who he considers are preferable to *officiating* Chaplains.

'16. *Recruiting*.—The recruiting for the Regular Forces for the current year may be considered as satisfactory.

'17. *Miscellaneous*.—During the past year :—

'(a) The joint Naval and Military Committee has continued its labours with excellent results.

'(b) A new Gun introduced for the Horse Artillery has been highly approved.

'(c) An Examination of Majors for the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel has been introduced, to the admitted great advantage of all concerned.

'(d) All Establishments have been maintained at an increasing standard of efficiency.'

In the spring of 1895 public attention was once again directed to the Hartington Commission; and it was argued by many that, if its recommendations were to be disregarded, the Government of the day would, by such an act of omission, commit itself to a tacit approval of the existing constitution and organisation of our Land Forces.

It was felt on all sides and by all parties that there were many and grave defects in our Army system. These had been pointed out over and again by H.R.H.; in fact ever since he was in a position to make his opinions heard, as has been shown in this book with painful iteration.

The *fons et origo*, then as now, was the old one of striving to make bricks without straw—the difficulty, and at times impossibility, by any devised means of voluntary enlistment, combined with short service and no pensions, to attract, and to *keep in the service*, men of the right stamp. Year after year the same tale was repeated, as it is even now being repeated. Immature lads enlisted in shoals as 'soldiers,' to be discharged to 'the Reserve' in their years of early manhood, and not seldom thereafter to act as a deterrent factor to recruiting. A Militia and Volunteer Force tens of thousands below its paper strength, and with only a fraction of the necessary quota of qualified officers and N.C.O.'s. It is needless here to allude to other wants, for they are to be found over and again in H.R.H.'s annual protests. The popular cry was, so to reorganise the Military Service that certain high officers at the War Office should be held definitely responsible for

the duties definitely assigned to them. With the growth of the powers of the Secretary of State for War and consequent natural shrinkage of those of the Commander-in-Chief, the whole position of the Military Forces of the Crown had changed. Among ardent military reformers this change was welcomed, as it was considered—why or wherefore it would indeed be hard to explain—that, with an army definitely under Parliamentary control, or rather command, and acknowledged to be such, things would somehow improve.

To such reformers the individual who personified the old order of things, and who ever served as a target for every attack, was the Duke of Cambridge. For many years he had, as has been seen in this book, steadily and steadfastly resisted all attempts at lowering the status of the Army, either by the introduction of politics into it or by the hasty adoption of ill-considered reforms, some advocated in good faith, others alas! the reverse. All armies from their very nature are intensely conservative institutions, and none more so than the British Army; and although the Duke, as has been over and again demonstrated, was at all times careful to avoid identifying himself with any political party, he had inherited in a superlative degree that spirit which has been well described as the curious innate and intense Conservatism which is the very being and vital instinct of our Army. It was this spirit, coupled with the military traditions he had likewise inherited, that ever kept him in such close touch and sympathy with the officers and men of the Army, but which at the same time afforded opportunities for those desirous of what they elected to style 'Army Reform' to represent him as the head and forefront of the opposition to all changes.

What this spirit of our Army means is well illustrated by the fact that some of the most brilliant men who have risen to high rank and held the most important posts in our service have never been *personæ gratae* with the Army, simply because they represented something which was instinctively repellent to its best military instincts.

Lord Sandhurst's attributed saying that he 'hoped to democratise the Army' probably gave deeper offence to

men who hardly grasped his meaning than to those who took it at its political value, and most certainly was never forgotten or forgiven by hundreds who, whatever may have been their defects, were intensely loyal to the Throne, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Army. The very suspicion that a military Chief has sought advancement through political services rendered to any particular Government has always caused such a one to be viewed with distrust and suspicion by the whole military hierarchy.

To revert to the Duke's position in 1895. It was felt strongly that, if the new organisation was to be adopted, it would be impossible to call upon him at his advanced age, and after having wielded the vast powers of Commander-in-Chief for close on forty years, to submit to any limitations to his office, or to deprive him of powers which he had exercised with but little curtailment for so many years. Hence arose the idea that when the time arrived for the changes to be introduced, and the Commandership-in-Chief was placed on an entirely different and subordinate position to that which it had hitherto occupied, it would be necessary to find a successor to His Royal Highness.

The Duke was well aware of these views. It was indeed no new thing for him to find himself attacked in the press or in Parliament; for it forms part and parcel of the everyday life of an Englishman who holds high official position to have to submit to such attacks, the vigour of which is not uncommonly in inverse ratio to their justification. So far back as the summer of 1856, Lord Panmure, then Secretary of State for War, in writing to acquaint the Duke of his selection for the post of Commander-in-Chief, warned him that, as he was now about to occupy a public position, he must be ready to accept the usual amount of abuse!

H.R.H. was, however, in a decidedly difficult position. Had his own interests and convenience only been concerned, in all probability he would have elected some years previously to resign the post he held, which was every year becoming less attractive to a man of his years and opinions. But there was another and far higher consideration which influenced him.

His intense loyalty to the Throne and his devotion to the Army, as well as the strong hereditary instincts already alluded to, caused him to believe profoundly that, so long as a member of the Royal Family was of sufficient age and experience to fulfil the duties of Commander-in-Chief, it was to the great advantage of the nation that such a man should occupy that post.

This opinion he held most firmly, and frequently expressed it; hence the necessity of alluding to it here. He believed with absolute faith that his first duty to the Throne, the Army, and the Nation, was to retain his post until such an arrangement could be effected; and his reasons for holding these views, although they may not meet with the approval of all, are at least worthy of very serious consideration. He contended that in an Army like our own, unlike any other, founded on Voluntary Service and officered by men of a different stamp to those found in most Continental Armies, and serving a country in which freedom of thought and expression are unchecked, the most suitable Commander-in-Chief would be found in the Royal Family.

His extraordinary knowledge of the officers and men of our Army made him convinced that, save on rare occasions, —possibly not once in a century—it would be practically impossible to select any individual, however successful in war, for the post of Commander-in-Chief who would command that implicit *confidence* and *respect* without which no high military position can be held with advantage to the State.

The Duke's letters and papers afford eloquent testimony to the correctness of his views. With human nature such as it is, it would seem to be impossible to find any soldier high in position who could carry out the duties so happily performed by the Duke of Cambridge without incurring considerable odium. In our history the successful soldier is not seldom a fortunate adventurer, and despite the violent protestations of politicians, the fact remains that the British officer and soldier, no matter what may be their political leanings in private life, have a profound dislike to and distrust of an adventurer.

No such man can ever command the confidence already alluded to as so necessary, or be credited with being above all party and personal prejudices; and when there are good grounds for believing that such private sentiments exist, a sharp division of interests at once springs up, and the individual is stamped as the leader of a party.

The Duke clearly foresaw that this would, in all probability, be the case after his resignation; and hence his desire to stave off the evil moment, if not to avert it altogether. He frequently expressed himself on this subject of jealousies and divisions in our Army, and those who knew him will recall in the following words one of his favourite sayings:—

‘The British Army is too small an army to be divided into parties. We don’t want to have any cliques or divisions in it. We cannot afford it. We want one Army, the King’s Army.’

If there is one point more strongly brought out than another in his correspondence with Queen Victoria, it is his intense devotion to her, both personally and as the Constitutional Ruler of these Islands.

Over and again during the many years in which he held high office this was clearly demonstrated. The mainspring of his actions was always to support the dignity of the Throne, and to protect it from any diminution of its power and influence. How often he sacrificed his own views in deference to the higher interests of the Crown and in order to shield it from criticism, however baseless, can only be realised by those who have read his private correspondence. Hence it came about that, when the question of the adoption of the views of the Hartington Commission assumed an important place in the public mind, he felt it his duty to write the following letter to the Queen. What it must have cost him to do so may be left to the imagination; for, added to the natural dislike which all men have to retirement after an active and strenuous life, were the grave misgivings he entertained as to the effect of the changes which might follow upon his withdrawal from public life, and the doubts whether the earnest desire of his life with regard to his successor would be fulfilled.

TO THE QUEEN.

'4 May 1895.

'MY DEAR COUSIN,—You are no doubt aware that there are serious attacks being made in some of the newspapers on the Authorities of the War Office and on myself in particular, and a Reform is called for in accordance with the recommendations of the Hartington Commission.

'It is especially pointed out that my age is much against me. . . . If I felt unequal to perform my duties from age, I should unhesitatingly ask to be relieved from them; but this I do not at present admit, and therefore it must depend on Yourself if You wish me to relinquish the high honour and trust You have placed upon me as Your Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

' . . . I should therefore feel grateful to You, if You would let me know what Your views are on the subject. I need not point out to You that there are grave political considerations to be taken into account when dealing with this very large and important subject, and though, no doubt, You have been fully alive to this fact ever since the Hartington Commission has been brought before You, I should be glad of an opportunity of fully discussing the subject with You. Should You desire to see me, I await Your orders in this respect.'

The Queen upon receipt of this letter considered the whole question with Her Ministers, and gave several interviews to the Duke. The matter was obviously an extremely difficult one to settle, but in the end Her Majesty gave her decision as follows:—

FROM THE QUEEN.

' WINDSOR CASTLE, 19 May 1895.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—Since seeing you on Thursday I have given much anxious thought to the question of your tenure of the office of Commander-in-Chief. I quite appreciate the reasons which make you reluctant to resign the Office which you have so long held with the greatest advantage to the Army, and with my most entire confidence and approbation.

'I have, however, come to the conclusion, on the advice of my Ministers, that considerable changes in the distribution of duties among the Headquarters of my Army are desirable. These alterations cannot be effected without reconstituting the particular duties assigned to the Commander-in-Chief, and therefore, though with much pain, I have arrived at the decision that, for your own sake as well as in the public

interest, it is inexpedient that you should much longer retain that position, from which I think you should be relieved at the close of your Autumn duties.

'This necessary change will be as painful to me as it is to you, but I am sure it is best so.—Believe me, always your very affectionate Cousin and Friend, VICTORIA R. & I.'

It is undeniable that the receipt of this letter caused the Duke great pain and deep sorrow. All those who have spent years in the public service, and who have in course of time been compelled by age to relinquish their active employment, will readily realise his feelings. Moreover, such sentiments are, if possible, more intense among the combatant services of the Crown than in any other.

It is, however, idle to deny that the Duke, who had now entered on his seventy-sixth year, was, though yet possessing marvellous energy and extreme clearness of head, at an age which thoroughly justified the Queen's decision.

A month later, on 21 June 1895, the Secretary of State for War announced the approaching retirement of H.R.H. in the House of Commons in the following terms:—¹

'H.R.H. has been at the head of the Army for the unexampled term of thirty-nine years. During all that time he has devoted all his energies and abilities—the whole of his life, in fact—to its service. He has become identified with the Army. The Army in all its ranks has seen in him a true friend, and, as he himself I am sure would like to be considered, a faithful servant. It has recognised in him some of the most characteristic qualities of our countrymen. The Army has been, in ever-increasing degree, proud of the Duke, as he is called, and fond of the Duke; and if the time has now come, as come sooner or later it must, when his active career shall cease, he will be followed in his retirement throughout the Army by a universal sentiment of gratitude, sympathy, and regret. . . .

'I will endeavour, as well as I am able, to disengage myself from the influence of his most attractive personality, and from the power he possesses beyond most men of winning for himself the regard—I would even say the affection—of those with whom he is brought closely in contact. I leave aside the question of technical attainments; I say nothing of the Duke of Cambridge's extraordinary familiarity with all the details of the military profession, and especially with the traditions, duties, practices, and requirements of our own Army—a familiarity in which probably no officer in

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, 1895, vol. xxxiv. (4th series).

the service could equal him; I say nothing of his industry, of the energy which he displays in an unflagging degree, even at the advanced age which he has now reached, and which can be gauged by any reader of the daily newspapers who follows H.R.H.'s engagements week after week;—I wish to speak rather of the other qualities which the Duke of Cambridge brings to the service of his country, and which appeal especially to us Members of Parliament.

'There are two qualities which, in my opinion, are the most important that any public man, and especially any public servant, can enjoy. One of these is supposed to be in-born, though I doubt it; the other acquired. They come in my opinion before talent; they are better than zeal; they make genius useful; they fertilise eloquence. They are as rare as they are essential; they are constantly spoken of, but never defined. We know them by the vague titles of common sense and knowledge of the world. In the exercise of these great qualities the Duke is a past master, and it is their possession that has made his influence so great. But, Sir, there is another characteristic which comes home very closely to the heart of the House of Commons. The Duke of Cambridge has been, as I have said, for thirty-nine years the occupant of the office of Commander-in-Chief. At first his position was one of quasi-independence; he was gradually brought closer to the Secretary of State, until at last he has been distinctly responsible to the Parliamentary Minister.

'During a great part of the time, though happily not of recent years, there was room for jealousy, for difficulty, and for friction, and if this trying time has been successfully passed, it has been in a great measure because the Duke of Cambridge is a firm observer of Constitutional propriety, a respecter of Parliamentary authority, and because he desires always to recognise and follow the general feeling of the country. I only now express publicly what I have often said privately, when I say that, if Providence had called the Duke to be sovereign ruler of some country, he would have exercised in an eminent degree all the qualities which we regard as necessary to the Constitutional head of the State.'

In the course of his speech, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman stated that the time had now come for some change to be made in the administration of the Army; and that, though the Government did not propose to carry out the whole of the recommendations of the Hartington Commission, they proposed that the functions and responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief should be 'greatly modified' as compared with those of its present occupant. He added that we could 'look back with admiration and gratitude upon a

long career distinguished by such constant zeal and devotion, and marked by a marvellous development and improvement in that Army which it has been the Duke of Cambridge's pride to command, and whose interests it is his highest happiness to serve.'

On the same occasion, Mr. Balfour, as the Leader of the Opposition, spoke in a similar strain.

'It has never become my good fortune to serve in an office with the Commander-in-Chief, but it is not necessary to have had that privilege which the right honourable gentleman has enjoyed to be assured that the Commander-in-Chief has shown a power of continuous and strenuous work which few can imitate, and of which, perhaps, we can hardly find such another example in the public service. As a result of that continuous and strenuous exertion the Commander-in-Chief has, by universal consent, a knowledge of the details of Army work, in which he probably has no rival. He has always been able, in spite of the great, of the revolutionary changes, which have taken place during his term of office, to keep abreast of each new condition of Army affairs as it has arisen. He has, as the deserved result of his public services, earned the gratitude and affection of the whole Army of which he has been the head.'

The same day the Duke wrote Mr. Campbell-Bannerman a kindly letter thanking him for his speech. To this the latter replied. The allusion at the end of the letter refers to the celebrated 'cordite' vote which resulted in the fall of Lord Rosebery's Ministry and the formation of Lord Salisbury's third administration.

FROM MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.

'6 GROSVENOR PLACE, 22 June 1895.

'I am deeply grateful to Y.R.H. for your very kind letter. It is not allowable in the House of Commons to introduce much feeling into a formal statement, and I could not therefore say all that I felt, but I was glad to be able to give expression to some small part of the appreciation of Y.R.H.'s career which I share with all competent observers. The tone of the House was entirely sympathetic.

'The incident which occurred later in the evening will probably lead to the severance of my connection with the War Office, but I shall always remain profoundly sensible of Y.R.H.'s kindness and consideration, and proud of the dis-

tinguished honour I have enjoyed of serving the Queen as a colleague of Y.R.H.'

The present writer has had the tale of the selection of the successor to the Duke from H.R.H.'s own lips.

It is now a matter of common knowledge that Lord Rosebery had decided to recommend Sir Redvers Buller for that high office, and that at one period of the transaction it was almost a matter of minutes whether the appointment to that post could be made before the Liberal Government resigned the seals of office.

The story is one of dramatic interest, and was, in its outcome, the source of long-lasting trouble. At this period (1895) the only possible competitors for the position of Commander-in-Chief were, in order of seniority, Lord Wolseley, H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, and Sir Redvers Buller.

True it is that a section of the public favoured Lord Roberts; but at that time his claims were not even considered, since it was ruled that he lacked experience and knowledge of European soldiering and of the British Army, except in India. Indeed, it was to remove this disability that he was subsequently given the command in Ireland—the first appointment in command exclusively of Imperial troops that he ever held—after a long and arduous service of over forty-one years in India.

It is superfluous to say that the Queen omitted nothing whereby she could soften the blow which she was well aware the Duke's retirement must inflict. Hence the following:—

FROM THE QUEEN.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 3 July 1895.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—I am anxious to confer on you, in recognition of your long and valuable services, the Office of my *first personal Aide-de-Camp*, with the right of attending me on all military occasions and of holding the Parade on my Birthday.

'I trust that this will be agreeable to you, and keep up your connection with the Army, who are deeply attached to you.

'Hoping that you are well.—Believe me, always your affectionate Cousin,

V.R.I.'

Upon Lord Salisbury forming his new Cabinet, Lord Lansdowne became Secretary of State for War; and one of the first duties which fell to him was to come to a decision as to the Duke's successor. This was, in the circumstances, a foregone conclusion.

In the light of subsequent events, in justice to Lord Lansdowne, it should be noted that he specifically states that he acquainted Lord Wolseley with the 'changes in the position' of the Commander-in-Chief about to be introduced.

FROM LORD LANSDOWNE.

'14 August 1895.

'It is due to Y.R.H. that I should lose no time in making you aware that I have obtained Her Majesty's permission to designate Lord Wolseley as the next Commander-in-Chief.

'After discussing the matter with the Prime Minister and the Duke of Devonshire, it seemed to me that Lord Wolseley's claims were stronger than those of any other officer in the service: to give the appointment to any one else, in the absence of special reasons for passing Lord Wolseley over, would, I believe, be a step unfair to him, and difficult to justify in the eyes of the public. . . .

'I should myself have wished that the selection of Y.R.H.'s successor could have been postponed till a later date; but there was a question of sending Lord Wolseley to Berlin as Ambassador, and it became necessary to make him aware that the other post, which he naturally covets much more, would probably be within his reach.


'I have of course explained to Lord Wolseley that changes in the position of the Officer Commanding in Chief are inevitable, and that Her Majesty's Government reserves to itself an absolutely free hand in regard to these.

'I have telegraphed briefly to Y.R.H. wishing that the earliest intimation possible should reach you.'

TO LORD LANSDOWNE.

'16 August 1895.

'I received your telegram the night before last, and your letter of the 14th this morning, and I thank you for the early information given me as to Lord Wolseley's having been selected and approved of by Her Majesty as my ultimate successor. I gather from this that there is no further change contemplated as to the period of my retirement, which remains, as agreed by you, as the 1st November. Of course, as I give up my post with a heavy heart I cannot but



Emory Walker Ph. Sc.

F. H. M. R. H. The Duke of Cambridge K. G.
1900

THAYER
1901
1902
1903

grieve over the result; but there is no more to be said on the subject.

'... As regards the difficulty of selection of a successor to the modified Commander-in-Chief, I know that you had no very easy task to deal with. . . . I don't think Lord Wolseley could have been passed over unless it had been for a high post such as the Embassy at Berlin, which I think he would have filled with great advantage to the public service and with much credit to himself. Lord Roberts would have found himself quite new to the home duties of the profession, as he has hitherto never served out of India; and therefore it will be an advantage to him in his Irish Chief Command to get into the ways of our European organisation. . . .'

Lord Wolseley, upon receiving the notification of his appointment to the post of Commander-in-Chief in succession to the Duke, wrote to the latter, and received the following reply:—

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 24 August 1895.

'I have to thank you for your letter received this morning, and offer you my best wishes on having been designated as my successor on my retiring from my present office, which I have held for thirty-nine years. . . . That I do so with the greatest sorrow and regret I cannot deny, for, as you know from personal experience, I am heart and soul devoted to the Army and to the duties that are connected with all that concern it. I assure you that if and when we have differed, it has been on public grounds only, and not from any personal reasons. The difference, if there has been any between us, has been that I have thought it better not to hurry or press changes, but to let them be as little felt as possible. I am therefore indignant with those who want to make out I have *opposed* all changes. There never has been a more continuous amount of change than there has been during my period of command, but it has been very, very gradual, because I felt the danger of sudden alteration in so delicate a machinery as the working of a great body of highly disciplined men. I hope and believe I shall hand over the Army into my successor's hands in a very creditable and satisfactory condition, and in a high state of progress and military *esprit de corps*, without which no Army can thrive or even exist. Adhere to this line of dealing with the service, and you will go on with the good work, now quickly progressing. . . .

As the day approached when the Duke was finally to sever himself from the Army he loved so well, innumerable tributes of affection and esteem poured in to Gloucester House, not alone from the great people of the world, but from men and women of all sorts and conditions.

FROM THE GERMAN EMPEROR.

‘JAGDHAUS ROMINTEN,
24 September 1895.

‘DEAREST UNCLE,—With deep regret did I read the letter you kindly wrote me announcing the change in the Command of H.M. Forces. It is the worst and most direful moment in a soldier's life when he has to leave the service he so much cherishes. I venture to say I can well feel how sore at heart you must be on relinquishing the Command to a successor, after such a long term, during which you have faithfully served your Queen and your Country, even as a young officer at the peril of your life, gaining your spurs on the battlefield.

‘With all my heart do I sympathise with you, and so do my brother officers, and also the British officers who serve under you. I am proud to say that in a way I also belong to them, having received my Dragoons when you were in command. . . .—I remain, dearest Uncle, ever your most devoted and faithful Nephew,
WILLIAM I.R.’

FROM MISS FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE.

‘10 SOUTH STREET,
PARK LANE, W., 26 September 1895.

‘Will you allow me to offer to Y.R.H., at the close of nearly forty years' work for the Army, something more than the sympathy of silence on your retirement?

‘My excuse for intrusion at such a time as this, is the honour of having been allowed to work with the Army and for it in days gone by. It has endowed my life with interests, occupations, and friendships that have enabled me to follow and to understand more fully than would have been otherwise possible the advance made since then in the health, comfort, and general well-being of our soldiers. Very few now living can know how much that advance is owing to the patient personal efforts of Y.R.H., which date back to the times when by far the most serious dangers to the soldiers in peace or war were bad food, insufficient accommodation for man and horse, and an absolute neglect of sanitary measures, and when barrack life meant, for men in the ranks, to be deprived of every home comfort, and never have an opportunity for healthy recreation either of mind or body.

'Any stranger can see what a libel on the Army such a description would be to-day; but the stranger could not know how the change had been gradually effected, and to how very few men it was largely due.

'It requires one who, to some extent at least, has been an official, to realise that nothing less than many years of minute attention to matters of detail, each of which brought its own special contribution to the soldier's welfare, could have made his position and profession what it is to-day.

'To transform the fashions of a Profession is harder than to succeed in a hundred campaigns, for it requires an enthusiasm for the drudgery of detail of which the public have no knowledge, and for which, therefore, they give no thanks. But rewarded work has never been so good as thankless work, and if known work has been the admiration of the world, it is the unknown work that is its salvation.

'It must have been a difficult and thankless work to subordinate favouritism in the Army to *merit*, which is the *chivalry* of modern times, and for one in Y.R.H.'s position peculiarly difficult and unusually thankless. And those who know what the soldier's life is, and how inter-dependent are their comfort, their health, and their fighting power—to those Y.R.H.'s work is known, and by them it will be gratefully remembered as a work not for our Army alone, but for our country and our countrymen and countrywomen of every class and rank, for whose benefit our Army exists, and whose homes are secured by its efficiency.

'May Y.R.H. still watch over the soldier! There is such good stuff in him when disciplined. In times of trouble he is so kind to his horses, coaxing them to eat when he has not enough himself. In times of trouble he really "loves" his comrade "as himself," risking and losing his life for him. His devotion to his officers is the same. But no man can be idle and, without physical activity or interesting occupation, resist temptation.

'May Y.R.H.'s hopes be fulfilled, and your work continued till every soldier is able to resist all sorts of temptations and to become a faithful subject and servant of his Sovereign, his Country, and his God.

'But it is not for me to tell Your Royal Highness these things—only to be again offering our humble but hearty thanks for the Troops.

TELEGRAM FROM H.R.H. THE PRINCESS OF WALES
(H.M. QUEEN ALEXANDRA).

'BERNSTORFF, 7 October 1895: 8.10 P.M.

'My thoughts are much with you, dear Uncle George, through all this most trying time. I share your sorrow from my heart; it is very hard for you, and will be regretted by all. Best love from here.

ALIX.'

On 1 November letters and telegrams arrived unceasingly, all breathing the same spirit of sincere affection and sympathy. Probably few people, on relinquishing high public duties, have elicited a warmer feeling than did H.R.H. on this occasion.

FROM THE QUEEN.

‘BALMORAL CASTLE, 31 October 1895.

‘DEAR GEORGE,—Accept my best thanks for your kind letter received yesterday, with the very kind and gratifying letter from the King of Italy, which I return. Of course I gladly sanction your accepting this distinguished Order, and am much pleased at the King's kind thought in conferring it on you. . . .—Ever your affectionate Cousin, V. R. & I.’

TO THE QUEEN.

‘HORSE GUARDS,

WAR OFFICE, S.W., 31 October 1895.

‘MY DEAR COUSIN,—As this is the last day I shall be at the office as Commander-in-Chief of your Army, I beg, in laying down my office, to express to Your Majesty my grateful thanks for the powerful support You have invariably extended to me, often at times of great difficulty and some anxiety. I have endeavoured to carry out all that was required without giving You more trouble than I could help, and yet I have at all times guarded the attributes of the Monarchy to the best of my ability. I hope and trust that my successor will adopt a similar course, for I know how important it is to continue in the present groove for the interests, not alone of Your noble Army, but of the Crown itself. You know that I am at all times at Your service should You at any time think I could be of any use to You and Your interests, and though advanced in years, I have still a good deal of physical and mental power left, not to be altogether useless with the vast experience I have gained from long active and official life. . . . I hear Lord Wolseley is going up to-night, and I hope You will impress upon him the necessity for being very particular and careful in guarding the interests of the Crown.’

FROM THE QUEEN.

‘BALMORAL CASTLE, 2 November 1895.

‘DEAR GEORGE,—Pray accept my warm thanks for your kind letter. It is with much pain that I see you leave the high, important, and responsible office which you have held so worthily for nearly forty years. Accept also my sincerest

thanks for the great services you have rendered to the Country, to the Army, and myself, which be most gratefully remembered.

'Believe me, that I feel deeply for you—this severance of a *tie* which existed so largely between you and the Army. It is not, however, a *real* severance, for you are a Field-Marshal, and Colonel of many Regiments. I need not either say that I shall be glad to have your opinion on affairs of importance connected with the Army. . . .

'I trust that you are well, and with sincere expressions of my affection and friendship,—Believe me, always your very affectionate Cousin and Friend,
VICTORIA R. & I.'

'I have seen Lord Wolseley, and shall not fail to impress upon him what you mention; and indeed I have already written to him in that sense.'

TELEGRAM FROM H.R.H. PRINCESS MARY OF TECK.

'RICHMOND, 9.50 P.M., 1 November 1895.

'Our thoughts with you in loving sympathy.

'MARY, FRANCIS, MAY.'

FROM THE REV. J. C. EDGEHILL (CHAPLAIN-GENERAL).

'WAR OFFICE, 30 October 1895.

'Among the many and varied expressions of regret that will reach Y.R.H. at this time, there will be none more heartfelt than mine; for I have to thank You for the kindest consideration and the most constant support during the last ten years. You have always placed the most favourable construction on my work; and no word has ever been spoken or written to me by Yourself, or those in authority under You, which I could wish to-day unwritten or unsaid.

'I know that my efforts to make the Chaplain's Department an honour to the Army and the centre of much useful work would have been hindered and checked on every side if it had not been for the *known support of Y.R.H.*

'I heartily thank You for this: the remembrance of it will ever be a grateful recollection to me. We have no scandals in the Department—not even an approach to one. The G.O.C.'s all speak in the high terms they should of the Chaplain. Among the young men some are the very best of their class. Had it not been for the knowledge that You, Sir, wished me to bring this about, and that You would sustain me in doing it, all my efforts would have been powerless.

'I trust in days to come, among the many good things You have done for the Army, the remembrance that the high interests of the men are not neglected, and that You did your utmost to provide beautiful Churches and Chaplains worthy of their office, will be a joy and happiness to You.

'There is not a chaplain of any denomination who does not grieve with me in losing so powerful and consistent a friend, or one who does not hope that in the days yet to come the blessing of God may rest upon You.

'My position and work enable me better than most men to know the sentiments of the N.C. Officers and men. Their voices have to be silent, and they cannot show their opinion of their Commander-in-Chief, but there is not a man that does not regret the loss of "the Soldier's Friend." . . .

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'17 DOVER STREET, W., 9 November 1895.

'I venture to send Y.R.H. the accompanying photograph, with the humble request that You will do me the great favour of signing it before I have it framed. The only other picture I have of Y.R.H. is an indifferent photograph I bought when in Dublin. I should like to have this one signed, and to keep it as a remembrance of much kindness received from Y.R.H., for whom I have always had and will continue to have the most profound respect and affection.'

FROM H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES (H.M. THE KING).

'CHATSWORTH,
CHESTERFIELD, 12 November 1895,

'MY DEAR UNCLE,—I must write you a few lines to thank you for your very kind letter, which I received just before leaving town. It was a great compliment, which I highly appreciated, in taking the Chair at a dinner which was memorable in every respect. It must have indeed been some consolation, on your quitting the post which you have held for so long, to see in what high estimation you are held by both services, which was clearly evinced by the great manifestation of goodwill and affection towards you which was shown on all sides.

'I hope you are none the worse for the exertion it must have been to you making so long and important a speech.—I remain, your affectionate Nephew and Cousin,

'ALBERT EDWARD.'

Among the humble tributes of affection were letters from old soldiers in various parts of the world, of which the following are examples:—

TO H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE.

‘1 November 1895.

‘MAY IT PLEASE Y.R.H.—To receive the good wishes of an old soldier (who fifty-seven years ago to-day enlisted at Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk, into 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards) that you may for many years to come enjoy every blessing this world can afford you, and, as I see by the press, be enabled to carry on those duties which Your Queen and Country has deputed you. I remember you a young man as “Prince George” then a Cavalry Officer. I well remember Your Royal Father, who commanded the Coldstream Guards. I remember him at the Dinner given to the Regiment (shortly after the 2nd Battalion returned from Canada) in Portman Street Barracks which he attended, when asked by Private Thomas Orpen if he would drink with him replied, “Yes, my boy, I would drink with you if it was *Water*.” I also remember and was present as one of the Guard of Honour at Y. Royal Father’s Funeral at Kew. I may here add that my Father was appointed Sergeant-Major 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards on the Field of Waterloo. I hope you will not think that I write this with a view to begging, etc., as I assure you I have a few pounds of my own and want for nothing but what I can buy myself.

‘Apologising to Y.R.H.—I am, most respectfully,

‘E. C. MIDDLEDITCH
(*Late 2375, Coldstream Guards*).

TELEGRAM FROM THE VETERANS OF SHROPSHIRE.

‘SHREWSBURY, 2.35 P.M., 5 November 1895.

‘Shropshire veteran soldiers assembled at Shrewsbury send their hearty greeting to their old Commander-in-Chief, and wish him all prosperity.

‘COLONEL SLANEY, Shrewsbury.’

TELEGRAM FROM THE VETERANS OF PORTSMOUTH.

‘SOUTHSEA PIER, 6.35 P.M., 5 November 1895.

‘The Veterans of Portsmouth at Inkerman Dinner assembled tender their loyal and respectful devotion to H.R.H. on the Anniversary of that great battle, in which he took a glorious part.

SIR GEORGE WILLIS, *Chairman*.’

TELEGRAM FROM THE CRIMEAN VETERANS, BRISTOL.

'PARK STREET,
BRISTOL, 5.27 P.M., 5 November 1895.

'The Crimean Veterans here celebrating Anniversary of Inkerman desire to offer to You, Sir, who took part with them in that glorious battle, their best wishes and dutiful respects.'

FROM MIRFIELD LODGE AND CLUB.

'MIRFIELD,
YORKSHIRE, 22 November 1895.

'It is the wish of a few old soldier pensioners, who enlisted in 1854-57—viz. Crimean and Indian Mutiny men—to have a supper in a small way in Honour of your retirement from the service. We all know and feel what a soldier's duties and pay were in those days, and we know what it is at the present day, and we must admit with thankful hearts that this vast improvement has been accomplished by Y.R.H.

'We wish you all success and happiness for the remainder of life, which like most of us is getting shorter in this world.

'If this should meet with Your Royal Highness's approval we shall be thankful.'

THE FAREWELL ORDER.

'Order to the Army by Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., etc., issued as a special Army Order on 31 October 1895.

'*Army Order* 180, October 1895.

'Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., relinquished to-day the duties of the Command of Her Majesty's Army, a post of honour and distinction which he has held since 16 July 1856.

'H.R.H. has for nearly fifty-eight years held Her Majesty's commission, and he now severs his connection with the active duties of his profession with the deepest sorrow and regret. In relinquishing these duties, H.R.H. desires to place on record the obligations he is under to all General and other officers who have so uniformly and ably assisted and supported him in maintaining the Army in the high state of discipline for which it is distinguished, and he desires to express his deep sense of the admirable conduct, both in the field and in quarters, invariably displayed by officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the active service over whom he has so long presided.

‘The period covering H.R.H.’s command of the Army has been one of great changes. The abolition of purchase, the introduction of short service, of the territorial system, and of improved arms and equipments, have all been materially assisted in their development by the cordial co-operation of all ranks of the officers of the Army.

‘The Militia has been brought into closer connection with the Line. The Yeomanry have become far more efficient, and the institution of the Volunteer Force in 1859 marked an important step in the expansion of the defensive resources of the Empire. By constant attention to their duties, and the desire to perfect themselves in practical knowledge of the military profession, all the Auxiliary Forces, including the Volunteers, have become a valuable portion of Her Majesty’s Army.

‘In India also most important military changes have been effected, commencing with the amalgamation of the late East India Company’s troops with H.M.’s Army in 1860, since which time great changes have been arrived at in many details connected with the Army of India, concluding with the recent organisation of the Presidential Armies into one command under the control of the Commander-in-Chief in India.

‘In bidding the Army an affectionate farewell, the Duke of Cambridge feels assured that he is handing over to his able and distinguished successor a force of which H.M. the Queen and the Empire at large may well be proud, and he assures the Army and the nation that, though relinquishing his active duties, his interest in and his devotion to the Service will continue to the end of his days.’

EXTRACT FROM ‘ORDER TO THE ARMY’ BY FIELD-MARSHAL
VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P., ETC.

‘In this his first Army Order Lord Wolseley wishes, in the name of the Army, to assure H.R.H. of the affectionate regard of all who have served under him during his long period of office.’

CHAPTER XXXV

CLOSING YEARS

The Jameson Raid. Mr. Chamberlain's Letter on the Settlement. The Augmentation of the Guards and Colonial Service. H.R.H.'s Memorandum on these subjects. The Re-conquest of the Soudan. Letters from Sir Herbert Kitchener. His opinion of Major Marchand. Threatened War in South Africa, 1899. Lord Wolseley's predictions. Sir Redvers Buller proceeds to the Cape. British Reverses. Lord Wolseley's great moral courage and marvellous optimism. Lord Roberts's Letters. Mr. Chamberlain's Letter on Peace being signed. Lord Wolseley on the War Office. Death of the Duke.

It may readily be imagined by all who have followed the career of H.R.H. throughout the kaleidoscopic changes of our military administration described in this book that the fact of his having ceased to be Commander-in-Chief in 1895 did not in the least cause him to take less interest in the service in general, or, in particular, in the regiments with which he was more especially identified.

Within less than two months of the Duke's retirement from office came the news of the Jameson Raid. Needless to say that H.R.H. was profoundly interested in the critical condition of affairs thus created in South Africa. Ever since our humiliating withdrawal in 1881 he had clearly foreseen that, sooner or later, a terrible day of reckoning must come in South Africa. To him it had fallen to organise and dispatch Sir Charles Warren's Expedition to Bechuanaland in 1885; and on several other occasions, as is now well known, the probability of our having to provide troops to assert our supremacy in South Africa had been under his consideration.

At one period of the troubles caused by the fatuous Raid it seemed as if we should be involved in hostilities

with the Boers. The resources of diplomacy, however, effected a quasi-settlement whereby our inveterate foes were granted another three and a half years to complete their armaments, and placed in the most favourable possible position to withstand us.

FROM MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

‘COLONIAL OFFICE, 16 *January* 1896.

‘I have had the honour to receive Y.R.H.’s very kind letter, 13th inst., and I was most grateful to Y.R.H. for your sympathy and approval.

‘Her Majesty’s Government have still a difficult task before them, but I believe that all chance of further bloodshed is at an end, and I hope that a satisfactory and lasting settlement may be reached.

‘The fear is that the Boers, encouraged by their success, should be arrogant and impracticable and should refuse all redress to the just grievances of the majority, to whom they have denied the rights of citizenship.

‘I trust, however, that, when the feeling raised by the recent invasion has somewhat calmed down, wiser counsels will prevail.

‘Meanwhile, I think that President Kruger is fully aware that H.M. Government will not tolerate the interference of any foreign Power in the affairs of the Transvaal.’

In the year following the Duke’s retirement the most pressing question which came before the new War Office authorities was the eternal one of endeavouring in some way to equalise the number of Line Battalions serving at home with those serving abroad, in order that they might properly perform their duties of annual self-immolation by dispatching adequate drafts, and thus keep up the Battalions abroad to their authorised strength. Many and strange were the proposals successively made, and abandoned, to overcome this initial stumbling-block to the attainment of the standard of perfection promised by the inaugurators of the Short Service and Linked Battalion systems. At one time it was seriously stated that, for the purpose of the system, the Mediterranean was to be viewed as a ‘home’ station! After many attempts at solving what was practically an

impossible equation under the conditions laid down, it became apparent that nothing short of increasing the Line by some seven battalions would enable the balance to be restored even in peace time. This augmentation of the Line the Treasury, however, refused. An alternative scheme was thereupon put forward to increase the Foot Guards and employ them in the Mediterranean, and thus to reduce to some extent the inequality between Line Battalions serving at home and abroad.

In order to carry out the system in its entirety, it was considered desirable to raise the Coldstream and Scots Regiments of Guards from two to three battalions each, so as to assimilate them with the Grenadiers, who already possessed three battalions. The weak point in the proposal lay in the uncertainty of an adequate supply of both officers and men, willing to accept the peculiar conditions of service in the Foot Guards, being forthcoming.

Events have proved that this fear was by no means a groundless one, and at the present time the grave deficiency of officers and the impossibility of obtaining an adequate supply of recruits are causing much heart-searching among our military authorities. When the question was under consideration, the Duke wrote the following Memorandum:—

MEMO. ON THE QUESTION OF THE BRIGADE OF GUARDS
BEING SENT ON COLONIAL DUTY.

‘I am desirous to place my views as Senior Honorary Colonel of the Brigade on paper on this most important subject.

‘I admit that, personally, I see no valid objection to the principle that, in order to place the three Regiments on a similar footing, it is an advantage to the Brigade that each Regiment shall have three Battalions. By this arrangement a whole Division of Guards of two Brigades, of three Battalions each Brigade, ought at all times to be prepared to take the field in the event of any sudden emergency arising, the third Battalion of each Regiment forming a well-consolidated Depôt for its two Service Battalions, whereas now, only a single though strong Brigade can be made available for such special service formed of two

Battalions of the Grenadiers and one Battalion from the Coldstream and Scots Guards.

‘I also see no reason to object to an arrangement by which two Battalions of Guards proposed to be raised should take their share in short Colonial service: for two reasons, first, because the contact of the Guards with the Line in large garrison towns is of mutual advantage; and, in the next place, because I very much doubt the House of Commons being disposed to grant this increase to the present Guards Brigade, unless accompanied by an arrangement by which the inequality of the double-Battalion system in the Line, which has been now so long and justly complained of, would be relieved to some extent by the assistance thus obtained. To my mind, the details for carrying out the necessary arrangements have not been thoroughly taken into account, and it is this point more particularly to which I desire to draw attention.

‘The whole question, in the first place, depends upon the possibility of obtaining the necessary number of men for two additional Battalions without any serious reduction in the height and physical condition of the men to be recruited. It is also essential that the present efficiency of the seven Home Battalions should in no respect be impaired. That can only be done by not depleting the Home Battalions for those on Colonial service. This can only be attained by maintaining an exactly similar establishment of the Battalions both at home and on Colonial duty. To facilitate this, the recruits for each of the nine Battalions should be told off as at present from the Catherham Dépôt to each distinct Battalion; and for this purpose each Battalion should take a short tour of Colonial duty, say one year, and should go out and return home, so to speak, all standing. I think only *two* Battalions, the proposed increase, should be on Colonial duty at the same time, and that seven Battalions, as at present, should in ordinary times be kept at home, one of these to be stationed in Ireland as at present. I think a Brigade of Guards stationed, as such, at Gibraltar would be a great mistake. One Battalion might be there and the other at Malta. There are obvious reasons for the whole Brigade not being concentrated in one garrison town like Gibraltar, where the duties are very heavy, both as regards guards and also heavy fatigues, and very limited drill ground and bad shooting-ranges. Besides, there would be no contact with Line Regiments; there would be no Band, which is essential in a large garrison town with a considerable civilian population; and the N.C. Officers would be severely worked. Again, I think that the withdrawal of a Battalion of Guards from Dublin would be a great political blunder, which can only be prevented by two Battalions serving in the Colonies at the same time. The necessity for increased establishments for the Colonial Service Battalions

will thereby be obviated, the difference in numbers, if in single Battalions, being made up by an additional number of Garrison Artillerymen, which are specially needed with such heavy armaments as are now mounted in both our Mediterranean fortresses. On these conditions, and with special liberality to the old and valuable N.C. Officers of the three Regiments, and provided the men can be obtained at a height never lowered beyond 5 feet 5 inches in time of peace, the experiment might be tried without serious injury to the present efficiency of the seven Battalions of Guards which it is so essential to maintain.'

Lord Wolseley, the new Commander-in-Chief, some time after the preceding Memorandum was received at the War Office wrote as follows; it may possibly be new to some military men to learn that the Duke was the originator of the scheme to add two Battalions to the Guards and to extend their ordinary service to Mediterranean stations:—

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'17 November 1896.

'I knew that Y.R.H. had already recommended that two Battalions should be added to the Foot Guards, and that they should keep that number of Guards Battalions at one of the Mediterranean Stations. . . .

'My proposal is to have three Battalions of Guards in the Mediterranean instead of the two Y.R.H. recommended. They would be always together and under a Guards Brigadier. This would give employment to another Guards Major-General, which I shall be glad of.

'There are no other terms upon which I can secure the addition of these two Battalions to Foot Guards, and I see so many advantages that must accrue to the Brigade from them that I think it would be the height of folly on their part to refuse them.

'In order to have six Battalions between London and Windsor, I propose to withdraw the Battalion from Dublin.

'If all this be carried out, we shall, for war purposes in future, have a Guards Division of six Battalions instead of merely a Brigade as at present.

'I hope, Sir, that the modifications to Y.R.H.'s scheme for two Battalions of Guards abroad which I now propose may meet with your approval.

'It is always so pleasant to me to feel that what I do or propose meets with Y.R.H.'s approval.'

TO LORD WOLSELEY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE,
PARK LANE, 19 November 1896.

'... I am glad you are disposed to carry out my original idea of some little time ago, but which was at the time not accepted by the Government, to augment the Brigade of Guards by two Battalions, giving each of the three Guards Regiments three Battalions, a far better organisation than the one existing at present, the only difference of the plan now suggested being that the three Battalions should be stationed abroad and in the Mediterranean, instead of only two, as was my proposal.

'The difference is this, that Dublin will in that case be deprived of its present Guards Battalion.

'I think, in many respects, your idea of three Battalions, under a Guards General at Gibraltar, is better than the *two* I proposed for the Mediterranean and *one* at Dublin. . . .

'That some portion of the Guards must serve abroad, should a considerable augmentation be decided upon, I consider indispensable; and I should hope that, for the advantages to be gained, in the interests of the Guards themselves as of the benefits to the efficiency of the Army generally, the Guards will be quite prepared to make this slight sacrifice to their individual comforts and convenience. On these grounds I cordially support your views, and I only sincerely hope they will be acceptable to Her Majesty, who will of course have to be approached before any action can be taken in the matter. . . .'

The experiment of sending a Battalion of Guards to Gibraltar was tried, but for many reasons did not prove a success. Among others, the Guards system of extreme short service, three years with the Colours, was found not to lend itself to Colonial Service, and this, combined with the cost incurred by frequent reliefs, led to the scheme being abandoned after the outbreak of the South African War of 1899.

The decision of the Government in 1897 to re-conquer the Soudan, naturally enough was a matter of engrossing interest to the Duke, inasmuch as, yet once again, he saw his urgent military advice, so lightly set aside in 1885, now endorsed and acted upon.

The story of Sir Herbert Kitchener's advance to Dongola in the summer of 1897, of the occupation of Berber and battle of the Atbara in the spring of 1898, and of the final

advance and defeat of the Khalifa at Omdurman in the autumn of the same year, are well set forth in the following letters to His Royal Highness:—

FROM SIR HERBERT KITCHENER.

‘FIRKET, 29 June 1897.

‘I am sincerely grateful to Y.R.H. for your congratulations and kind letter of the 12th. I have informed the officers of the Army here of the great interest Y.R.H. takes in us all, and they all desire to express to You, Sir, how highly they appreciate the honour done to them and their grateful thanks.

‘The dervishes in Dongola are entirely demoralised by their defeat at Firket, where they lost most of their best men; and if I could have pressed forward, I should have met with little or no resistance there, but the Nile is now at its lowest, and it is impossible to get steamers up the cataracts. Without steamers, supplies would be a great difficulty, and we could not take proper advantage of the occupation of the Dongola province.

‘I left the dervishes alone at Firket as long as I could, but when they were just beginning to attack the railway working parties, and had arranged for active operations on our lines of communication, to which they were being strongly urged by Wad Bishara, chief emir in Dongola, I thought it was time to advance.

‘Two days before the action the emir at Firket wrote to the Khalifa that he was quite strong enough to destroy us all, and that the Khalifa need not be anxious or send any reinforcements. I expect the Khalifa received the account of the fight at the same time as this letter.

‘The morning of the day we advanced, the dervishes made a strong reconnaissance under the head emir, half-way to Akasheh, where they remained some time, and retired about 4 P.M. My scouts saw them, and we left Akasheh; as they went back and found their tracks and marks fresh on the ground, they no doubt thought they could sleep quite happily as all was quiet in our direction: the surprise at dawn was complete. The behaviour of the troops in the action was all that could be desired, and as the Cavalry, Horse Artillery, Camel Corps, and a black Battalion, who went by a different road, were in position at dawn on the enemy's line of retreat, they were like rats in a trap.

‘I was very pleased after the first volley from the Infantry, when deploying, to see the Horse Battery of the other Columns open fire from the exact position I had intended them to occupy. There was no hitch about the

night march of either column, and both arrived exactly to time.

'The Cavalry soon found out that they were better men than the dervishes: they rode down dervish horsemen and foot men, and charged riflemen in position. Burn-Murdoch had to check them for charging rashly. One of the wounded prisoners, an old soldier of the Soudan Army, told me he had never seen such Cavalry, and that they were quite different to what he had expected: a severe sabre cut on the head had increased his respect for Egyptians enormously.

'Twice Egyptian Battalions charged with the bayonet to turn dervishes out of some of the most awkward positions made by high water channels and walled enclosures; there was no craning or hanging back; and they bayoneted every dervish in front of them.

'The action has done the troops a lot of good by teaching them their power, and all they want now is to be at them again.'

TELEGRAM FROM SIR H. KITCHENER.

'ATBARA, 10.5 P.M., 10 April 1898.

'I am very grateful for Your Royal Highness's kind message. Prince Francis of Teck commanded his Squadron during the battle, and proved himself to be a very capable and gallant soldier. All the wounded are doing well, and will be in hospital at Atbara fort on the Nile to-night.'

FROM SIR FRANCIS GRENFELL (COMMANDING BRITISH ARMY
OF OCCUPATION, EGYPT).

'ATBARA, 29 September 1898.

'... I was glad to meet Kitchener on his return from Fashoda, and congratulated him on his Peerage and the great success of his operations.

'He left Marchand in an uncomfortable position: very little ammunition, and not much supply; but he was relieved to see the Anglo-Egyptian Force as he expected the Dervishes, and there is little doubt that if Omdurman had not been taken he would have been wiped out. I went carefully over the battlefield, and had the advantage of being accompanied by the Egyptian Army Brigadiers, with the O.C., the Artillery and Cavalry. . . .

'I went carefully over the ground of the Cavalry charge, and I think, after seeing the spot and hearing the statements of officers and men engaged, that it was quite justified. Martin has been blamed for not making out what he had in his front. But four of his scouts were shot, and he was on the top of the dervishes (who were concealed in a depression) before

he knew the large force he had to deal with. If he had not charged, but retired, he would probably have lost heavily by the dervish rifle fire; from the number of bodies lying about, the lance did good service.

‘Omdurman is a curious place. Every tribe in Africa seems to have contributed to its population; it is being cleared out and strangers sent to their homes. . . .’

FROM SIR HERBERT KITCHENER.

‘SIRDARIEH,
CAIRO, 7 October 1898.

‘I beg to thank Y.R.H. very sincerely for your kind letter of congratulation. Your telegram, through Sir F. Grenfell, was communicated to the troops; there was, unfortunately, some delay in doing so owing to the breakdown of the telegraph wire.

‘The position of the French at Fashoda is no doubt the great question of interest now. It is very hard on Marchand, who is a fine fellow, to keep him there after all his hard work, and I think that, when the French Government hear from him, they will realise the impossible position they have got into. . . .’

In the spring of 1899 our relations with the Transvaal once again entered upon an unsatisfactory phase. Long and patient efforts were made by the Government to secure fair treatment for the Uitlander population, and otherwise to induce the Boer Government to regard their Treaty obligations. Eventually war became practically inevitable; but still the Government clung to the idea that hostilities would somehow be averted. In this it is undeniable they were encouraged by some of our military authorities, who might have been presumed to know better. Lord Wolseley, at any rate, did not conceal his opinion that war was imminent, as the following letters to the Duke show. At the same time, it is apparent that he considered the force which he was preparing both amply sufficient and suitably composed for the purposes he had in view, and that he was fully aware of the serious nature of the struggle impending. This is, of course, a highly contentious matter; but it will suffice to say that, had it been possible to concentrate the force, described in the following letter, in South Africa, and by intelligent

handling to deal sharp and decisive blows at the Boer Commandos in the early phase of the war, it would, in all human probability, have brought it to a conclusion in a few months. For such a purpose, and more especially for operations in Natal, the preponderance of Infantry, based on the usual European conditions, was by no means the error it has been freely asserted to be by unthinking critics. Where large masses of British Infantry were practically useless was when, in a later phase of the war, they were employed against the more mobile mounted Boers in the desultory and strangely protracted contest which was the inevitable result of the failure to deal vigorously with their elusive forces at the outset. That the system of Short Service and Reserve enabled us to put a powerful force, at least numerically, in the field and maintain it at full strength, is of course undeniable; but the fact remains that the system did not, in the peculiar circumstances of the case in point, enable us at the outset to take advantage of our vastly superior numbers and organisation over our enemy.

Among the many causes which rendered this impossible, was undeniably the fact that our system of Short Service and Reserve, without which all our Battalions were unable to take the field, rendered any idea of our having at hand an efficient 'striking force' wherewith to secure initial advantages in a campaign impossible. The necessity of calling up our Reserves before we could take the field was an obvious advertisement of our intentions which the Boers were not slow to appreciate at its proper value, and to reply to by a prompt invasion of Natal.

During August the War Office was occupied in arranging for possible eventualities. On 1 September Lord Wolseley wrote to the Duke as follows, giving him an outline of the contemplated expedition:—

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'FARM HOUSE,
GLYNDE, LEWES, 1 *September* 1899.

'... If war comes of it, we shall send a complete Army Corps and a Cavalry Division, and about one Infantry

Brigade besides, for lines of communication, these to be in addition to the troops we now have there, nearly 10,000 men. So our force of *Regulars* for the war would be about 40,000 men—a much larger and more efficient force in every way than that we fought the Alma with. Of this Army Corps, one Brigade will be of Guards (four Battalions). We shall call out the Reserve, for the Guards are now the youngest soldiers we have owing to their three years' engagement. But young as they were, they did their work well at Omdurman, where they were the youngest soldiers engaged.

'Sir G. White goes to Gibraltar, and, subject to the Queen's approval, Sir M. Clark becomes Q.M.G. Buller is to command if we have a war in South Africa. We could not have a better man, as Y.R.H. knows.'

Much has been written and said about the dual control of our Army; and very naturally military men are never weary of pointing out the absurdity of a system which entrusts the supreme control of our fighting machine to civilians—not infrequently men who are absolutely ignorant of the elements, not merely of Imperial defence, but of the simplest rules of war. On the other hand, the civilians, relying on constitutional theory, which requires the head of the Army to be the Minister of the Crown responsible to Parliament, consider that it is enough if they have at their call educated military opinion to which they can refer on an emergency.

Herein lies the innate weakness of our whole Army system as it was and as it is. All students of history are aware of the inherent weakness and ineffectiveness of a Council of War. Yet this is the very system which was created when, in 1895, most of the functions of the Commander-in-Chief were distributed among a group of subordinates, all of whom were permitted to enjoy direct access to the Secretary of State, and an equal opportunity to express their views.

The temptation to the subordinate under such a system to differ from his senior is at times almost irresistible. Simply to acquiesce, in the case of a man with an axe to grind, is merely to efface himself. Whereas to differ, and differ vigorously, affords an opportunity for the subordinate, should the course of events justify views he advocates, to claim superiority in judgment to his quasi-chief.

It has not seldom in recent years been the complaint of Secretaries of State that it is almost impossible for them to get a useful military opinion on any subject they referred to their 'military experts,' who, from one cause or another, only too often were hopelessly divided.

Although the Duke was in retirement at the time of the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899, he was in constant touch with all those who held high positions; hence the following letter from Lord Wolseley, in which, writing on 12 September, he predicts that 'if this war comes off, it will be the most serious war England has *ever* had. . . .

But at the very time that Lord Wolseley was thus expectant of war, and, as is now well known, doing all in his power to galvanise our constitutional military rulers into taking effective steps to prepare for it, the officer who had been selected for the command of the force, in the event of war, held entirely different views, and was firmly convinced that war would not take place.

Truly it would seem that the much-abused civilians have some right to complain as to the difficulty they have in obtaining a trustworthy military opinion on any concrete question they may refer to their soldier experts.

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'12 September 1899.

'If this war comes off it will be the most serious war England has *ever* had, when the size of our Army to be engaged and the distance of the seat of war from England are taken into consideration. When the troops now under orders for South Africa have arrived, say the 19th prox., we shall have, besides local forces, 16½ Battalions, 5 Regiments of Cavalry, 10 Batteries of Field Artillery (60 guns), besides Garrison Batteries and a number of R.E. and Army Service Corps Companies.

'That is, we shall have the same number of guns as we had at the Alma, more Regiments of Cavalry, and two-thirds of the Infantry with which we fought that battle.

'But when we send out the Army Corps and Cavalry Divisions and Line of Communication troops, the force in South Africa will be about twice that which we landed at Eupatoria, and will be three times stronger in Cavalry and guns. I tell Y.R.H. all this to show the magnitude of this

undertaking which is being forced upon us by the folly and ignorance of Mr. Kruger and of those who advise him.

‘The present War Office system is the only drag upon our military coach, but our Staff keeps on improving every year, thanks to the excellent education and training now given at the Staff College, and good men can work any system, no matter how wrong in principle and how complicated in its details.’

Sir Redvers Buller and his Staff sailed on 13 October 1899, and arrived at Cape Town on 31 October. They were met on landing by the news of Sir George White’s reverse at Lombard’s Kop. The situation at this moment was most serious. Sir George White, with practically the only available field army in South Africa, was to all intent and purposes placed out of action, whilst the Army Corps and Cavalry Division with which Sir Redvers Buller was supposed to undertake the reconquest of South Africa, was partly in England, and partly scattered on the high seas north of the Equator.

The small bodies of troops available for the defence of Cape Colony were distributed between De Aar and Naaupoort, whilst the frontier, save at Orange River Station, where a small force and some supplies had been collected, was practically only guarded by a few policemen!

Lord Wolseley has ever been famed for his determination never to look at any military situation, however desperate, from a gloomy point of view. His intolerance of all officers who did so is well known. Hence his attitude, which, when one considers how thoroughly the extreme gravity of the situation was known to him, cannot fail to inspire one with admiration for his steadfast courage.

It is now no secret that in the ‘dark days’ of December 1899—when all the politicians were gravely alarmed and depressed at our reverses in South Africa, combined with the serious, most serious, aspect of affairs on the Continent, about which the general public to this day know but little—the one man who never flinched, and who throughout that terrible period maintained his wonted equanimity, and by his example, constant cheerfulness, and ready resource, inspired all who sought his advice and opinion (and they were many) with confidence, was the Commander-in-Chief

whose services were subsequently but little appreciated or recognised. This is the evidence of those whose daily duty it was to transact military business with their indomitable chief; and the Duke, to whom Lord Wolseley's supreme example of moral courage was perfectly well known, has in conversation alluded to it to the present writer with the highest approbation.

With regard to the progress of the war, the only two of Lord Roberts's letters amongst the Duke's papers are the following:—

FROM LORD ROBERTS.

'ARMY HEADQUARTERS,
BLOEMFONTEIN, 11 *April* 1900.

'I was much gratified to receive Y.R.H.'s letter of 9 March, and I beg, Sir, you will accept my best thanks for the congratulations so kindly expressed at the results attained by Her Majesty's forces in South Africa.

'I have been greatly disappointed at the long delay which has occurred since we arrived here; but it has been unavoidable. The hard work of the previous month which the Artillery and Cavalry horses had to do, in a country practically devoid of forage, knocked them up so much that I have been compelled to halt here until remounts could be got up from the base. Then troops required refitting, for many were in rags.

'The enemy have taken advantage of this, and have given us considerable trouble, as Y.R.H. may have observed from recent telegrams. Their object is to avoid anything like a general engagement, and, by breaking up into small parties, to worry our line of communications.'

FROM LORD ROBERTS.

'PRETORIA, 21 *July* 1900.

'... The war still drags on, but the numbers against us are fewer than they were, and I hope that ere very long we shall be able to bring the Boers to terms.'

From time to time the present writer had interviews with the Duke on the subject of this book. Upon these occasions H.R.H. discussed all the current topics of the day, especially those connected with the Army and its manage-

ment, about all of which he evinced an extraordinary knowledge. It would be undesirable to repeat all his criticisms here; suffice it to say that they were thoroughly practical, and that the misgivings he thus expressed upon the way things were being conducted in the Army have been amply borne out by subsequent events.

He was especially strong on discipline and the danger of 'tampering with discipline,' as he expressed it. He maintained, and few will care to contradict him, that its administration was essentially the duty of the military Commander-in-Chief, and that, no matter how able a Secretary of State might be, it was as a rule most inadvisable for him to interfere in such matters. He attributed, and with justice, several of the 'scandals,' which during the last few years have brought unnecessary discredit on the service, to the fact that they were not dealt with according to the well-known and accepted methods of procedure. He was especially strong on the grave injustice likely to result from complaints or reports being made irregularly. 'These scandals are very unnecessary, very bad for the Army, and they make a bad feeling throughout the service in consequence,' was his summing up.

During the years of his retirement the Duke was most energetic in attending all public functions and lending his support to every movement designed to promote the welfare of the Army or of the public. He kept up a correspondence with many of his old colleagues, and the nature of the sentiments he inspired may be gathered from the following letters:—

FROM SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.

'6 GROSVENOR PLACE, 27 June 1900.

'It is exceedingly kind on the part of Y.R.H. to send me a signed portrait in answer to what I said to Colonel Fitz-George. I shall always prize most highly this memorial of the days when it was my good fortune to be associated in public duty with Y.R.H. in Pall Mall, days to which I look back as the most pleasant of all my public life. And as you have been pleased not only to do me this honour, but to use such friendly expressions towards me, I take this renewed

opportunity of saying how highly I appreciated the great kindness which Y.R.H. has always shown to me, and how sincerely I share the respectful attachment which you inspire in all who have had the honour to be familiarly associated with you.'

FROM MR. BALFOUR.

'10 DOWNING STREET,
WHITEHALL, S.W., 14 Dec. 1902.

'I hope Your Royal Highness will not think I am going beyond my duty in writing to express, not merely on my own behalf, but on behalf of a much larger public, the warm feeling of gratitude aroused by Your Royal Highness's long and arduous labours on the old Patriotic Fund Commission, and the high sense entertained by all acquainted with the facts, of the tact and judgment shown during the difficult period of transition from the ancient to the new order of things.

'These are not among the smallest of the many services which Your Royal Highness has rendered to Your Country.'

Upon peace being concluded in June 1902, the Duke wrote to congratulate Mr. Chamberlain, and received the following acknowledgment from him:—

FROM MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

'COLONIAL OFFICE, 2 June 1902.

'I am very grateful to Y.R.H. for your very kind letter of congratulation, which has given me most sincere pleasure.

'I fully believe that the terms of settlement and surrender now arrived at will be found quite satisfactory, and will justify the action of the Government on insisting, even at the risk of a renewal of hostilities, on a modification of the proposals first made.

'It has been a very anxious time for all of us, but I am convinced that we have escaped a great danger, and that the sacrifices we have made have preserved the Empire from disruption.'

FROM LORD WOLSELEY.

'FARM HOUSE,
GLYNDE, LEWES, *New Year's Day* 1904.

'SIR,—May one who has had the privilege of serving under you as a Staff Officer for many years presume to wish you all the compliments of the season? May you enjoy long life, and may each New Year's Day find you in good health and spirits, and able to take the keen and useful interest you have always taken in the Royal Army of England!

'I wish I could think that your successors, including my-

self, had been able to see through as many great and useful Reforms as were carried out by Your Royal Highness.

‘I am afraid the Army is not what it should be, and now I am told it is to be governed by a Board like the Navy. Perhaps that is preparatory to converting us into Indian Horse Marines!’


‘Again wishing my old master, Your Royal Highness, long life and happiness and a prosperous New Year,—I am, Sir, with all respect and loyalty, Your Royal Highness’s obedient and faithful servant,
WOLSELEY.’

The Duke entered on his eighty-fourth year on 26 March 1903. During the summer of that year it was evident that he was gradually failing. Still he continued to be marvelously energetic and to live much the same life as usual, attending public functions and dining out frequently. On one of the last occasions the present writer saw him he used the following words: ‘I am getting a very old man, but I keep on going, for I notice that when men give up their ordinary pursuits and do nothing they generally die very soon; so I keep on doing as much as I can.’

In the early spring of 1904 H.R.H. was taken seriously ill; and the end came on 17 March at his London residence, Gloucester House, within nine days of the eighty-fifth anniversary of his birth.

Although but little over eight years had elapsed since his retirement, he had lived not only to see two successors occupy the post of Commander-in-Chief, but to witness its abolition a few weeks before his last illness.

At the time of his death he had not been long enough out of harness for the public esteem and affection with which he was regarded to in any way diminish. There have been few public funerals within the memory of the present generation where this was so emphatically noticeable; and those who witnessed the passing of the funeral procession through the streets of London will never forget the genuine sorrow, sympathy, and affection which the immense crowds along the route evinced. For in him all men recognised that they had lost one who for many years, and despite unparalleled difficulties, ever had the best interests of the nation, and of the Army he loved so well, thoroughly at heart.



Lauffier Photo

Emory Walker Ph. S.

George

APPENDIX I

THE CRIMEA, AND MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

AFTER the death of the Duke of Cambridge I was requested to publish the *Life* with as little delay as possible; accordingly it became necessary to send the earlier chapters of the first volume to press before the examination of his papers was completed. It was evident this would mean the omission of letters from their proper place in the story. In fact, I have since from time to time come across letters which H.R.H. had, for various reasons, elected to keep separate from his general correspondence. Since some of these are of considerable interest I have collected them together.

The first of the series is the letter which Queen Victoria wrote to the Emperor Napoleon when the Duke proceeded to Paris on his way to the Crimea.

FROM THE QUEEN.

'10 April 1854.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—I send you the Copy you wished for. God bless you.—Ever your affectionate Cousin, V. REG.'

FROM THE QUEEN.

'PALAIS DE BUCKINGHAM, 9 Avril 1854.

'SIRE ET MON FRÈRE,—J'adresse ces lignes à V.M.I. pour recommander à vos bontés mon Cousin, le Duc de Cambridge, qui s'estime heureux de répondre à Votre aimable désir de le voir à Paris à son passage en Orient. Il sera l'interprète de mes sentiments amicales pour V.M. et son présence à Paris servira à manifester le bon accord qui existe entre nos deux Gouvernements et qui animera de même je l'espère nos deux armées appelées à combattre ensemble pour la défense de l'Empire Ottoman.

'Je fais des vœux constants pour que le Tout-Puissant bénisse nos efforts pour reconquérir une paix durable.

'Agréez, Sire, les hommages du Prince, mon époux, et daignez être l'interprète de nos sentiments affectueux auprès de l'Impératrice.—Je me dis, Sire et mon Frère, de V.M.I., la bonne sœur,
VICTORIA REG.'

Upon the Duke's arrival at Constantinople in May, Omar Pasha, who was in command of the Turkish army in Bulgaria, wrote to welcome him.

FROM OMAR PASHA.

'ALTESSE,—Daignez Altesse accepter les saluts et les félicitations de Votre bien-venue à Constantinople. Nous sommes tous impatients de La voir au milieu de nous. Le porteur de cette lettre Bayram Pacha (Général Cannon) sujet anglais, aujourd'hui au service ottoman dira à Votre Altesse avec quel empressement l'armée qui est sous mes ordres attend les armées alliées non seulement pour repousser l'ennemi de la Turquie, mais celui de la civilisation et de la justice, et combien je serai heureux de déposer à Votre Altesse ces hommages respectueux que je La prie d'accepter aujourd'hui et de me compter parmi ses très obéissants serviteurs.

'Le Généralissime de l'armée ottomane, OMER.'

'CHOUMLA, le 3 May 1854.'

Then follows a letter from the Duke to his brother-in-law, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, written from Bulgaria at the time of the cholera outbreak in the British Army in August 1854. It affords an excellent example of the way in which England usually goes to war, with no prearranged plans of campaign or adequate preparations, and how an irresponsible and not seldom an ignorant press advises our embarking on military operations of the most serious nature, alike unaware and reckless of their possible duration or of our degree of preparedness for such undertakings.

This programme, which the Duke comments upon, of making a 'grand coup' somehow and somewhere in the Crimea and 'finishing the whole affair by the end of September' is a curious forerunner of the ideas held by those who, in October 1899, assumed that the Boer War would be 'over by Christmas.'

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURG-STRELITZ.

'CAMP, GENNER KLIN, NEAR VARNA,
3 August 1854.

'MY DEAR ADOLPHUS,—Whilst our friends in England seem to imagine that we have crossed the Danube and had a brush

with the Russians, here we are still near Varna, and I am sorry to say losing a good many men by cholera and fever. Amongst the victims of the former disease is poor Lauderdale Maule, who was dead within thirty-six hours of his being first attacked. He is a sad loss, and deservedly regretted as a good officer and kind friend by the entire Army. We have a good many other officers very ill, but the men have been those that have died most, and the Grenadier Guards have lost a good many, though nothing in comparison to the Light Division, when it at first began. We have all changed our Camps, and I hope may now do better. It has, however, been a sad time, I assure you. . . . The inactivity is dreadful and the want of excitement lamentable. Six weeks have we been here now under canvas, and have only moved twelve miles from Varna. The raising of the siege of Silistria was no doubt a great event, but for us it came just too soon. Would to Heaven we had at once marched up. We should then have fallen in with the Russians in their retreat, defeated them no doubt, driven them out of the Principalities, forced the Austrians to activity, and satisfied England and Europe, to say nothing of the spirit of the Armies, which long for employment. As it is, we have done nothing as yet but lose men from disease and climate, and now the Press of England, not knowing what they ask for, insist upon a grand *coup* being performed in the Crimea and before Sebastopol. Now against a good *coup* I have no objection whatever, and I think it most desirable that something should be done; but the idea to begin preparations for so vast an operation now in August, to embark in the middle of that month, land in an enemy's country, fight a great battle, undertake a most important and serious siege, and finish the whole affair by the end of September when winter sets in and the Fleet cannot be certain of remaining on the coast, appears to me such a marvellous undertaking that I can hardly believe in the possibility of it. And yet report says that such an attempt is to be made. In such case all I can say is, may it succeed; any mishap would be very disastrous, and I confess I think the risk run enormous, for recollect we have out here *now the entire British Army*. There is no reserve to fall back upon of any sort or kind, and the very drafts sent out lately are most miserable men, sickly lads of *five weeks* service, not one-quarter drilled, and now filling the hospitals.'

Upon the news of the battle of the Alma reaching England, Queen Victoria wrote the following letter to the Duke. The Lord Burghersh, to whom reference is made by Her Majesty, was the officer sent home with the dispatches announcing our victory, by Lord Raglan.

FROM THE QUEEN.

‘BALMORAL, 11 October 1854.

‘MY DEAREST GEORGE,—Accept my warmest congratulations on this great event and on your safety. You have shown *yourself worthy* of your command and of your race, which I was sure you would. Would to God it could have been a less bloody victory, and that so many brave hearts had not fallen! Many, many thanks for your kind letter, which was a great pleasure. We are very thankful that our friends are safe; we felt very anxious for poor Edward too.

‘How proud you must feel to have been able to *finish* the day and at the head of such a Division. But the poor Scotch Fusiliers have suffered severely. Alas! *how* many poor families are now in grief and misery! It makes my heart bleed. We have been listening for an hour to Lord Burghersh, who came here early this morning, and who has given us the most interesting details. This must account for my short and hurried letter, as I fear to miss the messenger.

‘Our boys are most anxious about their old Sergeant, who I *fear may* be amongst the killed in the Scotch Fusiliers. God grant we may very soon hear of the fall of Sevastopol.

‘The march to Balaclava is most important. God bless and protect you, my dear George; this is the daily prayer of one who has a truly sisterly affection for you! All the children send you their love.—Ever your most affectionate Cousin and Friend,
V. REG.’

‘Many thanks for your last letter from Varna and the one after the landing.’

The following letter discloses the Commander-in-Chief's (Lord Hardinge) views on the battle of the Alma:—

FROM LORD HARDINGE.

‘HORSE GUARDS, 9 October 1854.

‘I cannot resist to express to Y.R.H. my personal gratification, that You should have had an opportunity of taking so distinguished a share in the brilliant Battle of the Alma. The judicious manner in which Y.R.H. moved Your Division into action, and when there, directed its movements with energy and decision, are spoken of in the letters I have seen, with universal admiration.

‘I congratulate Y.R.H. on this great result: with my confirmed opinions, exclusive of personal considerations, I am gratified that a Prince of the Blood Royal should on such an occasion command the Guards and the Line combined, in rendering Her Majesty their best exertions and in cement-

ing that cordial good feeling which has always subsisted between them.

'It is a great operation in which the Army is engaged, and under the auspices of Lord Raglan will be brought to a glorious and successful termination.'

A letter of historic interest is that of Sir Richard Airey, who was Quartermaster-General to the British Commander-in-Chief, written at 9.45 P.M. on the night of the great battle of Inkermann only a few hours after 'the decline of the autumn day,' followed by the gloom of the November evening, witnessed the withdrawal of the shattered Russian hosts to the security of their fortress. Owing to the death of Sir George Cathcart and other casualties the Duke had become the next senior officer to Lord Raglan.

Hence the following letter, which should be read in connection with the events described on pp. 76-77 of Volume I:—

FROM SIR RICHARD AIREY.

'HEADQUARTERS, 5 November 1854: 9.45.

'I have the honour to acquaint Y.R.H. that Lord Raglan can give no particular orders or instructions for to-night; everything must depend upon circumstances.

'The 4th Division is the one that is in the greatest strength for effective men; but in the event of sudden pressure, it will be better to apply to the General Officer commanding French Brigade at the telegraph, for support.

'Y.R.H. will of course support the 2nd Brigade if necessary, but being now the senior officer in Camp, you will be good enough in case of emergency to give such general directions as you may see fit.

'I am desired to request that you will have the goodness to report to me immediately, for Lord Raglan's information, anything extraordinary.

'An officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department will take this letter and communicate at the same time with the officer commanding the French Brigade, at the telegraph. I cannot conclude without congratulating Y.R.H. upon the gallant and remarkable conduct of the troops under your command and upon your own personal safety, which, if it be not too great a liberty, is a very sincere pleasure.'

During the battle of Inkermann the Duke had his horse

shot under him. Sir W. H. Russell, the *Times* correspondent, gives the following account of this incident:—

‘At one time, while the Duke was rallying his men, a body of Russians began to single him out, and to take shots at him in the most deliberate manner. A surgeon of a Cavalry Regiment, Mr. Wilson, 7th Hussars, who was attached to the Brigade, perceived the danger of H.R.H., and, with the greatest gallantry and coolness, assembled a few men of the Guards, and utterly routed and dispersed the Russians. The Duke’s horse was killed in the course of the fight. At the close of the day he called Mr. Wilson in front of the Regiment, and publicly thanked him for having in all probability saved his life.’¹

When, towards the last days of June 1857, the news of the serious outbreak in India reached this country, Sir Colin Campbell, who had in May, for good and weighty reasons, declined the honour of the Chief Command of the China Expeditionary Force, at that time under preparation, most nobly responded to the renewed call made upon him, and proceeded forthwith to take up the Chief Command in India.

His reasons for refusing the China command on 9 May are given on p. 151, Vol. I., and this letter should be read in conjunction with the events described on p. 153.

FROM THE QUEEN.

‘BUCKINGHAM PALACE, 12 July 1857.

‘MY DEAR GEORGE,—Many thanks for your letters. There is more telegraphic news this morning from Trieste, saying that the Mutiny is fast spreading. I am very anxious to see dear old Sir Colin one moment before he goes to wish him goodbye and thank him for his loyalty and patriotic readiness to serve me in so prompt and handsome a manner, and wish therefore to know if you could bring him here for a moment this afternoon. Only let me know *what* hour he could come; or if the afternoon is inconvenient, bring him at *one* after church, only let me hear *when* it will be.—Ever your affectionate Cousin,
V. REG.’

During the most critical period of the relations between the offices of the Secretary of State and of the Commander-in-Chief as described in Chapter xix., Vol. I., when the

¹ *The War from the Landing at Gallipoli to the Death of Lord Raglan.*

question of the alteration of the period of the tenure of the latter's appointment was the subject of much discussion, both in and out of Parliament, Field-Marshal Sir John Fox Burgoyne wrote the following letter to the Duke.

Readers may be reminded that this was the same officer to whom, in 1847, the Duke of Wellington wrote his famous letter on the unpreparedness of England for defence. At the time of writing this letter Sir John Burgoyne was in his ninetieth year.

FROM F.-M. SIR J. F. BURGOYNE.

'5 PEMBRIDGE SQUARE,
BAYSWATER, 27 February 1871.

'I trust that Y.R.H. will excuse me for venturing to express the high sense which I entertain of the advantage which the military service derives from the retention of Y.R.H. in your present post, at a period of much popular agitation against existing Army arrangements and of proposed organic changes in the composition of our military forces.

'It is impossible to deny the fact that a strong, though ill-founded, impression existed throughout the officers of the Army, that their interests were in great danger of being sacrificed to the political exigencies of the moment; and I see reason to believe that the decision of Y.R.H. to remain at the head of the Army at the present time has had a most excellent effect upon the officers at large.

'The comments upon our military system and organisation put forward for consideration are innumerable, many of them fallacious, and the more dangerous as some are founded on plausible arguments, advocated by conscientious and honourable men. Great professional judgment and energy will be required then to prevent the injurious consequences that may result from the adoption, more or less, of many of these, as I believe, erroneous views.

'I will not deny but that occasionally I have held different opinions from Y.R.H. on some matters of detail, but always with doubts on my mind whether, on that account, I might not be in the wrong; but in the main elements of the constitution of the Army I am, in common with the Army in general, so perfectly satisfied of the sound judgment and high principles entertained by Y.R.H. that I anxiously hope that we may not be deprived of the influence of your watchful advocacy.

'I have a great objection to the term *Army Reform* as applied to this movement. The word *Army* implies the personnel of our forces, and consequently it is that which

needs reform. I will venture, however, to maintain that the combatant portion of our *Army*, from the general to the drummer-boy, is of first-rate quality, and needing no other reforms than, like every other institution of the world, to take advantage in improvements of the progress of the age.

'There is no doubt but that many of the accessory establishments connected with the action and operations of the Army as a field force are defective and need great improvements, but the two are confounded, and pre-eminence is given to the wrong one.

'Now, the *Army*, as I define it, is the particular part of which Y.R.H. has especially the charge; and it is excellent in organisation, discipline, exercises, and capabilities; acknowledged to be so by very distinguished officers of other countries, with, in their interests, the consolatory addition that *heureusement*, or as we should say *malheureusement*, *il n'y en a pas beaucoup*.

'Y.R.H.'s attention would assuredly always be given to the improvements required for these extra establishments, so immediately connected as they are with the military service; but it is what concerns the efficiency of the body of the Army that is most threatened, and where Y.R.H.'s influence is most needed.'

Readers will recall how, within a few months of assuming office as Commanding-in-Chief in 1856, the Duke communicated with the Rev. G. R. Gleig, the Chaplain-General to the Forces, on the subject of advancing military education to the Army. Mr. Gleig joined the 85th Light Infantry in September of 1813, and took part in the battle of the Nive and subsequent engagements in the campaign of 1813-14 in the south of France. After the conclusion of peace he retired from the Army and took Holy Orders. He was appointed Chaplain-General to the Forces by the Duke of Wellington in 1844, and in 1875 resigned that post owing to advancing years and infirmities.

FROM THE REV. G. R. GLEIG.

'DEANE HOUSE, MICHELDEVER,
HANTS, 9 April 1875.

'I cannot resign my present office without trying to express to Y.R.H. the deep sense which I entertain of your uniform kindness and generous consideration to me ever since you assumed the command of the Army.

‘If at any time I may have caused you uneasiness, or seemed to act contrary to your wishes, I pray you to forgive the wrong. If in anything that I may have done I have won your approval, I shall think of it with pride and satisfaction to my dying day.

‘I cannot write a long letter on such a subject. It is painful enough to think of my coming severance from Y.R.H. and your generous Staff. It would be intolerable to dwell upon the feeling. May God bless Y.R.H. and the noble Army over which you so worthily preside. It was the dream of my boyhood to have risen to distinction in it. It will be the consolation of my growing weakness and increasing years, if you tell me that, tho’ failing in that point, my long connection with it has not been altogether without benefit to the service.

‘Pray forgive my using the hand of another. I am still forbidden to put pen to paper.’

The Duke’s disapproval of the huge Volunteer field-days held at Brighton and elsewhere in the early days of the movement has been recorded in Chapter xiii., Vol. I. This was in 1861. It would appear by the following that ten years later matters were in a very unsatisfactory condition; and that then as now the difficulties of both officering and training the Volunteers adequately was a grave drawback to their practical utility.

FROM SIR J. HOPE GRANT.

‘BRIGHTON, 11 April 1876.

‘The Brighton Review is now over, and I regret to state to Y.R.H. that it was, in my opinion and that of Sir Charles Staveley, anything but satisfactory. It seems to me, moreover, impossible ever under the present system to have it carried out with any advantage to the force. A large body of some 25,000 men are thrown into the field, obedient and willing no doubt, but with a small amount of drill and discipline, and with officers the greater part of them thoroughly ignorant of their duty. The field-day yesterday might have appeared very interesting and good to ladies and civilians, but to officers who have any knowledge of their work, and more especially to Sir Charles Staveley and myself, it was utterly humiliating to see the little attention that was paid by the generality of Brigadiers and Commanding Officers of Battalions—not that they did so from a spirit of opposition, but from an utter want of knowledge of their duty. The men were orderly, well-behaved, and did what

they were told to do, but their officers apparently told them little, and always placed their Brigades and Battalions in the worst possible places. In taking up positions they were placed on the face of a hill or on the sky-line, when by going 20 or 30 yards back they would have been under cover. One Brigade came in this way within a couple of hundred yards, became heaped up in a mass, with guns of the defending force raking them on both flanks and a heavy rifle fire in front, and this they kept up with undaunted bravery till I sent orders for them to move back. These reviews are, in my opinion, a sad mistake. There is no time or opportunity to correct the mistakes, as I am told I must not keep them too long as they had to start off by train at a certain hour. Fortunately I had three troops of the Inniskillings to keep the ground in marching past and to open a way for the troops to take up their positions, or I scarcely think we should even now have accomplished the field-day. I shall forward my report to the Horse Guards as soon as I get returns of the force, and I trust Y.R.H. will allow me to state my opinions of these reviews, as mildly of course as I can; but unless the force has an opportunity of more extended drill in smaller bodies, under command of an officer, or rather officers, who are enabled to show and correct their mistakes, the Volunteers will be a far greater *danger* to the State than of service.

‘I have the honour to enclose a programme of the movements, which will show Y.R.H. that they were simple in the extreme. I went over the ground first with Sir Charles, and then on the Saturday with Generals of Division and as many Brigadiers as could be mustered. Everything was fully explained to them, and they were particularly told not to allow their Brigades and Battalions to delay in their movements, but yet with all I was kept waiting in the middle of the field-day in consequence of a Brigade of Sir Charles’s not having come up. It was Lord Bury’s, who was dressing his Brigade!’

APPENDIX II

SIR DONALD STEWART'S AND SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS'S
MARCHES IN AFGHANISTAN

READERS possibly may have wondered why, in dealing with the campaign in Afghanistan, the procedure adopted in the case of the Abyssinian and other expeditions of giving letters from the General in the field was not followed. The reason, however, is simple. During the whole of the war the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Frederick Paul Haines, who was in supreme command, directed the operations from a central point, usually Peshawar, whence he visited at various periods the lines of communications, the force under Sir Sam Browne at Jellalabad, and the force under Sir Frederick Roberts at Peiwar Kotal in the Kurum Valley. Both these commanders, as well as Sir Donald Stewart operating by the Bolan Pass, reported to the Commander-in-Chief separately and independently. During the second phase of the war Sir Frederick Haines was at Simla; and, upon Sir Donald Stewart marching from Candahar to Cabul, Sir Frederick Roberts came under his command. Throughout the campaign Sir Frederick Haines received and forwarded to the Duke the telegrams and official letters and reports sent him by various subordinates, and as Commander-in-Chief he kept up a weekly correspondence with H.R.H.

It was thus impossible to compile a connected story from the correspondence between the Duke and the Generals in contact with the enemy as was done in the case of Lord Napier in Abyssinia, and Lord Wolseley in Ashantee, Zululand, in South Africa, in Egypt and the Soudan. The correspondence between the Duke and Sir Frederick Haines dealt with innumerable matters of vast importance, but not with war operations at first hand.

It was after the text of this book was completed that the letter from Sir Frederick Roberts given below was found amongst Sir Donald Stewart's letters, where it had been placed by the Duke himself, obviously because it dealt with occurrences during the period that Sir Frederick Roberts was acting under Sir Donald Stewart's orders. The two events in the protracted Afghan campaign that most surely will go down to history are Sir Donald Stewart's march from Candahar to Cabul, and Sir Frederick Roberts's return march along the same route a few months later. Accordingly brief extracts are given from Sir Frederick Haines's letters to the Duke, in which these operations are alluded to, which, moreover, lead up to the letters that have recently come to hand.

Readers of H.R.H.'s diary of the Afghan War will recall the situation when Sir Donald Stewart set forth on his famous march across a country little known and largely unmapped, at the time swarming with gallant and fanatical enemies—a country which had not been traversed by a British force since 1842. Of the progress of this march Sir Frederick Haines writes:—

FROM SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES.

'SIMLA, 27 April 1880.

'... I have had the satisfaction of forwarding to Y.R.H. in the course of this week some most important telegrams detailing Sir Donald Stewart's brilliant successes before Ghuzni and his subsequent occupation of that city. This I consider to have been the most important action which has taken place since we entered Afghanistan.

'His subsequent action at Urzoo, on the Cabul side of Ghuzni, seems also to have been a very successful affair; as was the second battle of Charasiah, fought mainly by Colonel Jenkins, but most promptly supported by Brigadier-General Macpherson from Cabul. . . .'

A week later Sir Donald Stewart had arrived at Cabul.

FROM SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES.

'SIMLA, 4 May 1880.

'I trust Y.R.H. will consider Sir Donald Stewart's march from Candahar to Ghuzni, and then on to Cabul, a well-conceived and admirably executed movement. I should

have preferred a longer halt at, or even a temporary occupation of, Ghuzni, but this was put out of the question by the orders of Government. It has been such a focus of intrigue, and such a centre for hostile gatherings, that a short course of discipline and orderly government would have been beneficial. Sir Donald Stewart has brought his force across in splendid condition. The troops extremely healthy and in the highest efficiency. His cattle seem to be in the same state—quite a new feature in our Afghan campaigns. I had a telegram to-day sending excellent accounts of the wounded, the progress of the two officers, Young and Corbett, who were most severely wounded, being specially satisfactory. I should greatly regret anything which would tend to remove Sir Donald Stewart from that command. The full account of his action before Ghuzni will be most interesting. The Afghans must have fought desperately, as shown by the range at which our guns poured case into them, viz. 25 yards.'

The Duke did not altogether approve of the Commander-in-Chief in India exercising his command of the various columns operating in Afghanistan from Simla, as the following letter shows:—

FROM SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES.

'SIMLA, 11 May 1880.

'... We are in as good communication with Cabul, Candahar, and Kurum from Simla as would have been the case from Peshawar.

'General Stewart was for a time completely isolated from us, but that would have been the same in either case. He now exercises full control over all the troops in Northern Afghanistan, and should communications with Kurum be opened up, the troops in that valley will also act under his orders. ...'

Details of the severe nature of the fighting of the famous Ghazis at Ahmed Khel are given in the next letter.

FROM SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES.

'SIMLA, 13 May 1880.

'... I hope to be able to send by the next mail an interesting report with plans showing the present state of the place (Ghuzni). I also hope to forward by next mail a copy of Sir Donald Stewart's dispatch. There were critical moments in that fight, for at points part of his line was forced back by the determined attacks of the Ghazi swordsmen in overwhelming numbers. These tactics were some-

thing like those of the Zulus. The Ghoorkas received the attack in small rallying squares with great success. . . .’

The letters dealing with the disastrous affair at Maiwand, the failure of the leaders, the shortcomings of certain Native Regiments on that unfortunate occasion, and the weak defence of Candahar, are best omitted. Owing to the Zulu War monopolising the attention of the public, and the somewhat disjointed nature of the operations in Afghanistan, the course of events in the latter country passed almost unnoticed, and raised little enthusiasm. Hence it was that Sir Donald Stewart’s splendid march escaped the attention it merited in this country. It was the pitiful defeat of Maiwand and the consequent shutting up of a British Garrison in Candahar that revived an interest in the war and gave almost a dramatic interest to Sir Frederick Roberts’s return march to the relief of Candahar. At this time Sir Donald Stewart was at Cabul charged with the evacuation of Afghanistan. How, on receipt of the bad news from Candahar he dispatched his trusty lieutenant, Sir Frederick Roberts, at the head of all the picked troops at his command to the relief of Candahar, is now a matter of history. This superb force, which was of almost double the fighting strength of Sir Donald Stewart’s, and was, moreover, unencumbered by a single wheeled gun, made a most remarkably rapid march. It must, however, not be forgotten that it was due to Sir Donald Stewart’s having decisively defeated the enemy and absolutely pacified the tribes along the whole route to Candahar, less than four months before, that Sir Frederick Roberts was enabled to save much time, since it was possible for him to dispense in many cases with certain military precautions and their inevitable delays.

FROM SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES.

‘SIMLA, 3 August 1880.

‘. . . Sir Donald Stewart is to dispatch a powerful force from Cabul to Candahar *via* Ghuzni. I have warned him regarding the efficiency of Ayoub’s troops, and especially with regard to his strength in Cavalry and Artillery. Sir Donald will be prepared to dispatch his force on the 7th inst., and it is hoped that the column will reach Candahar in from thirty to thirty-two days, relieving Khelat-i-Ghilzi *en route*. . . .’

In the following week he describes this force as 'a magnificent one,' whilst on 17 August he reports its progress and 'the country quiet.'

FROM SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES.

'SIMLA, 10 August 1880.

'... The force told off under General Roberts for the relief of Candahar is a magnificent one. Y.R.H. will have received telegraphic information of the detail of the force, and will be able to form an opinion of its efficiency. I believe he is not hampered with a wheeled vehicle of any sort; certainly he has no wheeled Artillery. I should have been glad to have seen his guns increased to twenty-four; but Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts in consultation together agreed that the number already settled was sufficient. All the troops, both British and Native, are of first-rate quality—their Commanders and Staff are all excellent. . . .

FROM SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES.

'SIMLA, 17 August 1880.

'... Sir Frederick Roberts's force seems to have started on its march for Candahar under most happy auspices, judged by the health, high spirits, and efficiency of his troops. . . . It is a fortunate circumstance in connection with this move, that as yet we are in fair communication with Khelat-i-Ghilzi from Quetta through Maruf. We hear from Colonel Tanner commanding that post occasionally. His last letter was dated 12 August; up to that date he had not been interfered with. He had heard through Sir Robert Sandeman of Roberts's march; reports the country quiet; all quiet in Fort, and supplies abundant. He further says he will be able to help Roberts with supplies on his arrival. . . .'

On 24 August he reports Sir Donald Stewart's withdrawal, also the progress of Sir Frederick Roberts.

FROM SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES.

'SIMLA, 24 August.

'Sir Donald Stewart's movement is being carried out in a most successful manner. Hardly a shot has been fired since he left Cabul, and the troops continue in very fairly good health. . . .

'Sir Frederick Roberts is more forward than I expected to find him. He was four marches from Khelat-i-Ghilzi on

the 20th, and may be at that place to-day, expecting to reach Candahar about the 29th. . . .

On 31 August he writes to report the successful termination of Sir Frederick Roberts's march.

FROM SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES.

'SIMLA, 31 August 1880.

'The collection of telegrams sent by this mail would have been more than usually interesting had their receipt not been anticipated by the wire itself. The admirable energy and skill which have brought Sir Frederick Roberts's force from Ghuzni to Candahar in sixteen days will be acknowledged by Y.R.H. as constituting a military feat of first-rate importance. The endurance of the men as evidenced by the small numbers of casualties shows the high qualities of the troops, and the success of the movement generally those of their leaders. The "bold military adventure" of which I spoke has certainly been brought to a most successful conclusion.

'I much doubt whether the relief of Candahar could have been so easily effected from the Quetta line. . . .

Upon the news of Roberts's unopposed march to Candahar with his successful affair with Ayoub Khan at the close of it, the Duke, who was at Kissingen, wrote on 2 September to his Assistant Military Secretary, Sir Martin Dillon, and requested the latter to telegraph his congratulations to Sir Frederick Roberts. Sir Martin having an intimate knowledge of India, and of the shortest and most direct means of conveying H.R.H.'s congratulations, telegraphed on 4 September to Sir Frederick Roberts at Candahar. This very natural proceeding caused no little friction in Indian circles, where it was held that the telegram should have been sent through the Indian Government. The Commander-in-Chief in India, however, as the following letter shows, did not share this somewhat parochial view of the matter.

FROM SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES.

'SIMLA, 12 October 1880.

'... I greatly fear that the incident of Y.R.H.'s most gracious message to Sir F. Roberts has given a great deal of trouble. General Dillon's letters lead me to suppose this to

have been the case, and I am exceedingly sorry for it, for as long as Your gracious words reached General Roberts and his troops, it mattered little whether they passed through General Warre¹ or through me. . . .

‘SIMLA, 19 October 1880.

‘. . . I cannot say how infinitely I regret that anything was ever said about the telegram; it was not mentioned at my instance. . . .’

The Duke, in addition to telegraphing his congratulations to Sir F. Roberts, on 7 September also wrote to him. Sir Frederick Roberts's reply to this is dated 9 October, and is the first letter from that officer to H.R.H. among the Duke's correspondence. It was placed by the Duke inside Sir Donald Stewart's letter of 26 October, as already described.

FROM SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS.

‘QUETTA, 9 October 1880.

‘. . . Y.R.H.'s cordial expressions of satisfaction on the success of our march from Kabul and of our fight with Ayoub Khan were highly appreciated, not only by myself, but by the whole force. Soldiers value the approval of their Chief, and nothing pleased the Cabul-Candahar troops more than to learn that Her Majesty the Queen, and you, Sir, were satisfied with the manner in which they did their work.

‘I personally am much gratified that Y.R.H. should consider the conduct of the march from Cabul, and of the subsequent operations around Candahar, worthy of commendation. With such superb troops, and such able, experienced commanders, it would have been my fault had anything gone wrong. . . .’

Under the same cover was the following letter to Sir Donald Stewart, in which H.R.H. acknowledged the receipt of Sir Donald's letter of 26 October:—

TO SIR DONALD STEWART.

‘19 November 1880.

‘. . . Let me now congratulate you on the able manner in which you have conducted the operations you have had the charge of at Candahar, the subsequent march to Cabul, and the chief command from that post, through the difficult Khyber Pass.

¹ Commanding the Madras Presidency at this time.

‘Nothing could have been better than your entire success on all these occasions, and the responsibility you have had on your shoulders has been such as to add greatly to the severity of the duties imposed upon you. The country is much indebted to you for your able management, and Her Majesty highly appreciates your great exertions.

‘The responsibility of sending Sir Frederick Roberts on his most important march to Candahar to relieve the garrison sent there surrounded by the enemy after the defeat of General Burrows at Maiwand was great indeed, and I own I had my doubts and fears as to the prudence of the step—all the more so as the force under your immediate command was simultaneously to be withdrawn from India. However, you took that responsibility, and have been completely justified by the result. . . .’

APPENDIX III

TABULAR STATEMENT OF CERTAIN PROPOSALS MADE BY H.R.H. WITH REFERENCE TO ARMY ORGANISA- TION, ETC.—1852-95

THE following list includes some of the many far-sighted measures proposed from time to time by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, and shows the fate which befell them, and in some instances the results of their non-adoption. It will be seen that many of these were eventually carried out, although in some cases only after a considerable lapse of years. Needless to say, many more most valuable proposals made by H.R.H. are to be found in the text of the foregoing volumes.

It is not contended that in every instance all the measures proposed by H.R.H. were entirely of his own origination. Some may possibly be recognised by students of military history as having been advocated, at least in part, by other Army administrators. But this in no way detracts from the credit of the Duke for having realised the value of such projects and lent all his official weight in advocating their adoption.

1852.

Proposals.

Points out that the British Army, alone amongst those of great nations, has no higher peace organisation than the regimental one.

Recommends creation of Brigades and Divisions.—i. 38-44.

N.B.—First tentative measure of this kind proposed since close of Napoleonic Wars.

Results.

Partially carried out at Aldershot and Curragh, etc., in 1856, but not completely provided for till 1901. New scheme again in 1904 with the same object in view.

1852.

Proposals.

Proposes to tell off certain Militia Battalions for defence of dockyards and arsenals, etc.—i. 43.

Recommends uniform establishment of 1000 abroad and 850 at home for all Regular Infantry units.—i. 44-49.

N.B.—At this time units were of unequal strength, four totally different systems existing in the Infantry alone.

Forecasts best features of Double Battalion system, but with improvements.—i. 46-47.

Results.

Provided for partially in 1888, and in a more complete form in 1901.

Eventually adopted.

Adopted 1871.

1853.

Forecasts Territorial system in a modified form by advocating that the local connection of counties and particular regiments could be obtained 'by permanent recruiting parties at each station.'—i. 52.

Adopted in 1871 (partly), and further developed in 1881.

Raises the question of the age of General Officers, and recommends a system of retirement.—i. 55-56.

N.B.—At that time thirteen Generals on active list had seventy years' *service* and upwards!

Adopted 1871.

Recommends holding of Manœuvres on large scale.—i. 59-60.

Carried out under H.R.H. at Chobham in 1853, one year before Crimean War broke out, and on a larger scale in 1871 and 1872.

1856.

Recommends that Medical Staff Corps be arranged so as to suit establishments such as Hospitals, and Divisions and Brigades of Army.—i. 117.

Germ of plan now adopted.

Maintains the 'great thing we want in this country is a Reserve Force for the Army, whence the latter can be easily and quickly recruited in time of war.'—i. 120.

Carried out partially in 1867, and more thoroughly in 1871.

1856.

Proposals.

Recommends that Militia Regiments be brought more immediately 'in connection with corresponding Regiments of the Line, and regular trainings instituted.'—i. 122.

Recommends creation of a Director-General and a special department to deal with military education.—i. 137-138.

Recommends institution of fortification and surveying course at Chatham.—i. 139.

Results.

Partly carried out in 1871, and completed by Territorial system in 1881.

Carried out. Director-General afterwards abolished (in 1897), and finally restored 1903.

Carried out, but recently abolished, and with doubtful results.

1857.

Sketches out course of study for future Staff Officers at Staff College.—i. 139-140.

Recommends that after Staff College course, graduates should be attached to other arms than their own.—i. 140.

Forecasts later system of garrison classes and promotion examinations.—i. 143-144.

Carried out, and existing to this day with very slight modifications.

Carried out, and now forming an important part of the training.

Instituted in 1871, and recently abolished, thus causing officers to resort to the 'crammers.'

1858.

Protests against abandonment of Corfu.—i. 220-221.

Loss of Corfu severely felt during Eastern Crisis in 1877-79. Cyprus occupied instead.

1859.

Points out difficulties of adopting a thoroughly uniform Territorial system to British requirements, and shows difficulty of approximating large and small recruiting areas.—i. 262.

Since felt in many ways.

Again calls attention to necessity of a real Reserve.—i. 262-264.

Created 1871.

1860.

Proposals.

Points out difficulties of any Linked Battalion system such as was adopted in 1871.—i. 263-268.

Results.

Since felt.

Urges necessity of a striking force in United Kingdom, irrespective of garrisons.—i. 290.

Recognised, and endeavour made to provide for the same in schemes of 1901 and 1904.

1862.

Already realises immense growth of military power of Prussia.—i. 361-362.

Partially realised after Austro-Prussian War, 1866; but not thoroughly realised till Franco-German War of 1870-71.

1864.

Urges necessity of military attachés to Great Powers.—i. 361-362.

Appointed to Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg in April 1864, and since then in other places.

1866.

Again recommends formation of a real Reserve.—i. 297-299.

Two years before Mr. Cardwell came into office.

1868.

Points out to Mr. Cardwell, on latter assuming office, that 'at present we have nothing in the shape of a proper Reserve Force to fill up battalions on an emergency.'—i. 390-392.

Provided for by Mr. Cardwell in 1871.

1869.

Points out danger of denuding Cape of troops.—i. 394-398.

Found to be painfully correct in Zulu and Boer Wars, 1878-79, 1881, and 1899-1902.

Shows advantage of having troops in such a central spot as South Africa.—i. 394-398.

Since realised. Vide *Times* articles in spring of 1903.

1870.

Recommends institution of a system of regimental instruction.—i. 143-144.

Now advocated by Lord Kitchener.

1870.

Proposals.

Lays down principles on which our offensive and defensive calculations should be based.—ii. 35-38, 44.

Fears that Short Service system will not produce a sufficient Reserve.—ii. 37-44.

Again urges the necessity of a striking force.—ii. 37-44.

Results.

Non-adoption of such settled plan still causing much inconvenience in spite of Defence Committee.

Found so during South African War (1899-1902), and since.

Provided for partially in schemes of 1901 and 1904.

1871-72.

Again advocates Manœuvres on a large scale.—ii. 52.

Recommends Yeomanry equipment being simplified; and Yeomanry being made more like Mounted Infantry than sham Cavalry.—ii. 57.

Carried out in 1871 and 1872 under H.R.H.

Carried out 1901-1903.

1875.

Forecasts later mobilisation plans by laying down necessity of possessing two Army Corps for dispatch to India or elsewhere.—ii. 96-100, 345-346.

Not officially recognised till 1888.

Shows weakness of Militia Reserves system, since, if embodied, Militia Battalions would be ineffective.—ii. 99.

Not demonstrated till 1899-1902 during South African War, and then abolished forthwith.

1876.

Once again advocates a striking force.—ii. 109.

Provided for partially in schemes of 1901 and 1904.

Advocates formation of a Defence Committee almost as now constituted.—ii. 111-112.

Carried out in 1903.

1882.

Shows how Territorial system must break down.—ii. 204-207.

Confirmed by Mr. Arnold-Forster in 1904.

1882.

Proposals.

Advocates more attention to Mounted Infantry training, and realises its value.—ii. 302-303, 330.

Results.

Not generally realised till South Africa showed its value, 1899-1902.

1883.

Laments the lack of Ammunition Columns.—ii. 318-319.

One only formed just in time for War of 1899-1902.

Points out, through the Adjutant-General, the danger of constant changes militating against efficiency.—ii. 310-311.

Severely felt, 1901-1905.

1883-84.

Points out that Depôts must break down in time of great stress owing to paucity of officers.—ii. 317-318, 321-322.

This actually occurred during South African War, 1899-1902. Depôts were almost entirely denuded of Regular officers, and depôt companies were in the main commanded by inexperienced Militia officers.

1886.

Again insists on value of Mounted Infantry.—ii. 334-335.

Value realised during South African War, 1899-1902.

Again insists that it is 'indispensable that provision must be made' for the objects for which we maintain our Army.—ii. 343.

Still a burning question.

1887.

Again presses for Manœuvres.—ii. 346.

Not carried out on a large scale till 1898—a year before South African War broke out.

1888-95 (LAST EIGHT YEARS).

In every annual statement which has been quoted during this period in the body of this work, it will be found that H.R.H. repeatedly insisted on the supreme importance of the

Secretary of State and the Government directing attention to some or all of the following points:—

Proposals.

1. Increasing the strength of and re-arming the Artillery.—ii. 322-323, 339-340, 345-346, 376-377, 387-389.

2. Provision of magazine rifles.—ii. 369-370.

3. Rifle ranges (ground suitable for).—ii. 369-370, 386-387.

4. Creation of a reserve supply of Stores, etc.—ii. 369-370, 377.

5. Formation of Regimental Transport, ii. 334.

6. Remount establishments.—ii. 377-389.

Results.

Not done. Guns outmatched in South Africa, and found necessary nearly to double strength of Artillery.

Most severely felt in 1899, and provided for by Sir F. Mowatt's Committee, 1901.

Found entirely insufficient in 1899-1902.

Whatever may be urged against the system of dual control, it may give cause for reflection when it is realised that, in the absence of a Commander-in-Chief, there is no one in a high position thus annually to place on record the wants and defects of the Army, entirely detached from party politics.

INDEX

A

- Abu Klea*, action of, ii. 281.
 Retreat from, 292, 295.
Abu Kru, action of, ii. 283.
Abyssinian War, i. 331-54.
Aden, i. 160, 363, 364, 366, 367.
Adjutant-General—
 Easier post to fill than Q.M.G., i. 367-8.
Afghanistan, ii. 131-44.
 Treaty of Gandamak, 119.
 Donald Stewart's and Roberts' Marches, 436-44.
Afrikaner Bond, H.R.H.'s forecast, 1881, ii. 196-7.
Aide-de-Camp, First Personal, to the Queen, ii. 399.
Airey, General Lord—
 Expiration of Q.M.G.-ship, i. 368.
 'Wisest and ablest soldier,' 434.
 Views on Military Secretaryship, 435-41, 442.
Re General Egerton as Military Secretary, 447-8.
 Mr. Cardwell's *entourage*, 450-1.
 H.R.H.'s tribute, 452-3.
 Retires, ii. 121, 122.
 Raised to Peerage, 123.
 Presides over Royal Commission, 203, 207-8.
 Letter to H.R.H. after Inkermann, 431-2.
Albert, H.R.H. Prince, i. 96.
 Strong advocate for improved organisation, i. 59.
 Correspondence with Duke, 116.
 Ideas on newly raised battalions, 130.
 Views on military education, 134, 135, 136, 142, 143.
 Letter on China Campaign, 259.
Alcester, Admiral Lord. *Vide* Seymour.
Aldershot, i. 87, 96.
 As a winter quarter, 123.
 H.R.H.'s memo. on subject, 124-6.

- Alexandra, H.M. Queen*—
 Telegram to H.R.H. on his retirement, ii. 403.
Alexandria—
 Massacre at, ii. 232.
 Bombardment of, 233.
Alma, battle of, i. 68-73; ii. 429-30.
Ammunition columns, ii. 318, 340.
Amocful, action of, ii. 86.
Armstrong guns, i. 259.
Army Act, 1881, ii. 221.
Army Enlistment Act, ii. 31-2.
Army Corps, ii. 37, 94, 331, 332.
 The Eight Army Corps scheme, ii. 105.
 Two Army Corps for Foreign Service, ii. 345.
Army and Reserve—
 H.R.H.'s memo., 1859, i. 262-4.
 Memo. to General Peel, 1866, 297-9.
 Correspondence on, 300-5.
Army Reserve Act, 1867, ii. 32.
Army Regulation Bill, 1871, ii. 7-26.
Artillery, Royal—
 Horse v. Field, ii. 332, 339, 340.
 Separation of Garrison, 332.
 Proposed reduction, 339-40, 376, 377, 387.
 Obsolete guns, ii. 348, 349.
Ashantee War, ii. 63-88.
Athara, action on the, ii. 417.
Attachés, Military, i. 361, 362.
Austro-Prussian War, i. 320.
Autumn Manœuvres, 1871, ii. 53-9; 1872, 59-62.
 Advocated by H.R.H., i. 44; ii. 345-6.

B

- Balaclava*, battle of, i. 74.
Balfour, Right Hon. A. J.—
 On H.R.H.'s retirement, ii. 398.
 On Patriotic Fund, 425.
Bannerman, Right Hon. Sir H. Campbell :—
 Financial Secretary, ii. 199.
 'Not a fanatic for economy,' 385-6.

Bannerman, Right Hon. Sir H. Campbell :—
 Becomes War Secretary, 325-6.
 Views on Hartington Commission, 360-1.
 Becomes War Secretary a second time, 372-4.
 Announces H.R.H.'s retirement in Commons, 396-8.
 Letter to H.R.H. in retirement, 424-5.
Barrack Loan, ii. 376.
 Stores, 376.
 Old buildings, 388.
Basuto troubles, ii. 183.
Bayuda Desert, ii. 272-95.
Beaconsfield, Earl of. *Vide* Disraeli.
Bechuanaland Expedition, ii. 323, 410.
Berlin, Treaty of, ii. 119.
Biddulph, Sir Thomas, i. 436, 440; ii. 16, 17, 201, 203.
Biddulph, General Sir R., i. 63.
 His *Life* of Cardwell, 388.
Bloomfield, Lord, i. 61, 65, 66.
 'Blue Water' School, ii. 344, 345.
Board of Selection, ii. 360.
Boers, The—
 Threatening aspect, ii. 173-4, 180, 182-98.
 Outbreak of Great Boer War, 418-9.
Brackenbury, General Sir H., ii. 342-3.
 'Bricks without straw,' ii. 390.
Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. J.—
 Tribute to H.R.H.'s foresight, ii. 44.
 Army Corps Scheme, 105-6.
Brown, General Sir George, i. 29, 85, 268, 355.
 On Army schools, 202.
 On depôts, 268.
Brunker's Spruit, ii. 184-5, 186.
Bugle-calls, or 'sounds' not in drill-book, 1851, i. 29.
 'Bulgarian Atrocities,' ii. 101.
Bull, John, keep him in a good humour, i. 119; ii. 106.
Buller, General Rt. Hon. Sir R. H., ii. 146, 152, 270, 293, 296, 328, 420, 422.
Burgoyne, F.-M. Sir J.—
 Offers to go to China, i. 151.
 Views on value of Gibraltar, 379-82.
 On War Office, ii. 433-4.
Burnaby, Colonel F., ii. 124, 125.

C

Cadogan, Earl, ii. 89.
 Letter to H.R.H. on leaving War Office, 125, 126.

Cambridge, H.R.H. Adolphus Duke, of—
 Birth and marriage, i. 1.
 Lieut.-Governor of Hanover, 1.
Cambridge, H.R.H. George, Duke of—
 1819-1852.
 His tact and extreme fairness, Preface, vi-viii.
 Continental military opinion on, Preface, ix.
 Opinion of Emperor William I., Preface, ix.
 Immense nature of correspondence, Preface, xv.
 His instructions to the Editor, Preface, xiv.
 Strong dislike to a 'job,' Preface, vi-viii., i. 33.
 Birth, i. 1.
 Prospective successor to throne, 2.
 Early education, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
 Life at Windsor, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9.
 Life at Brighton, 2, 6, 7.
 His early diaries, 2-22.
 Attached Hanoverian Army, 11.
 Brevet-Colonel, 12.
 Visits Duke of Wellington, 13.
 General-Lieutenant, Hanover, 13.
 Visit to Portugal, 18.
 Arrives at Gibraltar, 18, 19.
 Attached 33rd Regiment, 20, 21.
 Visits Malta, 24.
 Attends Austrian Manœuvres, 24.
 Colonel 17th Lancers, 25.
 On Staff at Corfu, 26.
 Major-General, 26, 27.
 Commanding troops Limerick, 27.
 G.O.C. Dublin District, 27.
 Colonel of Hanoverian Regiment, 'Cambridge Dragoons,' 1852, 32.

1852

Inspecting General of Cavalry, 32.
 Observations on Home Army, 39, 45.
 Memo. on organisation of Cavalry, 53, 54, 55.
 Memo. on age of General Officers, 55-9.
 „ on camp at Chobham, 59, 60.
 Attends Prussian Manœuvres, 61.
 On death of Duke of Wellington, 61-2.
 Commands troops at funeral, 62.

1854.

Secret mission to Paris and Vienna before Crimean War, 64-8.
 Commands 1st Division, Crimea, 67.

Cambridge, H.R.H. George, Duke of—
Lands in Crimea, 67.
Alma, 68-73.
Balaclava, 75.
Inkermann, 77-82.

1855.

Invalided home, 85.

1856.

Attends Paris Conference, 89-93.
 Inspector-General of Infantry, 95.
 Appointed C.-in-C.: Queen's announcement, 97.
 Lord Panmure's letter, 99.
 General Order to Army, 99.
 Memo. on duties of military and civil Chiefs, 105-7.
 Takes up his new duties, 115.
 Correspondence with Lord Panmure, 118-9.
 Memo. on state of Army, 120-2.
 „ on education and public schools, 136-9.

1857.

Memo. on Aldershot, 124-6.
 „ on increase of Home Army, 127.
 „ on Staff and Staff College, 140-4.
 Evidence before Education Commission, 144.
 Garrison and regimental instruction, 145-6.
 Attitude towards Staff College, 146-7.
 Founder of Staff College, 147.
 Memo. on distribution of Army, 149.
 „ on Queen's troops in India, 150.
 Protests against not being informed *re* Indian affairs, 159-60.
 Memo. on situation in India, 164-6.
 „ supply in the field, 199.
 „ military schools, 200.
 Diary of Mutiny, 1857-9, 173-93.

1858.

Memo. on home distribution, 211-2.
 On Cape as a sanatorium, 213.
 On creation of 2nd battalions, 215.
 Value of Corfu, 220-1.

1858-1859.

Letters to Lord Clyde *re* 'White' Mutiny, 224, 231, 232, 241-2.
 Letter to the Queen, 239.
 Indian Staff Corps, 243.
 On Army of Reserve, 262-4.
 To Sir W. Mansfield, 246-7.
 „ „ *re* China, 253-4.

Cambridge, H.R.H. George, Duke of—
Diary of Chinese War, 255-7.
 „ Italian War of 1859, 307-11.
 Memo. on dépôt system, 265-7.
 „ dépôt battalions, 267-8.
 Deficiency of Army, 271-2.
 Volunteer organisation, 272-3.

1861.

Diary of threatened war with U.S.A., 316-9.

1862.

Promoted F.-M., 358.

1863.

On Aden, 366.
 Memo. for Lord de Grey, 282-6.
 On war of 1864, 286-8.

1864.

On recruiting, 289-290.

1866.

On reductions, 292-3.
 On Irish roster to Lord Russell, 294.
 Memo. to General Peel on short service, 297-9.

1867.

Diary of Abyssinian War, 334-6.

1868.

Controversy with Sir J. Pakington, 370-5.
 Memo. for Mr. Cardwell on Infantry establishments, 390-2.

1869.

Letter on Colonies, 394-6.
 Memo. on same, 396-9.
 Attitude towards Purchase, ii. 6.
 On Estimates, 1870-1, 23.

1870.

Diary of Franco-German War, 324-9.
 On reduction, 399-400.
 On a Chief of the Staff, 406-8.
 C.-in-C.'s position, 408-11.
 C.-in-C. and Secretary of State, 412-17.
 Control system, 421.
 War Office conferences, 426-7.
 Speaks in House of Lords on Army Enlistment Bill, ii. 30-1.

1871.

Military Secretaryship, i. 442.
 Letter to General Forster on subject, 445-6.

Cambridge, H.R.H. George, Duke of—
 Official letter to Mr. Cardwell, 452.
 Tribute to Sir R. Airey, 452-3.
 Government demands his support on
 Purchase question, ii. 9.
 Tenure of C.-in-C., 9.
 Attitude towards Purchase, 12, 13.
 Speaks on Purchase in House of
 Lords, 20-6.
 Opinion of officers, 25.
 Letter to Mr. Cardwell on a Reserve,
 34-5.
 Memo. on Imperial Defence, 35-6.
 „ on general functions of our
 armed forces, 36-44.
 Letter to Sir R. Airey on Autumn
 Manœuvres, 54.
 Report on Manœuvres, 55-9.

1872.
 Report on Manœuvres of 1872, 59-62.

1873.
 Creation of an Intelligence Branch,
 52.
 Diary of Ashantee War, 64-7.
 Letters to Sir Garnet Wolseley in
 Ashantee, 71, 72, 76, 78, 80, 81, 84,
 85, 86, 87.

1874.
 Letter to Mr. G. Hardy on recruiting,
 92-3.

1875.
 Memo. on state of Army and Reserve,
 96-100.

1876.
 Memo. to Secretary of State on re-
 quirements of service, 102-3.
 Memo. on Estimates, 1877-8, 105.
 Forecasts Defence Committee, 110-
 12.
 Promotion, 120-1.
 Letter to Sir R. Airey on his retire-
 ment, 123-4.

1877.
 Letter to the Queen on Territorial
 system, 202.

1878.
 Speaks at Fishmongers' Hall on
 Territorial system, 204-5.

1879.
 Protests against reduction, 127-8.
 Diary of wars in Afghanistan and
 South Africa, 1879-81, 131-44.

Cambridge, H.R.H. George, Duke of—
 Letters to Sir Bartle Frere and Lord
 Chelmsford *re* Prince Imperial,
 153-7.
 To Sir G. Wolseley on Zulu War,
 164-6.
 On selection, 173-4.
 On officers, 179-80.

1880.
 Letter on linked battalions to Sir
 H. Ponsonby, 214-5.
 To the Queen on same, 217-8.

1881.
 To Sir L. Smyth, 185-6.
 To Sir G. Colley, 188-9.
 To Sir E. Wood on death of Colley,
 194.
 To Mr. Childers on reduction, 218-
 20.
 On seniority *v.* selection, 222-3.
 Annual letter on Estimates, 1882-83,
 223-9.

1882.
 Situation in Egypt, 233-4.
 Diary Egyptian War, 235-8.
 Letters to Sir G. Wolseley *en route*
 to Egypt, 238-9, 241-2, 246-7, 251-3.
 Letter to Lord Hartington, 303, 310.

1883.
 Annual statement to Secretary of
 State, 316-9.

1884-5.
 Diary of Soudan Campaign, 259-62.
 Letter to Queen on subject, 263.
 Letters to Lord Wolseley on cam-
 paign, 266-9, 272-3, 275-6, 280-4, 293-
 6, 299-300.
 Annual statement to Secretary of
 State, 319-22.

1886.
 The mobilisation question, 242-5.

1887.
 Annual statement on Estimates,
 345-6.
 Military education, 246-7.
 Created Commander-in-Chief, 350.

1890.
 Memo. on Estimates, 368-9.

1891.
 Memo. on Estimates, 369-70.

Cambridge, H.R.H. George, Duke of—
1892.

Memo. on Estimates, 376-8.
1894.

The last annual letter, 386-90.
1895.

A target for attack, 390-92.

His knowledge of officers and Army,
393-4.

Letter to the Queen *re* resignation,
395.

Made first personal A.D.C. to the
Queen, 399.

Letter to Lord Wolseley, 401-2.

Farewell Order to Army, 408.

1896.

Memo. on Guards going to Gibraltar,
411-5.

Interest maintained in current mili-
tary affairs, 420-1.

1904.

His last illness and death, 426.

Cameron Highlanders, ii. 321, 333, 334.

Campbell, Sir Colin (Lord Clyde), i. 74.

Offered command in China, 151.

Raised to Peerage, 217.

On C.-in-C. in India, 214-20.

'White' Mutiny begins, 223-5.

Letters on subject, 226-38.

Resigns, 244.

Relations with Lord Canning, 250.

Letter on China command, 251.

Campbell-Bannerman, Rt. Hon. Sir
H. Vide Bannerman.

Canada, i. 258-9, 360-1.

H.R.H.'s memo. on, 397, 398, 399.

Canadian Defence, 358-60.

Canning, Lord, i. 250.

Cape—

H.R.H.'s opinion of its value, i. 395-6.

Memo. on, 397-9.

Carey Court-Martial, ii. 167-8.

Cardwell, Rt. Hon. E. (Lord), 63.

His policy, i. 114.

Becomes War Secretary, 387.

His aims, 388-9.

Reduction of establishment *v.* cadres,
392-3.

Letter to the Queen, 402-3.

War Office conferences, 426-31.

Tackles Purchase question, ii. 7.

Support demanded from Duke, 9.

Army Estimates, 1870-1, 27.

Passing men into the Reserve, 34.

Undue haste in carrying out
measures, 220.

Cardwell, Rt. Hon. E. (Lord).

Policy continued by Mr. Childers,
200.

Cavalry—

H.R.H. on organisation of 1853, i. 53,
54, 55; ii. 370.

Recommends Cavalry School, 389.

Cawnpore, massacre of, i. 169.

Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J.—

Letter to H.R.H. on Jameson Raid,
ii. 411.

Letter to H.R.H. on close of Great
Boer War, 425.

Chaplain-General. See 'Gleig' and
'Edgehill.'

Chaplains, ii. 389.

Chelmsford, General Lord. Vide The-
siger.

Chief of the Staff, i. 255, 407, 408.

His duties, ii. 355, 356, 358, 359, 360, 385.

Chief Staff Officer. See Chief of the
Staff.

Childers, Rt. Hon. H.—

Becomes War Secretary, ii. 199.

Proceeds with Cardwell scheme,
200-1.

Re Cardwell system, 209.

On linked battalions, 211-2, 220-1.

Becomes Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, 229.

China—

Trouble threatened in 1857, i. 150.

Diversion of force to India, 153.

Canton taken, 1858, 248.

Expedition again considered in 1860,
249.

Sir Hope Grant given command,
253.

China War, 250-60.

Chobham, camp at, 1853, i. 59, 60.

Churchill, Lord Randolph, ii. 335, 336,
338.

Clarendon, Earl of, i. 66, 92.

Clothing, ii. 370, 377.

Clyde, Lord. Vide Campbell.

Coaling Stations, ii. 370.

Colley, Major-General Sir G. P., ii.
182-4, 186, 187, 190.

His last letter, 191-2, 193.

Colonies—

Defence of, in 1853, i. 49.

Reduction of garrisons, 399.

Commanding-in-Chief—

Historical sketch of office, i. 100-14.

H.R.H.'s memo. on, 105, 106, 107.

H.R.H. selected, 99.

General Order on same, 99-100.

Takes up duties, 115.

- Commandership-in-Chief*, i. 94, 95.
 Method of appointment, 100.
 Relations with Secretary of War, 102.
 Debate in Commons, 108.
 Government and C.-in-C., 400-4.
 Its tenure, 431-4.
 Changes in status, ii. 350-1, 353.
 The Hartington Commission, 354-8.
 A Chief of the Staff, 355-6.
 Dual control, 420-1.
- Compulsory retirement*—
 Advocated by H.R.H., 1853, i. 57, 58.
 Mr. Hardy on, ii. 121.
- Connaught, H.R.H. the Duke of*—
 Commands Brigade in Egyptian War, ii. 234.
 Letter to H.R.H. describing Tel-el-Kebir, 250-1.
 Letter to the Queen on war, 255.
 Lord Wolseley's tribute, 248-9.
 The Aldershot command, 383.
- Consort, H.R.H. the Prince*. See Albert, H.R.H. Prince.
- Constantinople*—
 H.R.H. invalidated to, i.
 Convention of, ii. 113.
- Control System*, i. 419-25; ii. 119.
- Controller-in-Chief*, i. 409.
- Coomassie*, ii. 85-7.
- Corfu*—
 H.R.H. on Staff, i. 26.
 Retrocession of, 220.
- Cornwall, Lieut.-Colonel*—
 H.R.H.'s military governor, i. 11.
 Accompanies him to Gibraltar, 15, 17, 24.
- Crimean War*—
 Storm-clouds, i. 64.
 Evacuation of Principalities demanded, 64.
 Alma, 68-73.
 Balaklava, 74, 75.
 Inkermann, 77-82.
 End of War, 93.
 Sir E. Hamley's description, 93.
 Revisited by Lord Wolseley, ii. 383-5.
 Appendix I., 426-32.
- Curragh, H.R.H.'s memo. on Aldershot and the*, i. 124.
- Cyprus*, i. 221; ii. 114-118.

D

- Dalhousie, Lord*—
 Royal Commission on recruiting, ii. 31-2.
- Danish War*, i. 319.

- Davies, Lieut.-General H. F.*, ii. 379.
- Defence Committee*, ii. 35.
 Recommended by H.R.H., 111.
 'Democratize the Army,' 391.
- De Grey, Earl*. See Ripon, Marquis of.
- Depôts*, i. 47-8, 49, 50-4.
 General MacDougall's Committee, ii. 50-1, 52.
 H.R.H.'s memo., 1860, i. 265-8.
- Derby, Earl of* (Prime Minister)—
 On Parliamentary tactics, i. 108.
 Speaks in House of Lords, 109-10.
 Letter to the Queen, 110.
 Praises Army, 110.
- Desert Column*, the, ii. 278-92, 295.
- Diaries*—
 H.R.H.'s early, i. 2-16.
 At Gibraltar, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22.
 At Horse Guards, 94.
 Camp at Chobham, 59.
 Events in 1856, 96, 97, 98.
 (See Military Journals.)
- Discipline*, tampering with, ii. 424.
- Disraeli, Rt. Hon. B.* (Earl of Beaconsfield)—
 Chancellor of the Exchequer, i. 109.
 Resigns, 1868, 387.
 Returns to power, 1874, ii. 89.
 Conversation with H.R.H. on Egypt, 122.
 Policy grows unpopular, 199.
- Divisions*—
 Embodying of, in Home Army, i. 117-8.
- Dockyards and Arsenals*, i. 272.
- Drill, H.R.H.'s system at Dublin*, i. 32.
- Drill-Book, The*—
 Scarcity at Headquarters in 1851, i. 29.
- Dual Control*, ii. 420.
- Dublin District*—
 H.R.H.'s 'observations' on same, i. 31, 32.
- Dundas, General Sir David* (Commander-in-Chief)—
 His drill-book, i. 29.
 Controversy with Lord Palmerston, 102.

E

- East India Company*, i. 163, 203, 206, 207.
 Sir W. Mansfield's memo. on Indian service, 208-9.
 H.R.H. advocates amalgamation, 212.
- Eastern Crisis*, ii. 89-130.
- Edgehill, Rev. J. C.*, ii. 405-6.
- Edward VII., H.M. King*—
 Commands a Cavalry Brigade in 1871, ii. 58.

- Edward VII., H.M. King—*
 H.R.H.'s tribute to, 58.
 At Manœuvres of 1872, 59.
 Volunteers for active service in Egypt, 234.
 Letter to H.R.H. on retirement, 406.
Egypt, passage through, 1857, i. 160-1, 365, 366.
Egyptian Expedition, 1882, ii. 230-56.
Ellice, General Sir Charles—
 His Committee, ii. 212, 213, 215.
Engineers, Royal, ii. 387.
Esprit de Corps—
 The Duke an ardent believer in, Preface, xi.
 The spirit of emulation, i. 32; ii. 401.
 Its value, ii. 203.
 Linking, 206.
 The Queen's anxieties, 210.
 H.R.H. on, 215, 217, 224, 267.
Establishments—
 Remarkable diversity in, i. 48.
 Dangers of weak, ii. 225-8, 376.
Eugénie, H.I.M. the Empress—
 Appeal to allay criticism on death of Prince Imperial, ii. 157.

F

- Fashoda*, ii. 417-8.
Fenianism, i. 292, 293, 294.
Field Training, inaugurated in Dublin by H.R.H., i. 31-2; ii. 369, 376.
Financial Secretary to the War Office, ii. 350, 353, 354.
Foreign Legion, i. 164, 165.
 Objections to, 168.
Forster, Rt. Hon. H. O. Arnold—, ii. 207.
Forster, General W. F.—
 On Staff in Dublin, i. 27.
 Correspondence with H.R.H., 27, 29, 30, 88.
 Military Secretaryship, 445, 451-2.
Frere, Rt. Hon. Sir Bartle—
 Letters to H.R.H. on affairs at Cape, 1878, ii. 147-8.
 On Ulundi, 163-4.

G

- Gathorne Hardy, Rt. Hon.* (Earl of Cranbrook). *Vide Hardy.*
General Officers, H.R.H.'s memo. on age of, 1853, i. 55-58.
German helmets, the Queen on, ii. 126-7.
Gibraltar—
 Proposed cession, i. 376-82.
 H.R.H.'s strong disapproval, 377-8.
 A 'home' station, ii. 411.
 The Guards and, 411-5.

- Gipps, General Sir R.—*
 The Alma, i. 69.
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E.—
 Commissioner to Ionian Islands, i. 220.
 Correspondence with the Queen re Commander-in-Chief, 448-9.
Re War Office, ii. 11.
 Letter to H.R.H. on Purchase question, 14, 15.
 Letter to H.R.H. on voting in House of Lords, 19, 20.
 Dissolves in 1874, 89.
 Returns to power, 199.
 Defeat of his government, 1885, 322.
 Returns to power, 1892, 371.
 Forms administration, 372.
Gleig, Rev. G. R.—
 On Wellington, i. 35.
 Chaplain-General, 132.
 Letter to H.R.H. on education, 133.
 Farewell letter to H.R.H., ii. 434-5.
Godley, Mr. J. R. (Assistant Under-Secretary of State for War)—
 Memo. on recruiting, ii. 33, 220.
Gordon, Major-General Charles, ii. 258-9, 262, 264-5, 278-9, 280, 284, 288-9, 322.
Gough-Calthorpe, Lieut.-General Hon. S.—
 Account of Alma, i. 69.
 " Inkermann, 75, 76.
Graham, General Sir Gerald, ii. 298.
Grant, General Sir Hope—
 Given command in China, i. 253.
 On Volunteer Review, ii. 435.
Grenfell, General Lord, ii. 417-8.
Grey, Colonel Hon. C., i. 51, 52, 128, 411, 412.
 Advocates exchange of Gibraltar, 376.
Grove, Major-General Sir G. C., ii. 343.
Guards—
 Proposed augmentation, ii. 333.
 Proposed addition of Cameron Highlanders, 334.
 Grenadier, 365.
 Scots, 382.
 Service at Gibraltar, 411-5.
Gubat, battle of, ii. 283.

H

- Haines, F.-M. Sir F. P.—*
 Account of Inkermann, 77.
 On Sir Donald Stewart's March, ii. 438-9.
 On Maiwand, 440-1.
 On Sir F. Roberts's March, 441-2.
 On termination of March, 442.

- Hamley, General Sir E.*—
 Account of Alma, i. 69.
 Treaty of Paris, 93.
- Hampton, Lord.* See Pakington.
- Hardinge, F.-M. Viscount* (Commander-in-Chief), i. 63, 67, 86.
 His fatal illness, 96.
 Moved to London, 97.
 His farewell order to Army, 99.
 Letter to H.R.H. after the Alma, ii. 430-1.
- Hardy, Rt. Hon. Gathorne* (Earl of Cranbrook)—
 Becomes War Secretary, ii. 89.
 Letter to H.R.H., 91-2.
 On mobilisation, 104.
 On Sir R. Airey, 123.
 Raised to Peerage as Lord Cranbrook, 125.
 Becomes Secretary of State for India, 125.
- Hartington, Marquis of* (Duke of Devonshire)—
 Becomes War Secretary, i. 295, 385.
 On Egyptian War, 1882, ii. 257.
 On Soudan Campaign, 1884-5, 265.
 Becomes War Secretary again, 301-2.
 Letter to H.R.H. on drafts, 306-7.
 Farewell letter to H.R.H., 322-3.
 His Royal Commission, 254-8, 390, 391, 394.
- Havelock, General Sir H.*—
 Complimented by the Queen, i. 163.
- Herbert, Mr. Sidney* (Lord Herbert), i. 255, 258, 274, 383, 384.
- Hicks Pasha*, ii. 258-9.
- Highland Tartans*, the Queen on, 202, 203.
- Home Rule*, probable outcome, ii. 380.
- Horse Guards*, i. 403, 404, 417, 424, 439.
- Horse v. Field Artillery*, ii. 332.
- Hospitals*, ii. 377, 388.
- Household Cavalry*, ii. 242-3.

I

- Imperial Defence*—
 The conditions in 1853, i. 49.
- India*—
 Mutiny—revolt of native army, i. 152.
 Mutiny at Delhi, 153.
 China force diverted, 153.
 H.R.H.'s diary of the Indian Mutiny, 173-93.
 Capture of Delhi and relief of Lucknow, 211.
 Appendix I., ii. 432-3.

- Indian Staff Corps*—
 Advocated by H.R.H., i. 243.
- Inkermann*, battle of, i. 77-82.
 H.R.H.'s horse shot, ii. 431-2.
- Ionian Islands*, retrocession of, i. 220.
- Ireland*, state of affairs in, ii. 28.
- Irish, 18th Royal*, i. 117.
- Isandlwana*, ii. 133, 148.

J

- Journals, H.R.H.'s.* See Diaries and Military Journals.

K

- Keppel, Admiral Sir Harry*, i. 248.
- Kilworth Camp*, ii. 379.
- 'King's Army'*, the, ii. 394.
- Khartoum*—
 Fall of, i. 289-91.
 Captured, ii. 417, 418.
- Kitchener, General Viscount*—
 Educational scheme, i. 145-6.
 Soudan Expedition, ii. 300.
 Advance to Dongola, 415-6.
 Firket, 416-7.
 The Atbara, 417.
 Fashoda, 418.

L

- Lancers, 17th*—
 Armament of, considered 1834, i. 5.
 Farewell Order to, 32, 33.
- Land for field manoeuvres*, ii. 387.
- Lansdowne, Lord*, i. 114; ii. 400-1.
- Lawrence, Sir H.*—
 Realises gravity of situation in 1857, i. 153.
- Lewis, Rt. Hon. Sir G. C.*, i. 276, 277, 278, 358, 359, 364, 365.
- Linked battalions*, the germ, i. 47.
- Lucknow*, relief of, i. 170.
- Lugard, General Sir E.*, i. 255.
- Lyttelton-Annesley, Lieut.-General Sir A.*—
 The soldiers' feeling for H.R.H., Preface, ix.

M

- Magazine rifles*, H.R.H. advocates, ii. 349, 369.
- Majuba*, ii. 189, 192.
- Malta*—
 Visits, i. 24.
 Invalided to, 85.
- Manchester Regiment*, ii. 204.

Manœuvres—

- Camp at Chobham, 1853, i. 59, 60.
- H.R.H.'s wish for Manœuvres, ii. 53.
- Autumn Manœuvres of 1871, 53-9.
- Autumn Manœuvres of 1872, 59-62.
- Advocated again by H.R.H., ii. 346.
- Land for, ii. 387.
- Grant for, 389.

Mansfield, General Sir W. Vide Sandhurst.

Marchand, Major, ii. 417, 418.

Mary, Duchess of Teck, H.R.H. Princess—

- Telegram to H.R.H. on retirement, ii. 405.

Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Grand Duke of—
H.R.H.'s Letter to, ii. 428, 429.

Medal, Crimean, i. 86.

Medical Staff, ii. 370, 388, 389.

Military Attachés, i. 361, 362.

Military Education, i. 130-47.

- Director-General of, ii. 346, 347.

Military Journals, H.R.H.'s—

- Mutiny, i. 172-93.
- China, 255-7.
- Austria and France, 1859, 307-11.
- The Trent affair, 1861, 316-9.
- Franco-German War, 324-9.
- Ashantee War, ii. 64-7.
- Afghanistan and South Africa, 131-44.

- Egyptian Expedition, 1882, 235-8.

- Soudan Campaigns, 259-62.

Military Schools, i. 200-2.

Military Secretary, i. 435-7.

Militia—

- Wellington's appeal for, i. 36.
- Embodied, 129.
- During Mutiny, 153-4, 167.
- Too soon disembodied, 213.
- Militia Reserve Act, ii. 32, 101, 390.
- Paucity of officers, 377, 389.
- Incomplete units, 389.

Minié rifle, i. 63.

Mobilisation—

- H.R.H.'s views, ii. 94-7.
- Value during South African War, 1899-1892, 96.
- Stores, ii. 377.

Moncrieff, General George, i. 68, 81, 84.

Morley, Earl of, ii. 199, 301.

Mounted Infantry, H.R.H. on, ii. 302.

Musket, smooth-bore, i. 63.

Mutiny, Indian. Vide India—
'White,' i. 223.

N

Napier of Magdala, Lord—

- Sketch of early career, i. 331-2.
- On Gymnasia, 332.
- Abyssinian Expedition, 332-3.
- His plan of campaign, 337-8.
- Advances on Magdala, 343.
- Fall of Magdala, 345-6.
- Raised to Peerage, 349.
- Cost of campaign, 349-51.
- On corporal punishment, 352-3.
- On Aden, 367.

- Becomes C.-in-C. in India, ii. 119.

Napoleon III., H.I.M. the Emperor, i. 65, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93.

- Suez route, 163.

- Offers supplies for Mutiny Campaign, 164.

- Attempt on his life by Orsini, 269.

- Letter from Queen to, ii. 427.

Necessaries, soldier's, ii. 370.

New Zealand War, i. 330.

Nightingale, Miss Florence—

- Letter to H.R.H. on his retirement, ii. 402-3.

Northbrook, Earl of—

- Appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary for War, i. 389.

- His committee on War Office, 390.

- Its work, 403-5.

- Third part of report issued, 418-9.

- Letter to H.R.H., 419.

- Purchase Bill in House of Lords, ii. 20.

- Army Enlistment Act, 31.

Numbers, regimental, ii. 370.

O

Officers, Regimental—

- H.R.H.'s high eulogium of, Preface, xiii.

- Lack of, ii. 25, 321.

Omar Pasha, Letter to H.R.H., ii. 428.

Orange Free State, unfriendliness, 1881, ii. 194, 197.

Order, H.R.H.'s farewell, to Army, ii. 408.

Ordnance Board—

- Its responsibilities, i. 104.

- Its Parliamentary representatives, 105.

Organisation—

- Want of Army, i. 38.

- H.R.H.'s first memorandum on, i. 39.

- Incomplete, ii. 389.

Outpost duties, practised by H.R.H. at Dublin, 1851, i. 32.

Outram, General Sir James—

Victory over Persians at Kooshab, i. 149.

Withdrawal of his force, 150.

P

Pakington, Rt. Hon. Sir John (Lord Hampton), i. 370.

Horse Guards *versus* War Office, 371-6.

Farewell letter to H.R.H., 386.

Palmer, Sir R. (Earl of Selborne), ii. 26.

Palmerston, Viscount, i. 82, 99, 102, 157, 161-2, 205, 206, 210, 258, 259, 357, 358; ii. 5.

Pall Mall v. Whitehall, i. 403, 404, 411-417.

Panmure, Lord (Earl of Dalhousie)—

Becomes War Secretary, i. 86, 87.

Views on his position, 116.

On Indian Mutiny, 166-7.

Re embodying Militia, 167-8.

On recruiting, 169.

On relations with France, 269.

On Purchase question, ii. 13, 14.

Paris, Conference, i. 88, 89, 90, 91, 92.

Treaty of, 93.

Pay and Good Conduct Pay—

Alterations in, 1860, 1867, 1870, 1873, 1876, Preface, x.

'Peace' in Transvaal, ii. 192-4.

Peel, Sir R., i. 35.

Peel, General—

Becomes Secretary of State, i. 210.

Indian Army, i. 218-9.

Reserve for the Army, 300-5.

Farewell letter to H.R.H., 383.

Pendjeh incident, ii. 298.

Pennefather, Sir John, General, i. 77, 152.

Pensioners, employment of, ii. 377.

Persia—

Difficulties with, 1856, i. 148.

Lord Panmure's views, 149.

Persian War, 148-9.

Ponsonby, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry, i. 449; ii. 44, 109, 110, 152, 213-5, 217, 356, 370.

Potchefstroom, ii. 183.

Pretoria, ii. 169, 170, 171.

Prince Imperial, H.I.H. the—

Volunteers for service in Zululand, ii. 153.

Death during a reconnaissance, 155-7.

His love for England, 158.

The Empress Eugénie's appeal, 157.

Public men, attacks on, ii. 392.

Purchase System—

Origin, ii. 1.

Promotion under system, 2.

Royal warrant of Charles II., 2.

Royal warrant of Queen Anne, 3.

Tariff of prices, 3.

Over-regulation price, 4-6.

Advantages of system, 5.

H.R.H.'s attitude, 6, 7.

Correspondence between H.R.H. and

Mr. Cardwell, 6-14.

Mr. Gladstone's views, 14-19.

H.R.H.'s speech in House of Lords, 20-6.

Q

Quartermaster-Generalship—

Difficulty in finding suitable occupants, i. 367-8.

Importance of its efficiency, 406.

Its functions, 421.

Queen's Birthday, Ireland, 1893, ii. 382.

R

Raglan, F.-M. Lord, i. 64, 65, 67, 75, 85, 87.

Ranges, ii. 369, 377, 386, 387.

Recruiting—

Difficulties in 1864, ii. 289.

Impasse, ii. 390.

Regimental Officers—

H.R.H.'s high eulogium, Preface, xiii.

Regimental Transport—

H.R.H. on, ii. 305.

Regulation of Forces Act, 1871, ii. 33-4.

Remounts, ii. 377, 389.

Reserve—

Wellington's views, i. 36.

For India, i. 128.

Reserve Acts, ii. 31, 32.

Army Reserve Act, 1867, 32, 93, 94.

Reserve called out, 1877, 113.

Reserve Force—

Advocated by H.R.H., i. 127.

Memo. to General Peel, 297.

Correspondence on, 300-5.

Retribution, H.M.S., narrow escape of, i. 83, 84.

Reynardson, Brigadier - General—

H.R.H.'s letter to, i. 81.

Richmond, Duke of, ii. 13, 20.

Rifle Brigade, i. 14; ii. 204, 382.

Rifles—

Not generally adopted till 1854, i. 63.

Minié, i. 63; ii. 81 n.

- Ripon, Marquis of* (Earl de Grey)—
 Becomes War Secretary, i. 282.
 On recruiting, 288.
 On reduction, 291.
 Farewell letter to H.R.H., 384.
- Roberts, F.-M. Earl*—
 Commander-in-Chief, i. 114.
 Afghanistan, ii. 130-3, 135, 138, 141-4.
 Sent to South Africa after Majuba,
 ii. 193.
 Offered Q.M.G.-ship, 229.
 Proposal to make A.G., 358.
 Letter on A.G.-ship, 374-5.
 Letters from South Africa during
 Boer War, 423, 424.
 His force in Kurum Valley, 437.
 His famous march, 440-2.
 Action with Ayoub Khan, 442-3.
 Letter to H.R.H., 443.
- Rorke's Drift*, ii. 134.
- Rose, General Sir H. Vide* Strathnairn.
- Russell, Earl of* (Prime Minister)—
Re Irish roster, i. 293-4.
Re Canada, 294.
 Military attachés, 361.
- Russell, General Sir Baker*, ii. 174, 175,
 297.
- Russia*—
 Crimean War, i. 61-94.
 Progress in Eastern Asia, ii. 100.
 Declaration of war against Turkey,
 112.
 Treaty of San Stefano, 113.
 Convention of Constantinople, 113.
 Treaty of Berlin, 118-9.
- S
- Salisbury, Marquis of*, returns to
 power, ii. 327.
- Sandhurst, General Lord*—
 Memo. on H.E.I.C.'s troops, i. 208-9.
 On White Mutiny in India, 236-8.
 Amalgamation of Imperial and Local
 armies, 245.
Re China War, 250-1.
 Protest to Governor-General, 252-3.
 Becomes C.-in-C. in India, 269.
 Motion in House of Lords, ii. 9-12, 391-2.
- Sandhurst College*, i. 142.
 H.R.H. recommends longer course of
 study, ii. 369.
- Sanitary Services*, ii. 388.
- San Stefano*, Treaty of, ii. 113.
- Scandals*, H.R.H. on Army, ii. 421.
- Scarlett, General Sir J. Yorke*—
 His command at Aldershot, i. 421.
- Schools*, Army, 201-2.
- Schools of Instruction*, Gunnery, i. 200.
- Schoolmasters*, Army, i. 200-1.
 H.R.H.'s views, 202.
- Scots Greys*, ii. 382.
- Scots Guards*, ii. 382.
- Sebastopol*, fall of, i. 87, 88.
- Secretary at War*, i. 102.
 His responsibility, 103-4.
 His work, 403, 416.
- Secretary of State for War*—
 His responsibilities and history of
 his office, i. 104-5.
 Duties undefined, 108.
 Seals and letters patent, 111.
 Case of Sir G. Lewis, 112.
 Position discussed, 412-7.
 Dual control, 420-1.
- Sekukuni*, expedition against, ii. 171-5.
- Selection Board*, ii. 360.
- Seymour, Admiral Sir Beuuchamp*
 (Lord Alcester), ii. 240, 255-6, 259.
- Seymour, Admiral Sir Michael*, i. 248.
- Shoulder-straps*, ii. 370.
- Smith, Rt. Hon. W. H.*, ii. 324-5, 327,
 328, 329, 330, 335, 336, 337, 338.
- Smyth, General Sir Leicester*, ii. 182,
 183, 185, 187.
 Stormy forebodings, 192, 193, 194,
 195-8.
- Soldier's dress*—
 Lord Palmerston, i. 367.
 'Soldier's Friend,' H.R.H. the, Preface,
 ix.
 Improvements in pay, Preface, x.
 Against barrack damages, Preface,
 xi.
 More liberal scale of clothing, Pre-
 face, xi.
 An appeal from the ranks, 1848, i. 28.
- Soudan Campaign*, 1884-5, ii. 258-300.
 Reconquered, 415.
- Staff, Chief of the*, i. 255, 407, 408.
 His duties, ii. 353, 355, 356, 358, 359,
 360.
- Staff College*, H.R.H. and the, i. 139,
 140, 144, 146, 147.
- Staff Corps*, Indian, i. 222.
- Stanhope, Rt. Hon. E.*—
 Becomes War Secretary, ii. 338.
 His career, 338-9.
 On reduction of R.A., 334-41.
 The famous memo., 342-5.
 On military education, 346-7.
 On Aldershot command, 348.
 War Office changes, 351-3.
 Hartington Commission, 356-7.
 On A.G.-ship, 358-60.
 On Wantage Commission, 371.
 Farewell letter to H.R.H., 371-2.

Stanley, Colonel Hon. F. (Earl of Derby)—
 Financial Secretary to War Office, ii. 89-90.
 Letter to H.R.H., 90-1.
 Proceeds to Cyprus, 114.
 Becomes War Secretary, 125.
 Intimacy with H.R.H., 129-30.
Stephenson, General Sir F., ii. 264-5.
Stewart, F.-M. Sir Donald, ii. 437-44.
Stewart, General Sir Herbert, ii. 278, 279, 281, 282, 283.
Stores, deficiency of, ii. 349.
Storks, General Sir H., i. 422-4, 425; ii. 119.
Storm, at Balaclava, i. 83, 84.
Strathnairn, F.-M. Lord—
 Appointed C.-in-C. in India, i. 244.
 On French defeats, 1870, 332.
 Committee on army transport, 419-20.
Strelitz. See Mecklenburg, Grand Duke of.
Striking Force, a lack of, ii. 101, 419.
Suez route, first considered, i. 160, 161, 162, 163, 365, 366, 367.
Suez Canal, occupation of, ii. 239.

T

Tactical training, defective, ii. 378, 379.
Taku Forts, i. 256.
 Feu-de-joie, 258-9.
Teb and Tamai, ii. 263-5.
Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, ii. 241-56.
Territorial System, i. 45; ii. 199-230.
Thesiger, General Hon. F. (Lord Chelmsford), ii. 145, 146, 148, 159.
Thompson, Sir Ralph, ii. 337-43.
Transports, ii. 389.
Trent affair, the, i. 313-6.
Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. Sir G. O., his indiscretion, i. 403.
Troopships, ii. 389.
Turkish Empire—
 Insurrection, 1875, ii. 93.
 Bulgarian rebellion, 100-1.
 War with Russia, 112.
 Treaty of San Stefano, 113.

U

Ulster, feeling in, ii. 380, 381.
Umdut, battle of, ii. 159-66.
Uniforms—
 Lord Palmerston on the subject, i. 357-8.

Uniforms—

The Queen on the subject, ii. 126.

V

Van Straubenzee, Major-General, i. 248.
Veterans, messages to H.R.H. on retirement—
 Shropshire, ii. 407.
 Bristol, 408.
 Yorkshire, 408.
Veterinary Department, ii. 370.
Victoria, H.M. Queen—
 Coronation, i. 14, 15.
 Visits Aldershot, 97.
 Letters on Captain Vivian's motion, 109, 111.
 On H.R.H.'s first General Order, 116-7.
 On outbreak of Indian Mutiny, 154-5.
 On Sir Colin and Lucknow, 170-1.
 On beards in the Army, 199.
 Writes to Lord Derby on creation of a foreign legion, 1858, 215-6.
 End of Mutiny, 222.
 On 'White' Mutiny in India, 238.
 Letter to Mr. Cardwell, 401-2.
 Letter to Mr. Gladstone on Army, 448-9.
 Signs Royal Warrant abolishing Purchase, ii. 26.
 On changes in uniform, 126.
 On state of Army, 153.
 On death of Prince Imperial, 154.
 On Carey Court-Martial, 168.
 On Territorial system, 201-2.
 To Mr. Childers on regimental numbers, 216.
 Telegram on close of Egyptian War, 246.
 Letter on same, 254-6.
 On victory of El Teb, 269.
 On death of Gordon, 290.
 On Hartington Commission, 356.
 On Regimental numbers, 370.
 On H.R.H.'s retirement, 395, 404, 405.
 Letter to Napoleon III., 427.
 Letter re Sir Colin Campbell, 432.
Vienna, H.R.H.'s secret mission to 1854, i. 65.
Vivian, Captain, i. 108, 111.
Volunteers, H.R.H.'s memo. on, i. 272-3; 267, 272, 273, 274, 275, 398; ii. 378, 390, 435, 436.
 H.R.H. against payment, i. 276-7.
Volunteer Reviews, i. 274; ii. 435.

W

- Waldersee, Count*, ii. 362.
Wales, H.R.H. the Prince. See Edward VII., H.M. King.
Wantage Committee, ii. 370-1.
Wars—
 Crimean, i. 61-93.
 Persia, 148, 149.
 Indian Mutiny, 150-97.
 Italian War of 1859, 307-11.
 China, 248-60.
 New Zealand, 330-1.
 American War of Secession, 311-9.
 Austro-Prussian, 211, 319.
 Abyssinian, 331-52.
 Franco-German, 321-9.
 Ashanti, ii. 63-88.
 Russo-Turkish, 113-4.
 Zulu, Afghan, and Boer Wars, 131-98.
 Egypt, 1882, 229-57.
 Soudan, 1884-5, 258-300.
War Committee, i. 316.
War Office, i. 113, 403, 404, 410, 411, 426-40.
 Organisation defective, ii. 378.
War Office Council, i. 426, 429, 430.
War Office meetings, i. 410; ii. 357.
War preparation, ii. 342, 343.
Warren, General Sir Charles, ii. 323-4.
Wellington, Duke of—
 Reviews Guards, i. 13.
 Alleged neglect of the Army in peace time, 34, 35, 36, 37.
 His famous letter to Sir J. Burgoyne, 36.
 His last great speech, 36.
 Death, 37, 61, 62.
 H.R.H.'s letter on subject, 61-2.
 Views on Purchase, ii. 5.
Whitehall and Pall Mall, i. 403, 404, 411-7.
'White' Mutiny, i. 222.
William IV., H.M. King—
 Death and funeral, i. 11.
William II., H.I.M., the German Emperor—
 Tribute to H.R.H., Preface, ix.
 Letter to H.R.H. on retirement, ii. 402.

- Wilson, Major-General Sir C.*, ii. 285, 296, 297.
Wolseley, F.-M. Viscount—
 Becomes C.-in-C., i. 113.
 On Ashanti War, ii. 63.
 On composite corps, 63-4.
 Letters to H.R.H. from Ashanti, 68-88.
 Given command in South Africa, 138.
 Expedition against Sekukuni, 171-2.
 On officers, 178, 179.
 Becomes A.G., 229.
 Egyptian Expedition, 1882, 253.
 Draft of arrangement between Army and Navy for seizing Ismailia, 239-40.
 Letters to H.R.H. on War, 240-3, 248-50, 255.
 Letters to H.R.H. on Soudan Campaign, 266-8, 270-4, 278-80, 292, 297.
 On selecting staff-officers, 273-4.
 Memo. on state of Army, 310-5.
 Minute on war preparation, 343-5.
 Aldershot command, 348.
 Command in Ireland, 362.
 Letters to H.R.H. on Ireland, 363-8.
 Selected as C.-in-C., 399.
 Writes to H.R.H. on subject, 401.
 On South African War, 421-2.
 Last letter to H.R.H., 426.
Wood, F.-M. Sir Evelyn, ii. 137, 146, 152, 162, 193, 194, 195, 196, 256, 271, 348.
Wood, Canon, i. 2, 3, 4, 5, 12.
Woodford, General Sir A., i. 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25.

Y

- Yeomanry*, ii. 363, 364, 378.

Z

- Zulu War*, ii. 131-49, 145-81.

